Kirsty Duncan

[Multiple Sclerosis, May 5th, 2010]

Mr. Speaker, multiple sclerosis is a devastating, unpredictable disease which affects balance, hearing, memory, mobility and vision. Its effects are physical, emotional and financial, and last a lifetime. MS steals futures from families, and there is no cure.

May is Multiple Sclerosis Awareness Month in Canada. Canada has one of the highest rates of MS in the world. Because many Canadians living with the disease are mothers, the MS carnation campaign takes place over Mother's Day weekend, with thousands of volunteers selling flowers to find a cure.

I encourage all Canadians to buy a carnation to honour the 75,000 Canadians who have tremendous courage to live each day so bravely and to honour the hope that when research shows promise, practitioners ask questions, advocate on behalf of their patients and begin to seek it for them.

[May 3rd, 2010]

Mr. Speaker, the perfect storm is brewing. Each of the social determinants of health, which cause concern, are combining to create a deadly state of affairs.

I call on the government to first convene an emergency health ministers meeting and to work with aboriginal people, the provinces and territories to send in crisis teams to the worst hit communities.

Working in tandem, the government must invite aboriginal people to the table and more importantly, listen. It must address its tuberculosis efforts immediately and set measurable achievable targets with timelines, with real resources. The government must also address the social determinants of health, food insecurity, income, overcrowding, poverty and water.

Finally, the Auditor General might be called in to review why $47 million was spent over the last five years with no change in TB rates.

[May 3rd, 2010]

Mr. Speaker, white crosses mark the Canadian landscape and paint a bleak picture of a terrible tragedy: residential school children who are poorly fed, poorly clothed and have little medical help. These are ideal conditions for the spread of tuberculosis.

In 2006, the national chief of the Assembly of First Nations warned that “In Canada, rates of infection are 10 times higher on native reserves”. This is simply unbelievable and unacceptable in any community in Canada in the 21st century.

A century of neglect and the alarm bells are still ringing. Only now, the tuberculosis rate among status Indians is 31 times higher than that of non-aboriginal Canadians, and the rate among Inuit is 186 times higher. These are rates comparable to sub-Saharan Africa.

How much more do these numbers have to climb before the government takes real action instead of investing a paltry $10 million to fight a national emergency?

Nick Finney, Save the Children's acting head of emergency capacity, normally responded to humanitarian disasters such as earthquakes, floods and health emergencies. In 2007, he was invited to conduct international aid assessments by remote aboriginal Canadians in northern Canada and witnessed what he called the slowest evolved disaster that he had ever worked in.

Finney described the level of deprivation as truly shocking. For example, a damp, one-bedroom home housed a family of 25. The aid worker compared what he saw in Canada with regions that had endured years of conflict. He explained that, “In a natural disaster, hope is a vital thing”. What he felt in northern Canada was like Darfur. Finney stressed that he saw powerful leadership in the communities he visited. Unfortunately, while they were fighting hard, they needed some help.

Finney is far from the first to compare the living conditions of aboriginal peoples with those in the Third World. The United Nations' Human Development index, a standard measure that ranks the well-being of member states, placed Canada sixth among 192 nations. However, when the same formula was applied to data about the living conditions of Canada's first nations, a very different story emerged: the ranking was 76th.

The government's efforts to combat TB are failing aboriginal people. Where is the real national plan, the what, by when and how, and resources to fight this 100% preventable disease? Why are the data kept in secret and why do government turf wars continue to stall progress? Why are the technologies for TB diagnosis not available?

In many Inuit communities there is no access to chest X-ray and people have to fly out for service. In regions with high rates of both latent and active TB, late diagnosis further increases the risk of spread. Where are the counselling supports needed for TB treatment? Where is the plan to address the social determinants of TB and the plan to counter overcrowding, poverty and social inequality? Fifty-three percent of Inuit homes are overcrowded, with Nunavut requiring 3,300 homes.

The government has a dismal record. It voted against the United Nations declaration on aboriginal rights. It rejected the 2005 Kelowna accord. The United Nations has repeatedly condemned it for the living conditions of aboriginals. When will the government honour its apology and take immediate action on TB?

[Questions Passed as Orders for Returns, April 19th, 2010]

With respect to armed conflicts where Canada is both directly and indirectly involved: (a) what are the sites and in detail, Canada’s involvement; (b) how are civilians, and particularly, children, minorities, and women impacted for each identified site; (c) which identified areas have refugees and refugee camps, with the numbers of civilians, and particularly, children and minorities affected, and what are the living conditions in refugee camps if applicable; (d) what is the process for determining whether Canada becomes either directly or indirectly involved or not in a conflict, and how does Canada become involved; (e) how does the process ensure that good verifiable information is obtained from the field, particularly in areas where there is poor communication; (f) how does Canada obtain information from civilians who might be afraid to speak out, as well as NGOs, who need to have their work protected; (g) what is the process for ensuring that good information is acted upon, and what is the demonstration, if applicable, of where Canada has acted upon such evidence with regard to identified sites; (h) does Canada invest in development and reintegration in areas to ensure alternative lifestyles for civilians and, if so, in which areas specifically; and (i) what are the other sites, by countries, where Canada is aware of an armed conflict but is not involved?

[Questions Passed as Orders for Returns, April 16th, 2010]

With respect to the Canadian HIV Vaccine Initiative (CHVI) and the Level 5 Laboratory (L5L): (a) what are the details of the initial request for proposals for the CHVI; (b) what amount were the government and the Gates Foundation planning to invest in the CHVI and what were the scheduled dates for investment; (c) how many bids for the CHVI were submitted and by which organizations; (d) what are the details of the CHVI process for determining suitable award winners; (e) what were the selection criteria for awarding the CHVI bid and who was responsible for identifying the criteria; (f) how many people made up the independent evaluation committee for the CHVI bids, how were they selected, and from which disciplines and geographic areas were they drawn; (g) were representatives from the pharmaceutical industry invited to be part of the independent evaluation committee for the CHVI bids and, if so, on what date did each representative serve and, if not, why not; (h) what were the results for each of the selection criterion for each of the organizations bidding on the CHVI and how were the bids ranked; (i) did the independent evaluation committee for the CHVI bids reach a recommendation, and, if so, on what date, and to whom was the information conveyed in the government; (j) was there a steering committee for the CHVI bids and, if so, who were the members, who was the chair and what was its mandate; (k) were there changes to the steering committee for the CHVI bids and, if so, on what dates and for what reasons; (l) was any organization bidding on the CHVI informed, formally or otherwise, that it had been chosen to host the facility and, if so, how and on what date; (m) did the federal government put up a notice on its Web site to announce that the CHVI project had been cancelled or would not proceed and, if so, on what date; (n) was the notice in (m) removed from the Web site and, if so, on what date and for what reason; (o) have each of the organizations bidding on the CHVI seen the results of the peer-review process and, if so, on what date and, if not, why not; (p) what constructive criticism was given to each of the organizations bidding on the CHVI; (q) what specific problems were identified that prevented each of the organizations bidding on the CHVI from being selected; (r) why were bidding organizations not encouraged to redevelop their CHVI bid; (s) why and by whom was the CHVI cancelled; (t) on what dates was the CHVI project cancelled, were the submitting organizations formally informed and was the Canadian public informed; (u) what do “changing needs” and “reallocation of resources” mean in relation to the cancellation of the CHVI project; (v) what post-mortem audit does the government plan to undertake to investigate how Canadian investigators and research centres failed to meet the selection criteria for the CHVI bid; (w) how will the planned CHVI investment monies be spent; (x) what are the details of both the CHVI’s and the L5L’s history from January 2009; (y) what are the organizations involved in the L5L, and what, if any, overlap (e.g., goals, funds, personnel, etc.) exists between the International Centre for Infectious Diseases, who was bidding for the CHVI, and the L5L; (z) what, if any, involvement does the government have in the L5L; and (aa) what, if any, review process is in place for the L5L?

[Questions Passed as Orders for Returns, April 16th, 2010]

With respect to the climate summit in Copenhagen and climate change: (a) what criteria needed to be met in order to be part of the Canadian delegation; (b) what were the name and position of each member of the Canadian delegation, what expertise and skills did each bring to the table, and for what time period were each in Copenhagen; (c) what was the total budget for the delegation, from flights to accommodation and living expenses; (d) what, if any, offsets were purchased for the delegation; (e) what was the description, in detail, of the Canadian climate change plan, and when will it be revealed to Canadians; (f) who were all the stakeholders consulted in the development of the plan, and how does each goal/target reflect or does not reflect each stakeholder's views; (g) did the government include the voice of Canadians who are on the “front line of climate change”, and were those who will be impacted by climate change meaningfully involved, and, if so, how; (h) what accountability measures, if any, were in place to ensure that the Canadian delegation would be responsible to those Canadians who will be particularly impacted (e.g., those living in low-lying areas and Aboriginal peoples); (i) what has been the stakeholder response to the plan, particularly from business, NGOs, scientists, and all stakeholders, and if available, what is the actual response of stakeholders' consulted; (j) what were the specific goals of the Canadian delegation, and how do they compare (in advance and afterward) with those of the G20 or OECD in terms of baseline, absolute reductions, and target date; (k) did the Canadian delegation support the notion that climate change is not just an environmental issue, but rather a human rights issue and a justice issue and, if so, what is the description, in detail, of Canada's position; (l) did the Canadian delegation listen to the world's “frontline voice”, such as Bangladesh's and the Maldives', and act upon scientific and humanitarian evidence; (m) what were the projected costs of mitigating acid precipitation and reducing chemicals that destroyed stratospheric ozone, the costs of inaction, and what were the actual costs required; (n) what are the projected costs of adapting to and mitigating climate change in Canada today, and what are the costs of inaction for each year, five years, and decade delayed; (o) will the government commit new research dollars to support global climate research and services; (p) in detail, what percentage of 2009's stimulus was “green”, and how was it a “triple win” for the economy, jobs, and the atmosphere, and going forward, what specific targets in Canada's climate change plan will be a “triple win”; and (q) what are the costs the government is willing to pay to mitigate climate change, and how do these costs compare with the projected economic, environmental and social costs of climate change?

[Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, April 16th, 2010]

Mr. Speaker, I proudly rise as a member of the Liberal Party of Canada to celebrate one of our great achievements. Tomorrow, April 17, marks the 25th anniversary of the enactment of section 15, the equality section of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This section states:

Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

We have come a long way since section 15 was enacted, but we still have far to go. Fortunately, we have organizations like the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund that works to ensure that the law guarantees substantive equality for all women in Canada. Everyone is entitled to equal treatment under the law.

[April 15th, 2010]

Mr. Speaker, my colleague will remember that his committee actually thanked me for my work on the listeriosis report.

Worse than inaction was the fact that in March, we were under a second listeriosis crisis under the government's watch. University of Manitoba professor Holley wrote in the Canadian Medical Association Journal in January about a study that found Canada's food safety system to be broken. He concluded that inspectors should be going after the source of contamination in food processing plants, rather than doing reactive calls after end-of-line inspections.

Tragically, 27 Canadians have now died in two separate crises. What will it take for the government to make food safety a priority? How many more listeriosis incidents will occur before the government backs its spin with inspectors?

In the spirit of accountability and protecting the health of Canadians, I call upon the government to table the status of each of the 57 recommendations made in the Weatherill report.

[April 15th, 2010]

Mr. Speaker, Canadians have new words creeping into their vocabulary: global synchronized economic downturn, recalibration, and listeria outbreak, rather than preventable incident. This carefully crafted spin attempts to remove blame from the government and instead imply action when little or none is taken.

Listeriosis was a real tragedy that cost 22 Canadians their lives in 2008. Depending on what media advisory we read, it was either an outbreak or a preventable incident. If the spin was outbreak, it implied an act of God and was beyond the government's control. If the crisis was in fact a preventable incident, it was absolutely in its purview.

Following the listeriosis disaster, the government ordered a secretive inquiry into the deaths. Weatherill concluded:

We cannot wait for another food-borne emergency to occur and more lives to be lost before we act. While there will be costs in implementing some of these recommendations, the costs of inaction—whether measured by the damage to individual Canadians’ lives, lost revenues and reputation for industry, or Canada’s global competitiveness in an increasingly food safety conscious world—are far greater.

There were 57 recommendations in the Weatherill report, including: provinces should follow more strict safety rules; Ottawa should review the training of federal inspectors; manufacturers must design meat processing equipment that is easy to clean; and Canada's Chief Public Health Officer must take the lead in any future cases of food-borne illness.

Unfortunately, the government ignored the chief recommendation, namely, to have an independent third party verify whether there were enough meat inspectors.

This past fall the American government warned Canada that its meat inspection procedures were too lenient. Had Canadians known, this would have caused us to wonder whether the current food safety regime was as effective as the federal government claimed.

Unless Ottawa took action, Washington might have forbidden the import of Canadian processed meat. As a result, Canada's agriculture minister promised the government would spend $75 million over three years on meat inspection and would hire 70 new inspectors.

Regrettably, in March when I asked my question, it was over two years since the listeriosis tragedy and eight months since the Weatherill investigation, and little had changed. While the government claimed to be moving forward, one of its most over-used phrases, no additional inspectors had actually joined the front lines of food inspection according to the meat inspectors union.

Cameron Prince, vice-president of operations, CFIA, confirmed this fact in his clarification on how the agency would continue to move forward on the Weatherill report. He explained that CFIA had hired and was training 35 inspectors and that an additional 35 inspectors would be hired over the next year.

If in the words of the minister, food inspectors “don't grow on trees”, why did he not take immediate action to ensure enough examiners to avoid a second listeriosis outbreak? Moreover, what can another of Prince's comments actually mean, when he said, “We have adopted a policy of enhanced inspector presence at all federally registered meat processing plants--”?

The federal government continues to have some explaining to do about Canada's food safety system.

[Questions Passed as Orders for Returns, April 15th, 2010]

With respect to humanitarian issues and crisis and Canada’s involvement: (a) how does Canada increase awareness around the world that abuse of children, minorities, women, etc. will be punished; (b) how often is humanitarian evidence examined in Canada, and by whom; (c) what accountability measures are in place to demonstrate Canada’s commitments with respect to human rights internationally; (d) what processes are in place to give Canadian family members information, and to give information on how to help; (e) what processes are in place or can be put in place to allow Canadians to sponsor family members more quickly if required; (f) what, if any, audit process follows Canada’s direct or indirect involvement during a humanitarian crisis; (g) what, if any, process follows the resolution of a humanitarian crisis, and how Canada performed with respect to it; (h) what opportunity, if any, is there for Canadians to have their input in such an audit process; and (i) with respect to Canada’s involvement during last year's crisis in Sri Lanka, (i) what, if any, audit will follow Canada’s involvement, (ii) what, if any, evidence is Canada receiving that might suggest violations against children, minorities, and women, (iii) what steps, if applicable, is Canada taking to address such evidence?