Thank you, Mr. Chair. It's a privilege to have the opportunity to address this committee.
I am in a bit of an awkward position because I have sympathy for the ultimate goal of the government in Bill C-9. There's no question that the imposition of conditional sentences for extremely serious crime has a dispiriting effect on public confidence in the administration of justice. On the other hand, I'm here to urge that Bill C-9 not be passed in its current form, and I say that for three reasons.
First, this bill is too blunt. It is going to prohibit not only inappropriate uses of the conditional sentence but also the application of conditional sentences in cases where it is not only appropriate but the preferred response for the criminal justice system. Secondly, it will add appreciably to the financial costs of the administration of justice, and it will do it without reducing the amount of crime that occurs in Canadian society. Thirdly, and I say this based on my experience both as a defence lawyer and as a prosecutor for more than seven years, part-time and full-time here in Ottawa, strategies will be adopted by judges and lawyers that will avoid the rigidity of Bill C-9, and I'll give you some illustrations later.
If this government chooses to act on its perception or conviction that conditional sentences are being applied inappropriately, I don't want to come empty-handed. I'm offering two alternative methods of attempting to deal with this difficulty. The first is to create an additional prerequisite for conditional sentencing that would make it appropriate solely in those cases where priorities should be given to rehabilitation or restorative justice. Secondly, I would encourage the government to provide a presumptive provision. It could identify offences that are most troubling, such as sexual assault or causing serious bodily harm, and in those circumstances it can be presumed that priority in sentencing should be given to denunciation and deterrence. I'll speak more about these at the end of my presentation.
In theory, conditional sentencing is treated as a jail sentence. Its virtue is that it does reduce reliance on imprisonment and it does, according to the theory, decrease the risk of reoffending by some offenders. I'm urging this committee to accept the validity of both of those propositions in appropriate cases. Imprisonment is far more expensive than the administration of a conditional sentence, and as Ms. Berzins has explained, locking offenders up together with those who are criminally disposed in a criminal subculture tends to make many offenders worse, not better. To the extent that we can assist in rehabilitating Canadian citizens, we know we can do it far more effectively when they're not incarcerated.
Having conditional sentences in appropriate cases makes both common sense and financial sense. It makes sense where appropriate principles are respected. I would put forward three principles where conditional sentencing is an appropriate response. The first is where leaving the offender in the community will not pose an appreciable risk to the community. The second is where the offence is not so serious that permitting the offender to remain in the community provides an unjust response to the offence. The third is where priorities should be given to rehabilitation or restorative justice.
The current law is appropriate with respect to ensuring that dangerous offenders are not released into the community. As the committee I'm certain is aware, judges are not empowered to give a conditional sentence if in their judgment the offender poses a risk to the community if allowed to serve the sentence in the community. It would be inappropriate, in my respectful submission, for the government to assume that judges cannot make that determination at the same time we're putting forward a bill to allow judges to use their discretion to declare offenders dangerous on the basis of evidence and to lock them up indefinitely. It's quite clear that mistakes can be made in the exercise of discretion, but the alternative to removing discretion entirely and having fixed sentences or removing sentencing options is to result in erring on the side of incarceration, which, in my respectful submission, is not an appropriate response.
If there is a problem with conditional sentencing, it relates to the second two principles I have identified. The reality, in my opinion, is that we tend to overestimate the denunciatory and deterrent effect of a conditional sentence. This is because of what I would consider to be a questionable assumption that is made in the case law dealing with conditional sentencing. That assumption is that a conditional sentence is more like a jail term or a period of incarceration than it is like a period of probation.
In my respectful submission, this inflates the impact of a conditional sentence. Individuals subject to conditional sentences certainly have the stress and impact of being under a court order, but that stress is certainly far less than actual incarceration, and the deterrent impact has to be, to the extent that deterrents may exist, less if an offender is permitted to serve the sentence in the community.
I think if there is a difficulty with the conditional sentencing, it's in the tendency to overestimate the deterrent or denunciatory impact of that particular provision, and that's why I'm putting forward the principles that I am.
There's a related concern, and that is that sentencing does so many different things. We sentence people to try to accomplish protection of the community by deterring offenders. We sentence people trying to achieve justice. We sentence people in order to try to restore them or reintegrate them into the community. Those objectives are often at opposition to one another in a particular case, so the priorities a judge gives in a particular sentence are going to have a huge impact on the way that judge chooses to impose conditional sentences.
What I'm going to ultimately suggest is that if there is a problem, it is in the tendency to overestimate the deterrent and denunciatory effect, and the proposals I put forward address those specific problems, rather than the blunt tool in Bill C-9. Bill C-9 is blunt because it would remove conditional sentencing as an option entirely for offences with a maximum sentence of ten years or more.
The fact of the matter is that our Criminal Code is not a coherent instrument. We've never had a scientific study of the seriousness of offences. It is historical accident as to whether a particular provision in the code carries a maximum sentence of ten years or more. It not only includes the offences that we as a society are most afraid of; it also includes things like theft of cattle, theft of a credit card, unauthorized use of a computer, possession of house-breaking instruments, uttering forged documents, uttering counterfeit money. None of those things are acts that flatter the offender, but I doubt that Canadians would identify them as being among the more serious or more feared offences in our community.
The second problem is more profound, and it is that the seriousness of offences depends far more on the circumstance of the offence than on the specific offence in question. Sexual assault, for example, can include everything from an unwanted kiss to the most reprehensible violation. A break and enter can be a young person committing a home invasion under very dangerous circumstances or it can be an estranged spouse violating a court order giving possession of the home to another party by going in to try to reclaim what they think are their goods.
It is inappropriate and wrong, in my respectful submission, to have a lumped-in category of offences and assume that should be the break-off for conditional sentencing.
Conditional sentencing is cheaper than incarceration, and it would not be, in my respectful submission, appropriate for the government to act on the assumption that if we remove conditional sentencing it will deter offenders and that will reduce the costs of incarceration.
I'm not going to get into the studies that have been referred to by the previous speakers, but I ask this committee to approach this as a matter of common sense. How realistic is it to think that people who choose to drink and drive or break into homes or commit sexual assaults do it because they know they have a chance at perhaps getting a conditional sentence if and when they're apprehended? All of those offences carry very heavy penalties. Do you really think that's going to be the difference in their decision as to whether to engage in criminal conduct?
Secondly, what we do know about deterrents is that if an individual doesn't know what the sentence is, they're not going to have any way to measure the cost-benefit analysis. This is a complicated piece of legislation. Are offenders really going to understand what the impact of this particular bill is, and will they take that into account before they engage in their conduct?
If this committee decides to recommend or the government decides to act on this legislation, it must be in the firm appreciation that it will increase the costs of the administration of justice, not decrease them.
Finally, history teaches us that when the law becomes rigid, lawyers find their way around it, and so, too, do judges. If this bill is passed you are going to see probationary sentences given in cases that now attract conditional sentences. In other words, inappropriately lenient sentences will be imposed in an effort to get around these restrictions. In addition, you will see tokenistic periods of incarceration followed by probation where a conditional sentence would have been used in the past. So in some respects it's going to backfire.
It's going to give prosecutors tremendous power, because, as you know, this bill applies only where the prosecution elects to proceed indictably, and they can therefore remove a sentencing option from a judge. Sentencing decisions should be made by judges, where they are reviewable, rather than in the unreviewable discretion of prosecutors.
The solution I'm putting forward focuses on the very problem that I think I have identified with conditional sentences. Some judges think they are far more deterrent or denunciatory than I think they are. Our Supreme Court of Canada authority reinforces this characteristic of conditional sentences consistently.
I would ask that the committee consider recommending, and the government consider acting, on different principles. Add an additional prerequisite if you feel the need to deal with conditional sentences. Make sure that those conditional sentences should be ordered solely where the sentencing priority is rehabilitation or restorative justice. If you do that, you will save this vehicle for cases where it is needed, and where you do have a real need for deterrence or denunciatory sentencing, it won't be an appropriate sentence.
Add to that a presumption that in cases where there is sexual violation or serious bodily harm--or even, if you feel the need, significant property damage or interference with property rights--the appropriate sentencing priorities are denunciation and deterrence. If you do it in the form of a presumption, that puts the onus on the accused to show some special circumstances as to why a conditional sentence is appropriate in that case, whereas it may not be appropriate in typical applications of those same principles.
It will also provide an error of principle if a judge who believes in or articulates or recognizes an important need for deterrence and denunciation chooses to try to express that through a conditional sentence. It would be grounds for appeal.
I'm asking the committee to take a hard look at Bill C-9. While the objective behind it is understandable, this is a blunt tool. It is not an effective and, in my respectful submission, carefully tailored way to deal with the problem that I think the government is trying to identify.