Bill C-10 (Historical)

An Act to amend the Criminal Code (cruelty to animals and firearms) and the Firearms Act

Petitions

[James Lunney, Canadian Alliance, Nanaimo—Alberni, BC]

Mr. Speaker, the other petition originated in my riding of Nanaimo--Alberni. There are about 2,500 signatures from residents of my riding who are particularly concerned about animal cruelty.

There have been some very nasty and very tragic animal abuse cases and the petitioners are rightly indignant. They call upon the House to enforce harsher penalties to ensure the prevention of cruelty to animals. The amendment from the Senate on Bill C-10 should make it possible to get the legislation passed.

An Act to amend the Criminal Code (cruelty to animals)

[Peter MacKay, Progressive Conservative, Pictou—Antigonish—Guysborough, NS]

Mr. Speaker, what my hon. colleague will find is that I am in support of the changes that were made. The process, I would agree, was a derivation and has set a dangerous precedent. In fact, we made that argument in both Houses. We argued here and in the Senate that this was not how the matter should have proceeded.

It does reflect a need for respect of the practices of the House of Commons. I am afraid that we are often on a slippery slope when we start to take this type of cavalier approach.

The end product, the legislation itself, has been improved. The way we went about doing that, in accepting the unprecedented move that was made in the other place to divide this bill, is more a reflection on the Department of Justice and the presentation in the improper form in the first instance.

What occurred here, the hon. member will know, is that the bill was receiving incredible internal criticism from the Liberal government, and it had proceeded to such a point where it could not pull it back, or at least it chose not to for reasons of expediency. Therefore the changes that should have been made in this chamber in the first instance did not occur.

What was happening was that there were provisions in Bill C-10 that related particularly to the Firearms Act, and there were deadlines looming. What the government had to do then was take this unprecedented move and divide the bill in the other place so that it could carve out the sections of the Firearms Act to meet looming deadlines, arbitrary as they were, and try to foster this feeling of legitimacy of the Firearms Act itself.

We all know what has happened there of course. Six provinces have now opted out in terms of prosecuting and have thrown it back into the lap of the government. One billion dollars has been wasted and police across the country have been left in confusion with no further ability to benefit from this type of legislation because, as we know, individuals will not participate in this to a large degree.

It creates a scenario where a dangerous precedent was set. This bill was improved but other legislation was left in a very flawed form, mainly the Firearms Act.

I agree with the member that what has happened here sets a dangerous precedent. This bill may be better but the firearms legislation remains a completely dangerous and improper act that should be repealed, and that has been the position of the Progressive Conservative Party for years.

[Tom Wappel, Liberal, Scarborough Southwest, ON]

Madam Speaker, I am very pleased to speak today to this issue. I want to explain first why it is that I am speaking to this issue.

For over five and a half years I was a full member of the justice committee and took a very active role in the issues of the justice committee. Having done that, I have always kept my eye out on the agenda of the justice committee so I could see what was going on in the justice committee, attend when I thought it was important, review the transcripts when I thought it was important and talk to my colleagues when I thought it was important.

When this particular bill in its original form came before the committee I was asked by the then chairman of the Liberal Party's rural caucus to attend the hearings, particularly because I am a lawyer and because I think that the then chair felt that I would take a look at this legislation in an objective manner.

I agreed to do that at the request of the then chairman and I did sit in on the committee hearings insofar as they pertained to Bill C-10. At that time it had two parts, namely the part respecting firearms and the part respecting the protection of animals. My remarks of course will be completely restricted to the part respecting the protection of animals.

As a member of the committee I was able to listen to evidence and to ask questions with respect to the evidence that we heard. We heard a lot of compelling evidence from a lot of people on different sides of the issue.

What was common to all people was that everyone wanted to make sure that animals were protected from unnecessary and cruel pain. I doubt very much if anyone in Canada would argue that it is perfectly acceptable to inflict purposeful pain on an animal.

However numerous legal issues had to be dealt with in respect of the provisions of Bill C-10 which dealt with the protection of animals. I want to mention a couple of the things that occurred while I was sitting on that committee and while I was reporting to the then chair of the Liberal Party rural caucus.

After listening to all the evidence we were talking about various amendments that might be able to go through. In late 2001, I wrote to the then parliamentary secretary to the minister of justice setting forth some friendly suggestions that I had to amend the bill to make it better, make it stronger, make it able to more easily protect animals while at the same time not being assailed by people because they thought it was somehow affecting their day to day livelihoods.

I just want to discuss a couple of the amendments that I suggested at that time. I will turn my attention to the very beginning of the bill. The bill in its form as passed by the House of Commons defined animal. It defined animal to mean “a vertebrate other than a human being and any other animal that has the capacity to feel pain”.

We heard compelling testimony from organizations such as the Poultry Welfare Coalition, the Canadian Veterinary Medical Association, the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, among others. A couple of those briefs made some recommendations to leave out that portion which said “any other animal that has the capacity to feel pain”, for a variety of reasons, including that there was no scientific unanimity on what animals have the capacity to feel pain, and that it would not be fair to litigate this ad nauseam in the courts with the attendant legal costs of calling scientific experts.

I recommended to the parliamentary secretary at that time that that particular definition be amended in the following way: “In this part, animal means a vertebrate other than a human being, whether privately owned or otherwise, which is hereby deemed to need protection from cruelty because it feels pain”.

The reason I did that was because those who were advocating changes wanted to link the concept of the protection of animals to the fact that they feel pain. I had no problem with that.

The point of my amendment was to say that vertebrates feel pain and obviously my amendment did not include animals that have the capacity to feel pain or may have the capacity to feel pain but are not vertebrates.

Interestingly enough, the bureaucracy at that time rejected that amendment outright. Lo and behold, the Senate held its hearings. What did it recommend as an amendment to the definition? It recommended that animal be defined as a vertebrate other than a human being. In effect, that is exactly what I recommended to the parliamentary secretary to the minister of justice and exactly what was rejected by the minister of justice at the end of 2001.

The Senate decided that the definition of animal should be limited to a vertebrate other than a human being. I applaud it for that for the reasons that I suggested that the amendment should proceed.

I see that the Minister of Justice now has moved a motion which reads:

That a message be sent to the Senate to acquaint their Honours that this House agrees with amendments numbered 1 and 5 made by the Senate to Bill C-10B, an act to amend the Criminal Code....

In fact, the Minister of Justice has now accepted an amendment which is exactly what I proposed at the end of 2001 and which was rejected. It just shows how ridiculously this place works. It is a shame that in many instances the bureaucracy cannot conceive of the fact that anybody but the bureaucracy can come up with an idea or with a suggested amendment that actually might make the bill better.

I am pleased to see that the Senate made the definition of animal to be that of a vertebrate other than a human being. I am glad to see that the Minister of Justice has finally seen the light and has agreed to that amendment years after I suggested it.

I have a second thing I want to talk about. I note that they are agreeing to some suggested amendments in the French version, and I have no comments on that. I do, however, want to comment on an amendment the Senate suggested to add to section 182.5.

The bill as passed had in it a protection, shall we say, of common law defences and the section as it passed reads as follows:

For greater certainty, subsection 8(3)applies in respect of proceedings for anoffence under this Part.

The document I am looking at is a document that says “Bill C-10B as passed by the House of Commons, October 9, 2002”.

Section 182.5 referred to subsection 8(3) of the Criminal Code. If we go to subsection 8(3) of the Criminal Code we see that it states the following:

Every rule and principle of the common law that renders any circumstance a justification or excuse for an act or a defence to a charge continues in force and applies in respect of proceedings for an offence under this Act or any other Act--

In other words, it is carrying on common law justifications or excuses. The debate at the time had to do with whether that was specific enough to allow the legal justification for the act, or that there was colour of right to do the act. Certain recommendations were made but they were rejected by the government to, shall we say, specifically state what the situation was.

I recommended to the parliamentary secretary that section 182.3 be amended in line 12, at that time, by adding “negligently or with legal justification, excuse or colour of right”. Why? To specifically remind people that legal justification or excuse or colour of right defences were allowed. The government said no.

Now the Senate has recommended that section 182.5 be amended to read as follows:

No person shall be convicted of an offence under this Part where he proves that he acted with legal justification or excuse or with colour of right.

Those were virtually my words at the end of November 2001. Obviously, since I agreed with them at that time, I agree with them now. The Senate was right in making this suggested amendment.

What does the government say with respect to this suggested amendment? It is interesting because the government agrees with the principle set out in amendment numbered 4, “namely, the desire to reassure Canadians that no defences are lost, but, because the wording of the amendment would codify a reverse onus by requiring an accused person to prove his or her innocence on a balance of probabilities”. The government thinks the latter is a bad idea and it proposes an amendment to replace section 182.5 with the following:

For greater certainty, the defences set out in subsection 429(2) apply, to the extent that they are relevant, in respect of proceedings for an offence under this Part.

I know I am talking legal jargon, but what does this mean? The Senate wanted to ensure that the defences of legal justification or excuse or with colour of right remain. Yes, the amendment does say “where he proves that he acted with legal justification or excuse and with colour of right”, and yes, that does put an onus on the defendant. The government, in its response, says that it agrees with the sentiment but not with the exact amendment of the Senate because it puts a reverse onus on the defendant.

If we look at the amendment proposed by the government, which no longer refers to subsection 8(3) of the Criminal Code but rather refers to subsection 429(2) of the Criminal Code, subsection 429(2) of the Criminal Code says:

No person shall be convicted of an offence under sections 430 to 446 where he proves that he acted with legal justification or excuse and with colour of right.

The government is proposing an amendment to put in the defences in subsection 429(2) because the Senate amendment reverses the onus and requires the defendant to prove this, yet the very section that the government is quoting to prevent this reverse onus calls for a reverse onus and requires that the defendant prove that he acted with legal justification or excuse and with colour of right.

I suggest that indeed the so-called problem that the Minister of Justice observed, which was the reverse onus problem, has not been solved by the government's proposed amendment because it has merely quoted subsection 429(2) of the Criminal Code which calls for a reverse onus on the defendant. While one possibly might agree with the government's rationale for not agreeing with the Senate amendment, the government's proposed resolution does not resolve it. In fact, it maintains the reverse onus on the defendant. I do not know what was going on when these responses were being prepared to the Senate's message, but I think somebody goofed.

I know that after fourteen and a half years I have become very cynical about this place and about how much ordinary members of Parliament are listened to, and in particular how much ordinary members of Parliament are listened to by the bureaucracy, which I dare say in my view is just about never.

I implore justice department officials to look at subsection 429(2), which clearly calls for a reverse onus on the defendant. How can they quote in their suggested amendment to protect against the reverse onus on a defendant a section which requires a reverse onus? It simply does not make logical sense. I am urging the government to look at that and thereby leave the amendment the way the Senate proposed the amendment. There is nothing wrong with the proposal that the Senate has put forward.

The final point I want to make about the Senate amendments concerns the third amendment. The Senate proposed in a particular section that a clause be added which reads as follows:

No person shall be convicted of an offence under paragraph (1)(a) if the pain, suffering, injury or death is caused in the course of traditional hunting, trapping or fishing practices carried out by a person who is one of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada in any area in which Aboriginal peoples have harvesting rights under or by virtue of existing aboriginal or treaty rights within the meaning of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and any pain, suffering or injury caused is no more than is reasonably necessary in the carrying out of those traditional practices

The clear intent of that amendment is to protect the traditions of our aboriginal peoples. I want to give two potential examples. Suppose aboriginal people go out to hunt caribou and choose for reasons best known to them to use a spear or bow and arrow as opposed to a high powered hunting rifle. Suppose that the arrow hits its mark but does not kill the caribou immediately. That caribou may, obviously in pain, travel across the tundra for some period of time with the hunter following it until it drops and dies. That example has been the way of life of the aboriginal people since time immemorial. They are afraid that the bill might cause someone to be charged for inflicting unnecessary pain and suffering on such an animal.

Let us take another example. A trapline is set for a beaver and it gets caught in the trap. It can either chew its foot off, which would be terribly painful, or starve to death or die of thirst in the trap because the hunter only visits the trapline once every week. Would that be chargeable? That is also something that has been done for millennia in different ways and I can see why the aboriginal peoples would be concerned that some overzealous person might lay a charge under these particular amendments.

This is clearly why this amendment is there. I do not care for different laws for different folks. All Canadians should be bound by the same laws, but if there were traditional rights or aboriginal rights that precede Canada, they would have to be honoured. I do not have a problem with that. What does the government say in response to this? The government says that it:

Disagrees with amendment numbered 3 because it is unclear and creates confusion about whether the intent is to create a different test for liability of aboriginal persons and because there is no clarity as to what “traditional practices” are and how law enforcement can be expected to act accordingly;

This is a ridiculous comment because the government says there is no definition of traditional practices, but we have countless examples in the House of the government amending the Criminal Code without defining certain words. I will not even bother getting into it because the history is well known, but it does not seem to trouble the government when it feels like it to put in amendments to the Criminal Code without defining certain words. Of course it would be up to the circumstances of each particular case to determine whether a particular aboriginal group had a pre-existing or section 35 or treaty right to do what it did if it were charged with cruelty to animals.

That must decided on a case by case basis. It clearly is dependent on the facts of the case. To say that we need a definition of certain words or to say that it is unclear in my view is simply disingenuous. I fully support the protection of animals from undue cruelty. I fully support Bill C-10 and the Senate amendments that I have mentioned do strengthen the bill and I support them.

[Svend Robinson, NDP, Burnaby—Douglas, BC]

Madam Speaker, my intervention will be very brief but I do want to stand in the House to indicate my strong support for Bill C-10B in its original form, in the form in which it was adopted by the House and sent to the Senate, I believe, in October of last year.

We as New Democrats, certainly I, as the member of Parliament for Burnaby--Douglas, strongly supported the provisions of Bill C-10B, which was Bill C-10, that strengthened the protection of animals. I would note that the current provisions of the Criminal Code date back almost 100 years. The original code in fact dates back to over 100 years. The original code was enacted in 1892. The animal sections of the Criminal Code were written basically to protect working animals, such as cattle and horses. These sections have only had very minor changes over the course of the past 100 years.

Therefore the changes that were passed by the House last fall were long overdue. Some would say that the bill, even as it was finally adopted by the House, was already somewhat watered down in terms of the importance of protecting animals in Canada.

I want to say very clearly that what I believe the Senate has done to the bill, both in terms of splitting the bill and now sending it back to the House watered down, is totally unacceptable. We strongly reject the amendments that have been proposed by the Senate in a number of areas.

It seems to me that what the Senate has basically done is it has caved in to industry as opposed to standing up to protect animals in this country.

There have been a lot of misconceptions about what Bill C-10B actually does. For example, I would point out that Bill C-10B does not actually widen the scope of what is a criminal offence in terms of the definition of animal itself. Currently, under the existing provisions of the Criminal Code, there is no definition of an animal. Bill C-10B actually narrows it by incorporating a definition.

Theoretically today, and I emphasize theoretically, a person could attempt to bring a criminal charge against somebody for harming a fish, a worm or, as my friend from Nova Scotia suggested, for boiling a lobster. However the reality is that a crown prosecutor would never allow such a charge to proceed.

As well, it is very important that we finally move animals and the protection of animals out of the property section of the Criminal Code. This is very important. To some extent it does elevate the status of animals. I think that is long overdue. It has been clearly documented that there is a link between violence to animals and violence toward humans. It is highly appropriate to protect animals because they can suffer whether someone owns them or not. Therefore taking the animal protection provisions out of the property sections of the Criminal Code is a provision that we welcome.

However, like the Canadian Federation of Humane Societies, the International Fund for Animal Welfare and many others, we reject strongly the attempt by the Senate to weaken the bill as it was passed by this House.

The International Fund for Animal Welfare has pointed out that every day in Canada an estimated 110 animals are abused or killed, and there are too many examples of terrible cruelty to animals that we must vigorously prosecute and condemn.

As I said, the existing provisions of the Criminal Code with respect to the protection of the rights of animals are hopelessly outdated. We believe that the Senate has abrogated its responsibility to Canadians, to listen to Canadians, the vast majority of Canadians, who want to strengthen the protection of animals in Canada. Instead, what it has done is it has watered down that protection. We say that is totally unacceptable.

I once again want to reiterate our strong support for effective and tough animal protection legislation. We want to see the legislation adopted in the form that it left the House in the first place. We think the Senate itself, as we have said for some time, should not exist as an unelected and unaccountable body. What better example of the abuse of that Senate power than the way in which it has dealt with Bill C-10B.

[Gerald Keddy, Progressive Conservative, South Shore, NS]

Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure for me to finish my time in debate on Bill C-10B, the cruelty to animals legislation.

As hon. members know, the cruelty to animal legislation was sent from this House to the Senate. The Senate, in its wisdom, amended, improved and changed the legislation and sent it back to the House of Commons in a better and more correct form in my opinion.

In my previous comments on Bill C-10B, I explained a number of points to which the Progressive Conservative Party took great exception in the legislation and therefore found many reasons to put in amendments to try to improve the bill.

There is a need to improve the legislation. As I said earlier in debate, the legislation is over 100 years old. It is obviously time for the bill to be modernized to reflect the current views and opinions of people, and to reflect the current public attitude about animals.

Without question, we agree with parts of the bill. I do not have any difficulty outlining those parts.

For instance, we have absolutely no problem with that part of the bill that states that no one should wilfully poison an animal or leave bait out where an animal can get hold of it. It is against the law to in any manner encourage, promote, arrange, assist or receive money for the fighting or baiting of animals, including training an animal to fight another animal. That is the bear pits and the bull pits of medieval society, and we have come a long way since those days. It needs to be an illegal activity to build, maintain, keep or allow to be built, made, maintained or kept, a cock pit or any other arena for the fighting of animals on premises. We can see in the language that there is very clear legislation that prevents cock fighting, dog fighting, baiting of animals or the type of activity with which most members of society would not want to be associated in any way shape or form .

The other thing of course is that anyone who raises animals to be released and immediately shot is also doing so against the law. I think that has been changed slightly to allow people who raise pheasants on pheasant ranges to release the birds in the wild and then they can be hunted. I do not think the legislation is trying to persecute those individuals.

Proposed section 182.6 defines law enforcement animal, meaning a dog, a horse or any other animal used by a police officer or public officer in the execution of duty. Everyone commits an offence who wilfully or recklessly poisons, injures or kills a law enforcement animal while it is aiding or assisting a police officer or public officer engaged in the execution of their duties or a person acting in aid of such an officer.

That type of legislation and that type of amendment to the old act is important, and they are amendments that we would support in the Progressive Conservative Party. The basis of clause 2 to amend section 182.3 states:

(1) Every one commits an offence who

(a) negligently causes unnecessary pain, suffering or injury to an animal;

(b) being the owner, or the person having the custody or control of an animal, wilfully or recklessly...

This is the key sentence “wilfully or recklessly”. It goes on to state:

--abandons it or negligently fails to provide suitable and adequate, food, water, air, shelter and care for it; or

(c) negligently injures an animal while it is being conveyed.

It goes on to define negligent as meaning departing markedly from the standard care that a person would use. I have absolutely no difficulty with that part of the legislation and I and the PC Party support it 100%.

Again I do take exception to clause 2 of Bill C-10B that amends subsections 182.2 (a) and (b) where it states, “causes or, being the owner, permits to be caused unnecessary pain, suffering or injury to an animal”.

The difficulty is in the definition. We are not sure what that definition is. I have a great deal of difficulty in allowing people to subjectively decide from their background what that definition is, and in this case that subjective decision would be made by a judge.

When one looks at “kills an animal or, being the owner, permits an animal to be killed, brutally or viciously, regardless of whether the animal dies immediately” as being a punishable offence, at first glance one would say that it should be an offence. However when one understands there is no real definition to “brutally” or “viciously”, it becomes much more difficult. What is a brutal and vicious act in the mind of one person may not be the same in the mind of another.

I know what it means to me, and I do not think I want to discuss that in public debate, but I do not know what it means to the government. Therefore, people who work in slaughterhouses, people whose livelihoods depend on processing animals, farmers, fishermen and hunters, have yet to see “brutally” and “viciously” described and thoroughly explained. I am concerned and worried about that.

There needs to be a clearer definition in the legislation. We all know what unnecessary pain is and we would agree with that. The rest of it is more subjective and very troublesome to this otherwise good piece of legislation.

Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Cruelty to Animals)

[Gerald Keddy, Progressive Conservative, South Shore, NS]

Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure to rise today to speak to Bill C-10B, an act to amend the Criminal Code concerning cruelty to animals.

As the Speaker is well aware, this is the second or perhaps even the third life of this bill. It was rammed through the House of Commons by the Liberal majority and sent off to the Senate.

I know there a lot of parties that do not approve of the Senate, think it is redundant and have some difficulty with the fact that our senators are not elected persons. However, if it were not for the Senate, this legislation would now be law. It was a flawed bill then, and the Senate improved it. There are still some instances where I certainly believe we could continue to improve upon.

However I would like to say, clearly and categorically, that if it were not for the Senate, we would be prosecuting and arresting people next week or next month for traditional practices that are not in any way, shape or form, cruel to animals. That is how bad the legislation was.

I would like to read part of an article from the May 30 Vancouver Sun . It states that:

The Senate on Thursday made major changes to the government's animal-cruelty legislation, prompted by concerns the legislation might enable unfair prosecutions of ordinary Canadians.

That is exactly why there was opposition to the legislation.

It went further and said:

The Senate will now send the legislation back to the Commons for reconsideration. Government representatives have said the federal government doesn't agree with the Senate's interpretation of the legislation.

We will see exactly what happens here.

I see the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans just came into the House. What the senators were most concerned with were the parts and provisions of Bill C-10B, which the minister himself voted for, that certainly may have been found cruel and would therefore be against the law, such as common fishing practices which we take for granted in the east and west coasts and the high arctic. The fact is that under the legislation I am doubtful if Canadians would have been able to boil a lobster. With the proposed changes they can. That is how poor the legislation was. However that did not matter. When the Liberals have it right, they simply line their boys and girls up, crack the whip two or three times and they mouth the words, as they stand and bow to the omnipresent Prime Minister, and push the legislation through.

It is an embarrassment that in the House of Commons a piece of legislation would leave this place in such poor condition that the Senate, with its limited powers, would have to amend it and send it back to us with a little note attached saying, “Try and get it right this time, guys. See if you can do it a little better. We're not against you. We're trying to work with you but see if you can get it right”.

The bill, as it existed in its previous form, would have found as punishable offences the traditional practices in the aboriginal community, the farming community and for people who practise animal husbandry. Traditional slaughtering practices of the Muslim and Jewish faiths would have been outlawed by the government.

It is unbelievable and inconceivable that this piece of legislation was passed by the House of Commons and sent to the Senate and had to be returned.

Although there are still some things which I think are problematic in the new legislation, it at least defines cruelty. There was some nebulous definition before. We could kind of put our finger on the centre of it but it just kept moving away from us. Now there is a clearer definition. There is one part that I am going to emphasize which I will come back to.

I will read the definition so the public understands exactly what it is we are talking about. Under proposed subsection 182.2(1) we have defined what cruelty is, or we are closer to defining what cruelty is. It states:

Every one commits an offence, who wilfully or recklessly--

We are starting to tighten up the language. Hopefully in the future the traditional farming practices will not be penalized. However the wording is that anyone who wilfully and recklessly, and I would add the word deservedly, should be prosecuted under the law.

The debate has never been about the fact that the legislation is 100 years old and it is time to modernize it. It is time to bring it into accordance with the morals, the mindset and the advances in thinking that have been made in the last 100 years.

The Liberals decided to ram this piece of legislation through the House, and ram it through the House they did, in one week in an unamended form.

The bill states:

Every one commits an offence, who wilfully or recklessly,

(a) causes or, being the owner, permits to be caused unnecessary pain, suffering or injury to an animal;

(b) kills an animal or, being the owner, permits an animal to be killed, brutally or viciously, regardless of whether the animal dies immediately--

I still take great umbrage to those two paragraphs. We are leaving the definition of “brutal” and “vicious” in the hands of some judge somewhere. Quite frankly we all may have various definitions for those two terms. I do not know what a judge may decide. I am not willing to second-guess the lives and livelihoods of farmers on this issue.

I was a farmer before my life in politics. I raised sheep. Out of 100 to 150 lambs that would run around the barnyard, it was guaranteed that one of them would find its way into the water tanks and would drown. It was guaranteed that one would get his head stuck in the fence, flip over and choke itself to death.

Does that mean the farmer should be held responsible and receive up to a $10,000 fine and five years in jail because somehow he was not there to prevent that from happening, even though he had put up the very best of fences, even though the animals were kept in the very best of conditions with lots of food and water? An accident can occur that is beyond the control of the individual and some judge may look at this bill and see “causes, or being the owner, permits to be caused unnecessary pain, suffering and injury to an animal”.

Canadians who are watching today should be the judges. Who is guilty of an offence under those circumstances?

The Minister of Fisheries and Oceans is in the House. When one sets a gill net for herring or mackerel and catches a fish which is a vertebrae by the gills and it struggles and drowns because it is caught up in the net, that is cruelty under this legislation. With some judge who is not a fisherman, who has never had to make a living by putting on a pair of oil skins and rubber boots and standing on the deck of a tossing boat, who has never had to go out at 4:00 in the morning and come back at 2:00 the next morning, how is he or she going to feel about that? I suspect someday one of them is going to look at it and say “We permitted or caused unnecessary harm or pain to an animal”.

Whether that animal has the capacity to think or feel or make judgments is immaterial because we cannot control what people think. I am not about to state that we should. That is why we need clarity. That is why we need crisp definitions in the bill.

Other parts of the bill we absolutely, totally agree with, such as killing an animal without a lawful cause or reason; “without lawful excuse poisons an animal, places poison in such a position that it may easily be consumed by an animal; administers an injurious drug or substance to an animal; or, being the owner, permits anyone to do those things”. Obviously no clear thinking Canadian wants that type of thing to happen and should be responsible to prevent it.

Do we need new cruelty to animals legislation? Absolutely. Can we do better than we have done already? Yes, we can. Let us get it right this time and send it back to the Senate so it is not returned.

[Bernard Bigras, Bloc, Rosemont—Petite-Patrie, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to speak today on the motion in relation to the amendments made by the Senate to the bill before us today, Bill C-10B.

First, I would like to thank and congratulate my hon. colleague from Châteauguay, who has worked hard all during this long battle over Bill C-10B to make the government understand that we had constructive amendments to suggest. Unfortunately, during the committee stage, the government refused to yield to any of our arguments.

The paradox is that the motion before us in the House today contains many of the amendments the Bloc Quebecois asked for and put forward, and with which it hoped the government would agree. Today, I must state at the outset that the Senate's amendments essentially echo those of the Bloc Quebecois. Therefore, we are in favour of the government's motion, but we regret the fact that it does not include Senate amendment No. 3, which proposed recognition of the ancestral hunting rights of the first nations.

First, we agree with the first paragraph of the motion. The Senate's first amendment is the same as the first amendment the Bloc Quebecois had proposed. So essentially, the Senate confirmed that the Bloc Quebecois was right in what it was asking for and in the amendments that it had moved.

The definition of animal in the bill is very broad; it describes an animal as

a vertebrate, other than a human being, and any other animal that has the capacity to feel pain.

That is the definition found at clause 182.1 of the new part.

This is another example of change. In addition to removing animals from the property part of the bill, it provides for how the Criminal Code will consider animals from now on, as beings that have the capacity to feel pain.

Several witnesses mentioned that there is a lack of resources to enforce sections of the Criminal Code that deal with cruelty to animals. As a result, the Bloc Quebecois fears that the Crown could, through expert witnesses, prove which animals have the capacity to feel pain. The Bloc Quebecois also fears that there could be unfounded legal proceedings, which could cost the animal, sports and research sectors considerable amounts of money in legal fees.

The fifth amendment proposed by the Senate is a grammatical correction.

With regard to paragraph 2 of the motion, we are in favour of it. Clause 182.2(1) lists the acts towards animals that would lead to criminal responsibility if committed by a person who does so wilfully or recklessly. Paragraphs ( a ) through ( d ) do not provide for all means of defence as found in part XI of the Criminal Code. Paragraphs ( c ) and ( d ) do provide the protection of lawful excuse.

I want to read paragraphs a ) through d ) of clause 182.2(1):

(a) causes or, being the owner, permits to becaused unnecessary pain, suffering or injuryto an animal;

(b) kills an animal or, being the owner,permits an animal to be killed, brutally orviciously, regardless of whether the animaldies immediately;

(c) kills an animal without lawful excuse;

(d) without lawful excuse, poisons ananimal, places poison in such a position thatit may easily be consumed by an animal,administers an injurious drug or substanceto an animal or, being the owner, permitsanyone to do any of those things;

Accordingly, the Bloc Quebecois believes that it would have been appropriate to amend the preamble of clause 182.2(1) to include the concept of lawful justification, excuse or colour of right.

Paragraphs ( e ) and ( h ) do not contain the defences provided for under part XI of the Criminal Code. It should be noted that the Bloc Quebecois moved an amendment providing for an exception for hunting with hounds or for the roue du roi under paragraph ( g ), but our amendment was voted down in committee.

Still in relation to paragraph 2, I would reiterate that the Quebec Bar's comment on this was that we should go with the standard of offences punishable on summary conviction and not the increase to 18 months as this bill proposed.

The Bloc Quebecois agrees with the Quebec Bar proposal with respect to the standard of offences punishable by summary conviction. However, it should be pointed out that the Bloc Quebecois favours increased sentences for criminal acts.

As for paragraph 3 of the government motion, I must say we are disappointed that the government has not seen fit to clearly set out the rights of aboriginal persons in this bill, according to the Senate proposal. We are, however, confident that by virtue of the new wording of amendment 4, and by virtue of the Constitution, aboriginal ancestral rights will be preserved and protected.

As for paragraph 4 of the motion, we are also in favour of this. It represents the core of what we were calling for in committee and was added by the Senate. Creation of a new section of the Criminal Code will have the effect of transferring animals to a section applicable to them alone, while not including the defences that were set out in section 429 of the Criminal Code under property.

The defences proposed in Bill C-10B are central to our concerns. The fact that the means of defence are not included in the new part V.1 will certainly result in those who legitimately and legally kill animals or cause them pain being deprived of the protection currently afforded them under subsection 429(2) of the Criminal Code. Such provision would allow them to act with legal justification or excuse or colour of right.

Section 429(2) reads as follows:

No person shall be convicted of an offence under sections 430 to 446 where he proves that he acted with legal justification or excuse and with colour of right.

Although Bill C-10B contains provision for lawful excuse for certain offences, as well as the common law defences set out in section 8(3) of the Criminal Code, these are inadequate because they apply only to offences under sections 182.1( c ) and ( d ) and are much narrower than those set out in the current provisions.

However, the minister, the deputy minister and the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice amended the bill by stating that section 8(3) of the Criminal Code would apply and that the defences of legal justification or excuse or colour of right would be implicit. The Bloc Quebecois has grave reservations in this regard.

Colour of right is defined as follows. In R. v. Ninos and Walker, in 1964, the court stated that the accused must show that he had an honest belief in a state of facts which, if it existed, would constitute legal justification or excuse.

The colour of right defence is based on the honest and subjective belief of the accused that at the time of the offence there was colour of right. It is based on a belief in a set of circumstances or a situation of civil law which, if it existed, would negate the wilful intent to commit the offence.

Even if the belief does not need to be reasonable, the fact is that it is a factor to be taken into consideration in determining whether such a belief exists. However, it is not enough for the accused to have an amoral belief in the colour of right. The colour of right applies to errors of fact or errors in law and is not limited to areas of the law concerning proprietary interest or ownership right.

That being said, we are in favour of the government's motion.

We are disappointed, as I said, that the government is not considering Senate amendment No. 3, because it proposes recognizing ancestral rights. Nonetheless, I think it was important to make these clarifications today.

I would like to thank my colleague from Châteauguay, who led the battle on this issue. He put forward amendments in committee that were voted down by the government across the way. These Bloc amendments were taken up by the Senate and approved.

We agree with this motion. We hope, as I said, especially with regard to amendment No. 3, that the government will take our requests and recommendations into consideration.

[Paul MacKlin, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise today to introduce the debate on the amendments made in the other place to Bill C-10B, an act to amend the Criminal Code with respect to animal cruelty.

Bill C-10B received third reading and was passed in the other place on May 29. After careful study and reflection, five amendments were adopted. One amendment is a minor housekeeping amendment and four reflect more substantive changes. The House now has an opportunity to consider and vote on these amendments. I will briefly summarize these amendments.

The housekeeping measure corrected a word in the French text of the proposed section 182.6, which deals with injury to police animals and was a provision put into Bill C-10B by the justice committee of this House. The French text had a small error, in that it used the word aux where the word des should have been used. The government supports the correction of this error.

The second amendment would abbreviate the definition of animal contained in Bill C-10B. The definition of animal was “a vertebrate, other than a human being, and any other animal that has the capacity to feel pain”. The amendment made in the other place would cut off the definition after “other than a human being” so that it would include vertebrates, but not “any other animal that has the capacity to feel pain”. The current sections of the Criminal Code that deal with animal cruelty do not contain a definition of animal. It is therefore a term capable of extending to all manner of animal life, including many invertebrates.

The original definition in Bill C-10B was drafted with a view to bringing some clarity and certainty into the law by clearly enunciating that vertebrates were included. It was also designed to achieve maximum flexibility in respect of animals that are not invertebrates. The original definition would have allowed the Crown to prosecute a case in respect of a non-vertebrate if it was prepared to meet the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the animal had the capacity to feel pain.

The science of animal physiology is evolving and will continue to evolve. This element of the definition allowed the law to continue to evolve with the science. The policy rationale was clear. Any animal that is of a species that has the capacity to feel pain should be protected from the infliction of pain that is not necessary. The amendment would foreclose the possibility of any charge in relation to an invertebrate. It chooses maximum certainty of the definition, all vertebrates and only vertebrates over flexibility in the law. This is not the choice that the government made. The government can understand the preference for certainty over flexibility and so the government is prepared not to oppose this amendment.

The third amendment reflects a concern that defences in subsection 429(2) of the code were being taken away. This amendment has replaced section 182.5 which expressly refers to subsection 8(3) of the Criminal Code which preserves all the common law defences. The justice committee of the House added section 182.5 during its study of Bill C-10B. The amendment would replace the reference to subsection 8(3) with a reproduction of a smaller set of defences that is currently in subsection 429(2) of the Criminal Code. Section 182.5 now reads:

No person shall be convicted of an offence under this Part where he proves that he acted with legal justification or excuse or with colour of right.

The intent of this amendment was to reassure Canadians that the specific defences in subsection 429(2) would not be lost in Bill C-10B.

In fact, even if no express reference is made to “legal justification or excuse with colour of right”, those defences are common law defences and captured by subsection 8(3) of the Criminal Code. Therefore, this amendment is not legally necessary. Those defences are available to any accused charged with any offence and they do not need to be rewritten into every section of the code in order for them to be available.

The very existence of a subsection like 429(2) creates the kind of confusion that has led to this concern. This is an old subsection that was enacted before the charter in order to reverse the burden of proof for certain common law defences in the case of certain offences. Reversing the burden of proof means that the accused must prove that the defence applies. Normally the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defences raised by the accused do not apply. Today, in the post-charter era, we know that in all likelihood the reverse onus is unconstitutional because it could result in a conviction despite the existence of a reasonable doubt about the accused person's innocence.

The historical purpose behind subsection 429(2--to reverse the onus of proof--is no longer acceptable in the charter era. However, its continued existence has caused some to have the misleading impression that the words must be present in order for the defence to be available.

The absence of express reference to these defences was not an oversight in Bill C-10B. On the contrary, by not reproducing the defences the bill would ensure that all of the common law defences of subsection 8(3) would be applied without any possibility of a reverse onus. The bill tried to eliminate the confusion caused by subsection 429(2).

However, some people continue to fear that the absence of the words could result in a court finding that the defences are no longer available. The government can understand the desire to reassure Canadians, who may perhaps not be familiar with such intricacies of the criminal law, and who may fear that the removal of reference to these defences could lead to their loss of application. The amendment made by the other place was meant as such a reassurance. It does not change the law nor provide any new protections.

Although the government can understand the goal of reassuring Canadians, the manner in which this has been accomplished is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, it reintroduces the reverse onus with the words “if he proves that”. This would require an accused to prove his or her innocence on a balance of probabilities, a burden that the accused should not have and would not have in the absence of the amendment.

It is almost certainly an unjustifiable violation of the presumption of innocence. Most provisions in the Criminal Code introduced after the charter do not have this reverse onus because the courts are likely to find that it violates the charter. It is poor law reform to introduce a provision that, on its face, likely violates the charter.

The second reason the government does not support this wording is because it would give rise to a degree of uncertainty about whether the full body of case law decided under subsection 429(2) would continue to apply. It would certainly be desirable to signal to the courts that the old case law should continue to apply. This is important both in terms of the application of case law that interprets the meaning and scope of these defences, and in relation to some case law that already suggests the reverse onus in subsection 429(2) is unconstitutional and of no force or effect.

The government therefore proposes an amendment to the amendment with slightly different wording that would accomplish the very objectives sought by the other place, and at the same time, would avoid the constitutionality problem of reverse onus. In addition, the government's amendment would signal more clearly to the courts that the old case law should continue to apply.

The government's reworded provision would read as follows:

182.5 For greater certainty, the defences set out in subsection 429(2) apply, to the extent that they are relevant, in respect of proceedings for an offence under this Part.

By referring directly to subsection 429(2), this formulation has the advantage of ensuring that all the case law decided under the provision continues to apply, including case law that deals with the constitutionality of reverse onus in that subsection.

I urge the members of the House to reject the amendment before us and approve the government's motion to amend the amendment.

On the topic of this amendment I would like to make two final points. First, I wish to repeat that this amendment is not legally necessary. There was no oversight in the bill as originally drafted. On the contrary, the legislation was carefully crafted to try to minimize the kind of confusion and concerns that have been expressed by removing reference to defence provisions that are redundant and contained a reverse onus. This is a comfort clause designed to reassure Canadians that defences that used to apply will continue to apply.

As a last point on this issue, I would like to also be clear that the defences referred to in subsection 429(2) do not provide a specialized protection for industry uses of animals. There is still a fair amount of confusion about what these defences mean and how they work, especially the defence of colour of right. I wish here to be clear so that all Canadians understand the scope and reach of the law.

Hunters, farmers, animal researchers and veterinarians do not need to invoke any defences to justify their activities. It is only the wilful, reckless or criminally negligent infliction of pain that is avoidable and unnecessary that amounts to a crime. The government believes that the vast majority of all industry participants take great care to cause no more pain than is required to meet their objectives. Where this is the case, there is no cruelty and there is no crime. The humane use of animals is simply not a crime.

The Ménard case, the leading case on animal cruelty, makes perfectly clear that in the industry setting, causing only necessary pain is not a crime. However, where more pain than is reasonable or necessary is knowingly caused, these defences do not provide an additional layer of legal protection. Cruelty is cruelty wherever it takes place.

The defences are therefore not needed to shield industry personnel. However these defences may in exceptional circumstances be relevant, for instance, where people cause harm to an animal because the animal was attacking them or their property. Colour of right is simply the excuse of mistake. It could apply, for instance, where people euthanized an animal that they believed to be their pet but which actually was not their pet. These defences have a very limited scope.

The fourth amendment deletes the offence of “killing without a lawful excuse” and adds the notion of “causing unnecessary death” to the offence of causing unnecessary pain or suffering to an animal.

The government opposes this amendment because it is problematic for several reasons. It may be intended to clarify that certain activities, such as hunting and fishing, are lawful but in fact it brings greater uncertainty into the law.

Bill C-10B makes it an offence to kill an animal without lawful excuse. The phrase “without lawful excuse” is well understood in the case law and the Supreme Court has clarified that it is a broad and flexible term to be understood in the context of the offence. It is broad enough to encompass commonly accepted reasons for killing animals such as hunting and euthanasia. This term is currently in the offence of killing kept animals and the courts have not shown any difficulty in interpreting its content or scope.

The amendment would take away the term “without lawful excuse” and instead qualify “killing” by the word “unnecessary”. This is illogical and would lead to confusion. The term “unnecessary” has been judicially interpreted in the context of “pain”. In essence, it means “no more pain than is reasonably necessary taking into account the objective sought”.

This interpretation of the word “unnecessary” cannot logically be applied to killing where the only relevant question is whether or not there was a good reason for killing.

The amendment would delete “without lawful excuse”, which is a well-known and well understood concept in the context of a killing offence, and would replace it with the term “unnecessary”, the interpretation of which does not make sense when applied to killing.

This would surely lead the courts to question what the intent was and could lead to a reinterpretation of the elements of the offence.

There is yet another reason for rejecting the amendment. For decades it has been Parliament's intent that there be two distinct offences, one of causing unnecessary pain to an animal and one of killing an animal without lawful excuse. The blameworthy nature of each type of act is quite different. Killing one's neighbour's dog humanely but without good reason is something very different from torturing an animal.

However, the amendment would collapse these two offences into one single offence. This could lead to confusion about the elements of the offence and be problematic for police and prosecutors who need clarity in terms of which offence to charge and what elements to prove. For these reasons the government opposes the motion and urges the House to reject it.

The final amendment would add a new subsection 182.2(3) which would create a defence for aboriginal persons who carry out traditional hunting, trapping or fishing practices in any area in which aboriginal peoples have harvesting rights under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, where pain caused is no more than is reasonably necessary in the carrying out of those traditional practices.

The government opposes the amendment for several reasons. First, the amendment is not necessary. It was made in response to concerns that aboriginal persons would be subject to undue risk of prosecution for their traditional practices.

Aboriginal persons are not at risk of prosecution or conviction for any activities that are humane and cause no more pain than is necessary. In addition, aboriginal persons have all the protection of section 35 of the Constitution Act, and in any case they can raise the claim that the law violates their protected rights.

In addition to being unnecessary, the amendment is extremely problematic in the way it is drafted. There was substantial confusion in the other place about the effect of the words. Although five members of the Senate legal and constitutional affairs committee voted for the amendment, two opposed and five abstained.

Concerns were expressed that the amendment would create an inappropriate reverse onus on aboriginal people. Others were concerned that it was over broad because, the way it is written, it would allow an aboriginal person from one geographic region to go to any area where aboriginal peoples have rights and claim the defence. This would allow aboriginal persons to claim the benefit of the defence based on the rights of another group of aboriginal persons.

There is also some confusion and uncertainty about what “traditional practices” are. Would those be the same as practices that are protected aboriginal rights under section 35 of the Constitution, or would they be something else?

Concern was also expressed about how difficult it would be to expect the police to know what are traditional practices before laying a charge. It is difficult to know whether this provision would be practically enforceable.

In the other place the intent was to ensure that aboriginal persons were subject to the law just as other Canadians are. However some were concerned that the wording would create an exemption. We cannot be certain how the courts would interpret the provision. If the same rules and standards are meant to apply to aboriginals as to non-aboriginals, then courts may wonder what the purpose of the clause is.

For all the above reasons, the government urges the members of the House to vote against the amendment. It is confusing and its scope and effect are uncertain, and it is simply unnecessary.

Aboriginal peoples who treat animals in humane ways are not being cruel and therefore not at risk of prosecution or conviction.

The government would once again like to thank the other place for all its hard work and dedicated study of this complex and important legislation.

I strongly urge all hon. members to vote in favour of the amendment which corrects a word in the French text, to vote against the amendments that deal with the offence of killing without lawful excuse and a special defence in respect of aboriginal persons, to vote against the amendment that deals with colour of right and in its stead vote in favour of the government's motion to amend that particular amendment in a manner that is constitutional and better captures the existing case law.

On the amendment that deals with the definition of “animal”, the government neither supports nor opposes it.

[Don Boudria, Liberal, for the Minister of Justice]

moved:

That a message be sent to the Senate to acquaint their Honours that this House agrees with amendments numbered 1 and 5 made by the Senate to Bill C-10B, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (cruelty to animals); but

Disagrees with amendment numbered 2 because the amendment is inconsistent with the other elements of the offence and makes the law less clear and because the amendment would collapse two offences with different elements into one single offence, leading to confusion about the elements of the offence and to problems for police and prosecutors;

Disagrees with amendment numbered 3 because it is unclear and creates confusion about whether the intent is to create a different test for liability of aboriginal persons and because there is no clarity as to what “traditional practices” are and how law enforcement can be expected to act accordingly; and

Agrees with the principle set out in amendment numbered 4, namely, the desire to reassure Canadians that no defences are lost, but, because the wording of the amendment would codify a reverse onus by requiring an accused person to prove his or her innocence on a balance of probabilities, would propose the following amendment:

Amendment numbered 4 be amended to read as follows:

Page 4, clause 2: Replace lines 22 to 24 with the following:

“182.5 For greater certainty, the defences set out in subsection 429(2) apply, to the extent that they are relevant, in respect of proceedings for an offence under this Part.”.

Business of the House

[Don Boudria, Liberal, Minister of State and Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, that is a very powerful question. Yes, I have checked my agenda as to what work remains to be done. We all know that there is lots of work to do.

That is why, this afternoon, the House will return to its consideration of Bill C-15, the lobbyist legislation, followed by Bill S-13, respecting census records. We will then return to Bill C-17, the public safety bill.

I am sorry that this morning we were unable to complete our consideration of Bill C-7. Tomorrow, we will begin considering the Senate's amendments to Bill C-10B, the cruelty to animals legislation, and Bill C-35, the military judges bill. If we have any time remaining, I still hope we can finish with Bill C-7, of course.

Next week, starting on Monday, the House will consider Bill C-24, the elections finance bill, at the report stage, and any items from this week that have not been completed.

I wish to confirm to the House that Thursday, June 12 shall be an allotted day.

[Don Boudria, Liberal, Minister of State and Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, to answer the last question first, as to whether we need to have late night sittings, I suppose it depends on the co-operation on the part of the opposition, which is usually quite good, I must say.

Going to the substance for the next few days, we will continue this afternoon with the opposition day motion. The House does not sit tomorrow because of the Conservative leadership convention.

We are now entering June, the month when we try to wrap up the year's work and we will be consulting other House leaders on a daily, sometimes hourly basis, in order to determine the precise order of bills. However for the next few days we will be dealing mostly with report stages, third readings and consideration of Senate amendments to bills we have already passed.

The bills that will be considered next week will be, and I will start with the one on Monday, although we intend to have a minor conversation about another minor issue later, but generally speaking they will be as follows. We will start with Bill C-25, the public service bill. We will then move on to Bill C-31 respecting certain pensions for veterans and the RCMP. When that bill is completed I would hope to start Bill C-7 respecting first nations governance; and because they are all government days next week we are going to take them probably in roughly that sequence, Bill C-17 public safety; then Bill C-13, the reproductive technologies bill which is presently at third reading.

It would be my intention to then call Bill C-32, the Criminal Code amendments. When the bill is reported to the House, which hopefully will be one day next week, we could then commence Bill C-24, the political financing bill. We also have the amendments from the Senate which I understand might happen on Bill C-15, the lobbyist bill, and Bill C-10B, cruelty to animals.

At some point, we would also like to debate the second reading of Bill S-13, respecting the census, and Bill C-27, the airport bill.

As a matter of courtesy, I wish to indicate to colleagues that it is my intention to call the final supply day on or after June 12. This is not, of course, an official designation of that day at this point but that is why I say on or after, but at least to try and give an indication to colleagues in the event that they will not take other commitments at or about that particular time in order for them to be able to plan their agenda.

Supply

[Robert Lanctôt, Bloc, Châteauguay, QC]

Mr. Chair, I will start with an issue that the minister did not mention even though it was there in the first session of the 37th Parliament and again in the second session, and I am talking about Bill C-10B on cruelty to animals.

When we started looking at this issue, the goal was to impose stiffer penalties; of course, the Bloc Quebecois agreed that something had to be done to protect animals against cruelty. These provisions were to be removed from where they are in the Criminal Code and included in a new part V.1.

However, there is a problem with the new part. The government has forgotten to explicitly include the defences provided for the animal industry, including researchers and all those who deal with animals, like hunters, ranchers, farmers, those who are there to protect animals from cruelty. These people came to testify that it was indeed necessary to impose stiffer penalties and to enforce legislative provisions with regard to cruelty to animals, but that the animal industry should not be jeopardized by these efforts.

During the proceedings of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, we brought forward an amendment to stand by those who act in a responsible manner and want to protect the animals, just like the Bloc Quebecois, without hurting the animal industry. We asked that all the defences provided for in section 429 be made explicitly available. We were told that these rights are protected, that the farmers, the researchers and all the animal industry were implicitly protected.

Strangely enough, when we asked for these defences to be explicitly included, we were referred to section 8 providing for the rights based on the common law. We were told that this provision allowed defences implicitly. But they did listen to my request. Section 8 is explicit,and yet, the defences allowed under section 8 are implicit.

I want to ask this of the minister. It would not take away anything if you do not want to hurt the animal industry. Why not include the defences laid out in section 429, which were part, of course, of the property provisions, in the new part V.1?

Those who seek to protect animals have even told us, “We are willing to go along with this. We do not want to hurt those in the animal industry who meet the standards and do everything right. Why not include this explicitly?” That is my question to the minister.

[The Deputy Speaker]

I have the honour to inform the House that a communication has been received which is as follows:

Rideau Hall

Ottawa

May 8, 2003

Mr. Speaker:

I have the honour to inform you that the Right Honourable Adrienne Clarkson, Governor General of Canada, signified royal assent by written declaration to the bills listed in the Schedule to this letter on the 8th day of May, 2003, at 4:07 p.m.

Yours sincerely,

Barbara Uteck

Secretary to the Governor General

The schedule indicates that royal assent was given to Bill C-2, an act to establish a process for assessing the environmental and socio-economic effects of certain activities in Yukon; and Bill C-10A, an act to amend the Criminal Code (firearms) and the Firearms Act.

It being 5:33 p.m., the House will now proceed to the consideration of private members' business as listed on today's Order Paper.

An Act to amend the Criminal Code (cruelty to animals and firearms) and the Firearms Act

[The Acting Speaker (Ms. Bakopanos)]

It being 5.58 p.m., pursuant to order made earlier today, it is my duty to interrupt the proceedings and put forthwith every question necessary to dispose of the amendments tabled by the Senate to Bill C-10 now before the House.

The question is on the amendment to the amendment. Is it the pleasure of the House to adopt the amendment to the amendment?

[Jay Hill, Canadian Alliance, Prince George—Peace River, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the opportunity to ask my Bloc colleague a question.

Before I ask my question, I would like to say for the record on behalf of my constituents of Prince George--Peace River, who I am always pleased and privileged to represent in the House of Commons, that never before in the history of Liberal boondoggles is there anything to rival the Firearms Act for the sheer stupidity of this legislation.

I wanted that on the record because, as I said earlier in a brief question and comment that I made, unfortunately the government has again invoked time allocation and many of us will not have the opportunity to represent our constituents with a 20 minute or even a 10 minute speech on the legislation before us today, Bill C-10.

I could not agree more with my Bloc colleague when he talked about the problems with the Senate. I think he referred to the fact that it could split this bill as many times as it wanted. It can be divided up into bite sized pieces and it is still a zero.

My concern and the question I want to raise with the member is one of computer security. This list, even as inaccurate as it is, obviously is not secure. We already know that. That concern for computer security is one that I hear repeatedly from constituents who have not registered their firearms and will not register their firearms. When IBM and pentagon can routinely have their systems hacked into, obviously this is not a secure list either, and I hear that.

Does the member also hear these types of concerns being expressed by his constituents in the province of Quebec?