Mr. Speaker, I welcome the opportunity to address Bill C-265, An Act to amend the Employment Insurance Act.
I would first like to commend the members of the New Democratic Party and the member for Acadie—Bathurst for their ongoing interest in enhancing Canada's employment insurance program, one of the key elements of our social safety net.
Our government is open to making improvements to the employment insurance program, but since this is such a very important program, we must be sure that any changes must truly be for the better.
This bill proposes dramatic changes to qualification for and entitlement to employment insurance benefits. While I do not doubt the sincerity and the intentions of the member who has proposed this bill, there is no evidence to suggest that these changes would improve employment insurance and every reason to believe that they would not.
One of the program's chief goals is to encourage attachment to the labour market. In other words, the program should encourage Canadians to seek and to retain employment.
To demonstrate the potential negative impact of this bill, I think it would be useful to examine just how well the program is currently working.
The system as it is currently structured is meeting claimants' needs. The Employment Insurance Commission produces an annual monitoring and assessment report to provide information on whether or not the program is working effectively. The 2005 report makes it clear that when Canadians need employment insurance, it is there for them both in terms of the amount they receive and how long their benefits last.
In fiscal 2004-05, for example, the program provided approximately $13 billion in income benefits to some two million Canadians. More than 83% of the unemployed who had paid into the program and had a recent job separation were eligible for benefits. Moreover, more than 90% of employees met the eligibility requirements for special benefits, such as sickness, maternity or parental benefits.
Ongoing analysis also indicates that the duration of benefits is also meeting the needs of Canadian workers. On average, regular beneficiaries collect less than two-thirds of their regular benefits. The number of beneficiaries who are exhausting their benefits is declining. In fact, the benefit exhaustion rate has been steadily declining since 1996.
All the evidence available suggests that the employment insurance program is meeting the needs of claimants. Any program can be improved, but before we make dramatic changes, we need to make sure that the outcomes will be positive.
This brings me back to the bill in front of the House today. Among its provisions, the proposed legislation seeks to introduce a flat 360 hour entrance requirement for regular and for special benefits. This would eliminate the variable entrance requirement, as well as provisions for new and returning entrants. The bill also seeks to introduce a best 12 weeks formula for calculating income benefits.
I believe, taken together, these proposed changes would undermine the program's focus on labour market attachment. To put it another way, the changes could reduce incentives to seek employment. As we all know, the Canadian economy is facing growing labour shortages and one of the government's policies is to promote participation in the workforce.
Let me specifically detail my concerns with the bill.
First, in a region with high unemployment, it can be more difficult to obtain work and to build up the necessary hours to qualify for employment insurance. That is why the program as it is currently structured has put in place variable entrance requirements. Through this policy, the program adjusts entrance requirements each month to reflect unemployment rates by region. As unemployment rates go up, entrance requirements go down and benefits are extended. This has proven to be a sensible approach to address regional disparities in economic opportunities.
The flat rate proposed by the bill would dismantle this system. It would essentially favour Canadians who live in regions with low unemployment, who would likely have an easier time meeting the lower entrance requirements. I am concerned about the fairness of this proposal in changing the variable entrance requirement. Reducing the entrance requirements would also have a very marginal impact on the number of people who would qualify for benefits.
There is no vast pool of applicants being turned down for benefits because of high entrance requirements. In fact, more than 83% of unemployed people who have paid into the program and who have become unemployed through no fault of their own are eligible to receive benefits.
Second, I am also concerned that the bill would eliminate the 910 hour entrance requirement for new entrants to the labour force and for those re-entering after an extended absence. The 910 hour entrance requirement strengthens the link between hours of work and entitlement to benefits. It helps present a cycle of reliance on employment insurance. Indeed, the last four monitoring and assessment reports suggest that the current entrance requirements encourage workforce attachment. This is not a provision we should idly discard. That is why the government launched a pilot project recently to test eligibility thresholds for new entrants and for re-entrants into the workforce.
The pilot project drops the entrance requirements from 910 hours to 840 hours, benefiting more than 16,000 individuals each year. However, before we embark on such significant changes to the entrance requirements, we should await the results of the pilot project.
Third, the bill also proposes to calculate and employment insurance benefits based on the best 12 weeks of earnings over a 52 week period preceding a claim. Again, it would be premature to accept this change without sound evidence.
To that end, the government is currently running a pilot project known as the “best 14 weeks”. It is testing the impact of the very same principle that the proposal in the bill seeks to address. This initiative will test labour market impacts of improving incentives for individuals to accept all available work, including weeks of work that are shorter than their normal full weeks. It will also test whether employers facing labour shortages will have access to additional workers. Consequently we should await the results of the pilot project and make a decision informed by logic, fairness and the evidence.
Fourth, the reason why I think we should also oppose the bill is that it extends benefits for employment insurance in a way that is not accessible to all Canadians. For example, the area that I represent, the greater Toronto area, has a much lower percentage of the workforce participating in the employment insurance program than other regions of the country. There is evidence to show that this is a result of the many new Canadians who have recently arrived in the country and who participate in the workforce but do not participate in employment insurance. They are in occupations that are often self-employed and are not eligible to participate in employment insurance programs. By extending the employment insurance program to greater entitlements than is presently the case, we are in effect not creating a greater benefit for those newer Canadians living in some of the country's larger cities like the greater Toronto area.
There is evidence to suggest that these new Canadians are some of the most disadvantaged in our society, that they are increasingly falling behind in their social outcomes, their poverty levels, their unemployment rates and the like. This is not something that is unbeknownst to public policy-makers. It is something that has been highlighted by many organizations, including the United Way of Greater Toronto. By extending benefits, especially benefits like caregiver benefits, we would not include this group, many of whom are disadvantaged.
For these four reasons, we should oppose the bill. I urge all members of the House to vote against the bill.