National Defence Committee on Oct. 28th, 2014

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Welcome, colleagues and guests.

Given the events of the past week and that this is our first committee since the tragic events of last Wednesday, I would like to begin this meeting with a moment of standing silence in memory of Warrant Officer Vincent and Corporal Cirillo.

[A moment of silence observed]

Thank you.

In today's meeting, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we are continuing our study on the defence of North America.

We have two witnesses with us today. They are appearing as individuals, but they are co-authors of a recent study on NORAD and, by implication, the defence of North America.

We have in our committee room Dr. James Fergusson, who is a professor and director of political studies at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba.

Welcome, Dr. Fergusson, and thank you for your appearance here today.

As well, by video conference from Winnipeg, we have Dr. Andrea Charron, associate professor and deputy director of political studies at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba.

Thank you, Dr. Charron, for appearing with us today. If you will, please go ahead with your opening remarks.

[Dr. Andrea Charron, Associate Professor, Deputy Director, Political Studies, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual]

Thank you for the invitation to speak to you today.

I understand that this committee has sought information from a variety of academics and practitioners on the subject of the defence of North America on an ongoing basis. My assumption is that I'm being asked to make comments on NORAD and its role in the defence of North America based on the study that Jim Fergusson and I, with other academics, completed. My remarks today will focus on what is working vis-à-vis NORAD, and the current challenges it faces, especially with respect to the Arctic.

In 2006, NORAD was signed in perpetuity, and a new mission, maritime warning, was added to the air warning and control mission. The justification for the new mission was that 9/11 had proven that defence of the homeland was paramount and that threats could originate from a variety of sources, even from within North America.

NORAD is now undergoing a review of its ability to remain relevant to new threats given current command policies, current mission challenges, potential evolving or emerging roles, and missions and partnerships. This high-level review, consisting of approximately a dozen working groups, is called “NORAD Next”.

This is timely, given that the new maritime warning mission means that organizations other than military-to-military ones, which is the hallmark of the air warning and defence missions, are required to provide information so that NORAD can create a North American-wide maritime picture in addition to its air picture. However, while NORAD Next is preparing for 2030, our study focused on the here and now and what is working and not working for NORAD.

I'll begin with what is working. The binational partnership that is NORAD is incredibly important to both countries, but especially for Canada because of the geostrategic significance of this partnership and for the training opportunities and information it receives. NORAD can provide all-domain awareness and has the benefit now of an air and maritime picture of potential threats to all of North America.

Still, there are areas of concern that I wish to highlight. I have chosen to focus on the Arctic given my research area of expertise.

Arguably, the Arctic has always been a critical focus of NORAD. Indeed, during the Cold War, NORAD was focused on the threat emanating from the direction of the Arctic, hence, the logo of NORAD has a broadsword facing northward.

There is a fierce debate in Canada about whether or not the Arctic is subject to increased threats, especially from states like Russia and China, because the Arctic has garnered more attention for a variety of reasons, including melting ice, maritime boundary issues, and resource extraction. First, none of these activities in and of themselves are defence threats to the Arctic automatically, and second, there are many things the Canadian government can do that can help ensure increased traffic and attention in the Arctic is of benefit to Canada, such as better infrastructure, more services, and more navigational aids.

Based on the unclassified information I have reviewed, we can say that, yes, there have been Russian sorties of late, but this is not new, nor is it new for NORAD. Indeed, this is its bread and butter. What is of concern, however, is the aging NORAD infrastructure and general rust-out, especially with respect to the north warning system, which is made up of long-range and short-range radars. The north warning system is coming to its end of life, and some would argue that it is located too far south.

The north warning system provides critical information not only to allow NORAD to detect threats, but also to provide valuable constabulary information to both Canada and the U.S. We need this information to continue to be fed to Canadian Joint Operations Command, or CJOC, U.S. Northern Command, and NORAD.

Whether the north warning system remains in its present or some other form—for example, perhaps space-based—the cost of replacing or reinventing a north warning-like capability will be in the billions of dollars, and governments tend to be chary of such capital outlays, especially during uncertain economic times and when trying to replace infrastructure and capital across the country.

Often it is reported that melting ice leads to automatic increases in shipping and resource extraction in the Canadian Arctic, but (a) there is no direct causal relationship, and (b) increased traffic is not a NORAD-only concern.

A number of projects are tracking the amount of traffic in the Arctic. I'm involved with one: the Arctic marine use and transportation project, run by Jackie Dawson at the University of Ottawa. It will map for Canada the ultimate route for ships to follow in using the Northwest Passage, to limit the impact of shipping on Arctic ecology, benefit northern communities, and be safe for ships, given the incredibly difficult navigational realities of the Arctic. Such predictability would be a boon for NORAD, which could then separate the predictable law-abiding vessels from those they and other departments flag for warning.

Other concerns include the need for more communication infrastructure in the north, both for civilian and classified military use. We will need to ensure that these assets can be protected from cyber-attacks.

The NORAD maritime warning mission is new and is not as mature and well resourced as the air warning and control functions. This is why Dr. Fergusson and I have applied for funding to study this mission specifically.

According to testimony by General Jacoby, the commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM, to the U.S. House Armed Services Committee in February of this year, the number of maritime warnings issued by NORAD increased from 8 in 2012 to 14 in 2013.

We do not have any idea of what percentage of all potential threats this represents or how many potential threats were dealt with at the national level before a NORAD warning was warranted. Still, another set of eyes on the North America-wide, all-domain picture is another opportunity to protect the homeland or to put Canada first, the number one priorities of both the U.S. and Canada.

Finally, the bifurcated command arrangement between the Canadian NORAD region, or CANR, and the Canadian Joint Operations Command needs to be considered. CJOC represents the amalgamation of several former commands. It is nearly two years old and is now being tested because of combat operations outside of Canada in addition to the need to conduct domestic missions. CANR, via 1 Canadian Air Division in Winnipeg and the joint force air component commander, is historically well linked to NORAD, but CJOC is still making and perfecting links with NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and CANR as a result of this new maritime warning function.

Finally, I'm conscious that with last week's events in Ottawa and Quebec, despite those being ground events, NORAD was put on heightened alert, which was important given that at the time there was uncertainty regarding the nature and scope of the threat. It demonstrates the continued importance of this binational agreement that binds the U.S. and Canada inextricably to the defence of North America.

Mr. Chair, these are my opening remarks. I'd be happy to answer any questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you very much, Professor.

Dr. Fergusson, please, for your opening remarks.

[Dr. James Fergusson, Professor, Director, Political Studies, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual]

Thank you.

As noted by my colleague, Dr. Charron, who's a lead scholar for the “NORAD in Perpetuity?” study, this brief presentation draws directly from some of our findings. As I have no doubt that you are aware, the subject of the defence of North America is an extremely broad, deep, and complicated one, especially in terms of the range of issues involved, encompassing land, sea, air, outer space, the cyberworld, defence industrial, defence technology, and research and development, among other issues.

As the defence of North America has consistently been qualified in government documents over time by reference to the phrase “in cooperation with the United States”, one is immediately directed towards two questions or considerations as a means to understand Canada's North American defence relationship with the United States. One I loosely term as the dominant but not exclusive Canadian question, and the other is the dominant but again not exclusive American question.

The dominant Canadian question concerns the type or form of cooperation with the United States that should be undertaken in order to enhance Canadian defence and security in North America. The American question is the proportion of American defence and security in North America that should be undertaken in cooperation with Canada.

The foundation for the first question is simply the fact that Canadian military capabilities are dwarfed by the capabilities of the United States. The United States possesses the capabilities to defend all of North America. As such, under the traditional idea of “defence against help” that is produced by the reality of capabilities relative to an evolving or changing threat environment, Canada's fundamental national strategic interest continues to seek the means to ensure that U.S. plans to defend North America take into account Canadian defence requirements.

In effect, Canada seeks opportunities to influence American thinking and American planning. The means have been twofold: binationalism and bilateralism.

Binationalism, embedded in the NORAD arrangement, was initially driven by the common threat posed during the Cold War by the Soviet Union and its long-range bomber force, and functional defence requirements to ensure an effective and efficient response. This led NORAD into its two main missions: aerospace early warning—initially air breathing—and then ballistic missiles/space threats and aerospace control or defence, which remains restricted to air breathing threats.

Since its establishment, NORAD has been the institutional centrepiece of the Canada-U.S. defence relationship in North America, but NORAD or binationalism does not account for the majority of the actual defence relationship. Beyond its two missions and the addition of the maritime early warning mission in 2006, the overwhelming majority of the relationship has been bilateral in nature.

There was an expectation after 9/11, in the context of the new threat environment and the subsequent establishment of first the binational planning cell and then the successor, the binational planning group, which issued a final report in 2006, that NORAD or binationalism would expand to encompass greater cooperation. This did not occur beyond the addition of the maritime early warning mission, and this mission, in functional terms, was driven by the recognition that a maritime threat approaching the North American continent might quickly transition into an air breathing threat requiring a NORAD response. Specifically, a freighter might become the platform for the launch of a cruise missile.

Importantly, the new mission did not entail additional NORAD assets per se, but rather placed NORAD as a recipient of new maritime domain awareness information at the end of national sourcing and as an add-on to evolving bilateral arrangements between these national sources, which included both military and civilian agencies in both countries.

The dominant perception in this regard is that the United States sought a broader and deeper binational arrangement to include both sea and land, but Canada said no. I would suggest that the U.S. believed that its defence required expanded cooperation with Canada but was largely open to a range of modes of cooperation. Canada's preference was bilateralism, for a range of political reasons stemming primarily from concerns related to Canadian sovereignty.

The core issue confronting this committee is whether the current structure of the relationship concerning the defence of North America, dominated by bilateral arrangements relative to the three existing binational missions, is functionally efficient and effective for the defence and security of Canada relative to the current and future threat environments and the reality of constrained and limited defence resources on both sides of the border.

In this regard, let me add that NORAD binationalism, in practice, has not been a one-size-fits-all relationship or one dictated by the United States. There are national caveats that exist within the binational relationship, and the operational reality of NORAD's air defence mission, for example, is aptly summed up in the phrase “decentralized command and decentralized execution”.

The American recognition post-9/11 that homeland defence requirements required greater cooperation with Canada has not been replicated in the case of the thorny issue of ballistic missile defence in Canada. Importantly, the current system deployed in Alaska and California, and possibly a future interceptor site in the United States northeast, is a function of a congressional mandate in law to defend all of the continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii—not Canada.

As a function of its evolution and the failed 2003-04 negotiations, which were initiated by Canada, it is clear that the United States, for now, does not perceive cooperation with Canada as required for defence of a ballistic missile attack. The only portion of the missile defence equation sought through cooperation with Canada was a link of NORAD's aerospace—the ballistic missile and space component part of it—early warning assessment into NORTHCOM, or the Northern Command missile defence system, which Canada agreed to.

Even then, dedicated forward-deployed missile defence U.S. tracking and queuing radars are not linked into NORAD. It may be the case, however, that the U.S. will identify, if or when a third site is established, that a forward-tracking radar on eastern Canadian soil is necessary. If so, this will provide a range of options relative to the specific form of cooperation or Canadian participation.

For the time being, the issue of ballistic missile defence for Canada is a national one. Does Canada need the capability to defend itself against a ballistic missile attack relative to its origin and nature? If so, the issue becomes the possibility and cost of acquiring a national capability from the United States, and such a decision would naturally alter U.S. defence thinking and planning and possibly place NORAD back into the equation. If not, then missile defence will remain, in American thinking, a U.S.-only mission.

I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you very much, Dr. Fergusson.

We will proceed with the first round of questions, with seven minutes for each questioner, beginning with Mr. Norlock, please.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and through you to the witnesses, thank you for being here today.

My question is based on fiscal responsibility and how we exercise it. I believe Professor Charron mentioned the rusting out of the north warning system. How do we begin to replace infrastructure or do things...? The infrastructure is becoming obsolete. My concentration would be on whether satellites, unmanned aircraft, are a more economical way than building these radar sites across North America, such as the old early warning radar systems, in that satellites look down. We know the technology in satellites is such that they can almost—and I think in some cases can—read licence plates on cars.

I'd like both of you to comment specifically on whether satellites and unmanned aircraft are a more economical way to defend North America from an air threat, or perhaps even a maritime one, because we know there are different platforms that threats can take place from.

Also, if you wouldn't mind, could you comment on the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which you mentioned in some of literature you've referred to, and how it can relate to what I've just asked?

We could perhaps start with Professor Fergusson and move on to Professor Charron in response to that question.

[Dr. James Fergusson]

Briefly, satellites can do a lot for you, but they can't do everything that most people think they can do.

The current system that does provide limited wide area surveillance of the Arctic is RADARSAT-2. It provides all-weather capabilities 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

The planned deployment of our RADARSAT constellation for an additional three satellites will boost the coverage or exposure time, the ability to revisit areas. It basically provides wide area surveillance to identify something going on, such as a ship moving out there. The technology does not now provide the capability to provide a specific, narrow “what is this vessel?” answer. It may be able to provide that it is a vessel, but you need to send in something else for narrow surveillance or reconnaissance purposes.

Whether these should be drones or existing aircraft or new aircraft—and I'm not considering the F-35 here—is an interesting question from a cost perspective. There's an assumption that drones are cheap. Well, they're not cheap: you will still need infrastructure and alternative training. It requires significant investment.

We have an existing capability, which is an air breathing and pilot-driven capacity for reconnaissance—very limited—relative to investing in the large numbers of drones that you're going to need and the infrastructure that goes along with it. I can't answer on the trade-off, but you still need a supporting system at the end of the day, a north warning system.

One thing that's important to remember about satellites, and I'll conclude here, is that the north warning system was modernized in the 1980s. We are now 30-plus years away from that. Satellites don't last 30 years. You have to replace them in five to ten years, depending on how lucky you are relative to the harsh environment in outer space. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty has no bearing on this issue at all.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Dr. Charron.

[Dr. Andrea Charron]

Thank you.

The only comment I would make in addition on satellites is that often they have a predictable orbit, so we have to ensure that we have the opportunity to see all of the Arctic in one go. That's the advantage of the long-range and short-range radars.

If we were to completely replace the north warning system with unmanned aircraft, I would have a few concerns with that. First of all, we're talking about an incredible distance and amount of geography to track, and it may encourage more attacks. You have the impetus of being able to hedge your bet and hoping you are able to enter into Canadian airspace or marine space when the unmanned aircraft is not there. That's the advantage of the radar system: we always know where it is, and it's tracking 24 hours.

Rather than starting from whether we should be replacing the north warning system or not, maybe we should be thinking about the kind of information that NORAD and other agencies need, given that NORAD now is in the business of tracking not only traditional defence threats but also new threats like pollution and cyber-attacks. Do we need something different from the north warning system or in addition to it? Given that the cost of putting in this infrastructure is so expensive—in the billions of dollars—and that other agencies are going to benefit from this information, is there not a way that we can have one system collecting multiple bits of information that are then fed to the necessary agencies?

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Since we have one minute left, I'd like to have you each make a quick comment with regard to, as you mentioned, Professor Charron, cyber-attacks. We see more and more of an interrelation between military and commercial cyber-attacks as a way of weakening the economy or defences.

Number one, we all know we have to spend more, so would you both comment on whether the authority should be under one roof? In Canada, it's under several roofs.

We'll start with Professor Charron.

[Dr. Andrea Charron]

The only comment I can make is that right now NORAD's requirement is to protect NORAD assets. Whether or not it should then be responsible for tracking other cybersecurity threats—for instance, civilian apparatus—it would mean that we need to change the nature of NORAD and the command and control structures to be able to do that.

[Dr. James Fergusson]

Beyond the important requirement to protect their own systems from cyber-attack through the military, I'm of the view that really this is not a military function. Certainly, in terms of North American defence or homeland defence in Canada and the United States, the military, by nature of its capabilities, is important in terms of consequent management of these events, but I don't see that really the military, the defence, should be taking the lead.

We are driven, as we always have been, by the United States. They set up a cyber command and somehow we think we should as well. Well, they are entirely different, those American motives and what's driving the United States, and what's driving our interests here.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you. Your time is up.

Mr. Davies, please.

[Don Davies, NDP, Vancouver Kingsway, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Dr. Charron and Dr. Fergusson, for being with us today.

Dr. Charron, I'm going to start with you. You mentioned priorities in your opening remarks. I'm wondering, from an operational perspective, what you believe are the key actions that Canada and the U.S. need to take to ensure NORAD's continued relevance and effectiveness.

[Dr. Andrea Charron]

Thank you.

Well, I think NORAD is doing that, and it's prompted by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, the NAS/NORAD, and with General Jacoby's enthusiasm to look at how NORAD is going to remain relevant: the model for future and emerging threats. These working groups—and hopefully we'll have a report in a December-January timeframe—are really looking at the horizon out until 2030.

What Jim and I were interested in, however, was the here and now. While it's important to plan for the future, there are issues such as the fact that CJOC has been up and operational for nearly two years now. How does the Canadian CANR-CJOC relationship feed into NORAD? Those are more immediate concerns that we thought perhaps we could aid with.

In terms of priorities, I think NORAD is doing their due diligence. They are thinking about this, and we're trying to fill in a few gaps. I also note that we are hoping to do a study just on maritime warning, because that's the newest mission and it's by far the least understood.

[Don Davies, NDP, Vancouver Kingsway, BC]

Thank you.

Dr. Fergusson, I'd like to talk a bit about ballistic missile defence. Your report states that “given U.S. cuts to defence...Canada would have to make a significant contribution and investment” to participate in the program. In your view, what would be the cost implications for Canada to join the United States' BMD program? Could you give us a ballpark idea?

[Dr. James Fergusson]

It's very difficult to cost-estimate. The idea that somehow we can go to the United States and say that we want to participate and we can assign personnel and NORAD will get a window into the U.S. missile defence systems and get access to more planning, to intercept strategies, etc., I think is just simply wishful thinking on our part. It's part of what derailed the negotiations that Canada initiated in 2003-04, which was, if we participate, what does it mean?

It seems to me that if we're going to participate, then there would have to be some investments that provide added efficiency or effectiveness for the American system and would drive the United States to consider in fact opening the door and rethinking its current U.S.-only planning structure and process.

Radar? What does a modern tracking-queuing radar cost? I don't know. Interceptors? The current per unit price of an interceptor is $75 million. You can add up how many you want, where you would want to put them, and how this would assist the United States, but it's not free. We missed the free bus 20 years ago when things were different.

[Don Davies, NDP, Vancouver Kingsway, BC]

I'm going to ask you about priorities as well. Recently the Canadian Armed Forces have been grappling with significant cuts in addition to what has been called “reprofiling” of $3.1 billion in last year's budget. Given the significant need for military equipment in the form of ships and jets to defend Canada, what priority would you recommend BMD have for Canada?

[Dr. James Fergusson]

On the surface, the natural conclusion, given the nature of the threat, which is not clear right now—it's still evolving relative to North Korea and the question of the future of Iran's nuclear program and its ballistic missile program—and relative to the pressing need to replace the existing fighter force and large chunks of the Canadian navy, it's not one that I would suggest is a high priority right now.

[Don Davies, NDP, Vancouver Kingsway, BC]

This is for either of you, Dr. Charron or Dr. Fergusson.

You've mentioned space and of course the issue of BMD is linked to Canada's policy with respect to outer space and the non-weaponization of space. That has been Canada's policy.

I wonder whether you still feel that the non-weaponization of space is a wise policy to pursue. If so, why? Or why not?

[Dr. James Fergusson]

I'll answer this very simply. It's a wonderful rhetorical policy, but space is weaponized. Don't think it isn't. Satellites in orbit with fuel can be used to collide with other satellites. A missile defence system can strike at satellites in space. A variety of issues are coming down the road that require significant thinking on the part of Canada in the future.

I'm not trying to be a scaremonger about these things, but there are things Canada doesn't pay attention to that we need to pay attention to. We can keep the rhetoric of opposing the weaponization of space—the Americans and everyone oppose it—but strategic realities are changing.

[Don Davies, NDP, Vancouver Kingsway, BC]

Dr. Charron, do you have any comment in that regard?

[Dr. Andrea Charron]

Jim is really the expert when it comes to space and the weaponization of space.

[Don Davies, NDP, Vancouver Kingsway, BC]

I want to turn to aircraft. The U.S. government is reportedly looking beyond fifth-generation stealth jet fighter aircraft, such as the F-35 Lightning II, and we hear that it has initiated work on sixth-generation platforms.

Do you know when our sixth-generation fighter prototype is expected to be rolled out? How will this timing affect existing fifth-generation fighter programs, for example the F-35 program?

[Dr. James Fergusson]

Do you want me to answer?