Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
I want to thank our witnesses, Ms. Dekker and Ms. Besner. I know that you've been very patient with us.
Welcome, Ms. Michaud.
I think she's our only visitor—oh, we have Mrs. Thomas as well. Thank you very much for joining us.
I think that the dichotomy between the two amendments is an interesting one. A lot of what we deal with really does come back to the clause generally that we're dealing with, clause 3, as it relates to the issue of a miscarriage of justice.
To our witnesses, we've heard what both Mr. Garrison and Mr. Housefather have said. I don't doubt they obviously come at this from a very sympathetic and compassionate point of view. They come at it probably from the same angle as everybody here, which is that none of us wants to see a wrongful conviction.
I have expressed this many times before. I won't get into significant details, but most people here know I was a defence lawyer for a time, and a prosecutor for a much longer time. One case haunts me to this day, an administrative case that would not have been considered a serious case by the public, but one in which I really think the person was not dealt with appropriately by the courts. I would classify it as a miscarriage of justice. There are all sorts of law society obligations now on my part, even with respect to that file. I think about it, because these things absolutely, positively never go away.
Again, I won't mention names due to privacy and confidentiality, but I've also dealt with somebody who, in the past, was subject to a wrongful conviction, and was—