I can't speak to the WTO negotiations because that was a very long multi-year process, but certainly when the WTO member states were trying to find a way to make compulsory licensing work in jurisdictions that had no pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, there were a number of things that concerned them, and that was if you allowed jurisdictions with the capacity to manufacture without any constraint, this would eviscerate the patent system around the world. They said, okay, people who have a need to issue a compulsory licence but don't have local manufacturers can request products from the WTO and jurisdictions with capacity can then issue a compulsory licence domestically. The request from the putative importer to the WTO had to name the product involved and the quantum that they needed to treat their local health problems.
That was a critical element of the WTO agreement and it's a critical element of the Canadian implementing legislation that tried to put the system in place. The same is true, I guess, with the names of the importers, because what happens in the international drug markets is that a lot of product gets diverted. It seems critical that this kind of information be available about compulsorily licensed products, so that the patentees and the granting nations can control how the product is used, that in fact it gets to the destination that's intended.
It took a lot of negotiation here domestically when we were doing the legislation, because as Bill C-393 shows, there are a lot of interest groups that have ideas about what the perfect system would be. I think that in the course of developing the initial CAMR legislation, Canada was concerned that it remain compliant with its WTO obligations or that it didn't create a scheme that would go beyond the scope of the TRIPS waivers decisions. It's a long process, both domestically and internationally.