National Defence Committee on Sept. 20th, 2006

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

My second question is for Professor Maloney, and again, it's tied to the comments that have been made by the leader of the NDP, demanding that our troops cut and run from this mission.

I'm wondering if you can indicate to the committee what impact that would have on the security situation in Kandahar province, and further, what effect that would have on the ability of our troops and the provincial reconstruction team to bring aid and reconstruction benefits to the community such as those that are currently taking place.

[Dr. Sean Maloney]

Let me address it in this fashion. Any counter-insurgency war is a psychological war. We've focused on dealing with the psychology of the population; let's talk about the psychology of the enemy, and the psychology of our population, and the psychology of our friends.

Let me backtrack. I can draw a distinct line between the Americans leaving Somalia, after what everybody knows as the Black Hawk Down operation, and 9/11. We can draw that line. Osama bin Laden, in his own writings, was emboldened by that event, that the Americans would cut and run after taking 18 casualties. He called the United States a “paper tiger”, and that emboldened further operations.

In this case, the precipitous withdrawal of the Canadian contingent would be a significant psychological victory for the enemy. So I view with great circumspection questions or suggestions that we negotiate with the enemy or withdraw from that place. Our reputation in the world would be severely damaged--I mean severely damaged.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

And in terms of the impact it would have on our ability to bring aid and reconstruction?

[Dr. Sean Maloney]

Oh, forget it. Our provincial reconstruction team would have absolutely no credibility with the Afghans, with the government, with our allies, and we wouldn't get the resources to do what we need to do. Again, it all works together. You cannot just have a PRT there and no combat force.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John Cannis]

There's room for flexibility here. The reason this has flexibility is that two of you gentlemen did not take up the 10 minutes, so I'll give you some flexibility time, if you want to go quickly.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

You seemed eager to respond to my opening question to the other two, so perhaps you'd like to comment on the impact it would have on the morale or the impact it would have on the risk to our troops, knowing that.... I think you were nodding in agreement that the enemy is monitoring what's going on here in Canada.

[Dr. Sean Maloney]

I am very familiar with the enemy monitoring what we do. They keep very close track of what goes on here. We suspect, for example, that the suicide campaign in Kandahar that started in 2005 may have been an attempt to convince the IMF not to commit funds to the country by generating artificial instability and making it look like Kandahar was out of control and therefore the whole country was out of control. There is that dimension that we have to look at. The enemy is extremely adept at information operations.

There are jihadi websites that have pictures of our guys in coffins. There are jihadi websites that show Russians in Chechnya getting blown up and assassinated, and it's the same with the Americans in Iraq. These are in languages that we generally don't speak, and so we cannot access that world, but we can see the images they employ. They keep very close track of what goes on.

We're into the area of intelligence here, so I'm not sure how far I should go with this. It might be better to bring in someone from the intelligence world who can talk specifically to this. But it's there, and there are links.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

You are affirming that they are listening to what we're saying.

[Dr. Sean Maloney]

Absolutely.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John Cannis]

And we don't have people who can interpret what they're saying?

[Dr. Sean Maloney]

Oh no, we do. I'm just talking about how, if an average Canadian goes on the web and starts looking at this stuff--I'm not quite sure--it might look like just a news story to them when in fact it may be a jihadist message.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John Cannis]

But our people in theatre can and do understand what is being transmitted from their side.

[Dr. Sean Maloney]

Yes, absolutely. We have very good Afghani contacts in this regard.

[John Cannis, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

Good.

Well, we'll move on to the second round, and that is five minutes, so I'll make both the member and our guests aware of the five minutes.

We'll go to Mr. McGuire.

[Joe McGuire, Liberal, Egmont, PE]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, welcome to our committee.

A lot of people in the last number of years have become more familiar with the history of Afghanistan. There's a lot of debate going on in the country with politicians and citizens who have become somewhat familiar with the history. They're wondering if we can ever get out of the country with our heads high, or if we can get out with an exit strategy that improves the situation for Afghanistan. For the price we're paying there, is it worth staying in? They are becoming very discouraged, I believe, with what they're reading and learning about the country and what the Russians and Brits...and the Greeks, depending on how far back you may want to go in this benighted country.

The Prime Minister says that he will leave when he's successful. As an exit strategy, there's no...and it's difficult to put a time limit on it. How do you put a time limit on a war? When we entered World War I we didn't put a time limit on it, I guess, or on World War II.

I see the article here by General Paul Manson, who outlines conditions for an exit strategy and how long it may take. Based on your experience, how long do you think it's going to take to actually leave this country, when its population is able to take over? How long will it take the Afghanis to become masters of their country, masters of their own fate? When will the NATO forces be able to leave there, with a successful operation behind them?

[Dr. Sean Maloney]

The closest model we have right now is Bosnia. We were there 14 years. Bosnia was simple compared to Afghanistan, so I would be very hesitant to put a date or timeframe on this. It's going to be at least a decade, and we've already been there five years.

We were in Cypress from about 1964 to 1993, so we can handle protracted conflict. The question is.... You've anticipated my next Maclean's article, actually, which deals with exit strategy. We've never had an exit strategy in Canada. We've never had to conceptualize one before. We've gone along with the flow, hopped on board with another international institution and let them do the thinking for us. In this case we can't do that, which means we have to mature and start thinking strategically. What do we want? What are the conditions going to be?

The main problem, as I see it, is the Afghan security forces, primarily the police. That's a real problem. The Afghan National Army is marginally better. Those two institutions definitely need work, because they're the ones who are going to handle the security.

Now, I've said that, but let's recognize that you have a Canadian general who's in charge of police transformation there. They've just initiated a program to try to work on this. This will take time. There is no easy fix. As I've pointed out, time is of a different construct in Afghani society.

Again, one of the initial reasons we're there is to form this shield so that these other efforts can take place behind it. At some point, that shield will have to go away and be replaced with an Afghan shield. In terms of being masters of their own destiny, they already are up to a great deal in a number of areas, but not in all areas. That's one of the reasons we're there.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John Cannis]

Anybody else on this?

Go ahead.

[Col Brian MacDonald]

Let me give you some numbers. The average GDP per capita in Afghanistan is approximately $228 U.S. per annum. The revenue base of the Afghan government, according to the Asian Development Bank in 2004, as we've mentioned, was a total of about $625 million, of which $300 million came from the normal tax and other revenues to the Afghan government and another $325 million in direct assistance, and on top of that of course was the indirect assistance of the various programs conducted by international organizations.

When you are looking at the resources of the Afghan national government in a scenario in which there is no international participation, you are then facing a government with virtually no resources and tasking them to conduct the normal security operations that we would expect in a country of the west. That simply at this point is not something they are able to do at all. So we are looking at a very long-term development program in order to raise the GNP from legitimate sources of the government, allowing it to move from a central government expenditure of about 5% of GNP to a more normal developing world relationship of about 20% to 30%, to a developed world of somewhere between 40% and 60%.

When one looks at an exit strategy, I look at it in terms of simply the task of, first of all, reconstructing the destruction that has been left by 25 years of war, which has ruined everything, and then once you have that basic restructuring done, perhaps something similar to the Marshall Plan in Germany, and then looking forward at the long-term development assistance program that is going to take us out 20 or 25 years. The idea of disappearing quickly is simply a non-starter in real terms.

[Joe McGuire, Liberal, Egmont, PE]

[Inaudible--Editor]...or in decline or they're controlled by either the Pakistanis or by the.... There's never going to be safe reconstruction or an increase in the GNP if the Taliban comes in and blows everything up as fast as it can be constructed. When do you foresee the forces of evil or the Taliban ceasing their operations, and who is going to be able to do that?

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John Cannis]

Two quick responses.

[Dr. Sean Maloney]

The whole country is not in as bad shape as the south. The Taliban do not control the bulk of the country; they control part of the country.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John Cannis]

A quick response?

[Col Brian MacDonald]

In defence of Professor Maloney, in the northern part--

[Joe McGuire, Liberal, Egmont, PE]

[Inaudible--Editor]...a bigger part. They will continue to take a bigger chunk of it, as they did before.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John Cannis]

Mr. McGuire, I am over-flexible now.