If I could just add to that, we could look at the Five Eyes partners, in particular, and I think we would find in that look that they all have different forms of judicial or executive authorization for surveillance abroad, and indeed for surveillance at home. They're probably all variations on a theme.
I think what makes the Canadian legislation unique is a product of the fact that we're trying to find a legislative scheme for an agency that is, as I've said, a hybrid. CSIS started out being a domestic security intelligence service and we fashioned laws to allow them to perform that function and to control that function in terms of possible abuses. Now it is, in addition, a foreign intelligence service in a way that there is no parallel among any of our Five Eyes partners.
All of our Five Eyes partners have separate foreign intelligence services and domestic security intelligence services. They have made those separations over time for reasons that they think are very good reasons, and I think they're reasons that stand up in terms of international perspective as being very good reasons.
They are very different skill sets, very different training regimes, very different resources, very different kinds of forms of internal accountability and external review that are required for those two very different kinds of operations, operating abroad versus operating at home.
We're trying to find a legislative fix-up for an agency that we've allowed to evolve into this hybrid model, without giving that evolution any serious consideration. That is the concern that, I think, Parliament and anyone interested in the functioning of the Canadian intelligence community should have.