Thank you for those questions.
You're correct. We have also seen the statistics published by the International Monetary Fund.
In my opinion, we need to compare current forecasts of Russia's economic growth with pre-invasion forecasts. In the absence of that invasion and the imposition of such harsh sanctions, Russia's economic growth would have been much higher than 0.7%, as is currently projected.
Are sanctions the fatal blow? Not necessarily. Did they hurt the Russian economy? There's no doubt about that.
That said, it's important to consider which economic sectors were most affected. The purpose of sanctions is not just to shrink Russia's economy, but also to disrupt those sectors most likely to hurt Ukraine.
To go back to what I was saying a few moments ago, I think we need to knock out as many value chains as possible, meaning those refined technological components that can wind up in Russia's weapons supply chain.
Does Russia have strategies to evade sanctions? There's no doubt about that, and that's one of the reasons why it's still able to fund its war.
Russia is a country that exports a huge number of energy products, such as oil and gas. However, not all countries in the world engaging in trade with Russia have an autonomous sanctions regime or would consider implementing one.
We can be very effective only once sanctions are universal, which is why it's important to ensure that we coordinate with our partners and put pressure on countries we maintain diplomatic relations with, countries that don't necessarily have autonomous sanctions regimes but that we have some influence over.
Finally, our objective with regard to Russia remains unchanged. We want to limit the country's capacity to fund its war, diplomatically isolate it and, ultimately, hold it responsible for the damage it's done. That's one of the reasons why our new seizure and forfeiture regime is so unique, and it gives us opportunities to pursue that objective.