Good day. Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you members of the committee for this opportunity to answer your questions about this very important matter.
My name is Gilles Michaud. I am the director general of national security criminal operations. I've been occupying that position for the last eight months.
I am accompanied this morning by Superintendent Bert Hoskins, who is in charge of our national security legislative affairs branch.
First, I would like to emphasize that the RCMP takes the findings of the O'Connor and Iacobucci inquiries with the utmost seriousness.
In the process of implementing all the recommendations directed at the RCMP that Justice O'Connor made in Part 1 of his report, the RCMP has strengthened its policies and governance framework regarding national security criminal investigations.
These enhancements have focused on relations with partner agencies, cultural sensitivity and human rights training, information sharing and central control.
We have provided the committee with a comprehensive document explaining how the RCMP has addressed each of Justice O'Connor's part one recommendations that apply to the force. Last week we invited some of your committee staff members and researchers into our office to further discuss the steps that we have taken to ensure that Justice O'Connor's recommendations help to guide the important work we do to protect Canada's national security. I believe our actions speak to the RCMP's commitment in addressing the important issues raised by Justice O'Connor and Justice Iacobucci. Indeed, O'Connor's part one recommendations are now at the core of how the RCMP conducts national security criminal investigations.
I would like to take a moment to mention some of the key areas in which, from a national security perspective, we have moved forward. In developing the government's framework for increased effectiveness and the policy on national security, we have strengthened our capacity to centrally monitor, supervise, and direct national security criminal investigations. This is achieved largely through more responsibility and accountability at all levels, in conjunction with a decentralized governance approach. This means, among other things, that our employees have a clear and concise framework within which to operate—one that ensures centralized control and monitoring of national security criminal investigations. Bolstering this framework is the fact that our employees have access to enhanced training that addresses human rights and cultural sensitivities. This training is given by respected citizens representing Canada's diverse communities and is regularly updated to reflect the current environment. The national security program's extensive community outreach activities are intended to build mutual trust and understanding between RCMP personnel and the community members most affected by national security operations.
Regarding information sharing, the RCMP will continue its policy of releasing information to relevant partner agencies, as supported by Justice O'Connor in his report. In adhering to his recommendations, we must ensure that information is shared in accordance with clearly established policies respecting relevance, reliability, and accuracy. In addition, national security criminal investigations consult with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade when assessing the implications of sharing information with a country that has a questionable human rights record.
As stated in our policy, in assessing the implications of sharing information with a country with a questionable human rights record, every attempt is made to ensure there is no support or condonation of torture or other abuse of human rights. Specifically, the RCMP conducts an analysis of the human rights record of a country with which it intends to share information. This analysis is based on DFAIT annual reports assessing that country's human rights record. Reports from other human rights organizations may also be consulted. All decisions to interact with a country with a questionable human rights record are documented, including the importance of supplying or receiving such information and the implication of doing so for Canada's human rights obligations.
I would like to be clear that there is no absolute ban on the use of any information received by the RCMP. However, we do not use information whose reliability, accuracy, and relevance is suspect. Information knowingly extracted under torture would by definition be unreliable. In the real world, the challenge is to make a judgment on the known facts about whether any particular information received is the result of torture. Our policy is based on making such assessments on a case-by-case basis.
I would also like to stress that the RCMP's relationship with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service is as strong as ever. We have updated the RCMP-CSIS Memorandum of Understanding to clarify key aspects of our respective operations, and to establish procedures that help resolve problems in a cooperative manner. This has further strengthened our working relationship by instituting activities such as joint workshops aimed at clarifying the respective roles and responsibilities of the two organizations. We are committed to further changes to our national security criminal operations as we continuously adapt to the ever-changing environment.
In closing, I would like to say that public trust is essential to the RCMP's ability to respond to issues of national security. To this end, the RCMP fully supports enhanced review of its national security criminal investigations, and recognizes the important role it plays in maintaining this trust. Enhanced review, however, can only be implemented by the Government of Canada, and any questions on this issue should be directed to the Department of Public Safety.
The RCMP will work within whatever framework the Government of Canada adopts to establish the necessary oversight structures that will ensure continued transparency and accountability of our national security criminal investigations.
Thank you.