National Defence Committee on May 31st, 2007

[Denis Coderre, Liberal, Bourassa, QC]

General, excuse me for interrupting you, but I am allowed very little time. I know that you understand that rotation is in order for international missions.

Let me put two brief questions to you. If we want things to work, if we want to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people, we must deal with the problem of civilian casualties. Currently, there is a serious problem with civilian mortality, and I would like you to tell us about it—because just now, we passed the puck to you, it stopped with you, and now you can no longer pass it on—i.e., the way in which NATO views the civilian issue. Unfortunately, people have been killed.

Secondly and this is my last question with regard to detainees, you mentioned guidelines. I can understand that you have guidelines, but after speaking about this to the Norwegians, I know that we need no guidelines, what we need is a treaty with NATO and with the Afghan government to ensure consistency and coordination in the handling of detainees. What do you have to say about this?

[Gen Raymond Henault]

With regard to the civilians—

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

The time's up. We have to keep close time limits here. But if there are any questions brought to you that we don't have enough time for, I'd ask that you supply that information in writing to us.

Mr. Bachand is next, for seven minutes.

[Gen Raymond Henault]

If we don't get to the last two questions, we'll make sure you get answers in writing.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

We will have time for a second round.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would also like to welcome the general. It is not the first time he has appeared before us, but perhaps his first time as military leader of NATO. I think his presence here is very important and will allow us to learn a bit more.

A few delegates, some members and myself recently attended a NATO meeting in Madeira. As you know, that is where the parliamentary assembly took place. Several issues were raised. I, personally, was particularly interested in some.

I'll start with the importance of cardinal points. That is what I started with over there. There is no place on earth where cardinal points are more important than in Afghanistan, because there is a major difference between the north and the south. I wanted to check with you the possibility of rotations, not necessarily as of 2009. There is a price to be paid for Canadians in the south. Moreover, there is joint funding within NATO. It's been discussed for a long time, but it hasn't yet been done. And God knows that a theatre like southern Afghanistan is far more expensive for a country like Canada than what has been established in the north, for instance in Fayzabad, where I went with NATO and where essentially patrols can use Jeeps. The cost is therefore very different between military presence in the north and in the south, and there is also the human cost in terms of lost human lives which is very, very different. I know the Germans lost three soldiers recently, but we have lost 56 and I consider the cost to be very high. How can we and through which forum may we ask for a fairer sharing of the burden and for action to be taken in this regard? How was the first selection of soldiers done? Why did the Germans go to the north and we the south? Would it be feasible to better share this burden by 2009?

[Gen Raymond Henault]

Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

You did indeed notice that there are four regions in Afghanistan, aside from Kabul, the south, the north, the west and the east, which have experienced security situations that have varied from time to time. As you know, we undertook the mission in Afghanistan in Kabul. The counter-clockwise rotation in Afghanistan started in the north and went to the west.

We first started in the north towards the end of 2003, early 2004; in the west in 2005; in the south in 2006, etc. We spent more time in the north than in the west to establish security. These regions are not the heartland of the Taliban, which is the south. There is greater security and stability in the north and west due to what we are planning, in other words, securing the situation to promote development and reconstruction. We want to do exactly the same thing in the south. It will take us a little longer because of extremist activity which we have to deal with. Eventually, I think the country will establish its own stability.

Is one region of the country more at risk than another? We noted that when we deploy the necessary forces to establish security in the south or the east, the extremists move, in the west or in the north. So we have to deal with threats in all areas. And the threats we are dealing with are the most serious or the most significant, at the moment, because of the use of devices referred to as improvised explosive devices. Suicide bombs could be triggered anywhere. In the south, last year, there was a concentration of Taliban launching strikes against NATO. They saw that it wasn't going to work. Is one country more vulnerable than another? For the time being, probably not. There are a host of events which could occur in any part of Afghanistan. You cannot forget that the countries that have a military presence in the north or the west want to maintain security in their respective theatres. That is one of the reasons why they're reluctant to move their troops elsewhere.

Finally, I would say that heads of state have recognized that following the events of last October, with Operation Medusa, all countries had to be ready or able to support others in need. That is in the past, I think. Now, we have to focus on the future, and all countries have committed to doing that, if necessary.

I don't like to compare loss of life because first of all it is always regrettable and second it could occur anywhere. Almost all countries have lost citizens in Afghanistan.

I don't want to go on too long, but I think it is important to note that on the different security situation, primarily the north and west are more secure. We will establish that in the south and the east in due course, and that will make a big difference.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

General, it is rare for me not to agree with you, but if I were a head of state, I would prefer to have my troops in the north rather than in the south. Of course it is always possible for attacks to surface elsewhere, but everyone knows that the Taliban stronghold is in the south and that is not an easy area to be in.

Earlier on, I asked Gen. Howard a question, and as my colleague said, he sent you the puck. I would like to follow up on that. It would seem that this is a new contentious issue: I am referring to the way in which we can convince the hearts and minds of Afghans of our good will. It would seem, from what we're hearing, that there is more reconstruction and development occurring. However, in terms of civil losses, they are starting to hurt. I am a member of the Defence and Security Commission of the NATO Parliamentary Association, and this subject will be addressed in the report of the general rapporteur. You heard my questions earlier on and I would like you to explain to us who decides that there will not be a surgical hit, that the air force will not intervene. I would like you to clarify this point. It seems to me to be an important issue and it could lead to less civilian support.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Once again, hopefully we'll have time to clarify that later. We must move on.

Ms. Black, seven minutes.

[Dawn Black, NDP, New Westminster—Coquitlam, BC]

Thank you very much.

Thank you, General Henault, for coming to the defence committee and making your presentation.

Both my colleagues on the committee have talked about civilian deaths. I know that the Karzai government and also the Afghan Senate have been very concerned about this. They have made statements and had votes in the Senate, I believe, about asking NATO to take this under advisement.

I want to ask how NATO is dealing with that. How will the air strikes be handled to try to prevent civilian deaths? Along with that question, many of us at this committee have asked a number of people how Operation Enduring Freedom works alongside NATO. Are the Americans who are outside of NATO and Operation Enduring Freedom also doing air strikes?

You mentioned, and our own Minister of National Defence has mentioned, that this conflict will not be solved only by military means. I think everybody understands that and agrees with that. I wonder what other means you consider to be useful. Does that include negotiations? By negotiating, I mean specifically with different factions in Afghanistan, and negotiations that are more than an offer of amnesty.

The third part of my question is to deal with the flow of illegal arms into counter-insurgeny hands in Afghanistan. I'm very concerned about this, and I'm sure that NATO must be looking at this issue. I believe you said there were 80,000 Pakistani troops on the border. I find that quite disheartening. If there are 80,000 border guards or Pakistani military officials there who are meant to prevent the counter-insurgents from going back and forth across the border, I would presume it's meant to prevent the flow of illegal arms coming into Afghanistan. I find that figure disheartening, not encouraging. We know that the insurgents are coming back and forth and that illegal arms are coming in, not only from Pakistan; there are reports that these kinds of arms are coming in from Iran.

Yesterday, when the Chinook helicopter went down, the reports in the press seemed to indicate this was by a surface-to-air missile. I find that very alarming when another seven NATO personnel, one Canadian, were killed in that attack.

That's the start of my questions. I hope I get time for more, but I want to give you some opportunity to respond.

[Gen Raymond Henault]

Thank you, Ms. Black. I'll do my best here.

From a civilian death point of view, NATO is very focused on that. It's an object of continuous discussion at the military committee, and more specifically at the council level. Every effort is made to try to reduce the impact of that, to reduce civilian deaths.

The use of force, especially in built-up areas, is something that the commanders on the ground, right up to the Supreme Allied Commander, want to use judiciously, to protect forces and the mission they're trying to do but also to minimize the impact on loss of life of innocent civilians. Every possible thing is done, including warning people when operations are going to be undertaken and stopping operations when it's obvious that the Taliban or whichever opposing militant force is using human shields or trying to infiltrate built-up areas.

In fact, there was an incident just a few days ago. An embedded journalist in the Canadian contingent was witness to the commander stopping fire against insurgents when they became enmeshed, if you like, with the civilian population.

So things are taken into consideration in that context. We give very clear guidance to our commanders to minimize collateral damage at all possible costs. When you get into a combat situation, you have to make some very quick decisions on the ground, and sometimes those decisions will result in unfortunate collateral damage. We do that not wittingly, not by any stretch of the imagination, but with every intention of trying to limit that to the greatest extent possible.

In terms of air strikes--

[Dawn Black, NDP, New Westminster—Coquitlam, BC]

And OEF.

[Gen Raymond Henault]

OEF, yes. Operation Enduring Freedom, or the U.S.-led coalition activities, coordinate very closely with the International Security Assistance Force. When we established the operations plan currently in force—operations plan 10302—there was a very distinct command and control relationship established between OEF and ISAF.

Now, the coalition is doing counterterrorist operations. They are hunting Taliban and al-Qaeda. ISAF is not. But their activities are coordinated, through Commander ISAF, in a dual-headed relationship with what we call the deputy commander of security, the American head of the special operations forces in Afghanistan.

All of their activities are coordinated with NATO, or at least they're aware of them. The Operation Enduring Freedom forces can come to the assistance of ISAF, if required, in extremist situations. I might add that we don't do it the other way around. We don't do counterterrorist operations; we do anti-terrorist or force protection operations in terms of the Taliban.

The air strikes, though, are called in through a very well-established air strike request system. It goes from the commander on the ground to the air support operations centre to what we call the deputy commander air, an officer in the staff of Commander ISAF in Kabul. Those requirements are vetted. It may not always be air strikes; it may be artillery, for example. Those decisions are made through a very well-established set of criteria.

If the air strikes are required, the requests for support go through the combined air operations centre in Qatar, which then assigns the mission based on what aircraft are available, the requirements of the mission, and so on.

[Dawn Black, NDP, New Westminster—Coquitlam, BC]

Could you address the illegal arms issue as well? I think my time's going to run out soon.

[Gen Raymond Henault]

Okay.

We are certainly conscious of illegal arms. I would remind you that the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is 2,500 kilometres long. It's a very tough and treacherous border, almost impossible to delineate. The flow of contraband, which has been going on for centuries, is in some cases going to continue. That's why we need more and more capability to disrupt that.

This is something the Pakistanis have discussed directly with us--better surveillance capability, night vision devices, border controls, and so on.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you, sir.

We'll now move over to the government side. Mr. Hawn, seven minutes.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Thank you, Chair.

Welcome, General Henault and Colonel White. It's good to see you again.

Just before I move on to questions, I want to clarify, for the edification of Ms. Black and others, something that's been mentioned a couple of times. An RPG is not a SAM but in effect a large bullet--quite different.

General Henault, I'd like to ask a number of questions. I'd appreciate the customary military brevity, if we could.

During your entire time as Chief of the Defence Staff, was there ever a detainee transfer agreement in place?

[Gen Raymond Henault]

We had very clear knowledge of the rules that were established, or at least the guidance provided by NATO. There was, I remember, very clear direction or guidance to our staff to hand over in very much the same manner that we do now, which is 96 hours maximum, and under the types of conditions we see now, but not the type of very well-coordinated detainee agreement that the government has now established and that is much more comprehensive. This has been a feature of bilateral negotiations between countries and Afghanistan as we've gotten into the much more volatile operations we see now in the south and the east, but particularly in the south.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Thank you for that.

You talked about, and everybody knows, that Canada has gained respect and admiration in the international community. We talk about consequences of the mission. I want to talk about the consequences of failure.

I want to get your thoughts on the consequences of failure of the mission in Afghanistan to Canada if Canada is deemed to be the cause of that failure because of a decreased commitment, and also the consequences of failure to NATO and the future of NATO. The consequences of failure to Afghanistan itself are obviously catastrophic, but I want to get your thoughts on the consequences of failure to Canada if we're seen to be the cause of that failure, and the consequences of failure to NATO as an alliance.

[Gen Raymond Henault]

Because this mission is a very broad-reaching one, with 37 nations involved, I think no single nation would be the cause of failure of this mission, understanding that some nations have a larger commitment than others because they're capable of providing more. Canada is among those that have provided a much larger commitment than others, but again with a force that has been expeditionary for decades and is quite capable of doing the operations that we now see in Afghanistan, something many forces have patterned their deployments on. We find from a NATO perspective that there are many forces, if they're going to partner with a nation in Afghanistan where they have a smaller capability, that will always seek out nations like Canada to partner with because they know how beneficial that would be to their own ability to make a difference, but also knowing that Canada is very capable from an operational and an overall mission point of view.

What I would say from the consequences point of view is that this would be extremely damaging for NATO and for the international community if we were to fail in Afghanistan. This is the first expeditionary operation for NATO in the post-Cold War timeframe—expeditionary in the sense that it's well outside the traditional Euro-Atlantic area, not looking at Bosnia or Kosovo in the same light in terms of expeditionary—and this really defines what NATO is all about in terms of not trying to be a global NATO, not by any stretch, but rather, trying to be a NATO with global partners and trying to project security and stability much further away than it had in the past, especially with comprehensive political guidance, having identified that as close in being out to 5,000 kilometres from the Euro-Atlantic area, and far out being about 15,000 kilometres.

So if we were to fail, we would damage our credibility in an almost irretrievable way, in my view. Hence the importance of all nations recognizing that and continuing to commit to the long-term success of the mission.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

And Canada is clearly a critical part of success in the mission, or failure, if it were to come to that.

[Gen Raymond Henault]

Canada has been in the post-9/11 equation right from the beginning. I remember, in the first post-9/11 period, dispatching a ship that was in the standing naval maritime group north, if you like, the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, to the North Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf to support those operations as quickly as possible.

So this has been our mandate. Canada has always taken on the tough missions and it has always prevailed as well. We look back to World War I and World War II, Korea, and now Afghanistan, and all of those missions have had Canada at a very central position in both execution and also measures of success. So, yes, Canada is a very important cog in the wheel.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

I want to talk a little bit about contingency planning. Some people jump to a conclusion that if the military or an organization has a contingency plan to do A, B, C, or D, you're obviously planning to do that.

As you well know, the military has contingency plans on the shelf for many, many eventualities. Can you comment on the importance of contingency planning to the military or any organization that doesn't plan to fail?

[Gen Raymond Henault]

Well, contingency planning is part of our lifeblood. We have operational planners. We have defence planners. We have planners at all levels, whether it's at NATO headquarters, Brussels, or within the Supreme Allied Commander's staff in Mons, or down at the Joint Force Command in Brunssum, indeed, down to the Commander ISAF level in Afghanistan.

In all cases, we do prudent military planning, and we're always looking ahead. We're always looking ahead a significant distance in that very context, in not only the missions in Afghanistan, but also the mission in Kosovo, and the NATO response force, Operation Active Endeavour. We have recognized the criticality of having long-term force-generation processes.

That's a new feature, if you like, of NATO planning, which looks at how we can share the burden and adjust the contributions of different nations over a longer period, using a long-term force-generation process that identifies nations' ability to contribute at different times during the cycle of a mission, and then doing the burden sharing that's required to make sure that all can contribute, or get the regeneration time they need over time.

For Afghanistan specifically, I have spoken to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Craddock, as well as to the Secretary General about the need for us to start looking a much further distance ahead, looking at what's going to happen, not only in 2008 and 2009, when, as many nations have indicated, their parliaments will ultimately have to make decisions as to whether or not they remain, and looking at how we can now sustain this mission in the longer term.

Again, going back to the fact that we have had a history of long-term sustainment in Kosovo and in Bosnia—and even Operation Active Endeavour has been in place for more than six years now—we can do it. We have the capacity, but the planning is crucial to success.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Very good.

Thank you, Mr. Hawn.

That ends our first round. We're going to a five-minute round. Before we do that, though, committee, I know we started late. We had an hour and a half slotted for the General, and we started a tad late.

General, I don't know what your time schedule is. I know we all have commitments, but if we were able to go to about 10 after or 15 after, would you be all right with that?