National Defence Committee on Feb. 15th, 2007

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

Or to get our Canadians out, as the case may be.

[LGen J. S. Lucas]

In the case of the non-combatant evacuation operations, absolutely, or not to have to depend on another country, because that is also something we've done. Possibly, in some parts of the world, we would do that as well. If it's close to Australia, the Australians would help and have helped us out. But if it's close to here and there are some Australians, we would like to be able to help them too. We would like not to always depend on others to do the heavy lifting for us.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

That's almost like an element of sovereignty, to be able to do your own work, your own job, rather than relying on other people.

[LGen J. S. Lucas]

You could characterize it that way.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

I'll leave it at that.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

I would like to ask a question.

Put into just troop-hauling mode, how many troops with full combat gear on would one of these C-17s haul?

[LGen J. S. Lucas]

It's about three times as many as you could bring in using a C-130.

In fact, this is one of the uses we are likely going to make of this aircraft, especially as we go through the transition. As the older C-130s die and the new C-130s come on line, there is going to be a period of time of some fragility. The tactical capability of the C-17 will allow us to use that aircraft, so if we want to take people from Camp Mirage into Kandahar, we can do it much more effectively with an aircraft that has self-protection on it. We can't make that flight with an Airbus because it doesn't have self-protection and it's not designed to be shot at, whereas the C-17 is a militarized aircraft with self-protection on it. We would feel much safer about moving our people in that conveyance.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Very good. Thank you.

We'll start our second five-minute round.

Mr. Coderre.

[Denis Coderre, Liberal, Bourassa, QC]

I would like to point out, for the record, that after the Tsunami, there was no equipment-related problem, because in the course of 48 hours, once a political decision had been made, the Canadian Armed Forces were ready to go. So, it had nothing to do with the C-17, etc.

Two weeks was another issue. There was maybe some political bickering, but it had nothing to do with the equipment. We were supposed to do it. I was not in cabinet at that time, though.

General Lucas, you swear there was no intervention. We also know that the minister has the final say in writing on the requirements, so we can proceed with the rest of the process.

On May 1, Colonel Burt said there would be a meeting with the Minister of National Defence at 10 o'clock sharp.

There was some question about what is the CF vehicle that drives the weight, and at that time it was 43,000 pounds, and is this vehicle weight-limited, and so on. So you were discussing requirements with the minister.

On May 1, the final recommendation of Colonel Burt was as follows--he sent this to General Martin:

As you and I have discussed, tracked vehicles were not included on the understanding that they would not form part of a rapid reaction team. Do we still consider this valid in the context of recent DCP discussions? If a decision were taken to incl track vehicles, this would reduce contenders to one. I recommend we not incl the complexity of the ADATS in the Strat HLMC (and leave the HLMC as amended on 18 Apr);

So Colonel Burt's recommendation at that time was that we stick to the 43,000 pounds.

I would like to know, first, what was discussed with Minister O'Connor at that time, since there was some follow-up. On June 14, another e-mail says, “Bring us the latest version”, and this is at the exact moment that we changed the 43,000 pounds. So the payload was changed at that time.

What was the discussion? What was the decision? And why did we change a study of six years, the statement of operational requirements? Even in 2003, my colleague, the former Minister of National Defence, was sending a letter to the president and chief executive officer of Airbus saying that, “DND has completed its assessment of airlifters against its Statement of Operational Requirement, and the Airbus A400M has been found to be a fully satisfactory solution.”

Something happened. Perception is reality. I'd like to know what happened, since the experts, the ones who truly have all the expertise for the requirements, said we should stick to 43,000 pounds.

[Col D. C. Burt]

Thank you for the question. It's certainly something that there has been a lot of speculation on over these last couple of weeks, and I welcome the opportunity to put things into the open.

First of all, it's an interesting thing we do as we develop statements of operational requirement. As the Chief of the Air Staff has stated, up until the point that I pass the document to him, it remains in a period of refinement, a period of draft, a period of development, and a lot of iterations go on through that in order to refine this, with the clear focus that we are trying to get best value for Canadians in the Canadian Forces.

[Denis Coderre, Liberal, Bourassa, QC]

Sorry. I just want to catch you on this. You recommended and you were in favour of sticking with the 43,000 pounds?

[Col D. C. Burt]

No, that is not what I'm stating now.

[Denis Coderre, Liberal, Bourassa, QC]

So you changed your mind in due course?

[Col D. C. Burt]

No, I'm stating that I was in a period of refinement of the SOR.

The other thing I'll comment on is that if one takes part of a discussion from one period of a process like that, that I've just described, referring to an e-mail string that I was involved in at one period of time in part of this refinement period, and then takes an e-mail from another period and tries to relate them, they are probably very unrelated issues.

The issue we were dealing with on May 1 had nothing to do with the actual abilities of the individual aircraft. It had to do with whether or not we wanted to include tracked vehicles in the requirement. The challenge we had with this is, at that time, tracked vehicles were not considered part of our rapid reaction process, and we realized that if we included all tracked vehicles, including our tanks, that would significantly change the operational requirement for the payload. But the dilemma we had, and the dilemma my staff had presented to me, was that the ADATS, the air defence anti-tank system, could be considered part of our rapid reaction process, and therefore we should be including that.

[Denis Coderre, Liberal, Bourassa, QC]

The time is up, but I would like to hear from General Lucas on what happened with the minister and whether he is willing to deposit all the e-mails from between May 1 and June 14--

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

We'll have to come back to that, General. There'll be another opportunity.

Mr. Blaney, then Mr. Bouchard.

[Steven Blaney, Conservative, Lévis—Bellechasse, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to speak this morning.

I'm also pleased that the committee can consider the issue of procurement, because I realize it has been a long time since the Canadian Armed Forces had assessed the tools they needed in order to accomplish their missions, be they rescue missions here or military and humanitarian missions abroad. I want to thank you for taking the time to meet with us and give us some explanations. The clarification is much appreciated.

I have flown on board a Hercules, from the host country to Kandahar. We felt like we were in a relatively safe vehicle, but as you explained, it is at the end of its life cycle and must be replaced. It is a tactical aircraft, as you explained. Many questions were also asked on strategic airlifters.

I remember one of your sentences, Mr. Lucas. You said more or less the following:

“I am happy to see that Canada is finally getting what it desperately needs.”

Finally, this morning, that is at the very heart of our discussion.

You clearly indicated that the only thing government did was, essentially, to make the resources available. You said so on two occasions since the beginning of your presentation. What is important is to know that the government's role is to make resources available so as to cover our area of jurisdiction at the federal level with respect to military equipment, rather than encroaching in other areas of jurisdiction.

We have learned, from the testimony we've heard, that there was a radical downsizing in Canadian aircraft fleet over the last decade, which not only jeopardized our ability to ensure our own sovereignty, but it made us vulnerable. That came across clearly.

So, what is embarrassing, is not necessarily to have started a procurement process, but rather the fact that we are doing it now, in 2007, when 18 out of 32 Hercules are still operational. I think it is important to stress that. I am also very open to the process we are undertaking.

We have seen that the military role is to define its needs. We really noticed that you do have the necessary skills to do so. The government's role is to make the resources available to the Department of National Defence. You mentioned defence policy and principles. We clearly see that you developed estimates based on performance.

This allows me to get back to what Mr. Bachand was saying. Mr. Bachand said that when he was young he had a Firebird. But needs change. When you have children and other needs, you sometimes have to set aside your Firebird in order to buy a minivan, which is more spacious. So there you are, needs change!

Perhaps that has something to do with income, Mr. Bachand.

Which leads me to my question. You mentioned that it was necessary to have the resources available. Can you tell us about the versatility of C-17s? You explained that it was a strategic airlifter, which travels long distances, but which can also be used for tactical purposes. You also mentioned that with respect to the Hercules, which is at the end of its life cycle, you may be able to do what you referred to as operational bridging, given the aircraft's versatility. I'd like to hear what you have to say on that, to start.

If there is any time left, Mr. Williston, could you tell me about Public Works and Government Services' role, because we will be hearing from departmental officials soon. So, I would like to get back to the role of PWGSC in the procurement process as well as on the issue of competition. How can we ensure competition in the procurement process once the needs have been defined with the Canadian Forces?

Mr. Lucas.

[LGen J. S. Lucas]

Very quickly, on the C-17, while it is a strategic lifter, it also has tremendous capability that can be used in the tactical realm. We will use it to help bridge that period of time when the older 130s are less available to us and we have not yet received the C-130J. It has great capability in terms of lifting into short airfields. It has self-protection. It will be actually useful to transfer people and equipment. Other than that, I don't know what more....

I'll leave a little time for Mr. Williston.

[Terry Williston]

One of the things I would say is that we, along with other federal departments, are involved in the whole procurement process, through advisory committees and what have you. There's a significant challenge role that's played, not only by Public Works and Government Services Canada but also in these committee meetings, which include Treasury Board Secretariat, PCO, Industry Canada, Finance, and other departments.

We try to make sure the performance specifications are clear. We challenge to determine what those mission parameters are that the general has already indicated. We compare them with the market analysis we have available to us to determine whether there's a sufficient competitive situation out there, and if not, why that situation has occurred and whether there is an opportunity to determine that we can do something slightly differently or whether the requirement has to be built.

I should say that we're comparing requirement here with what's commercially or militarily available off the shelf. If the requirement is so specific and so precise and so high that something doesn't exist, then we're into a build situation, which can take many years to deliver the required solution.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you.

We have to move on.

Mr. Bouchard.

[Robert Bouchard, Bloc, Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, General Lucas. We're pleased to have you with us today.

Welcome also to you, gentlemen.

National Defence has already announced the procurement of search and rescue equipment. The issue was raised by Ms. Black. One could say that this issue has a certain amount of history: four ministers have examined this program. Twice, Treasury Board has approved spending. You spoke earlier about the Defence department's priorities in terms of procurement.

What has to be done to move this forward?

[LGen J. S. Lucas]

Thank you again for the question.

My sense is that the ongoing defence capability plan discussions that are proceeding at this point in time are going to examine the needs of the Canadian Forces to determine where the remaining moneys we have are going to be spent.

Essentially, unlike some programs—for instance, the C-17 program, which came with dollars specifically identified for it—search and rescue did not. The search and rescue deal that was struck a number of years ago was simply that we could move money forward; that they would allow us to bring money from the future down to the present and spend it at that point in time. But it was still part of our allocation.

We are now examining that whole allocation and determining all of the different requirements we have and where the money should be spent. Fixed-wing search and rescue is involved in this. Once these discussions are completed, we will determine when fixed-wing search and rescue can go forward.

[Robert Bouchard, Bloc, Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, QC]

Thank you. We are in fact currently examining the procurement process. National Defence is proceeding with the acquisition of equipment. What we were told is that the department neglected to replace its equipment for several years.

When equipment is replaced what happens with the old equipment? Is any provision made for that within the current procurement process? What happens with the equipment that has been replaced? Is that part of the negotiations? How are these tools, this equipment disposed of once they are replaced?

[LGen J. S. Lucas]

Thank you for that.

Unfortunately, my translation device has just died on me, but I believe I understood the intent of your question.

For the most part, the Canadian Forces are among the best in the world at deriving the last useful piece out of any piece of kit we have. So as in the case of our Hercules aircraft, for the most part the oldest of them will probably be too uneconomical to continue to work with.

That being said, there are times when, for reasons, we have some useful economic life left in aircraft. In many cases, we turn them over to Crown Assets Disposal for sale, and we have derived benefit from them. In some instances, we've been able to do that with helicopters. Or we find a different use for them. Some of the Griffin helicopters that we determined were surplus to our needs we have essentially turned over to the company that is now helping us with our helicopter training in Portage.

In most cases, the older equipment is pretty much dead by that point in time. Essentially, it's disposed of for the components; it's down to that level. In some cases, obviously with some limitations for some military equipment, it gets turned over to Crown Assets, and that revenue is returned to the Government of Canada.

[Robert Bouchard, Bloc, Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, QC]

For information sake, you have several old unused aircraft parked on a lot in Bagotville.