Foreign Affairs Committee on Nov. 2nd, 2010

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you.

I'll just ask for a quick response, then we're going to move back to this side for questions.

[Mark Simmons]

Okay.

I would add to what Dr. Elsadig said, particularly relating to South Kordofan and eastern Sudan.

In South Kordofan, a recent survey we did of 1,000 villages gave a figure of around one-third that didn't have enough food for one meal a day. In the east, the figure is around one-half. So that's quite significantly food insecure.

South Kordofan has no permanent watercourse, so it's very dependent on seasonal rains, and that also makes food security very problematic.

We have a long hunger gap in Sudan, usually from January. It depends on the rains; next year it will be a bit later. Maybe it will start in February or March and go until July, when really nothing grows. It's very hard to feed people, especially in that time.

That's relevant especially in the light of the referendum and what will happen after that.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you, Mr. Goldring.

We're going to move back over here to Mr. Dewar. Sir, you have seven minutes.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to our guests, particularly Mr. Simmons for his determination to get here today. I appreciate that.

I'm just hearing as of today that there was a resignation of the south Sudanese representative as a commissioner for the referendum. Basically he was pushing to have a delay in the referendum. We have the Abyei process, which we have discussed, which went off the tracks before we even got started, in terms of delay. The White House was involved in trying to push that along.

Nonetheless, most people are asserting in the case of the referendum that it will go ahead. When we have commissioners resign—I think it was yesterday, the resignation of the commissioner—I'm concerned. If we don't have a referendum going ahead because they're not prepared or there is some involvement from other parties to obstruct it, I'm concerned that we'll have conflict again, frankly.

Maybe I'll ask Mr. Simmons, first. What's your take on the referendum itself? Is it something Canada can help with, or is it something they're just going to have to untangle themselves? In light of yesterday's resignation, what's your read on what's happening with the referendum?

[Mark Simmons]

My read would be that the people who are prepared to say that something could go wrong are not well tolerated. Immediately after the resignation yesterday morning came a law from the southern Sudanese government detailing the dates of the registration period and the referendum period that are extremely optimistic.

You have a population in the south of somewhere between 8 million and 16 million. That's already problematic; I would probably suggest it's somewhere between 10.5 million and 12 million. Sudan as a whole is the size of Quebec and Ontario combined. Southern Sudan, which is the Ontario equivalent in size terms, has possibly as much as 100 kilometres of paved road. How on earth are you going to do a registration of voters there, and in Canada, and in Ethiopia, and in the U.S., and in the U.K., and in northern Sudan, in six days, which has now been extended to 17 days? Even so, how realistic is that, and how realistic then is a referendum in six days, from January 9 to January 15?

I think one thing, and it relates to some of the comments my colleagues have brought up earlier, is the very limited way in which the National Congress Party in the north and the SPLM actually represent the people. So they've certainly come to a point where the SPLM hasn't done any kind of voter education, or any kind of public information, or any kind of managing of expectations.

When you talk to ordinary men on the street in the south, they think that on January 10, 2011, the Arab occupation will have ceased. There's this massive expectation for wholesale change without really being able to clarify what that change would bring, how it would make things different on the ground. Because there's been no management of expectations and because the SPLM realizes it's going to have to become more accountable if it loses the north--it's not going to have that common enemy that keeps it together in the same way--it's going to have to become more accountable to citizens, especially in the margins of the country. It can only do that by forcing the referendum to be on time.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

With Abyei, and you were touching on it, what I'm reading from afar is that they're looking at negotiating this so that the sanctions the U.S. has placed would be lifted, that the south would guarantee revenue sharing, and there'd be access to grazing for those tribes that are nomadic; I guess those are the Misseriya peoples. So I guess that one is simply left.

If that can work, fine, it's a negotiated settlement. I give Mbeki a star for taking on the job, but I'm not sure I'd want it. Again, if that's the deal, is there anything Canada can do in that, or should that be left to...? Well, what I described sounds like what the option is, but is it realistic?

[Mark Simmons]

I have to say that we wish Canada would be a little bit more involved than your southern colleagues, or that your colleagues directly to the south would sometimes be a little less involved in some of these things, because their involvement is not always very helpful. I would have thought that Canada, with its particular history and circumstances, has quite a lot to offer the Sudanese people. I think examples are very useful of how states can work in a federation and a confederation and so on, but maybe the time for that has already passed.

One of the challenges in Abyei is the extent to which the Misseriya will feel that they've been sold out by the government. There have been Misseriya groups joining JEM, for example, in fighting the Riziegat, who are seen to be more pro-government, so there's a lot of tension there. It's not clear that the Misseriya will really feel that the government, the north, adequately represents them.

In terms of Canada's role, it's hard to know how best you can incentivize people to make the right decisions. None of this is particularly complicated if there were the political will to implement it.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Yes, and I think with respect to negotiating we've been there before, in terms of north-south. Granted, the CPA is lacking for recent attention, but Canada had a role there.

I guess we're looking for specific recommendations. Please--not today, as you ponder this--send them to the committee. We're going to be doing a report with recommendations to the government, so keep that in mind.

I see Mr. Dean wanting to speak, so I'll stop.

[Prof. James Dean]

Well, I mean, this touches on the question of a niche role for Canada, independent of the U.S.

I was struck by your remarks on the role of the U.S. The U.S. was instrumental in engineering the CPA, and you said that it was a bad thing, that it should have been engineered on a multilateral basis. You hinted that perhaps it wasn't in the interest of Africa as a whole for separation to occur in a large country within Africa. Certainly Mbeki himself is on record as saying that he wants unity, because most African countries, not all of them, but most, don't want to set that precedent.

Are you saying that the U.S. has played a counterproductive role by actively encouraging the separation? The sub-question is whether you think independence for the south is going to be dysfunctional.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

He's asking your question.

[Prof. James Dean]

Is it going to be dysfunctional for...?

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

We have the witnesses asking questions now.

[Prof. James Dean]

Is separation of the south from the north going to be dysfunctional in the long run for the country of Sudan, and in particular, for the south? And second, is it going to be dysfunctional for Africa as a whole? Has the U.S. played a role, has it wrongly played a role, in encouraging the separation? If that's true, should Canada then go in and support unity?

[Elsadig Abunafeesa]

Thank you. That's an important thing to raise.

First of all, the conclusion in the minds of most Sudanese is that the United States' policy, the international policy of the United States in many places or several places, causes havoc. Working in the United Nations and in the field, I saw that for some policies of the United States, maybe the intention was good, but the application and implementation were wrong. My point is that with regard to the CPA itself, if you read it carefully and fairly, you will find that already the secession was signed on that day in 2005.

Once our brothers in the south signed the CPA, they were already working for secession. Now the national anthem in the south is ready and it has been given voice. Nobody could go to the south and say that the people of the south are working for unity. Even the people in the north know and the government itself knows that. My point of view is that the U.S. was working for secession. That was very clear to me from the manoeuvres, from the CPA, and so on.

Of course, that secession is a right for the people of the south to have. But if it is planned in an international forum in a way that.... If there was some kind of transparency, some kind of national administration for it in one way or another, that might be tolerated. But I think the way the United States has involved itself in this CPA and in the implementation of it, although the government in the north carried out its policy toward implementation very badly indeed....

Here I have to inject something. It was very surprising to me that Canada lost the seat for the chairmanship of the Security Council. That was a disaster, because as a UN staff member throughout, I'm very familiar with the role of Canada. Canada is a country for peace development, peace-building, economic development, and human rights, and there's no reason for Canada to lose that seat now unless there are things that went wrong with regard to this issue.

Therefore, it is too late now, in my view, for playing a role. Let things go, because the south is going to separate. Let things go. Then there will be a role for Canada in the relations between the two states. I think that is a big issue. Something will need to be done.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

I just have a quick question on the UNMIS, the United Nations Mission in the Sudan.

There is a concern because the north is saying no. The south wants the protection of the border. Is there any resolve on that? I don't want a long answer. The south said they will welcome additional peacekeepers. Many people are concerned about security on the border. The north's saying no. Do you see any resolution of that?

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

A quick response, please.

[Elsadig Abunafeesa]

I think there has to be international pressure. The government in Sudan is weak, by the way; it is not that strong. I know it very well, and they are weak. I think there has to be international pressure, and specifically if the UN comes to the front line with regard to peacekeeping. That's their role. The United Nations should come in the front line, not to have the U.S. present it. I think here is Canada, there is a role for Canada to play to put the UN in the front line, and then the Sudan government might not actually be in a position to reject that. Because according to the charter, the UN could have a more vigorous and stronger level of action in things that might threaten the peace in that area.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

So that would be a recommendation from you. Very good.

[Elsadig Abunafeesa]

My recommendation is that, yes.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Thank you--duly noted.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you.

Mr. Van Kesteren.

[Dave Van Kesteren, Conservative, Chatham-Kent—Essex, ON]

Thanks, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Dean, my colleague who has left just wanted me to say that she too is an economist and a musician, so she shares much in common with you.

I have a few questions, but I don't know if I want to jump into this fray. It was an interesting dialogue between the two of you, and I share that too. I'm reluctant even to go here. I don't know, maybe I'll just make a comment and say that much as we may criticize the United States, what has filled the vacuum is, at very best, no better, and I think, when I look at the implications for the future, far worse. When I see what's happening to the oil fields, how they're being exploited, and how land is being sold, and to where it's being sold, I shudder.

I would also say that as far as reasons why we should be in here are concerned, I can think of no other reason than humanitarian. There comes a point, though, that as a country you start to ask yourself, is there any solution? I hope and I pray that there is a solution, but it gets to the point where you think, what a quagmire.

That being said, I've got a couple of questions. Maybe somebody wants to make a comment on that. I just figured I had to get it off my chest, because the more I hear this, the more, quite frankly, I despair.

Mr. Dean, how is the currency established, the value of the currency? I would imagine that's done by the world just by trade. And these are my colleague's questions: Is there a willingness to share debt? Are they looking for debt relief? What steps is the government—I suppose she meant the government in south Sudan—preparing for governance?

So first of all, how's the currency established, the value of the currency?

[Prof. James Dean]

We've drawn up a design for the currency, but it can't legally be implemented until May 2011. There is a body of thought within the Bank of Southern Sudan that they should print and circulate the currency immediately, because there's a paranoid fear that the south will cease accepting the old currency, or, even worse, that the south will reintroduce the old Sudanese dinar, which they used until 2007. There are these rumours that they didn't really burn the old currency, but it's up there in the vaults in Khartoum. I think that's very far-fetched, but there's a real possibility that they would stop accepting payments in Sudanese pounds from the south.

To establish a new currency that is convertible into foreign currency, people have to believe that it can be converted on demand into foreign currency--i.e., effectively, U.S. dollars. When I arrived in Sudan, in the Bank of Southern Sudan they had deposits in foreign banks, mostly in Kenya, of 500 million. They now have 400 million because in early July we discovered that the north had begun to pay us for the south's oil. Khartoum was paying the Bank of Southern Sudan 100 million Euros a month, and in July we instead got 100 million euros worth of soft currency, the Sudanese pound, which can't be spent abroad. So we lost, essentially, $100 million before that was sorted out.

Anyway, the currency issue is far from sorted out.

What was the second question?

[Dave Van Kesteren, Conservative, Chatham-Kent—Essex, ON]

Is there a willingness to share debt?

[Prof. James Dean]

Yes. The debt was contracted by Khartoum and an awful lot of it hasn't been paid for 30 years. So because of accumulated interest, they owe an enormous amount. They're one of the few countries in the world that has a long-term outstanding debt to the IMF.

But they have two other kinds of recently contracted debt. One debt is to the Chinese for drilling the wells and building the pipeline, and they regularly make payments to those; otherwise the Chinese will stop working. So they're very regular on their payments to the Chinese and also to the Middle East, particularly the Saudi Arabians. The rest of it is seriously in arrears.

And frankly, I'm a big advocate of debt relief, even for evil governments such as Khartoum. I expect that one of the incentives the White House is putting out right now is to say we'll support you on a Paris Club and other negotiation to relieve you of the debt. I think it would be apocryphal if the south was expected to come onside to pay back that debt.