Good afternoon. Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you this afternoon.
My name is Greg Holbrook. I am the national chair of the Canadian Federal Pilots Association.
The CFPA represents approximately 375 licensed pilots employed by Transport Canada as civil aviation inspectors. CFPA members are professionals who inspect, test, license, monitor, audit, and enforce Canada's aviation safety regulations.
We have serious reservations about Bill C-6 and the safety management systems it authorizes. For years, Transport Canada has achieved acceptable levels of aviation safety with a system of checks and balances and regulatory oversight carried out by inspectors to produce the enviable safety record Canadian travellers now enjoy.
Bill C-6 and SMS set out to switch to affordable levels of safety. That's right, from acceptable to affordable. Driven by forecasted funding cuts and an aviation inspectorate that will shrink by half in the next few years, Bill C-6 will transfer determination of appropriate risk levels to the airlines. With Transport Canada's implementation of SMS, the airlines will decide the safety levels for the travelling public. The airlines' bottom line will now be factored into deciding acceptable risk levels for the public.
The bill will also let airlines monitor their own safety standards and regulatory compliance. Transport Canada has already transferred oversight of the corporate business aviation sector to the Canadian Business Aviation Association. Bill C-6 will give airlines immunity from enforcement for self-reporting of safety violations, a “get out of jail free” card.
Unable to afford its safety responsibilities, Transport Canada is off-loading them. With a number of recent decisions, Transport Canada is already giving up its safety oversight role and is dismantling the system of checks and balances that brought us to the relatively low accident rate we have today.
In spite of some testimony you've heard from Transport Canada officials, SMS is replacing key safety programs that have already been cancelled. Here are a few examples.
In December 2005, Transport Canada issued civil aviation directive number 39, which handed over enforcement and investigation to the airlines themselves. When Transport Canada now receives a report of an occurrence that may require looking into, regardless of the source, the information is to be passed to the airline management, who are requested to handle the situation in accordance with their safety management system. Transport Canada inspectors have been directed not to investigate.
In March 2006, Transport Canada killed the national audit program, which covers the eight largest airlines, the five largest airports, and the three largest aircraft manufacturers in this country. The reason? To allow for regulatory oversight resources and funds to be redirected to the administration of SMS programs. Regional audit programs are being shut down as well.
In October 2006, Transport Canada managers abruptly closed all enforcement investigations into safety violations committed by airlines so long as they had an SMS or were working on one. It was declared no further action was to be taken on all these files.
Pilot proficiency check validity periods have been extended to two years and PPCs will no longer be conducted by Transport Canada inspectors as of December 2007. Airlines have been advised to check their pilots themselves or contract this service, a clear conflict of interest.
Insights from the cockpit provided by PPCs will no longer inform the work of Transport Canada inspectors. I should note that this decision places Canada in violation of international standards. For years, Transport Canada has lacked the resources necessary to adequately inspect and audit Canada's airlines. Rather than increase resources, Transport Canada simply directed staff to comply “with the frequencies to the extent that resources allow”.
To help you understand the different role that inspectors play under SMS, I'd like to give you a then-and-now metaphor.
In the system that has delivered Canada's current high safety rate, inspectors were under the hood of companies they audited and inspected. We flew with the pilots. We were in the maintenance shops. We were in the flight operations centres.
With SMS, we will no longer do regular audits and inspections. We will review SMS documents, SMS reports, and system structures only. Our focus is shifting from actual operations to paper and policy. I invite you to review the publication, which I have included, to see the documents that substantiate my testimony.
Against this backdrop, and with Transport Canada's emphasis on farming out safety oversight, it's no wonder that aviation inspectors are gravely concerned about SMS.
We commissioned Pollara to survey our members about SMS. More than 65% completed the online survey, which was conducted between January 26 and February 2.The most shocking result is that three-quarters of our inspectors believe that a major accident is likely or very likely to occur in the near future, and 60% believe Transport Canada's SMS will actually increase this likelihood.
The survey also found that 80% believe SMS will prevent them from addressing and correcting safety problems before they happen; 67% believe Transport Canada's SMS will result in a higher level of risk in Canada's aviation system because industry cost pressures will result in safety corners being cut; 77% believe that the public confidence in the aviation system would decline with the awareness of SMS; and 80% believe SMS is simply a response to dwindling resources on the part of Transport Canada.
These sobering insights bring me to the recommendations I would table for your consideration:
One, urge the minister to provide Transport Canada Civil Aviation with the resources needed to oversee the industry properly.
Secondly, amend Bill C-6 to require that SMS achieve the highest practical levels of safety and not leave the determination of appropriate risk levels in the hands of the airlines.
Third, rescind subsection 5.31, or at the very least prevent the delegation of regulatory oversight activities to the industry for commercial airlines that operate for profit.
Four, add whistle-blower protection for employees who report safety problems and concerns to the regulator.
On this last recommendation, I am personally aware of the need for whistle-blower protection to achieve the non-punitive reporting environment that Bill C-6 seeks to establish. Last week a senior Transport Canada official called my office after learning that the CFPA was to testify and stated, “It will be a problem” if any TC inspectors appear before your committee to talk about safety concerns.
I don't know if Transport Canada is trying to limit what you hear, but I can't think of a better example of why we need employee protections. What if I succumbed to this pressure and decided not to give you the whole picture as you consider Bill C-6?
The travelling public will take the risk on this gamble by Transport Canada. It is up to you to decide if that is acceptable.
Thank you very much.