It's my pleasure, Mr. Chairman, and members.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the House of Commons of Canada's Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.
Following the outbreak of the Syrian uprising in March 2011, I've had multiple opportunities to speak with members of Canada's government, the diplomatic corps, intelligence services, and military, either in Ottawa, at the Halifax security forum, or in Washington, on what I think the previous testimony has shown can only be now described as Syria's meltdown.
While a long-term resident in Damascus as well, I met often with Canadian diplomats who were very concerned with Middle Eastern and national security issues. As much as I liked all those meetings, the real reason I'm with you today is that Canada has remained a stalwart ally of the United States in a rapidly changing world in which there are no easy answers to foreign policy dilemmas which have already been outlined here today.
The rapidly deteriorating situation in Syria now represents not only the biggest humanitarian crisis in a generation, but also the most complex in terms of short- and long-term security challenges. The effort by President Bashar al-Assad's regime to shoot its way out of what started as peaceful protests demanding reform has set off a bloody civil war in which more than 130,000 people have been killed, between a third and a half of Syria's population of 23 million has been displaced, and what remains on paper as the Syrian Arab Republic has been divided into three complex entities in which terrorist organizations are not only present but ascendant in each area.
In the western part of Syria, the minority-dominated Assad regime is holding on, not only through using the full lethality of its arsenal, including poison gas and scud missiles, but also through the direct aid and coordination with U.S.-designated terrorist organizations. These include Iranian-backed Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and a number of Shiite militias from as far away as Iraq and Afghanistan.
In the majority Sunni-dominated centre, al-Qaeda affiliates such as Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant have grown in response to the regime's slaughter, the presence of Iranian-backed forces, and perceived international inaction to stop the slaughter, particularly the U.S. decision to put off, at least until now, punitive strikes against the Assad regime for its assessed use of chemical weapons against Syrian civilians.
Last but not least, in Syria's northeast, the Democratic Union Party, PYD, the Syrian affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, PKK, dominates those areas.
The longer the war has gone on, the more bloody and sectarian it has become, particularly between Alawites and other minority factions that dominate the regime and Sunnis who dominate the opposition. Here I'm speaking in broad brush strokes, not specifics.
Extensive Sunni-Kurdish tensions and violence have grown as well, particularly in tandem with the growth of al-Qaeda factions in Syria's centre and northeast. Syria's Christian population has very much been caught in the middle, fearful of extremist elements among the Syrian Sunni-dominated opposition, all the while knowing that seeking security from the brutal Assad regime is not in keeping with its long-term interests in the Middle East in terms of survival, let alone the teachings of Jesus Christ. As a student of his words and the values they inspired, I share their concerns and fully appreciate their dilemmas and the dilemmas that they'll continue to face.
Sectarianism has grown with the help of each group's regional backers, with Shiite-dominated Iran supporting the Assad regime and Shiite-based forces on the one side, and the Sunni Arab Gulf and North African countries standing on the side of the opposition. Assistance has included donations from governments as well as individuals in these countries and the flow of assistance has been haphazard, which has helped fuel extremism on both sides.
In many ways, the battle for the future of the Middle East between Iran and the Arab countries is being waged in the streets, mountains, and fields of Syria, but these are not the only regional interests at stake. Turkey and the Kurds are also vying for power and influence in Syria. Globally, Russia continues to support the Assad regime with weapons and the west supports moderate factions of the opposition overtly with non-lethal assistance and covertly with small weapons and training.
Las Vegas rules don't apply in Syria: what happens there doesn't stay there. We don't see that so far, and I don't expect it will change any time soon.
Syria's primary importance, as has been outlined, to the west as well as to the Middle Eastern region as a whole, remains its central geographic position in the regional security architecture, that is, the Middle East post-World War I boundaries. The Syrian war is now spilling into Lebanon to the west, which has seen multiple terrorist attacks in the last few months, and east into Iraq, where similar attacks are taking place.
If the fighting in Syria continues apace and spreads south into Jordan, which hosts hundreds of thousands of refugees in and out of camps, and in the north into Turkey, the Syrian crisis will directly threaten the security of key Canadian and U.S. allies, all the while eroding the current state boundaries in the Levant and the Middle East as a whole.
But a spillover into the west could happen directly as well. Recent reports citing U.S. intelligence sources indicate that some extreme Sunni factions in Syria could be planning attacks in the United States and elsewhere in the west. Other reports indicate that Iran, the Assad regime's ally and an ostensible enemy of Sunni extremist forces, could be supporting these elements as well. Others indicate that the Assad regime is buying oil products from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and refraining from targeting its forces, instead hitting more moderate rebels supported by western countries, a Machiavellian strategy that drives all sides to extremes. Syria is increasingly a Middle Eastern twilight zone: a place where none of the usual rules apply.
Making matters worse, efforts to foster a transition in Syria that would have a hope of reuniting the country remain dim. President Assad is now putting forward a forced solution masquerading as a reform plan centred on his “re-election” to a third term as president. I observed the last election in 2007 in which he won by a laughable 97.62% of the vote. Given the level of Assad's brutality and the minority nature of his Alawite-dominated regime, not to mention the Assad regime's past manipulations of elections and referendums, this is a non-starter for the Sunni majority-dominated opposition. Since Assad's forces, even with Hezbollah and Iranian assistance, seem unable to re-conquer and effectively hold all of what was the Syrian Arab Republic, implementation of Assad's plan would mean a prolonged de facto partition for the country. Such an outcome would perpetuate human misery, lawlessness, and a haven for terrorists.
The days of easy foreign policy options in Syria are over.
Here I'm going to get to some specific recommendations. They're along three lines.
The matter is not just as simple as arming the rebels or re-engaging with Assad, as the media often portrays it, but that does not mean the west is out of options. The war in Syria is likely to go on for years, and it is important that Canada and its allies explore multiple tracks to constrain, contain, and eventually bring the Syrian war to an end. The best way to do so is through a more assertive, three-pronged approach, prioritized by tackling first threats first.
First, and the immediate thing facing the U.S. government at the moment, is the issue of chemical weapons and the implementation of the Geneva communiqué of 2012. Why do I put them together? One, concern is growing in the U.S. government that the effort to destroy Syria’s chemical stockpile “has seriously languished and stalled”. It's not just because Syria is predictably behind in the schedule to dispose of those chemical agents, but because Damascus is now demanding its chemical weapons sites be inactivated instead of physically destroyed as is required under the convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons. The Assad regime is revising its position. This element, especially following the regime’s consolidation of control in the western half of the country, indicates that the Assad regime is dragging its feet on fulfilling its obligations in order to achieve concessions from the United States and the London 11 countries concerning the formation of a transitional governing body in Syria.
This is where I think I differ with Professor Landis. I think what the United States specifically wants is a negotiated transition in Syria, not a regime change à la Iraq, although that transition would at least require that President Assad and his family and the Makhloufs, their immediate cousins, depart Syria. Other than that, the contours of that agreement are not clear.
In order to counter such pressure, the United States and its allies should turn the tables on Assad's gambit and use Syria’s compliance with the chemical weapons convention as leverage to gain Assad's compliance with a transition in Syria as outlined under the Geneva communiqué. Fortunately for the United States and Canada, both Syria’s compliance with the rules set out by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Geneva communiqué are actually enshrined in the same UN Security Council resolution, resolution 2118, which is enforceable by chapter VII measures, such as sanctions and the use of force following the passage of a subsequent chapter VII resolution. In the likely event of a veto by Russia or China, the credible threat of sanctions or the use of force should be used to ensure Assad follows through on his obligations to give up Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal. Successful follow through could also help foster a real long-term transition in Syria based on, but not limited to, the Geneva communiqué.
Second is humanitarian access and evacuation. The humanitarian situation in Syria is rapidly worsening. The Assad regime continues to use starvation campaigns that violate not only the Geneva Convention but international humanitarian law as well. Canada should support, and I believe is supporting the current proposed Security Council resolution concerning humanitarian access in Syria, which also, by the way, emphasizes the Geneva communiqué.
Third is counterterrorism. Combatting terrorism should occur on multiple levels, including a plan in conjunction with regional allies to back moderate opposition elements at the expense of extremists. But that will not be enough. Plans should also be developed using offset assets—here I'm talking about missiles, but it's not limited to only that—and drones to hit all designated terrorist groups operating in Syria, no matter what side they're fighting on, that are deemed to be aiming at Canadian, U.S., or international targets. Those would be based on not only the intelligence assessments, but also what we can learn publicly.
Such an approach would constrain and contain Assad on the use of chemical weapons, the possibility of their leakage to non-state actors and terrorist groups, and the regime's use of starvation and siege as a form of warfare. It would also contain, alienate, and help eliminate terrorist groups operating in Syria among the opposition and the constellation of forces helping to prop up Assad.
Doubtless the priorities on this list will likely change multiple times before the Syrian crisis is over, but I believe the basic pillars for present and future courses of action are there.
Thank you for your consideration of this testimony. I'd be happy to answer any questions you have.
