National Defence Committee on Oct. 23rd, 2006

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

I appreciate that.

[Col M.D. Capstick]

The Senlis Council has an agenda, and it's big on commercializing the poppy crop for medicinal reasons. The reality is that unless there is absolute security, any legal poppy crop will become illegal in a heartbeat. There should be no doubt in anybody's mind. I think that too much has been made of eradication, because from my knowledge, not very much eradication really went on down there anyway. Canadian Forces do not do poppy eradication. No NATO forces do poppy eradication. Under the new Afghan counter-narcotics strategy, poppy eradication is but one part of that strategy and it's almost like the last resort part of the strategy. There are all these other strategies that I talked about earlier: alternative livelihoods, interdiction of the stuff on the roads, interdiction of labs, etc., are part of that comprehensive plan.

At the end of the day, in the simplest terms, if you want to look at the south of Afghanistan for about a four-year period after late 2001 and early 2002, there were very few international forces there, and even fewer Afghan security forces. What's happened is that the 8,000-plus NATO troops that Brigadier-General Fraser is commanding are standing where these guys had a free run, in a security vacuum, and they don't like it.

In the final analysis, we didn't start the insurgency down there; the insurgents started the insurgency. And until enough security is established in the region, there is no way to do development. We can talk about it all we want, but you have to have the basic security. That's a principle of counter-insurgency that has been known to military professionals for 50-plus years. That's what Field Marshall Templar did in Malaysia. He brought the people to secure areas. We can't do that these days. We have to bring security to the people, and that is a joint Afghan-international effort that is now going on down there. That's what's happening in Kandahar province.

And believe me, personally, Mike Capstick as a taxpayer and as a human being, I'd rather see 90% of the Canadian effort being expended on development as opposed to the conduct of military operations. Until we can shift that security situation in the south, that's simply not going to happen.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you.

That ends the second round. The way the third round is structured is the official opposition, government, Bloc, government, official opposition, government, official opposition, and then the NDP.

Mr. McGuire, do you want to start for the official opposition, a five-minute round?

[Joe McGuire, Liberal, Egmont, PE]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Capstick, there's a book, and I forget the author's name, but the book is saying that Afghanistan is in worse shape now than if we had stayed home. I know you don't believe that to be true, and I don't believe that to be true. What does this say about countries like ours and NATO? What do they do to prevent genocide in a country or mass suffering of a people inside a country, when we either don't know what we're doing before we get there or we don't seem to be that effective when we do get there? I believe we have to do something in these countries, whether it's Zimbabwe or wherever, when you see hundreds of thousands of people being massacred by their own rulers. But then we see books like this that say we'd be better off staying home.

I could probably answer the question myself, but I'll let you answer.

[Col M.D. Capstick]

I think you might have answered your own question there, sir. That's a tough one, and you're really into a realm of policy and strategy. It's more theoretical than practical, and those kinds of decisions are made well above my pay grade. That's not to say I don't have an opinion.

You need to have a comprehensive plan when you go in. Now, that's easier said than done, because history's not neat or clean; history's messy. Things happen that aren't being controlled by political leaders or by the Secretary General of the UN--they just happen out there. So you need a comprehensive plan.

I think the Canadian concept of whole government--the shorthand is a three-D approach--is really more than three-D. When you look at the RCMP, Corrections Canada, etc., that kind of idea is needed. Can that be achieved, mobilized, driven together at the international level? I can't answer that, but that's what's needed.

[Joe McGuire, Liberal, Egmont, PE]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Mr. Hawn.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Just to carry on with something my friend Mr. Dosanjh said when we talked about coalition teams, I would suggest to you, Colonel, that coalition teams are what won us World War I, World War II, and World War III, which was the Cold War. It was won by what's not a novel concept of countries' forces providing particular parts of an overall solution to an overall set of objectives, which were met in those three instances I mentioned.

Is it militarily or strategically...? I guess at a higher level a good approach is to play your strength and have the flexibility to move your strength from role to role as the overall strategic objectives require.

[Col M.D. Capstick]

I'm not sure what sort of question you want me to answer there.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

I'm talking about the fact that the Canadian military has to be very good at what they're doing right now, and in my view we're in a better position to provide the best military part of the overall strategic solution. Does it make sense for us to be doing that, given that we'd all rather be doing development? There's no question about that.

[Col M.D. Capstick]

I'll comment on what I know, and I won't comment on why or how it got there.

For the first time in over 30 years of service I've stood in a place and watched American officers and British officers essentially drooling over the equipment the Canadian Forces have brought to the table in Afghanistan.

That battle group in Kandahar is the most capable unit-size organization in Afghanistan, bar none. It delivers far more firepower, far more mobility, and better yet—I don't want to insult any allies—far better-trained soldiers and leaders than anyone else has on the ground. For the first time in my career I can say that.

I commanded in Bosnia in 1997 when a British general stood up and said that the Canadian army had lost its right to call itself a real army. I can assure you that not one member of the 3rd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment of the British army, which was the first regiment of Brits into Helmand province, would agree with now-retired General Sir Hew Pike and his comment.

So we have the stuff and we have the troops. Canadians should be proud of the way those troops have stepped up, because we haven't done this in my time in the army, and it's amazing to watch the adaptation on the ground.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Thank you.

A previous witness who had spent a fair amount of time in Afghanistan, and not just with the military but with Afghan civilians, suggested that compared to what the Russians did and the way things happened under the Russians, what is happening now, as bad as it is, is really a cakewalk. Do you have a comment on that?

[Col M.D. Capstick]

I'll comment on the context. You see a lot of these historical analogies. You see commentary on the British invasions in the late 1800s. You see commentary on the Soviet invasion of 1979. There's a substantive difference here, in that right now under NATO auspices and a UN mandate, and in cooperation with the Government of Afghanistan, this is not an invading force, nor is it an occupying force. As I alluded to before, these operations are Afghan-led.

The policy action group in Kabul, which meets on a very regular basis--I think the president chairs it about once a month--and is directing the strategy in the south, is an Afghan-led operation. There are about 30 million people in that country, and the Taliban are a pretty small minority--that's even if you can call them Taliban. So the analogy isn't there. This is not the Soviet invasion of 1979.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Can the Afghans tell the difference?

[Col M.D. Capstick]

That's hard to tell. Some can, some can't.

There are remote villages—you read about them in Rory Stewart’s book. There are people there who have never ventured outside of their village. And strangers almost never venture in. To them, in those areas, a stranger is a stranger.

So some of them can't tell. But the people running things, the people in the government, the educated people in Kabul, the thousands who've come back to the country, they understand the difference and they recognize it.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Mr. Bouchard.

[Robert Bouchard, Bloc, Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, QC]

What is the nature of the relationship between US troops and NATO forces? In your opinion, what changes are needed in order to possibly improve relations between the two sides?

[Col M.D. Capstick]

As of last week or the week before, what was called stage four of NATO transition has occurred. So right now, General Richards, the NATO commander, commands all the troops. He has five regional commands: regional commands north, west, south, east, and Kabul. All those manoeuvre forces are under NATO command, if that's what you're asking me. We have achieved what we call in the military “unity of command” in Afghanistan.

Now, there are still special forces of various countries under national command, but that was so far below my radar that I can't comment on it. I don't know how they work.

[Robert Bouchard, Bloc, Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

We'll go back to the government, if needed.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

I could ask another one.

We talked about delivery of aid and the delivery agency—where the money from CIDA goes, who's delivering it, and who's best equipped to deliver it. Given that delivering it is sometimes pretty tough, what's the best mix for it? I know there's not an easy numerical answer. But as for the delivery agency, whether it's the CF or CIDA, what kind of mix are we talking about?

[Col M.D. Capstick]

CIDA has the lead on getting development aid to the people, as it should. That's the way it is. CIDA uses the Government of Afghanistan to the maximum extent possible. There's a fund called the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, and that's how CIDA's money gets put into the system. Beyond that, I don't expect CIDA to know how to make a fire plan, so I won't tell them how to do development.

The military isn't in the development business, per se. The PRT development projects are CIDA projects. We provide extra security and technical assistance. I think the last five fatalities occurred while building a road. The reality is that in the current security situation in Kandahar the only way to build a road is with military engineers. When the fighting ends, there is no local general contractor who's going to go out there in his yellow Cat and start building a road. So the military has to do it. If it's a development project, it's been coordinated by CIDA in the first place. They may have bought the gravel. I don't know how all that stuff works at the tactical level. That's the short answer.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Thanks.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Back to the official opposition—Mr. Temelkovski.

[Lui Temelkovski, Liberal, Oak Ridges—Markham, ON]

I have a couple of questions.

Colonel, it's been brought to my attention that the way they pay soldiers in some other countries is far different from the way we pay ours. The cost of sending a Canadian, an American, a western soldier, as opposed to sending one from the less developed countries, is much higher. It has been estimated that three soldiers from less developed countries could go for the same price as one western soldier. Can you shed some light on that?