Jean-Marc Jacob

[Supply, November 21st, 1995]

The comments of my colleagues across the way are most amusing.

To continue, I would like to add that, during the defence policy review, we discussed procurement policy. A degree of agreement was reached that National Defence ought in future to purchase from companies already equipped with the necessary expertise and infrastructures, in order to make optimum use of the taxpayers' funds.

Here again, in the Bloc's dissenting report, reference was made to certain situations in which it had been found that there had been overruns, sometimes extremely substantial, and that the construction of certain plants had cost the taxpayers dearly. I referred earlier to the fact that Halifax got infrastructure subsidies in order to obtain the frigate contract. Under such circumstances, the costs are definitely greater.

Except where it would be more profitable to acquire systems already available within Quebec or Canada, I am convinced that this procurement policy is a good thing, nevertheless.

We must, however, avoid simplistic analyses of the situation. In some areas of activity, there are Canadian and Quebec firms which are totally competitive and competent and, contrary to some people's desire to see all defence spending curtailed or totally abolished, I feel that it is definitely necessary. The defence industry, whether in Quebec or in Canada, includes certain high tech jobs I feel are very important, if not vital, for certain regions, whether in Quebec or in elsewhere in Canada.

However, as I said right at the start, it is important to have a procurement policy but it must be applied consistently, whether in a given sector within Quebec or elsewhere in Canada, the Maritimes or Ontario for instance.

In the dissenting report, reference was made to the necessity of our immediately opposing abandonment of the regional redistribution policy, because it might serve the interests of Quebec businesses in coming months.

The systems whose manufacture is currently in the planning stages call upon technical expertise located outside Quebec, whereas the opposite situation has prevailed in the past.

For this reason, Quebec may well find it increasingly harder to secure its "fair share" in future. It is unthinkable that a policy that has been a barrier for Quebec in the past could be terminated now, at a time when it could be invaluable.

That is what we said in the dissenting report prepared by the Bloc Quebecois. When the minister says we agreed, we did have certain reservations. The minister says we agreed with the purchase of armoured personnel carriers, but we had certain reservations and as far as the submarines were concerned, we were definitely against that purchase.

I may add that at the Department of National Defence, at Defence headquarters, there is a policy for defence procurement. It is dated June 1995. This is not old stuff. This is an internal document circulating within the department.

Here is one item that states: "Contribute to long term regional and industrial development and to achieving relevant national objectives".

This is another one: "Priority shall be given to products and services that are respectively manufactured and provided in Canada and to certain other products and services if there is sufficient competition".

During the 1993 election campaign, the Liberals often referred to a defence conversion program, and in fact this was part of the Liberal Party's wonderful red book. They have now been here for two years, and I wish someone would show me an example of defence conversion. In any case, it certainly did not happen in Quebec. If it did anywhere else, it was a well-kept secret. Maybe in the maritimes because I vaguely remember that at some time, the Minister of Supply and Services tried to take a certain amount from the Department of National Defence for some industry.

Unfortunately, in every case the defence conversion program proposed by the Liberals-and unfortunately people often call this having a selective memory-when the Bloc Quebecois approved the cancellation of the EH-101 helicopters, that approval was conditional on the implementation of a thorough and practical defence conversion policy.

It has now been two years and nothing has transpired. Some of my colleagues will expand a little on the DIPP and the new development fund for defence conversion. Let us face it, this is a worldwide phenomenon. Since the end of the cold war, the defence industry has not been in the best of shapes. Just in Quebec, in the past five years, deliveries of defence products have declined by 48 per cent.

This means Quebec has lost nearly 30 per cent of the jobs connected with Canada's defence industry. Neither the policy nor the promises in the Liberal Party's red book with respect to defence conversion specify how this is supposed to work.

Several times the minister of defence told us that his budget had no money for defence conversion and that it was the responsibility of the Department of Industry. In the red book it was put very clearly, but we have seen no results. When we in the Bloc point out that certain expenditures seem to be a waste of money and the government goes ahead anyway, we have no choice but to ask the government to apply the same economic spinoff policies it applies to Ontario or the maritimes but not to Quebec.

[Supply, November 21st, 1995]

Just one moment. I see that the department is reacting rather quickly, and I will give you enough time to respond. Allow me to continue.

Given the population's strong, I would even say violent, opposition to the purchase of these submarines, they came back with a new formula. The cost of the submarines went down to $500 million with ill-defined exchanges of training time whose value was somewhat indeterminate.

The minister announced at the time that negotiations had not started and would be postponed. They waited until the middle of August, while it was still summer, before telling us that they had bought new armoured personnel carriers for our Canadian soldiers.

We see that the Canadian content is very high. The contract was awarded without tender to a London, Ontario company, a General Motors subsidiary, for the manufacture of armoured personnel carriers. I then said on behalf of the official opposition that buying new armoured personnel carriers was a waste of money when we already had over 1,700 of them in stock and when only about 215 or 218 were used for the most part during the mission in Bosnia.

The minister had indicated at the time, during special joint committee hearings, that a report had been prepared and that the Bloc Quebecois agreed with the procurement of these armed personnel carriers.

Unfortunately, I do not think that the minister bothered to read the Bloc's dissenting report, because this report, drafted by the Bloc Quebecois members of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy, clearly stated that, in our view, buying new APCs for better armour protection was only justified if Canada and its peacekeepers were to continue to take part in warlike actions and armed conflicts.

My understanding, based on what was discussed at committee and elsewhere, was that a review of Canada's peace effort was contemplated and that we would only participate in missions that did not involve the use of weapons, as was always the case in the past for our peacekeepers. It seems very clear to me that, if the nature of peace missions was to be changed to focus again on peacekeeping-the kind of missions the Canadian Armed Forces have always being involved in and carried out remarkably-there would be no point in having APCs with improved armour since our role would have changed. That was clearly stated in the Bloc's dissenting report. In this regard, the Bloc Quebecois always stood by its policy, remaining steadfast, regardless of what the minister and his department might say.

Coming back to the history of the tendering for APCs, a certain company was awarded without tender the $2 billion armoured vehicle acquisition contract.

From then on, nothing could be done. When the government makes a decision without taking into account the fact that we oppose the acquisition of armoured personnel carriers and awards the contract, since all members have the duty to look after the interests of the people they represent in their region or province, we ask that the government at least acknowledge the existence, in Quebec, of a company whose expertise in manufacturing armoured vehicle turrets is internationally recognized and that it even go a far as demanding that the contract and economic benefits be split.

Shortly before the referendum, as I recall, the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs had sent a letter to Oerlikon stating that it would, of course, be considered for a later turret manufacturing contract with GM. Later, we learned that there were no dealings between GM and Oerlikon and that it was out of the question for GM to be forced to go with Oerlikon. The turrets can easily be ordered from the U.S. They had no qualms makings this kind of statement. This reminds me that all this love expressed before the referendum now appears to be dissipating like some sort of vapour blown away by the wind.

I would like to add, regarding this famous armoured vehicle renewal contract, that this is another instance where there seems to be something of a double standard. As far as the work to be carried out in Quebec is concerned, no problem, no requirements need to be set. On the other hand, for those vehicles to be overhauled in Chatham-because Chatham was affected by base closures-the minister said the part of the work on the 450 armoured vehicles must be carried out in Chatham to offset the losses caused by the closure of CFB Chatham.

Strangely enough, there is no infrastructure whatsoever in Chatham to support the repair and overhaul of these vehicles. This means that subsidies will have to be granted, as this was done-as several members probably remember-for the Canadian patrol

frigates, since Halifax did not have the basic infrastructure required to build the frigates. Between $350 million and $360 million was spent in subsidies to put the infrastructure in place so that the shipyard could secure the contract.

A competitor for MIL Davie, in Lauzon, which had the required infrastructure to execute the contract, appeared out of thin air. Something similar is happening now. When there is a closing in a place such as Chatham, some compensation must be made through economic spinoffs. Consequently, the government requires that the upgrading of the 450 armoured personnel carriers be done in Chatham.

As for the closure of the military college in Saint-Jean and the downsizing at the military base in that municipality, the government should use the same approach, avoid any double standard and say: "Yes, the Saint-Jean region was adversely affected. Consequently, since Oerlikon is located in the area, we should tell GM that a portion of the armoured personnel carriers contract ought to be awarded to Oerlikon". But no.

The minister tells us that he cannot get involved in the discussions going on between the companies. If this is the case, why is it that he can require that part of the upgrading be done in Chatham, where there is no existing infrastructure, but cannot do so when a similar situation occurs in Quebec?

I now move on to the helicopter issue, more specifically the recent announcement made by the defence minister concerning the acquisition of 15 search and rescue helicopters. During the review of Canada's defence policy, the Bloc did agree with the acquisition of search and rescue helicopters.

However, it did not agree with buying armoured personnel carriers and submarines and this is clearly stated in the dissenting report. It might be worth taking a look at that document, so that we are not accused of being inconsistent. The fact is that we did show consistency in our approach to this issue.

In the case of the helicopter contract, there is again some sort of a double standard. There is really no Canadian company that builds search and rescue helicopters similar to the Labrador. You have to go to Boeing with the Chinook, Sikorsky with the S-70, Eurocopter with the Cougar, and Agusta-Westland with the Cormoran, as well as another Russian company.

In Quebec, there is Bell Helicopter. This Quebec company, Canadian company builds helicopters that do not quite meet the requirements of the defence department for search and rescue helicopters. Therefore, the minister decided to call for tenders. Since no Canadian company builds these helicopters, a call for tenders can be made. No Canadian content requirement has to be met. Yet, in the case of these helicopters, we could, given the existing infrastructures, have part of the contract executed by a Canadian company, or at least demand that this be done, as in the case of Chatham, or in the case of GM, in London.

As mentioned by the special joint committee in its discussions on the procurement policy, the government is adamant about calling for tenders, to save money. However, if you use that approach, you have to do it all the time and in a consistent manner, regardless of which industry is involved, or whether that industry is located in Quebec or in Ontario. It is difficult to see any consistency in the approach used by the department, since it applies a given measure in one case and different one in another situation.

Let me give you another example. The defence minister tells us, by calling for tenders, that we do not trust our Quebec companies. Bell could bid to provide a portion of the helicopter's equipment, and Oerlikon could bid to build the turrets of the armoured personnel carriers, because we want some Canadian content and we want to award contracts to existing companies. But the minister tells us that we do not trust our companies.

It seems to me that he has a funny way of showing his lack of confidence in Ontario companies, since in the past five years the federal government has awarded more than $3 billion worth of contracts in Ontario without any bidding process.

I would like to see the same rule apply. If Canadian unity and the federal government are so profitable to the provinces, let them put their money where their mouth is. As far as I am concerned, the only thing they are giving is one more demonstration that, in the case of Quebec and, I might add, some other provinces as well-Parenthetically, let me add, in connection with the base closures in the west and the expansion of the base in Edmonton, when you evaluate all of the costs of closing and reconstruction, there are no savings; it will cost $60 million more.

There are some unkind souls who would say: "Tough luck for those living west of the Rockies, west of Edmonton, because they had the misfortune of voting Reform and that is when the bases got cut in their region". I am beginning to realize that this is a kind of repeat performance: if you do not vote for the Liberals, you pay for it afterward.

If that is how Canadian unity is created, I am even more anxious for Quebecers to finally wake up to the reality. I have the impression that perhaps our colleagues in the West might appreciate that too, at some point.

[Supply, November 21st, 1995]

moved:

That the House condemn the government for having dropped the Canadian content requirements in the contracts for the purchase of military equipment and refusing to set up a genuine program for the conversion of the military industry, thus endangering the Canadian aerospace industry located in Montreal.

Mr. Speaker, my remarks in support of the motion I put forward will certainly go beyond this motion concerning the latest statements made by the defence minister and the Department of National Defence about the acquisition of certain pieces of equipment.

First of all, this motion condemns the government for having dropped the Canadian content requirements in the latest helicopter contract announcement, when this condition was clearly respected and even required in previous contracts.

I started by reviewing how this matter had evolved, a situation that has prompted us to table this motion. During the summer, the minister of defence announced the acquisition of British submarines, which were to cost $1.6 billion excluding maintenance, staff training, and renovations.

[Defence Industry, November 20th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, I was aware of this as well in the contract for armoured personnel carriers which was awarded to Toronto without tender.

At a time when the government still refuses to put in place a genuine defence conversion program for the industry, does the minister realize that by getting rid of Canadian content requirements, he is directly jeopardizing the existence of the defence industry and in this case the aerospace industry which is concentrated in Quebec?

[Defence Industry, November 20th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, first of all I want to thank the Minister of National Defence for his friendly comments in recent weeks.

By refusing to specify a certain percentage of Canadian content in the contract for search and rescue helicopters, the Minister of National Defence has paved the way for a procurement policy that from now on would eliminate any Canadian content requirements from purchase contracts for military equipment. In so doing, the government is directly jeopardizing the existence of the defence industry in Canada and Quebec.

What explanation does the minister have for the fact that barely two months ago, he awarded a $2 billion contract, without tender, to a company in Ontario and that now, in the case of the search and rescue helicopters, he will call for tenders without a Canadian content requirement, when the aerospace industry happens to be concentrated in the Montreal region? Another example of the double standard at work.

[Industry Canada, October 4th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, again, the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs did not answer the question at all. I did not talk about defence supplies but about defence equipment. He did not say anything about that.

Here is my supplementary: As the secret document prepared in March refers to defence contracts in the next three months, how does the minister explain that they have not yet confirmed the benefits from the equipment acquisition contracts? The government is probably saving this lever to put pressure on some Quebec businesses.

[Industry Canada, October 4th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs.

The secret document prepared for Operation Unity shows that the federal government is set to spend $5.6 billion on the potential acquisition of defence equipment, including armoured vehicles, submarines and helicopters. According to the document, these equipment acquisition contracts could have a profound impact on Quebec businesses. The document identifies eight Quebec businesses likely to benefit economically and outlines the political views of their top executives.

How should we describe the federal government's behaviour in dangling in front of some businesses generous contracts in return for their support for the No side? Is this not pure blackmail?

[Cfb Chatham, October 2nd, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, I did not forget the whole business of refurbishing the armoured vehicles, but I remind the minister that he specified that contracts would be in Chatham, whether there is expertise there or not.

Should I understand that when it comes to Ontario and New Brunswick the Minister of National Defence does not hesitate to compensate for closures, protect jobs and even create new ones, whereas for Quebec there is no maintenance work provided for the old armoured vehicles? The Prime Minister wants us to give him good reasons to vote yes, here is one.

[Cfb Chatham, October 2nd, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, my question is to the Minister of National Defence.

In order to lessen the consequences of the closure of the base in Chatham, New Brunswick, the minister forced the bidders for the program of refurbishment of armoured vehicles to do the work in Chatham, where there is no expertise in the field. Yet, in Saint-Jean, Quebec, the government closed the Military College, reduced the staff and the activities of the base, with dire consequences for the region's economy, but offered no compensation whatsoever.

How does the minister justify, on the one hand, compensating Chatham for the losses while, on the other, refusing to give Oerlikon of Saint-Jean the same incentives he gave GM, and this despite the fact that Oerlikon has unique expertise in the area of gun turrets?

[Peacekeeping Act, June 19th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, on several occasions already we have had a chance to speak in the House on subjects concerning the peace missions. As did the member from the Liberal Party and my colleague from Foreign Affairs, we thanked the member for Fraser Valley East for having given us, by means of this bill, an opportunity to discuss the peace missions.

During the review of Canada's defence policy, the question of peacekeeping missions came up in the discussions of the national defence committee, of which I am a member.

When you look at Bill C-295, as the previous speaker remarked, you realize that there is an all-party consensus on the principle of peacekeeping missions and the humanitarian way. I would like to add that the people of Quebec and of Canada accept the fact that Canada participates in peacekeeping missions.

However, I am far from sure that this bill will remedy the shortcomings that have been noted during recent peacekeeping missions, whether in Rwanda or more recently still in the former Yugoslavia.

In my opinion, the bill-and we support it in principle, as I said-contains certain restrictions that are not spelled out as the Bloc Quebecois has requested on a number of occasions. As well, in the report on the review of Canada's defence policy, the member for Shefford and I asked on behalf of the Bloc Quebecois that criteria for peacekeeping missions be defined. Nowhere, either in the bill or in a statement by the government, is there set out what Canada thinks should be the basis for a clear definition of criteria governing participation by our military personnel in other or possible future peacekeeping missions. And yet Canada is supposed to be a leader in peacekeeping missions.

The government or some of its spokesmen have expressed reservations about the bill, saying that the fact that a peacekeeping mission agreement would have to be discussed in the House would slow down the effectiveness and speed of a decision and that this could be prejudicial to certain categories of mission.

Looking at the current mission, I think that argument does not hold a great deal of water, because ever since the conflict in the former Yugoslavia started, the Canadian government has been havering and wavering and sometimes even flip-flopping. When the Minister of Foreign Affairs told the UN last summer that Canada would be encouraging the UN to set up a permanent contingent and that Canada would participate, the Department of National Defence retorted that Canadian military personnel could not serve under an operational command that was not Canadian, and the whole issue is still up in the air.

In my opinion, with respect to peacekeeping in general and the current conflict in the former Yugoslavia in particular, the views of the citizens who pay for the humanitarian mission with their taxes are not given much attention.

Almost 1,800 of the peacekeepers in Bosnia come from CFB Valcartier, which is in my riding, and I can tell you that the people there are extremely interested in any discussion in this House of peacekeeping missions and also in statements from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister, or the Minister of National Defence. Some of them would like to know how it happened that in April 1992 Canada recognized Bosnia-Hercegovina as a sovereign state and called attention to Serb aggression, when throughout the conflict there seems to have been a certain slackness on the UN's part, recognized on all sides.

I have already reminded this House once that General Dallaire said that more than 200 UN resolutions had never been implemented and that with the amount of dithering going on it seemed possible the Serbs would end up laughing at the UN and the international organization.

The Minister of Defence was also reported recently to have said he was beginning to believe that the Serbs were playing cat and mouse.

I would like to add, because the bill does address the peace missions, that when soldiers return from missions, we hear some strange things. We also hear them from European parliamentarians who say that, since the UN has taken a great deal of time to act and change course-Indeed, several persons have requested either a change in the Security Council or a change in the way its resolutions are actually implemented; some persons are trying to say that at present the peace missions are no longer peace missions but no more than buffers between warring parties. They are even going so far as to say that UN peacekeepers, sometimes against their will, or because of the laxity of the UN, will practically be maintaining the conflict or making it drag on.

Mr. Speaker, you are not unaware-you have certainly heard-that when humanitarian convoys travel in the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia, or the self-proclaimed pseudo-Serb republic inside Bosnian territory, they are stopped at the checkpoints and, often enough, equipment, trucks and even food supplies are seized; Serbian soldiers or sometimes Bosnian soldiers then use the goods-ostensibly requisitioned for checkpoint purposes-to line their own pockets by selling them.

I think that the bill on the peace missions is certainly of value, and we agree with it in principle. I would go farther in that direction and say that it is high time the government made a decision once and for all, some aspects of which would certainly be referred to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs or the Defence Committee. It is high time to specify some basic criteria, before sending off our peacekeepers as part of peace missions without previously defining how far they are to go, how long they are to endure being slapped on one cheek and turning the other, and how long they are to be given equipment; I say "given" ironically, because very often that equipment is seized. Unfortunately-or perhaps fortunately-those things are known.

When soldiers return from missions, they mention the damning facts I have mentioned to you. At that point, the public, which, through its taxes, does send our peacekeepers on humanitarian missions, finds it hard to accept that Canada, the leader in peace missions, does not take the lead at the UN once and for all and make a really valid proposal for change that, I am sure, would be accepted by the parties in this House.

There is far too much hesitation and procrastination. I believe we have reached a point where we must-without necessarily pounding the table and becoming belligerent, something Canada has never been-at least manage to define a clear policy. For some eight or 10 months, since the first debates in this House on the peace missions, the Bloc Quebecois has in fact requested that specific criteria be established regarding the role our peacekeepers are called upon to carry out and also regarding a definition of our participation-military or humanitarian-that can be targeted, not only within a budget, but also within the limits of what is acceptable.

After all, we must not delude ourselves and begin to react energetically when we see hostages taken by the Serbs. People saw that on television screens all over the world. I think that chaining up a soldier as a human shield alone runs counter to every principle of the Geneva Convention governing countries at war. Unfortunately, both Canada and the other UN member countries took that incident lightly and hardly reacted to acts that can only be described as barbaric.

In conclusion, I believe that this bill is essentially a good idea, but it needs elaboration, and I would suggest to the government that it initiate a discussion process, both at Foreign Affairs and in the defence committee, with very precise criteria.