Bill C-20 (Historical)

Senate Appointment Consultations Act

An Act to provide for consultations with electors on their preferences for appointments to the Senate

This enactment provides for the consultation of electors in a province with respect to their preferences for the appointment of Senators to represent the province.
Part 1 provides for the administration of a consultation, which is exercised under the general direction and supervision of the Chief Electoral Officer.
Part 2 provides for the holding of a consultation, initiated by an order of the Governor in Council.
Part 3 provides for a process whereby prospective nominees may confirm their nominations with the Chief Electoral Officer.
Part 4 addresses voting by electors in a consultation.
Part 5 sets out the rules for the counting of votes pursuant to a preferential system, which takes into account the first and subsequent preferences of electors as indicated on their ballots.
Parts 6 and 7 deal with communications and third party advertising in relation to consultations.
Part 8 addresses financial administration by nominees.
Part 9 provides for the enforcement of the enactment, including the establishment of offences and punishments for contraventions of certain provisions.
Part 10 contains transitional provisions, consequential amendments to the Canada Elections Act, the Director of Public Prosecutions Act and the Income Tax Act, coordinating amendments and commencement provisions.

Opposition Motion—Senate Accountability

[Scott Reid, Conservative, Lanark—Frontenac—Lennox and Addington, ON]

Mr. Speaker, contained in the question was the following comment: that the government seemed so loath to move legislation relating to Senate reform. I will look back at the legislative history of this government's attempts to cause the Senate to be reformed.

Bill S-4, An Act to amend the Constitution Act, 1867 (Senate tenure) was tabled in 2006. As members can tell from the date, in 2006, the first year of this government, it sought to introduce limits to Senate tenure, which would limit the term of senators, but the opposition blocked it.

In all fairness, that was in the Senate, and I think my colleague is pointing out these were not the New Democrats, and I accept that. However, the fact is the opposition held the majority in the Senate at the time and the government did move. The concern the member had was that the government had not taken action on the Senate.

Bill C-20, the Senate appointment consultations act, which was also moved by the government when it was in minority and opposed by the opposition, would have had the effect of setting in place a national electoral process with a preferential ballot designed to actually avoid some of the pitfalls that created a highly partisan nature in the Australian Senate. We would have ensured that there was none of what they call “above the line” voting that occurs in Australia that causes people to vote for parties instead of individual senators. We did that legislation.

Bill C-7, the Senate reform act, was also put forward by this government.

There are three pieces of legislation, all of which were opposed by the opposition. I cannot remember the details of when the NDP opposed, or which ones were opposed to others, but the general trend has been that NDP members oppose everything because they favour abolishing the Senate, which is a legitimate point of view. However, I do not think it is legitimate to go from that to say the government has not been trying very hard and consistently over the past few years.

Senate Reform Act

[Scott Simms, Liberal, Bonavista—Gander—Grand Falls—Windsor, NL]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the House and the Speaker for allowing me this time, as well as for allowing the debate regarding the House of sober second thought to move ahead.

Over many years, certainly since the inception of this country, this debate has raged on as to its content, how it proceeds, how it is selected and how it goes about its daily business. It has been debated across the country in many forums, sometimes high profile and other times not so high profile. Nonetheless, there have been several repeated attempts to make it better reflect the opinions and the diversity of this country, not just of persons but also the regions that many of us represent. Therefore, I will go through a brief analysis.

I do not think we thank the people who work in the Library of Parliament enough. However, I am thankful to them and, in particular, Sebastian Spano, who did some background information on this. He brought forward some great points. He also brought forward an historical context with respect to the Senate and, in particular, this bill, the thrust of which proposes two things: that we should limit the duration of time that senators can sit, in this case nine years; as well as allow the participation of the provinces in the selection of senators and, more to the point, in the election of senators, which is a practice that has been done circuitously at best when it comes to the situation.

For instance, we remember the particular appointments of the late Stan Waters, as well as Bert Brown, but they were not direct elections per se. This particular bill hopes to bring a direct election within the confines of the Senate, along with term limits.

The bill is divided into two parts. The authors of the bill, in this case the government and the minister in question, have expressed a desire to initiate a process for constitutional reform leading to an elected Senate “in the near future”, which begs the question whether this opens the door to something else. I assume that it does, given that the origins of the party in power always talk about the triple E Senate, equal, elected and effective, which, in my opinion, refers to two things, being equal and elected. Whether it is effective remains to be seen.

The legislative model would allow voters to select candidates wishing to be considered for appointment to the Senate. It does that on two levels. It does that at provincial elections and municipal elections, which is something I will discuss a little later.

It should be noted that the bill would impose no obligation on the provinces or the territories to establish a selection process. However, the nominees model and framework is set out in the schedule, a lot of which the entire framework is set out in the province of Alberta legislation, which is what the schedule is modelled on.

Bill C-20, An Act to provide for consultations with electors on their preferences for appointments to the Senate, was a past attempt to do this. There were past recent attempts in both the Senate and here. We had Bill S-7 and Bill C-20, which were two ways of doing that, both of which died on the order paper in 2008.

I will trace back to when it all started. Basically six major changes were proposed with respect to how the Senate should react through committees, through the House of Commons, as well as through the Senate. First, in 1887, they proposed a Senate in which half would be appointed by the federal government and the other half would be appointed by the provincial governments. Again, we go back to the appointment process. There was no election involved.

The second time this happened was at the end of the 1960s. In the constitutional conference of 1969, the federal government of the day proposed that senators be selected in part by the federal government and in part by the provincial governments, which is the same sort of situation we had in 1887. As well, the provinces could choose the method of selection of senators, whether by nomination by the provincial governments or with the approval of their legislatures. The difference here is that in the past they wanted to infuse provincial input into this by allowing them to appoint but it never set out the way it was to be done, whether by election or appointment. I am assuming they wanted to do it by appointment of the legislatures so they would choose their own, but we can get the idea.

What they wanted to do, for the most part, for the past 144 years, was bring the provinces into a direct consultation process and a process to directly appoint senators to Parliament.

Third, in 1978, the Government of Canada's proposal for a time for action, as the document was called, a renewed Constitution, which would include a house of the federation that would replace the Senate. How interesting is that? It was probably something similar to what the Council of Europe has in Strasbourg.

Basically, the legislators in their home provinces would come to Ottawa and use the Senate, the upper chamber, as a house of the federation, as it was called. Now that proposal did not last very long. It is did not cause a lot of excitement around here and it did not get a lot of media attention. Nonetheless, it was something that was brave and bold for its time.

Bill C-60 was tabled and received first reading in the House of Commons in 1978. In 1979, the Pépin-Robarts task force on Canadian unity recommended the abolition of the Senate and the establishment of the council of the federation. It moved one step further. The council of the federation was to be composed of provincial delegations led by a person of ministerial rank or by the premier of a province. I suggest that members in this House may want to look at that as a proposal, as an alternative, as in the case of the NDP who want to abolish the Senate. There is something there the NDP may want to consider.

In 1984, the Molgat-Cosgrove Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons recommended that senators be directly elected. The Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada recommended that senators be elected in elections held simultaneously with elections to the House of Commons. Therein lies the rub. That is where the direct participation of the provinces is needed, depending on the formula, in particular, seven provinces representing 50% of the population.

That brings us to 1987. I have three words, Meech Lake accord. We all remember that. That was one of the more high-profile attempts at reforming the Senate, a constitutional reform that would have had implications for the method of selecting senators.

With the Meech Lake accord, once a vacancy occurred in the Senate, the provincial government of the province in which the vacancy existed could submit a list of nominees for potential appointments to the Senate. It was somewhat circuitous in the way it went about its business. The provinces would provide a list of people for the prime minister through the governor general to select. That is a little different but, nonetheless, I do not think it would have put it into the context of allowing the provinces to be directly involved simply because it was more of an advisory role. That brings me to this bill, but I will get to that in a little bit.

In 1992, the Beaudoin-Dobbie Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on a renewed Canada recommended the direct election of senators under a proportional representational system. Therein again lies the participation of the provinces.

Several provinces have enacted their own legislation to make way for this type of procedure where they would be involved in electing senators to the Senate. We know about Alberta. It enacted a senatorial selection act in 1989 which set out the guidelines by which they could do that.

In 1990, British Columbia enacted a senatorial selection act as well, which mirrors the counterpart in Alberta, and it did lapse by the way, but it has been reported in recent media accounts that British Columbia may revive this type of legislation.

In 2009, Saskatchewan passed the Senate nominee election act, which received royal assent but has not been proclaimed into force yet.

In Manitoba, there is the special committee on Senate reform. Manitoba took a different track. In November 2009, it proposed an election process for selecting Senate nominees to be administered by Elections Canada and to be paid for by the federal government. Manitoba went in a different way, which tied it a little more directly into the federal system, certainly with Elections Canada, and proposed that the federal government would look after it. As my hon. colleague from Manitoba points out, it was put forward by Gary Doer of the former NDP government.

Proposals for reforming Senate tenure, again from 1867 to 1985, I mentioned the Molgat-McGuigan committee and others. There were several guiding principles involved, which brings me to the point I am trying to make here when it comes to Senate reform. This is why this particular bill could find itself in trouble.

A few years back a former premier of Newfoundland and Labrador, Danny Williams, made a representation by saying that this cannot be done without the provinces. I think he was right and here is why.

In a judgment delivered in 1980, the court articulated a number of guiding principles in the British North America Act and the Senate. It said, basically, that in many ways we cannot change the spirit of the legislation because of the effect of direct election to the Senate. It said that what we would end up doing is changing the very thrust of the way the Senate operates. However, in this particular case, the Conservatives will convince themselves that it is not direct, but it is, thanks to clause 3, which states that the Prime Minister must consider this.

[Alexandrine Latendresse, NDP, Louis-Saint-Laurent, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I have a question for my colleague, whose speech I very much enjoyed.

I would like to know what he thinks about more substantive and fundamental reform of our parliamentary institutions. The former Bill C-20 on Senate reform very clearly set out a transition towards a means of direct election for the Senate, which would completely change the system. This bill was simply a transition. That was completely cut out of the bill before us today. There is no more talk of a transition or of more substantive changes. This seems to be all that the Conservatives have to offer us by way of reform. I would like to hear what my colleague has to say about that.

[Alexandrine Latendresse, NDP, Louis-Saint-Laurent, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak.

I recognize that it is a privilege to have the opportunity to address the House today. This is a privilege granted to me by the democratic principles of our country. Based on the supremacy of the rule of law, Canadian parliamentary institutions recognize this fact and often serve as an example throughout the world. Whether it be our Supreme Court, our Constitution or the House of Commons, the international news constantly reminds us that it would be very dangerous to take our democratic institutions for granted or to simply handle government business in a manner that is inconsistent with the most basic parliamentary rules.

This opportunity to speak about Bill C-7 is an opportunity to express my concern about the profound changes that this government wants to make to Canadian parliamentary institutions and, in particular, about the questionable manner in which it intends to go about doing so.

First, I would like to draw the House's attention to one thing, and that is the purely cosmetic nature of this bill. It is like a face lift that merely serves to superficially hide the signs of aging. This proposed Senate reform does not do much to hide the wrinkles. It is what I would call botched surgery. This bill does not address the real problems with the Senate.

First, this government is not above the laws, and certainly not above our Constitution. How does the Conservative government plan to justify the fact that it is blatantly thumbing its nose at the most basic rules of our state? In the preamble of the legislation, the government says it plans to use section 44, which, subject to sections 41 and 42, allows Parliament to make an ordinary law to change the way senators are appointed. This move would very clearly violate subsection 42(1) of our Constitution, which states:

An amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to the following matters may be made only in accordance with subsection 38(1)...

The Constitution unequivocally states that the powers of the Senate and the method of selecting senators cannot be changed without the consent of seven provinces representing at least 50% of the population of Canada.

This provision is in the Constitution in black and white. How does the minister justify ignoring it? If the government wants to reform the Senate, it must do so in accordance with the rules that have been established.

The government is saying that the scope of section 44 covers everything else, including, it says, what it is trying to do with this bill. This argument does not hold water, given the name of the bill: Bill C-7, An Act respecting the selection of senators and amending the Constitution Act, 1867 in respect of Senate term limits. That kind of language cannot go unnoticed. I urge the government to honour the procedure for amending the Constitution.

I would like to add something here. I took a look at the government's previous Senate reform bill, Bill C-20. It was very interesting. In the preamble, it states quite clearly that the reform based on consultative elections was to be a transition process that would lead to a more permanent constitutional reform of the Senate to provide for a means of direct election. This statement, which is quite significant, does not appear in Bill C-7. This is yet more proof of the superficial nature of this bill. This is all that the majority government plans to bring to Senate reform. It is amazing that this is being used for political games.

This government feels justified in using an undemocratic method to make an antiquated institution that is ill-suited to modern political realities more democratic. All I am seeing here is another attempt by this government to unilaterally move forward with institutional reform in the least collegial and transparent way possible. What is more, the government is saying that this is all there will be in the way of Senate reform. What a lost opportunity.

Flouting the process for amending the constitution would create a dangerous constitutional precedent. Is this the historic legacy this government wishes to leave? I would like to take this opportunity to say that the New Democratic Party will always defend the rule of law and stand up for healthy, friendly and constructive debate on the future of this country and the issues that directly affect Canadians. No government can avoid meeting this country's constitutional obligations. No government can do that.

I do not think it could be any clearer that the use of section 44 is a way to avoid debate and especially to avoid obtaining the consent of the provinces, which are also concerned about these changes. By proceeding in such a unilateral way, the bill sends an ambiguous and underhanded message to the provinces. Last I heard, they were an integral part of this country. Is this government afraid that this reform bill will not obtain the required consent? This kind of attitude tells me that the government is incapable of generating the support it needs to make these reforms. This bill, in its current form, is an excellent way of short-circuiting the provinces' opinions.

The provinces that had an upper chamber in their own legislature abolished it a long time ago. Furthermore, a number of provincial premiers have opposed this unilateral reform. It is blatantly obvious that the government is saying, “You do not agree with us? Oh well, too bad for you. Our mandate is too strong for us to worry about you. Here are the wonders of Canadian constitutional law, covered in Conservative sauce.” What a fabulous message to send to Canadian citizens. Does that really represent the actions of a responsible majority government that claims to work for all Canadians?

The role of the Senate has been controversial since the early days of Confederation. If I may, I remind the House that the Senate, as an institution, was meant to be a chamber of sober second thought, a chamber of wise people chosen to represent the territorial diversity of the country and act as a counterbalance to the decisions made in the House of Commons. Today, the makeup of cabinet reflects one of the requirements for regional representation, which was previously a responsibility of the Senate. The role of the Senate has increasingly weakened since it was created at the time of Confederation.

Above all, the Senate must be absolutely devoid of partisanship. I am in no way questioning the wisdom of the current senators. However, it is clear that the Senate has never consistently attained the other objectives laid out for it. Territorial representation, a concern at a time when it took several days to reach the federal capital, is no longer relevant and does not protect remote regions. The Senate rarely opposes the decisions made by the House of Commons. When it does, it hinders the proper functioning of the democratic process. The perception of voters is not that the Senate is a chamber of sober second thought, but that it is the chamber where bills that are too controversial remain in limbo. Finally, and this is the key point, Senate partisanship is legendary. That is the greatest complaint about the Senate. Far from correcting the situation, Bill C-7 will only makes things worse.

To get an idea of its partisan nature, we need only watch the news. My colleague from Winnipeg Centre recently gave an interview in which he criticized the involvement of a Conservative senator who was serving as the election campaign co-chair and leading spokesperson for the Manitoba Conservative Party. It is clearly unacceptable for a member of the Senate, who is paid by taxpayers, to use his time for that purpose. If he wishes to get involved in the Manitoba election campaign, he should never do so at the expense of Canadian taxpayers. This example highlights how the Senate, in its current form, is poisoned by partisanship.

Canadians expect the Senate to act as independently as possible. Can the minister clearly tell this chamber that reforming the way senators are selected—by adding an election process—will make the Senate less partisan? No, I do not think he can, unless the minister outright contradicts a Progressive Conservative senator who told the Hill Times last June that Bill C-7 could be a threat to the Canadian parliamentary system. He maintained that the proposed reforms could politicize the Senate even further instead of making it free of partisanship. He also stated that a senator is more effective when there is no partisanship.

What more is there to say? This bill would clearly exacerbate the partisanship that is already all too prominent in the Senate. How can this bill possibly be described as an improvement to the democratic legitimacy of the Senate? The proposed nature of the method of selecting senators would poison the Senate's mandate, which is supposed to be as independent as possible. If we look closely at the government's line of thinking, there would be a huge divide among senators appointed before October 14, 2008, and those appointed after. How will these new, elected senators with fixed terms serve alongside senators who were appointed without any fixed terms? How will Canadians perceive this dual reality?

On that topic, I have a few questions I would like to raise. Approximately 60% of the current senators were appointed before October 14, 2008. This means that they would be able to fulfill their senatorial duty and enjoy the generous privileges of their position until the age of 75. The coexistence of the former kind of senators with the new kind of senators would go on for several years, perhaps even decades. Consider the example of a senator who still has 35 years of service ahead of him. How would the legitimacy of the former kind of appointed senator compare to that of the new senators with a fresh mandate from the electorate? The legislative process and the reputation of the Senate would definitely be undermined. This simply does not fit in with the vision of an independent Senate whose mandate is to remain as impartial as possible.

The Hill Times tried to contact the 37 senators currently serving who were appointed by the Prime Minister after October 14, 2008, and they received very few responses.

Most of them declined commenting or simply did not respond. There is not even a semblance of unity on this bill from Conservative senators. If their own senators do not support it, it is the ultimate insult to present it to this House. How can this government claim that its Senate reforms are based on increasing its democratic legitimacy? This same government did not hesitate a single second to appoint three candidates from its own party who were defeated in the last election. That is an insult to the intelligence of Canadians who clearly expressed their free and democratic choice.

If this government truly had the intention of reforming the upper chamber, as it has been claiming for a long time now, it would have avoided this unacceptable and irresponsible behaviour. This is yet more evidence of a consistently applied double standard: one policy for friends of the Conservatives, another policy for other Canadians. That is the reality of this government's policy. I doubt that the public takes this lack of respect for their democratic choices lightly. There are strong mandates, and then there are brutal mandates.

There are some aspects of this bill that are worth special attention. Unless they are declared as independents, provincial candidates for the Senate will be free to associate themselves with a political party during their election campaign. If the minister is hoping to cut down on the politicization of the work of the upper chamber through this initiative, I think he has misunderstood the role of the Senate, which is to protect regional, provincial and minority interests, while acting as a chamber of sober second thought to examine legislation in greater detail.

It all comes down to the same thing. How can this government say that greater politicization of the Senate could help deliver this mandate? And how does it reconcile overstepping the opinions of the provinces on this, when the mandate of the Senate is partially entrusted to them in order to balance representation within Confederation? Political party affiliation has a major influence on the work of the Senate. Through this bill the minister is proposing to increase the number of partisan battles by renewing the contingent of senators from each province every nine years.

By introducing a non-renewable term, the reform also denies Canadians an opportunity to reward the work of an elected Senator. If the senator is doing good work, he or she will not be able to continue and the voters will not have a chance to show their appreciation through a re-election. If, on the other hand, the senator is doing mediocre work, voters will not be able to punish his or her incompetence and the senator will leave when the nine-year term is up. Either way, citizens are denied their say in the matter. One of the fundamental principles of democracy currently seriously lacking in the Senate is accountability and this reform is devoid of it as well. This principle is working quite well in the House of Commons and it forces us to give the best of ourselves.

Again, this government does not know what it wants. It is trying to achieve a number of objectives without any real focus. This bill would give us a partially elected Senate that, according to the government, is more democratic by virtue of repeated partisan elections for a non-renewable and non-punishable term. Where I come from, we call that hogwash.

These things cannot be reconciled with the mandate of the Senate, as I was saying earlier. Allow me again to read part of the preamble to Bill C-7, which states that “Parliament wishes to maintain the essential characteristics of the Senate within Canada’s parliamentary democracy as a chamber of independent, sober second thought”. I do not think partisanship will create a climate for independent, sober second thought within the Senate. Just look at the climate in this House to see what I mean by that.

The objective of the bill contradicts its actual effects. The government must decide whether it wants to respect the historical mandate of the Senate or whether it wants to make the Senate more democratically legitimate through partisan elections. Regardless, it is inconceivable that the government would introduce this bill to the Canadian public and insist that these two goals are compatible. Frankly, such vague legislation should not be introduced. But perhaps the government is sacrificing finesse for strength.

I was also distressed to notice that the bill, vaguely and without explanation, shifts the responsibility for holding elections to select Senate candidates. Under the bill, Senate candidates would be elected during provincial elections, on a date to be determined by the lieutenant governor, or during municipal elections. Dumping this responsibility seems like a disorganized and very imprecise way of improving the Senate's democratic legitimacy. The government could have taken the time to draft a clear, detailed and intelligible bill, but instead, Bill C-7 is terribly unclear and illogical. For example, when Canadians choose their candidates during an election, they will not even be certain that the one they choose will sit in the Senate. The final choice will remain in the hands of the Prime Minister since the bill imposes no obligation.

I mentioned that this reform seems to be purely cosmetic and here is the evidence. Parliamentary institutions deserve a little more respect and rigour. Unfortunately, when I look at this bill, the public's cynicism about politicians seems justified to me. Nothing now guarantees that this government will take its reform of the Senate any further.

In addition to this important point, we must also consider the costs of this reform. However, Bill C-7 does not make any mention of these costs. As further proof of how vague this legislation is, the bill does not clearly set out which level of government will have to assume the new costs. In these uncertain economic times, the government is adding new costs without having analyzed the proposed reforms to determine how useful they actually are.

Senate elections would thus become a federal, provincial, or municipal matter. Nothing is clear because the bill allows for all three scenarios. How will expenses be shared in these even more complex elections? Moreover, this new use of public money will contribute nothing to democracy. Canadians have long questioned the usefulness of the Senate. I doubt that the public will find the Senate more attractive if it becomes more expensive. In other words, we do not know “when?” or “how?”, and especially not “how much?”. Would it not be preferable to reform the Senate by passing bills that have more substance than grey areas? Is that asking too much of the government?

These are the indicators of a sloppy bill that takes too simplistic an approach to the parliamentary institutions of this country. I am disappointed if this is all that this government can add to the debate on Senate reform. The regions, provinces and minorities of Canada are again left hanging and will continue to be represented by an upper chamber that is completely disconnected from contemporary reality.

This bill, in addition to moving ahead in a manner that is, at a minimum, constitutionally suspect, only masks the problem of the democratic legitimacy of the Senate, without undertaking the mandatory and necessary consultation of the provinces of this country and, above all, without considering what mandate Canadians realistically want an upper chamber to have. The message to the provinces is as follows: this government does not need to consult you to proceed unilaterally with constitutional amendments. The message to Canadians is that this government is not listening to them. Its mandate is too strong for it to worry about them, especially when they indicate their preferences in a general election.

My colleagues are certainly aware of all the attempts made to reform the Senate since its inception. These attempts all have one thing in common: they failed. In the past 100 years, 13 attempts have failed and, today, given the lack of provincial interest and the absence of a consensus on the nature of the reform, there is every indication that this bill will be added to that historic list of failed attempts.

The reality is that the Senate is a problem that no one has been able to fix. So, as our party is suggesting, it is time to consider another option that has yet to be explored—abolishing the Senate. That is why are proposing that we consult people about this, to see if they believe that the upper chamber still has a place in our democratic institutions. We want to ask them if they feel this legacy from the 19th century still has a place in a 21st century democracy. The provinces that abolished their senates did not stop functioning. Countries like Denmark and New Zealand abolished their senates and continue to operate without any problem.

Yes, I am critical of this bill, but the official opposition will not be content with simply criticizing in a stubborn and narrow-minded fashion. The opposition will do everything it can to propose well-thought-out and reasonable solutions for the good of Canadians. Our parliamentary institutions deserve more of our time and intellectual rigour. That is why I insist that when difficult issues such as Senate reform are brought before the House for debate, we should be discussing the option of abolishing the Senate and presenting that to the Canadian public as well. That is the spirit of what I consider to be constructive and respectful debate.

[Marc Mayrand, Chief Electoral Officer, Elections Canada]

Thank you.

Good morning, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.

I am accompanied today, as the chair indicated, by Mr. François Bernier, the legal services director at Elections Canada.

I was requested by the chair of this committee to assist members in the study of the review and treatment of election financial returns and the key considerations involved in the review of these returns. In discussions prior to my appearance, the chair requested that I provide a detailed explanation of the aspects of the legislative and administrative framework that relate to political financing under the Canada Elections Act and, more specifically, of the treatment of election expenses.

This will be the subject of the first part of the presentation. I hope it will provide the committee with a better understanding of the operating context in which decisions are made regarding reimbursement of electoral expenses. I will then turn to the subject of particular decisions of interest to the committee and explain how they relate to the legislative and administrative framework.

The mandate of Elections Canada is to administer the Canada Elections Act in a fair, consistent, transparent and impartial manner. As an officer of Parliament, my first duty is to serve Parliament and Canadians. While the committee is reviewing the activities of public office holders, I trust it will understand that in my capacity as Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, I can only speak to electoral matters. I will not comment on ongoing investigations of the Commissioner of Elections Canada, or the specifics of the case currently before the Federal Court. As well, I will not deal with any individual cases.

Mr. Chairman, with your concurrence, I will now proceed with the first part of my presentation. The committee has already received a presentation that extends to a number of pages—42 pages, I believe. So I won't read each of those pages, but I will simply make the main comments on the essential aspects of the presentation.

The presentation will contain four parts: first, the objective itself, as well as a part dealing with the key principles underlying the legislation and the administration of that legislation, the key aspects of the legislation, and, lastly, the aspects of the administration of that legislation. I will also provide a brief conclusion.

I think it's fair to say that the first hundred years of federal democracy in Canada have been focused almost exclusively on the conduct of elections and on progressively expanding the franchise--the right to vote--to all Canadian citizens. In fact, the right to vote became a fundamental right protected by the Constitution and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982.

This focus continues today, as the agenda of the 39th Parliament attests. For example, Bill C-2, the Federal Accountability Act, dealt with the appointment of returning officers, who are now the responsibility of the Chief Electoral Officer. It also dealt, under Bill C-31, with the integrity of voting. It also dealt with the issue of proof of residence, under Bill C-18. And it is considering, currently, Bill C-6, which deals with visual ID; Bill C-16, which deals with advanced polling; and Bill C-20, an important piece of legislation that deals with the appointment of senators. This is all to show that there is still a focus on the electoral process and the conduct of elections.

However, over the last 40 years, growing concerns have been expressed with regard to the influence of money in the electoral process. These concerns have led Parliament to incrementally design a regulatory regime to govern the use of money during electoral campaigns. We are now at the point at which Canada is at the forefront among mature democracies in how it regulates the influence of money in election campaigns. This regulatory regime of political financing was initially built in the seventies, and it has since witnessed repeated legislative reform that continues today. Again, this Parliament passed Bill C-2, which deals with contributions and gifts and which banned contributions from corporations and unions. It is also considering another important aspect of the financial regime, under Bill C-29, with regard to loans.

My purpose today will be to deal with a particular and key aspect of our political financing regime, that of election expenses and their treatment by Elections Canada under the Canada Elections Act. More specifically, I will touch on the legislative framework, the administrative framework, and the compliance and enforcement program.

There are certain principles underlying the legislative and administrative framework. First, to maintain public trust, are transparency and fairness. These principles are expressed through various provisions in the act that deal with public disclosure, expense limits, public funding, compliance and enforcement, and, something that is often forgotten, the distinctiveness of political entities. Each has its own regime, with distinct rights and obligations.

Transparency is about disclosure. It's about providing information to electors on candidates, parties, and other entities. It involves, with regard to financial matters, reporting revenues and expenses and the sources of those.

Fairness is the key principle of a healthy democracy. In our democracy, fairness is about allowing political parties' candidates to have an opportunity to present their visions, their policies, and their values to electors. What those are and how they are communicated to electors is the exclusive domain of political parties and candidates. However, legislation seeks to ensure that the competition among political parties and candidates to secure the vote of electors be conducted within certain rules designed to create and maintain a level playing field. One area of legislation, again, over the last 40 years, has been the adoption of rules that will foster this level playing field. These rules deal specifically with how money can be raised and how it can be spent in order for them to present ideas and reach out to electors.

The Canada Elections Act passed it to the CEO to administer these complex rules, with a view to ensuring that key principles are maintained at all times. In doing so, Elections Canada must act fairly and impartially and exercise due diligence at all times. When it finds evidence of non-compliance and possible offences, it must exercise the authorities provided by the legislation in accordance with all the requirements of fairness and due process, within the strict limits of the law. To do otherwise would undermine not only Elections Canada as an institution but also the democratic process itself.

Let me turn now to the key aspect of the legislative framework as it relates to the treatment of election expenses and the role these key principles play in the electoral law.

The relevant aspects of the legislative framework involve key definitions, a brief discussion of duties of official agents, the notion and concept of election expense limits, the concept of transfers among political entities, reporting requirements for those political entities, entitlement to reimbursement, and key differences between parties and candidates. Note that some misunderstand the system and tend to view parties and their candidates as a single entity, yet the law makes clear distinctions and establishes distinct responsibilities, benefits, and obligations for parties and candidates. For the most part, these are treated independently of one another. This is particularly true in disclosure and reporting requirements, which are different for parties and candidates. Access to public funding is different. Spending limits are set differently for candidates and parties. To some extent, rules governing the raising of contributions are different for candidates and parties.

Let's first look at key definitions. Under candidate electoral campaign expenses, there are three key definitions that need to be considered: candidate electoral campaign expenses; candidate election expenses; and candidate personal expenses.

Electoral campaign expenses are expenses reasonably incurred in the election and include election expenses themselves and personal expenses. There are electoral campaign expenses that are neither election expenses nor personal expenses. An example is the audit expense in excess of the subsidy. It is an electoral expense, but it is not an election expense. There is also the rent of an office outside the rent period. For example, when a candidate rents an office before the writ is dropped or carries the office after the polling date, these are electoral campaign expenses, but they are not election expenses.

An election expense includes any cost incurred or non-monetary contribution received to the extent that the property or service for which the cost was incurred or non-money contribution received is used to directly promote or oppose a candidate during an election period. The expression “directly promote” does not refer only to expenses incurred to expressly urge voters to vote for or against a particular candidate. It has a much broader meaning that encompasses all expenses that directly assist in getting a candidate elected. For example, it includes the rental of office space, equipment in that office, the computers, the supplies, and the remuneration of campaign workers during the election period. All such expenses directly promote the candidate and are thus election expenses for the purpose of the act.

The third definition has to do with personal expenses. Personal expenses of a candidate are his or her electoral campaign expenses other than election expenses reasonably incurred in relation to his or her campaign. Personal expenses include travel and living expenses, child care, and similar expenses.

It's important to note that there are three categories of expenses, each with its own definition and standards. Election expenses must generally be disclosed. They are subject to a reimbursement, and they are subject to spending limits. Personal expenses must be disclosed, and they are subject to a reimbursement. Residual expenses that are neither personal nor for an election must be disclosed, but they are not subject to a reimbursement. Again, I mentioned previously the subsidy for audit.

Another key concept in looking at election expenses is the notion of transfer. The act allows specific political entities of the same political affiliation to move resources amongst themselves without being subject to the restriction on the source and amounts of contributions set out in the act. A contribution is the amount of money received that is not repayable; otherwise it would be a loan. It is the amount of money received that is not repayable, or the commercial value of a service or a property, or the use of property or money to the extent that it is provided without charge or at less than commercial value.

Again, this is a new, essential concept--commercial value. How is commercial value defined? It's the lowest amount charged for a property or service by the person who is in the business of providing that good or service. Alternatively, it's what another commercial provider charges for the property or service who is not in that business.

At the end of the electoral campaign, candidates must file an electoral campaign return. That return is an account of all financial transactions for an election. It consists of a form that has 15 pages and is divided into four parts. It's a bit longer than even a tax return, so there's a level of complexity attached to filing those returns.

Let me give you an example of how these concepts can come together. Let's assume that a party pools the purchase of lawn signs for its candidates and offers those lawn signs to candidates. They have the option of accepting the package or turning it down. Let's say one candidate agrees to purchase 1,000 signs for his campaign and that those signs have a value of $10,000; however, the candidate can only afford $2,000. Provided the signs are used during the campaign to promote the candidate, the return will have to show the transaction as follows. First of all, the election expense will be $10,000 for the candidate, because he received those 1,000 signs and used them during the campaign. That's the amount shown as the expense. Within that he will show the paid expense as $2,000. He will show a non-monetary transfer of $8,000, which is the commercial value of the signs that were transferred from the party to the candidate. The amount shown as the expense will be counted against the spending limit and it will be eligible for reimbursement. The amount shown as non-monetary will count against the spending limit, but it will not be reimbursed since nothing was paid for that amount.

This is a very simple example of how those transactions have to be reflected in the return.

To emphasize the critical role of money and the need to rigorously control inflows and outflows and ensure that financial activities are strictly within the constraints of the legislation, the legislation provides or requires that each candidate appoint an official agent. In fact, a candidate cannot officially run as a candidate without having appointed an official agent. This is a must under the legislation.

An official agent is much more than a bookkeeper. In fact, if we can do an analogy, he or she could be seen as a treasurer or a financial comptroller. You have on slide 9 the key duties of an official agent.

Generally, the official agent is responsible for controlling all electoral campaign expenses; that is, for a candidate's campaign, only the official agent or the candidate or someone authorized in writing can incur an electoral campaign expense. So you will understand that to fulfill his or her duties, the official agent must of course be familiar with all the concepts and the definitions I mentioned earlier and must develop a good understanding of the underlying principles of the legislation.

Let me talk briefly about expense limits. The first point to note is that there are separate limits for parties and candidates and that those limits apply to election expenses, whether paid or unpaid, and include the commercial value of non-monetary contributions or transfers.

Elections Canada calculates those limits for each in accordance with a formula set out in the act. I will not go through the specifics of the formula, except to say that, for candidates, that formula takes account of the number of electors, the population density in the riding, and the geography of the riding, and provides an adjustment for inflation.

Spending limits for parties are a little bit simpler to calculate. It's the number of electors in the ridings for which candidates are presented by the party.

For the 39th election—that's slide 13—the average expense limit for candidates per electoral district was a bit over $81,000, and for a registered party that endorsed a candidate in all 308 ridings, the limit was set at a bit over $18 million. What does that mean? One may be tempted to say that in total a party having 308 candidates could spend altogether up to $18 million for the party and up to $24 million, almost $25 million, given the limits of each and every candidate, for a total of $43 million. However, to look at it in this manner would be mistaken, as the law does not consider the political family as one entity but rather, in this case and this example, as 308 distinct, separate entities with their own rights and obligations.

Let me talk briefly about transfers. The Canada Elections Act recognizes the organic link that exists in the family of political entities, allowing them to move funds, goods, and services among themselves without treating those movements of resources as contributions. The provision of resources from one political party to another, which is not specifically provided for under the act, constitutes a contribution and is subject to the eligibility and limits set out in the act.

Transfer of expenses is not permitted, as this would render the distinct limit of parties and candidates meaningless. As you can see, it is absolutely essential to keep all those definitions and concepts as we look through various returns provided at the end of electoral campaigns.

You will find on slide 15 a table showing the transfers, what is allowed and what is not allowed. Clearly, you will see that transfers between parties and candidates are perfectly allowed by the Canada Elections Act. It has some standards, but they can move resources freely between entities.

You will note that for candidates, these movements of resources can start only after they've been officially declared candidates, meaning that their candidacy has been registered with the returning officer. You will also note that transfers to candidates after polling day are allowed only to pay for unpaid claims and for nothing else.

You will find again at slide 16 another way of looking at it. There is a triangle on that slide that shows the relationship between the party, the candidates, and the EDAs, and the respective rights and obligations for each. You will see clearly that the transfer of money, goods, and services among all three entities is allowed. You will also note that the transfer of expenses is not allowed, and you will see that Elections Canada is overseeing, through various programs, how the money flows among entities.

I should point out that for the 39th election, Elections Canada dealt with 15 registered parties that had over 1,200 electoral district associations, and with over 1,600 candidates, each with their respective agents.

On page 17 you will find a table of the transfers reported in Canada through returns for the 39th election. You will see that all parties represented in the House have transferred resources with their affiliated entities. These have taken place between candidates and parties, between candidates and EDAs, and between parties and EDAs.

[Scott Reid, Conservative, Lanark—Frontenac—Lennox and Addington, ON]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Senator, you've been talking about some changes that would necessarily involve a constitutional amendment using the 7/50 formula. And I would not dispute with you in any way that the kinds of things you're proposing—incorporating some provision like the Elton override, for example, or changes to the numbers of senators from each province—require an amendment under the 7/50 formula.

We've had some witnesses here who have suggested that this is the appropriate way to go with all Senate amendments of any sort, including the modest ones being contemplated in BillC-19 and BillC-20.

This gives me an opportunity to give a little editorial—which you're free to comment on when I finish—as to why it can be problematic turning to the provinces for their consent on these things.

Occasionally one of our witnesses will cite the way in which other countries have amended their constitutions. The Australians, for example, require the support of a majority of the states, so that's four out of six states. The Swiss require a majority of the cantons, and also a majority of the population. The Americans, of course, require the support of three-fourths of the states.

But in the Swiss and Australian cases, it's really the people of the states who decide the referendum. And in the case of the United States, just the very fact that there are so many states precludes what happens here in Canada, which is that you effectively are looking for the support of those individual premiers who, effectively, under our system, are elected dictators of their provinces, just as our prime minister is an elected dictator here, thanks to the strength of the party discipline in our system.

The consequence is that we can find ourselves being treated to the kind of thing we saw occur under the Meech Lake accord, and particularly the Charlottetown accord, where you essentially have them acting as feudal barons, horse-trading back and forth--“I will give you this provision if you give me that provision”, etc. Before you know it, you've created a cancerous growth like the Charlottetown accord, which effectively includes every imaginable provision—and the Senate is merely one part of this great tumour of a constitutional amendment you now have before you.

I worry very much that we would be unable to get the consent of the majority of the premiers, or of the seven premiers, representing half the population, without moving off the Senate and onto other topics. This fills me with some alarm.

I wonder if you have the same kinds of concerns—or perhaps you don't?

[Brian Murphy, Liberal, Moncton—Riverview—Dieppe, NB]

I wanted to get back, because my time ran out, to envisioning what would happen with an elected Senate and how those elected senators like yourself would feel. They would feel, I suppose, that they've been selected by the people to represent the people's interest, along the lines of what Rob Moore was saying. That sounds good. Canadians would accept that; I'm sure of it.

But on the House of Commons side, we have that already. We have people elected by the people. With this Bill C-20, in fact, I might argue that in my province of New Brunswick and Rob Moore's province of New Brunswick, each senator might have a bigger mandate--that is by votes--than each of us because their riding is the whole province of New Brunswick. So they might even feel more engorged with power, if you will. Then we come here with an elected Senate--say the senators from New Brunswick and the MPs from New Brunswick--and we're battling over a bill, let's say. The Constitution is not going to change with Bill C-20, so we will have, in fact, gridlock between the two houses with no mechanism to resolve that.

The words you spoke with respect to the Prime Minister's wish that the House of Commons maintain supremacy, while well-meaning on your part--and I take you as an honest, straightforward man who's been devoted to the cause for so long--seem hollow. The Prime Minister said to you that the House of Commons shall be supreme, yet the bill doesn't attempt to affect that, probably can't affect that without some sort of constitutional change. So is Bill C-20 just a waste of time? You believe--I think you do, and I can get your answer on this--that the House of Commons should be supreme to the Senate. Yet, if both houses are elected, I'll tell you, practically, I would think that elected senators might feel as powerful as elected MPs and in the fullness of time there might be quite a little fight over who has more power. The Constitution does not say the House of Commons is supreme.

If the Prime Minister meant what he said to you, I don't know why his Minister for Democratic Reform, the government House leader, didn't say that when he introduced this bill. I don't know why he didn't say that gridlock will not be an issue because we intend the House of Commons to be supreme. What are your comments on that?

[Senator Bert Brown]

Yes, through the chair again, Mr. Reid, I actually wrote a brief amendment to Bill S-224, suggesting that instead of forcing the vacancies to be filled on a specific timetable, they be filled after a consultative process with the provinces, making it as simple as I could while still reaching out to democracy.

I guess the one thing I'd say about Bill S-224 is that if it reaches approval in both Houses, I'm not sure it can be enforced. I went to the parliamentary library, which I found to be my biggest source of information since I've come here, and found that there have been vacancies as long as eight years. Manitoba actually holds the record. There have been a number of them at seven years and there have been many at six. There have been, I think, some down at 405 days, less than two years, but precedence is what runs our Constitution in many ways. The reason I say that is that there's no constitutional reference for the Prime Minister to appoint senators. It's the Governor General, if I may try to quote word for word:

The Governor General shall from time to time...summon qualified persons to serve in the Senate....

--to represent the provinces in the following numbers, and it goes on to list all those.

But I don't hold much more hope out for S-224 than I do for Bill C-20 in its current form. I think if we could talk about the fact that senators would like to accommodate something in terms of a 12-year maximum term and we could accommodate democracy by having an amendment that would allow for two six-year terms, we would have something spectacular for this country.

[Senator Bert Brown]

Yes, you're correct in your assumption about Bill C-20. While I support it, and while the committee I chair supports the idea of Bill C-20 for electing senators, we're not in lockstep with the Prime Minister on the bill in terms of our suggestion of the possibility of two six-year terms for being re-elected.

We felt that the one single term was not popular with the existing Senate and that it would take away the power of the ballot box. If you have an election for one term and then you don't re-elect them, you lose any ability for the people of the province that elected them to come and say, “Hey, if you want to be re-elected, you need to listen carefully to what we want you to do and how we want you to represent us in the Senate.”

The other part of your question was about a constitutional requirement. We are looking at Senate reform now, having been through both Meech Lake and Charlottetown. We're looking at Senate reform as a staircase, and you don't go from the bottom to the top of the staircase in one step. You take steps.

What we're proposing is the first step; that is, to accept the fact that the Prime Minister is very much committed to democratically chosen senators. He is not constitutionally bound to the outcome, however. It would only be his political word that would bind him, and we're hoping to take advantage of that and let as many provinces elect senators as they want. Politically, he would be committed to accept the outcome of those elections.

We're not suggesting that he is constitutionally bound by an election. We're suggesting that this is an elective process, and politically, the tie would be pretty strong.

[Brian Murphy, Liberal, Moncton—Riverview—Dieppe, NB]

Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, Senator.

Your comments are here. I've read them and listened to them. I know you've been around to a number of the provinces and you have spoken to a number of officials. We've read about that as well.

In your remarks and in your brief, you say that for the first time Canada has a prime minister publicly committed to the election of senators. I want to be clear. Have you talked to the Prime Minister, and has he said to you and in public that he is committed to the election of senators?

I say that because this bill is couched in terms of the selection of senators. Even Peter Hogg suggests that is the reason it is constitutional, because it is a selection that is subject to the Prime Minister's prerogative to accept or not.

The implication of your remark, sir, is that the Prime Minister has committed to the election of senators, and that the selection, which is the word used in Bill C-20, is in fact an election that the Prime Minister must respect. Is that your view of things?

[Senator Bert Brown, Alberta, CPC]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

It is interesting that you mentioned that it's been over 20 years. It's been almost exactly 20 years since I appeared before a committee of the House of Commons, a joint committee of the House of Commons and the Senate, 20 years ago. Interestingly enough, the subject is the same as it was 20 years ago.

Without further adieu, with your permission, I'll go ahead with my presentation, which will take about 10 minutes. I didn't know our chair would be “Madam Chair” when I wrote this up, so you'll have to forgive me, I hope. But I'm very pleased to be here today.

I have attached copies in English and French of my statement, “The Case for Initiating Senate Reform”, which I've been presenting to the premiers of the provinces and territories as we have met with them over the past few months. I thought it was only fair that this committee hear exactly what I've been giving the premiers of the country as I've toured since the beginning of January.

The points for Senate reform will take about 10 minutes to go through. I am prepared to answer any questions you may have on the points, as well as on my thoughts on Bill C-20 and its constitutionality and/or possible amendments that might make it more attractive to all parties in the House of Commons.

Support for Senate reform in the public polls is now 79% for the election of future senators—and that's Canada-wide.

For the first time in history, Canada has a prime minister publicly committed to the election of senators.

Real Senate reform can benefit every province, large and small, as well as minority interests within provinces.

Reform of the Senate is an important enough issue of long-standing interest to Canadians to warrant the focus of the provincial legislatures on it as a single issue.

The call from the western provinces for a triple-E Senate was never meant as an attack on central Canada or Atlantic Canada, but a desire for a real voice and real vote in Canada's upper house.

The Meech Lake accord failed because it didn't address the desires of provinces outside of central Canada.

The Charlottetown accord was rejected by the majority of Canadians and the majority of the provinces because it tried to address too many issues under one blanket constitutional proposal.

The Federation of the Provinces is a worthwhile sounding board for the concerns of premiers, but because it convenes only a few times a year, it has no ongoing input into federal legislation.

Only an elected Senate in session, in conjunction with the House of Commons, can be capable of providing continuous input into the proposed federal legislation, backed up with a vote and, if necessary, a veto by a majority of provincially elected representatives.

A reformed Senate could have prevented past majority governments from taking Canada to the brink of financial disaster. Our nation needs a counterbalance to federal parties that pursue party interests by buying votes on a national credit card.

Only a reformed Senate can prevent any future return to a single federal party putting its interests ahead of the national interests.

Senate reform does not require a constitutional amendment. Alberta has held three senatorial elections, and the winners of two of these elections have been appointed without constitutional change.

The only requirements for a prime minister to appoint elected senators have always existed. They are: a prime minister committed to respecting provincial Senate election results, and provinces willing to hold senatorial elections.

There are 14 existing Senate vacancies in seven provinces and one territory. Before 2008 ends, there will be 17 vacancies in eight provinces and one territory. As of yesterday, Senator Gill spent his last day in the Senate, so there are already 15.

If a number of provincial legislatures grasp this historic opportunity, they can have elected representatives to protect and forward their interests in the upper house daily.

It is possible to have a majority of elected senators within less than eight years, simply by filling naturally occurring retirement vacancies with provincially elected representatives.

That timeframe provides the provincial governments with eight years to discuss and agree upon the necessary conditions for a stand-alone amendment to the Constitution for, first, the change in numerical representation in the Senate by province. Whether those numbers are half of equal numbers to the large provinces, three-quarters of equality, or full equality, the provinces will have to decide. The second condition would require an agreement on an override for the House of Commons to assuage the fears of those who oppose an elected Senate with veto powers.

The provinces and their leaders have a time-limited opportunity with a willing prime minister and a huge majority of Canadians who want to democratize their Senate for the 21st century.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I have read some of the testimonies of previous individuals and panels who have spoken to Bill C-20. My committee and I find ourselves in agreement with most of the recommendations of Vincent Pouliot of the Centre for the Study of Responsible Government.

Mr. Pouliot recommends that the Chief Electoral Officer be charged to ensure that nominees qualify to be senators as set out by section 23 of the Constitution Act. That would also have to include a clause on page 7 of the Constitution. The phrase “political party”, he recommends, should be changed to read “provincial political party”. Bill C-20 should permit the provinces to determine otherwise how they wish to be represented in the Senate. For example, Quebec will, in the beginning, want to elect their future senators through the votes of their National Assembly. That was their position during the Charlottetown negotiations when I was there, and I assume it still is the same.

We agree with the above.

Very recently we were asked for an override provision that would permit the House of Commons to retain supremacy over an elected Senate with a majority opposed to a bill of the Commons. In consultation with Dr. David Elton, professor emeritus, political scientist, and others, we developed what l have named the “Elton override”. It is simplicity itself as well as brief in form.

When the Commons approves a bill and sends it to the Senate, which finds a majority of senators voting opposed, the bill would be sent back to the Commons immediately. Thereafter, the Commons would want a bill to become law and be unaltered. The Commons would send it back to the Senate by the same vote, not more or less, but by a simple majority.

The Senate must then vote a majority of its members, including seven provinces out of 10, representing 50% of the population. The timeline for this second Senate vote would be very short, possibly one month or 12 sitting Senate days.

Such an extraordinary majority as the Elton override requires from the Senate justifies the powers now existing in the Senate to remain in a reformed, elected, and more equally represented Senate of the future. The new Senate would truly be the House of the Provinces.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Extension of Sitting Hours

[Pierre Paquette, Bloc, Joliette, QC]

Mr. Speaker, with regard to the Senate, I am not the one who is saying that. Of the constitutional experts who testified, 80% said that Bill C-20 was unconstitutional, and the other 20% agreed that the government and the Prime Minister were doing indirectly what they could not do directly. Opinion was unanimous, and that was condemned by many of the experts who appeared.

Still with regard to the Senate, not only is the Conservative government paralyzing the work of the House, but it is also paralyzing the Senate. In fact, since the Conservatives came to power, they have not replaced any senators who have retired or died. The Senate currently has 15 vacancies. Last week, Christian Dufour, a political scientist at ENAP, said that at this rate, the Senate would also be paralyzed.

So we are not the ones who are bringing things to a standstill. It is the Conservative government. Moreover, its reform is not at all consistent with what is written in constitution. We have reached the point where it is the Bloc Québécois that is trying to uphold the Canadian Constitution of 1982. That is pretty amazing.

I will conclude by answering the member's last question. We agree that the regions of Canada are entitled to fair representation in this House. But we need to recognize that if Canada is shared by at least two nations, the nation of Canada and the nation of Quebec, then the nation of Quebec must have a political weight in this House that remains unchanged at 25%. We have had 75 members, guaranteed by the Constitution, but 75 out of 308 is not the same as 75 out of 350. It does not give the same political weight. What we are asking is that Quebec, which has been recognized as a nation, maintain its political weight within federal institutions as long as Quebec remains part of them.

[Pierre Paquette, Bloc, Joliette, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I will start off by saying that the Bloc Québécois, like the official opposition, and like—I believe—the NDP, will opposed the motion by the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons to extend the sitting hours, for a number of reasons.

First, it is important to remember—and this was mentioned by the House leader of the official opposition—that the government and the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons have been completely unwilling to negotiate and cooperate. Usually, when Parliament is running smoothly, the leaders meet and agree on some priorities, some items and some ways of getting them done. But since the start of this session, or at least since September, House leaders' meetings on Tuesday afternoons have simply been meetings where we hear about a legislative agenda, which, within hours after we leave the meeting, is completely changed.

That is not how we move forward. Now the government can see that its way of doing things does not produce results. In fact, I think that this is what the government wanted in recent weeks, to prevent Parliament, the House of Commons and the various committees from working efficiently and effectively.

As I was saying, usually such motions are born out of cooperation, and are negotiated in good faith between the government and the opposition parties. But we were simply told that today a motion would be moved to extend the sitting hours, but with no information forthcoming about what the government's priorities would be through the end of this session, until June 20.

This was a very cavalier way to treat the opposition parties. And today, the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and the Conservative government are reaping the consequences of their haughty attitude. As the saying goes, he who sows the wind, reaps the whirlwind. That is exactly what has happened to the Conservatives after many weeks of acting in bad faith and failing to cooperate with the opposition parties.

In this case, the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons—and earlier I mentioned his arrogance, which, to me, has reached its peak today with the way the motion was moved—gave us no indication as to his government's priorities from now until the end of the session, despite the fact that he was pointedly questioned about that matter. What we did receive was a grocery list with no order, no priorities. As the leader of the official opposition said earlier, when everything is a priority, it means that nothing is.

That is the current situation: they gave us a list of bills which, in fact, included almost all of the bills on the order paper. Not only were things not prioritized, but in addition, as I mentioned before, it showed a disregard for the opposition parties. There is a price to pay for that today—we do not see why the government needs to extend the sitting hours.

Not only was the grocery list not realistic, but also it showed that the government has absolutely no priorities set. The list includes almost all of the bills, but week after week, despite what was said during the leaders' meetings, the order of business changed. If the order of business changes at the drop of a hat, with no rhyme or reason, it means that the government does not really have priorities.

I am thinking about Bill C-50, a bill to implement the budget, which we waited on for a long time. The government is surprised that we are coming up to the end of the session and that it will be adopted in the coming hours. However, we have to remember that between the budget speech and the introduction of Bill C-50, many weeks passed that could have been spent working on the bill.

As I mentioned, the list presented to us is unrealistic. It shows the arrogance of this government, and furthermore, the order of the bills on the list is constantly changing. We feel this is a clear demonstration of this government's lack of priority.

In light of that, we can reach only one conclusion: if the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and Minister for Democratic Reform cannot present us with his government's legislative priorities as we near the end of this session, in effect, it means that his government has no legislative priorities. It has no long-term vision. Its management is short sighted, very short sighted indeed. I would even say it is managing from one day to the next. From my perspective, this can mean only one thing: it has no legislative agenda. When we have before us bills dealing with only minor issues, this is what that means.

Proof of this lack of legislative agenda is easy to see, considering the current state of this government's agenda. An abnormally small number of bills for this time of year are currently before the House at the report stage and at third reading. Usually, if the government had planned, if it had been working in good faith and had cooperated with the opposition parties, in these last two weeks remaining before the summer recess, we should have been completing the work on any number of bills.

Overall, as we speak there are just five government bills that are ready to be debated at these stages, in other words, report stage or third reading stage. Among those, we note that Bill C-7, which is now at third reading stage, reached report stage during the first session of the 39th Parliament, in other words in June 2007. It has been brought back to us a year later. And that is a priority? What happened between June 2007 and June 2008 to prevent Bill C-7 from getting through third reading stage? In my opinion, we should indeed finish the work on Bill C-7, but this truly illustrates the government's lack of planning and organization.

As far as Bill C-5 is concerned, it was reported on by the Standing Committee on Natural Resources on December 12, 2007, and voted on at report stage on May 6, 2008. Again, a great deal of time, nearly six months, went by between the tabling of the report and the vote at this stage, which was held on May 6, 2008, while the report was tabled on December 12, 2007.

Finally, Bills C-29 and C-16 were both reported on by the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs roughly six months ago.

All these delays of six months to a year force us to conclude that these bills are not legislative priorities to this government.

It would be great to finish the work on these four or five bills, but let us admit that we could have finished it much sooner.

This lack of legislative priority was even more apparent before question period when the House was debating second reading of Bill C-51 on food and drugs. Next on the agenda is second reading of Bill C-53 on auto theft.

If these five bills were a priority, we would finish the work. But no, what we are being presented with are bills that are only at second reading stage. This only delays further the report stage or third reading of the bills I have already mentioned. If we were serious about this, we would finish the work on bills at third reading and then move on to bills that are at second reading.

Furthermore, if its legislative agenda has moved forward at a snail's pace, the government is responsible for that and has only itself to blame, since it paralyzed the work of important committees, including the justice committee and the procedure and House affairs committee, to which several bills had been referred. And then they dare make some sort of bogus Conservative moral claim, saying that we are refusing to extend sitting hours because we do not want to work. For months and months now, opposition members, especially the Bloc Québécois, have been trying to work in committee, but the government, for partisan reasons, in order to avoid talking about the Conservative Party's problems, has been obstructing committee work.

Earlier, the NDP whip spoke about take note debates.

Once again, it is not the opposition that is refusing to work on issues that are important to Canadians and Quebeckers. Rather, it is the government that refuses to allow take note debates, because of partisan obstinacy. In that regard, we clearly see that the argument presented by the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and Minister for Democratic Reform is mere tautology or a false argument. In fact, it was the Conservative Party, the Conservative government, that slowed down the work of the House and obstructed the work of several committees.

Not only is the government incapable of planning, vision, cooperation and good faith, but furthermore, its legislative agenda is very meagre and does not in any way warrant extending the sitting hours. In addition, the Bloc Québécois sees many of the bills that are now at the bottom of the list as problematic, but if we extend the sitting hours, we will end up having to examine them.

Take Bill C-14, for example, which would permit the privatization of certain Canada Post activities. Do they really think that sitting hours will be extended to hasten debate on a bill that threatens jobs and the quality of a public service as essential as that provided by the Canada Post Corporation? That demonstrates just how detrimental the Conservatives' right-wing ideology is, not just to public services but to the economy. Everyone knows very well—there are a large number of very convincing examples globally—that privatizing postal services leads to significant price increases for consumers and a deterioration in service, particularly in rural areas.

I will give another example, that of Bill C-24, which would abolish the long gun registry even though police forces want to keep it. Once again, we have an utter contradiction. Although the government boasts of an agenda that will increase security, they are dismantling a preventtive tool welcomed by all stakeholders. They are indirectly contributing to an increase in the crime rate.

These are two examples of matters that are not in step with the government's message. It is quite clear that we are not interested in extending sitting hours to move more quickly to a debate on Bill C-24.

I must also mention bills concerning democratic reform—or pseudo-reform. In my opinion, they are the best example of the hypocrisy of this government, which introduces bills and then, in the end, makes proposals that run counter to the interests of Quebec in particular.

Take Bill C-20, for example, on the consultation of voters with respect to the pool of candidates from which the Prime Minister should choose senators. Almost all the constitutional experts who appeared before the committee currently studying Bill C-20 said that the bill would do indirectly what cannot be done directly. We know that the basic characteristics of the Senate cannot be changed without the agreement of the provinces or, at the very least, without following the rule of the majority for constitutional amendments, which requires approval by seven provinces representing 50% of the population.

Since the government knows very well that it cannot move forward with its Senate reforms, it introduced a bill that would change the essential characteristics of the Senate, something prohibited by the Constitution, on the basis of some technicalities.

It is interesting to note that even a constitutional expert who told the committee that he did not think the way the government had manipulated the bill was unconstitutional admitted that the bill would indirectly allow the government to do what it could not do directly.

They are playing with the most important democratic institutions.

A country's Constitution—and we want Quebec to have its own Constitution soon—is the fundamental text. We currently have a government, a Prime Minister and a Leader of the Government in the House of Commons who are manipulating this fundamental text— the Canadian Constitution—in favour of reforms that would satisfy their supporters in western Canada.

We do not want to rush this bill through the House by extending the sitting hours. It is the same thing for Bill C-19, which, I remind members, limits a Senator's tenure to eight years.

These two bills, Bill C-19 and Bill C-20, in their previous form, meaning before the session was prorogued in the summer of 2007, were unanimously denounced by the Quebec National Assembly, which asked that they be withdrawn. It is rather ironic that the federal government recognized the Quebec nation and then decided to introduce two bills that were denounced by the Quebec National Assembly.

I must say that the two opposition parties are opposed to Bill C-20, albeit for different reasons. Thus, I do not think it would be in the best interests of the House to rush these bills through, since we are far from reaching a consensus on them.

I have one last example, that is, Bill C-22, which aims to change the make-up of the House of Commons. If passed, it would increase the number of members in Ontario and in western Canada, which would reduce the political weight of the 75 members from Quebec, since their representation in this House would drop from 24.4% to 22.7%. It is not that we are against changing the distribution of seats based on the changing demographics of the various regions of Canada. We would like to ensure, however, that the Quebec nation, which was recognized by the House of Commons, has a voice that is strong enough to be heard.

The way things are going today, it is clear that in 10, 15 or 20 years, Quebec will no longer be able to make its voice heard in this House. We therefore believe we must guarantee the Quebec nation a percentage of the members in this House. We propose that it be 25%. If people want more members in Ontario and in the west, that is not a problem. We will simply have to increase the number of members from Quebec to maintain a proportion of 25%. There are a number of possible solutions to this.

Once again, I would like to point out that we introduced a whole series of bills to formalize the recognition of the Quebec nation, including Bill C-482, sponsored by my colleague from Drummond. That bill sought to apply the Charter of the French Language to federally regulated organizations working in Quebec. That was for organizations working in Quebec, of course. At no time did we seek to control what happens elsewhere in Canada. The bill would have given employees of federally regulated organizations the same rights as all employees in Quebec, that is, the right to work in French.

Unfortunately, the bill was defeated, but we will try again. Once again, the fact that Bill C-482 was defeated does not mean we are about to throw in the towel and let Bills C-22, C-19, and C-20 pass just like that. As I said earlier, we will certainly not make things easy for the government by rushing debate on these bills here.

And now to my fourth point. I started out talking about the government's lack of cooperation, vision and planning, not to mention its bad faith. Next, I talked about its poor excuse for a legislative agenda. Then I talked about the fact that we find certain bills extremely problematic. We will certainly not be giving the government carte blanche to bring those bills back here in a big hurry before the end of the session on June 20. Our fourth reason is the government's hypocrisy, in a general sense.

This has been apparent in many ways, such as the government's attitude to certain bills. I would like to mention some of them, such as Bill C-20. I cannot help but mention Bills C-50 and C-10 as well.

Bill C-50, the budget implementation bill, makes changes to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration's powers, but that is not what the debate is about. Bill C-10, which introduces elements that allow the Conservative government—

Concurrence in Vote 1--Parliament

[Brian Murphy, Liberal, Moncton—Riverview—Dieppe, NB]

Mr. Speaker, I have great respect for the member. We have served on committees together. I know he has many more years of experience in life and at the bar than I do.

I want to ask him very plainly, does he not think that Bill C-19, Bill C-20 and any of the other bills the government is proposing with respect to Senate reform need to pass muster by way of reference to the Supreme Court of Canada or in each province, as the case may be?

[Joe Comartin, NDP, Windsor—Tecumseh, ON]

Mr. Speaker, that is good to know because it means I do not have to worry about responding to some of the questions that might come particularly from the Liberal side.

I rise in strong support of this motion that we have moved to undermine in a very effective way an undemocratic institution that has been foisted on the Canadian people for 141 years now.

We heard from my colleague from Timmins—James Bay the type of abuse that goes on there in terms of the senators not performing any valuable function whatsoever, or at least the vast majority of them. I recognize that some of the people who are there are decent people; they are probably the exception, but there are a few.

The reality is we believe in democracy. I believe in democracy. I believe every constituent of Windsor—Tecumseh believes in democracy and they do not believe in an unelected Senate, a Senate that has consistently, and I saw it at a very personal level very recently, gone out of its way to thwart the democratic process in this country. We saw it a number of times in the period from 2004 to 2006 when the unelected Senate, in protecting big financial interests, thwarted legislation that was designed to protect wage earners in this country where their employers went bankrupt or into receivership and where priority was given not to the labour side of the equation but all priorities were given to the capital side.

We saw repeatedly that legislation was stalled, oftentimes by Liberal Senators, so that it would expire in the course of the upcoming election. Other times legislation was amended, or it simply sat there literally for a year, or a year and a half in one case.

That is simply not tolerable in a country that prides itself on being a democratic country, one that is a beacon for democracy in the world and one with every right to be proud of that reputation, but for this blight that we have in the other chamber.

I saw it very personally and it was so offensive, the work that a cadre within the Senate did to prevent the passage of legislation to protect animals in this country. It did it repeatedly. Not once but on three different occasions the Senate has been able to manipulate the constitutional framework of this country to the benefit of a very small segment of people that it wanted to take care of. The end result is that there have not been amendments in the animal cruelty area for well over 100 years, in spite of passage of bills in this House on two separate occasions. It was the Senate that prevented that.

I looked at some of the letters and petitions that came into my office from across the country. There were two things that showed up. One was outrage that it has taken our level of government this long to deal with the issue. The other thing that showed up was a combination of shock and sadness that after all this time an unelected Senate, an unelected body, an unresponsive body to the needs of the country could thwart the votes in this House, could thwart the desire right across the country of the need for this legislation to go through.

As I said earlier, there are any number of other pieces of legislation we can look to. Inevitably when we look at legislation that has been stalled, it has always been stalled, stopped or prevented from going ahead in the Senate because members in the other place were taking care of their buddies, always, every single time. It has never been done on principle. it has never been done on ideology. It is all about whom they are going to take care of. It is always their friends. It is always the big financial interests in this country that they take care of.

Today, we have the opportunity to send a very clear message. The Bloc members are going to be with us, but I invite the Conservatives to take a look at this. Bill C-19 and Bill C-20 are not going anywhere. They have a chance here tonight to send a message to members in the other place that we are sick and tired of them, we are not going to take it any more and we are going to shut them down. There will be no more wasting money.

The Senate costs us over $90 million a year. It is not in the motion that we have before us this evening but it costs us $90 million for absolutely nothing, other than to destroy parts of our democracy.

[Pierre Paquette, Bloc, Joliette, QC]

Mr. Speaker, the Bloc Québécois will support the NDP in contesting the vote for the Senate, for reasons that are perhaps not the same, but I am sure they are similar in some respects.

The first reason is that, like the NDP and many Canadians and Quebeckers, we think the Senate is an antiquated institution. In particular, the fact that the representatives are not elected means that the institution's legitimacy is by no means assured. Furthermore, all of the provinces got rid of this second unelected chamber a long time ago. It is obviously a legacy left over from a time when aristocrats, the elite, were afraid of the democratic decisions of the people, and created the Senate to act as a sort of counterbalance. The Queen of England and Canada appointed people back then. The Prime Minister has since taken over that responsibility. We know that officially, it is the Governor General who appoints Senators, after hearing the Prime Minister's recommendation. Thus, it is an antiquated institution.

It is also, and this is where we differ from the NDP and other Canadians, an institution that was part of Confederation in 1867.

In 1867, it was decided that the House of Commons would proportionally represent—although it was not entirely equitable—the population of each of the Canadian provinces and that the Senate would be a counterbalance—once again, not elected, unfortunately—to represent different regions in Canada: the Atlantic provinces, Quebec, Ontario and the West. This means that abolishing the Senate would require us to reopen constitutional negotiations and reconsider the question of representation of the Quebec nation within federal institutions.

Yesterday, Benoît Pelletier testified before the legislative committee examining Bill C-20. He said that Quebec has traditionally asked to appoint its own senators using its own democratic selection process. He certainly disagreed with the fact that it is the Prime Minister of Canada who chooses the senators who will represent Quebec.

What we now have is an institution that no longer has a raison d'être, but that, in the Confederation agreement of 1867, represented a counterbalance to Canada's changing demographics. In that respect, clearly, while we in no way approve of the Senate as an institution, we would like to remind the House that its abolition would force renewed constitutional negotiations to give the Quebec nation a presence and significant authority within the federal institutions.

I will not hide the fact that my preference would be for Quebec to escape from the shackles of Canada and have its own democratic institutions. We can now very easily imagine the National Assembly being complemented by a house of the regions. All possible scenarios are being studied at this time within the sovereignist movement. But until sovereignty is achieved, the people can be assured—and the Bloc Québécois has made this its first priority—that the interests of the Quebec nation will be met.

I know the Conservative government has made a threat in that respect. It has said that if the recommended changes to the Senate are not accepted, it would abolish the Senate. It is not that simple, as we all know, and as I just pointed out. Negotiations could be held, however, under the rules set out in the Canadian Constitution. As I have often said, and yesterday I reminded Benoît Pelletier, Quebec's minister of intergovernmental affairs—who was appearing before the legislative committee—that we are the only ones, that is, Quebec and the Bloc Québécois are the only ones trying to ensure respect for the Constitution of 1867 in this House.

It must be ensured that the results of these negotiations respect the political weight of the Quebec nation, as they will entail the enforcement of rules from amendments in the 1982 Constitution—that is, seven provinces representing 50% of the population.

Quebec has made its opinion known. We want 24% of the members of this House to come from Quebec, no matter the distribution of seats. For example, we are currently studying Bill C-22, which would increase the number of seats in Ontario and two western provinces. This increase, which is completely legitimate in light of demographic changes, will diminish the relative political weight of the Quebec nation. We find that unacceptable.

The Quebec nation must maintain 24% of the political weight in this House as long as Quebeckers decide to stay within the Canadian political landscape. I have no problem with increasing the number of seats in the west or in Ontario to reflect demographics. But I do not agree with marginalizing Quebec through that increase. I am not the only one to say so. The Bloc Québécois has said it, and the National Assembly unanimously passed a motion in this regard.

That leads me to the second reason why we support the NDP's opposition to the vote regarding the Senate, namely the manner in which the Conservative government, the Prime Minister and especially the Leader of the Government are going about their so-called reform, which does not alter the main characteristics of the current Senate with Bills C-20 and C-19.

They are trying to do indirectly what cannot be done directly. However, no one is being fooled. I would say that 80% of the constitutional experts who appeared before the committee—and I can assure him that there were not many sovereigntists among them—told us that the government's bills touched on the essential characteristics of the Senate and would require the reopening of the Constitution. Negotiations would require the application of the rules for making amendments set out in the Constitution Act, 1982, namely approval by seven provinces and 50% of the population.

The Conservative government wants to avoid that scenario and would like to present Quebec and Canada with a fait accompli. We will oppose this way of proceeding, as did the National Assembly. If the federal government wants to reopen constitutional negotiations to reform the Senate, Quebec will be there with the demands of successive Quebec governments.

If that happens, we will also raise the issue of the federal spending power. It is clear that the Conservative government does not really have the political will to get rid of that power. It is very clear that if Senate reform negotiations take place, Quebec will not only ensure that the Quebec nation's interests are protected, but also take on certain other irritants that are not working for Quebec, issues that the federal government refuses to address. These issues include the elimination of the federal spending power in areas under Quebec's and the provinces' jurisdiction.

The only way to be absolutely sure that the federal government will not encroach on Quebec's areas of jurisdiction is to ensure that Quebec and other provinces that want it have the right to opt out with no strings attached and with full compensation. So we say yes to reopening constitutional talks on Senate reform, but the government can expect Quebec to bring other things to the table: all of the demands of successive Quebec governments, both the sovereignist and the federalist ones.

That is what Mr. Pelletier said yesterday, and I will end on that note. The Conservative government's current plan for Senate reform is unconstitutional, it is against the Quebec nation's interests, and it is against the motions that were repeatedly and unanimously adopted by the National Assembly, most recently in May 2007. It is clear that this government's support for the motion that was passed almost unanimously in the House concerning recognition of the Quebec nation was nothing but an election ploy. Quebeckers have now realized that and condemned it.

[Brian Murphy, Liberal, Moncton—Riverview—Dieppe, NB]

Mr. Speaker, I wish to thank the member for his question.

Of course it is unfair to exclude one aboriginal group from a process that would select representatives for the entire population of a province. There are ways of going about it other than that proposed in this unfair bill C-20.

We received a submission from the Fédération des communautés francophones et acadienne du Canada which is opposed to the process in Bill C-20 because it is an appointment process that seeks to avoid a neighbourhood or riding system. The results would discriminate against official language minority groups, including those in New Brunswick.

I am very familiar with the situation in New Brunswick. With this system, the francophone population of that province would run the risk of not having any Acadian senators. That is unfair. The Acadian population fought electoral discrimination in the last century. The Acadian community of New Brunswick is opposed to this bill.

Why has the Minister for Democratic Reform introduced and supported a bill which runs counter to the aspirations and the hopes of the Acadian population of New Brunswick?

[Peter Van Loan, Conservative, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and Minister for Democratic Reform]

Mr. Speaker, I want to respond to a couple of the questions that he wished to ask me that he did not ask. First, what kind of consultation do we envisage? It is quite clear. It is in Bill C-20.

He talked about the committee. Apparently, at committee, he has not bothered to read the bill which talks about actually asking Canadians in the provinces, by way of a vote, who they would like to represent them.

What is our view in terms of provincial consultation? We are quite open to having provinces look at their own electoral processes for doing so. In fact, the Prime Minister has actually appointed a senator who was elected through such a provincial process, Bert Brown, a senator from Alberta.

In fact, it is only Conservatives who appointed elected senators. It is only Conservative prime ministers, people who have, through a consultation with the voters in their province, achieved some kind of mandate. That is the kind of appointments we will contemplate right now. Those are the kinds of appointments that would occur if Bill C-20 were in place.

My question is very simple, having posed those questions in this House, I ask my friend: Has he actually read Bill C-20?

[Brian Murphy, Liberal, Moncton—Riverview—Dieppe, NB]

Mr. Speaker, I will begin by saying that as far as I know there are no famous hockey players campaigning against me in the next election, that I know of yet. I would hate to face that prospect, to be quite blunt. It might be worse to be campaigned against by a famous ex-rock star, one never knows.

In New Brunswick, one of the four provinces that was part of our Confederation from the beginning, the issue of Senate reform has been topical over the years. I do remember, as a younger person, being involved in Meech Lake and having the then premier of New Brunswick, Frank McKenna, ultimately be a very ardent supporter of the Meech Lake process.

I remember as well the Charlottetown accord process, when I was first elected to municipal politics, and I remember that being a period of interesting consultation, with the voters and the provinces, with respect to Senate reform and constitutional reform in general.

What strikes me, as I begin the comment on the supply issue, is that I do think that both the Conservative Party and the NDP are being a bit sneaky, frankly, with their stances and I will explain that very clearly. The NDP, if it is as true to its convictions as it pretends to be, ought to open every session of Parliament with a private member's bill, a motion, or, perhaps with their new bed fellows often the government, a bill which calls for the abolition of the Senate.

It is one thing to say that we are continuously and regularly against the abolition of the Senate, but it is another thing to walk the walk and not just talk the talk. The NDP should in fact bring a vote for abolition, but it does not do that. It does this tonight, ladies and gentlemen of the public might want to know, it does it on a supply day.

The NDP members say that it is almost like the baby is coming, but we are not going to buy a crib for the baby. What they are really saying is that they will not fund the Senate, but they did not have the guts, it was not on their agenda. I am not accusing the member for Timmins—James Bay of not having guts or not making it his continual priority, but maybe he cannot get through to the leader to make it a priority to abolish the Senate. Maybe that is the case.

However, the fact is that we are standing here tonight discussing whether all of the departments of government should be funded, and the funding in question in this motion is the Senate, whether the Senate should be funded. If it is not funded, it dies. It cannot function.

That is a little sneaky. The real big sneak though is the government. The Minister for Democratic Reform, through his prepared text, would have Canadians believe that his party's sensible piecemeal approach, Bill C-19 and Bill C-20, of various ways to reform the Senate, are as a result of their consultation with the people of Canada and that is what the people want.

I do not know about that. If we want to talk about what the people want by virtue of polling, which is what he referred to, then really what we are talking about is the disrespect that Canadians now have in the honesty of the government. The government is falling in its credibility and honesty.

I think they will see that what the government is trying to do is to appease parts of Canada, and particularly western Canada that has in fact been underrepresented in the Senate of Canada since its inception and since the joining of provinces into Confederation, by promising them and their leaders in provincial capitals and movements like western think tanks and that sort of thing, promising them gradual reform but as an end game hoping that the gradual reforms do not work.

Then the end game for the Conservatives and the Minister for Democratic Reform is to do one of two things, I suppose, do what I think a vast majority of his caucus wants him to do, which is to join with the NDP and abolish the Senate. That would centralize the power of the governing party in the one house, the unicameral house.

There are very few unicameral houses in western democracies. Most evolved western democracies have bicameral systems, two houses: the congress and the senate, the senate and the people's house. That is generally the way these things work. So, he would be alone on that one but maybe that is what the government House leader wants. Maybe, however, he wants to fill the Senate with the people that he wants.

He said earlier that the only reason the vacancies have not been filled is because the government did not want to make patronage appointments. I do not know if that is an admission that Michael Fortier, the current senator, was in fact a patronage appointment. We heard some backtalk that it was necessary because we needed a minister from Montreal and he would run at the next available opportunity.

I do miss some press stories, but I have not seen Michael Fortier, the senator, run in any byelection in Quebec that was called recently. I think he is probably not going to present himself in a byelection and, therefore, the government's ruse in saying that it had to appoint someone to have representation really was false, as well.

Bills C-19 and C-20 are a furtherance of the government's disingenuousness with respect to achieving reform of the Senate, to which it pays lip service. That is because, despite the fact that a couple of eminent professors support, in the case of Bill C-20, Senate reform with respect to the election or selection of senators, the vast majority of academics have come out and said they are against Bill C-20, the bill that says provinces can select names that the Prime Minister can choose or not.

The vast majority of provinces, through their attorneys general, have been against the bill. It goes to the fundamental point, and it would have been a good question had I had the opportunity to ask it of the Minister for Democratic Reform, of whether the real public consultation that he seeks with the Canadians would be done in focus groups and hotel rooms in predominantly Conservative ridings? Or is he afraid of consulting with the provinces?

Provincial governments, and maybe the Minister for Democratic Reform did not know that, by some of his rhetoric inside and outside the House, I am not sure he does, are elected. Premiers, MLAs and MPPs are elected by the people of the provinces and they represent those provinces.

However, the Minister for Democratic Reform has serially called a number of them into question, that is, the premiers of the provinces. He has called the premier of Ontario, I think, the small man of Confederation. These kind of epithets are not really conducive to sitting down with premiers, which his government has not done yet.

The government gave a nice meal of venison and, I think, apple pie or cloudberry pie at Sussex Drive around Christmas, but it has not sat down with provincial premiers to discuss the idea of constitutional reform, which has been very much part of our Canadian history for some time.

I do not know if the member for Toronto Centre can recall any of these times, but even in the best of times, provincial leaders and prime ministers and their federal counterpart ministers had disagreements. So, if the Conservative government is afraid of disagreement, which clearly by the way the Prime Minister runs his caucus, it is, then that is fine. Why does he not come clean with the Canadian people, why does not the Minister for Democratic Reform come clean with the people and say, “Well, we're just not meeting with any provincial governments because we think there might be disagreement?”

I think the Minister for Democratic Reform has seen through the hearings we had on Bill C-20. We had Bênoit Pelletier, the minister for Canadian intergovernmental affairs of Quebec recently before the committee. I think he has seen that there is profound disagreement with the way the federal government is proceeding with Senate reform. He knows that in my own province of New Brunswick, Premier Shawn Graham, who is responsible for intergovernmental affairs, is against the procedure. Even what he thought were erstwhile allies in the west, they have said, “Well, we don't agree with the part of Bill C-20 that says that the election modality should be federal. It should be provincial.”

The Conservatives cannot even get their allies onside. They do not want these bills to pass. They are not genuine about Senate reform. I think in lieu of this supply item, the best they can do is hide their tails and oppose it.

[Brian Murphy, Liberal, Moncton—Riverview—Dieppe, NB]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask my friend a few questions. I know he has an aversion to great hockey players. I have heard that story a number of times.

On a serious note, he has ended his comments by saying that this matter will end up in court. I want a clarification. The issue of Senate reform or the amendment of the Constitution will ultimately end up in court, at least that is how I read his answer.

Earlier in his comments, he talked about four levels of government. I do not know if he was including the Senate as the fourth or the courts as a level of government. I am not clear on that.

My question, in pith and substance, is this. With regard to the role of the courts, does he see that an amendment of our Constitution is inevitable, arising from the process that the Minister for Democratic Reform has put before the committee with Bill C-20, and will put before a committee with Bill C-19?

Does he not agree that a reference to the Supreme Court would probably be the only answer to the question of whether these bills are constitutional? Does he at least agree on process?

[Peter Van Loan, Conservative, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and Minister for Democratic Reform]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to participate in the debate relating to the main estimates for the Senate.

I am glad that the New Democratic Party raised this matter because it draws attention to a very important issue, the need for Senate reform. The government clearly agrees that the Senate cannot stay as it is. Certainly, we understand the sentiment of those who support immediate abolition, as the NDP does and as that party is attempting to achieve through this supply motion, because the Senate is far from the effective institution that it should be. However, the government wishes to take a constructive approach. We support reforming the Senate. Only when it becomes clear that reform is not possible should abolition be pursued, but clearly, the status quo is not acceptable.

Canadians have made it clear that they want change. They no longer have confidence in the Senate as currently instituted and they do not regard it as a legitimate democratic institution appropriate to this millennium. Over the past few years, the consistency in polling results on Senate reform has been quite remarkable. Canadians consistently support either the direct election of senators, or alternatively, that there should be consultations on Senate appointments. For example, an Angus Reid poll just last month indicated that 60% of respondents supported the direct election of senators.

We have listened to Canadians and this government has made it a priority to renew and improve our democratic institutions so that we can have a stronger, better Senate.

A strong and united Canada requires federal parliamentary institutions that reflect democratic values in which Canadians in every region of this country can have confidence and faith.

This is why our government has taken concrete action to develop a practical and achievable plan to reform the Senate. Canadians are aware of the difficulties of an in-depth constitutional reform. That is why the government has adopted an incremental approach that will produce immediate results.

In particular, the government has introduced Bill C-19, concerning Senate tenure, and Bill C-20, which would provide for consultations with the Canadian public concerning appointments to the Senate.

Unfortunately, our efforts thus far have been stalled and obstructed in the Senate, demonstrating to Canadians that the Liberals in the Senate refuse to change.

Bill C-19 to limit the terms of senators to eight years of course was originally introduced in the Senate as Bill S-4. In the Angus Reid poll that I referred to earlier, 64% of respondents indicated they support limiting the terms of senators to eight years. In fact, the Leader of the Opposition at one time actually supported Senate term limits of only six years. He is on the record supporting those six year term limits.

However, even though we knew this strong popular support existed before the Angus Reid survey, and even though the Senate Special Committee on Senate Reform confirmed the constitutionality and goals of the bill, as did numerous constitutional experts, the Senate killed the bill by refusing to allow it to go to third reading, unless it was first referred to the Supreme Court of Canada.

This was definitely an unprecedented move on behalf of the Senate, and I would even go so far as to say that the senators who opposed the bill shirked their responsibilities as parliamentarians.

And it is a perfect example of why Senate reform needs to happen. It also shows the difference between the approaches of the government, the Liberals and the New Democratic Party.

The Liberal Party seems determined to maintain the status quo with regard to the Senate and thereby to maintain the entitlements that go along with an antiquated, undemocratic method of appointing senators.

The New Democratic Party, to its credit, recognizes that there is a problem, but the solution offered by the NDP is to simply give up, to stop trying.

As I have demonstrated, the government's approach is to listen to the people who continue to demand reform.

I believe that Bill C-20 is another important bill that responds to Canadians' desire for fundamental reform.

If the bill on Senate tenure is a modest step towards the renewal and modernization of the Senate, the Senate appointments consultation bill will allow us to address a much more serious problem, that of democratic legitimacy.

The government's view is that it is utterly unacceptable that in this, the 21st century, and in a federal country such as Canada that prides itself on its democratic values, democratic values that we promote abroad as an example to others, that we have a chamber in our Parliament that lacks fundamental democratic legitimacy. This lack of democratic legitimacy in the Senate impairs its ability to act effectively as a legislative body that plays a meaningful role in the federal parliamentary process.

The Senate consultations bill is a positive step toward correcting this problem. It provides a means for Canadians to have a say in who represents them in what would finally be their Senate.

I find it hard to understand how anyone can disagree with that basic proposition. How can anyone argue that it is okay for a prime minister to consult with friends and family, MPs and party organizers about who should get a good plum spot in the Senate, but not be able to ask Canadian voters for their opinion on who should represent them in their Senate?

Senate reform has proven to be difficult. But that does not mean that we should quit before we have even begun.

Canadians expect more from their government, and with good reason.

Senate reform has already proved to be a difficult task in no small part because of the negative attitude of Liberal senators and the Liberal Party toward improvement and change. However, I still believe it is important that we make every effort to improve this institution before resorting to move forward with abolition.

Therefore, I cannot support the NDP in its efforts at this time to withhold supply to the Senate. Rather, I call upon the NDP to join us in achieving real reform by supporting the government's proposed Senate reform legislation. In other words, let us respond to the desire of Canadians and work toward achieving a modern, democratic Senate.

If the NDP members want to engage in a democratic exercise to abolish the Senate, I invite them to introduce a private member's bill, to hold a referendum and ask Canadians if they want to keep the Senate as it is, to democratize it, or to simply abolish it. That open public debate is the democratically legitimate way to approach abolition, not a back door tactic such as we see tonight through a supply motion.

[Joe Preston, Conservative, Elgin—Middlesex—London, ON]

You mentioned there, and you said earlier, that you understand Canadians want greater democratization, that it's something Canadians may be reaching for. I agree with something else you said, that perhaps we've left this topic for too long, and it wasn't something that was talked about. We've gone since 1867 to where we are today, and I'm not sure many Canadians say the Senate they currently have matches their views of what democracy is, or where Canada should be. In my mind, we have to get there. I guess the question is, do we take one large jump at it or do we take small bites? They say the best way to eat an elephant is one bite at a time. Is Bill C-20 one of the bites along the way?

[Pierre Paquette, Bloc, Joliette, QC]

I can assure you that the Bloc Québécois feels that Bills C-19 and C-20 are unacceptable, and that it would be the torch bearer of the consensus of the National Assembly.

I would like to ask you a question that is somewhat peripheral, but that nevertheless is linked to the subject. Mr. Harper and the Conservative government are spending a great deal of energy to reform the Senate through Bills C-19 and C-20. With this vision, they are trying to make any change at all in order to relaunch the debate on Senate reform.

Would it be better for the Conservative government to deploy as much if not more energy in an effort to settle the problem of the federal government's spending powers in areas of Quebec and the other provinces' jurisdictions? As you know, the Minister of Finance and the Prime Minister have announced a bill several times that has yet to be tabled. For the moment, there is some control and they do not have to answer to anyone.

In the short term, should the priority not be to work on attainable goals, such as the elimination of the federal government's powers of expenditure in areas of provincial and Quebec jurisdiction?

[Pierre Paquette, Bloc, Joliette, QC]

If there is to be any Senate reform, the provinces and Quebec must be consulted. Regardless of the changes made, I am convinced that for Quebec, it is an issue of some kind of counterbalance to its presence in the House of Commons.

Earlier on, I read what Mr. Harper was saying about the idea of turning the Senate into a House of the provinces. We clearly sense that the Harper government—and this was also the case with Mr. Van Loan when he came to testify—considers that Bills C-19 and C-20 are a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, in the sense that if they are not passed, they will work to abolish the Senate.

Do you believe that that kind of statement, which in my opinion is almost blackmail, holds water? Should we really be concerned that the federal government, the Conservative Party, could decide unilaterally to abolish the Senate? Is this a credible threat? This would forcibly result in a new round of constitutional negotiations.

[Benoît Pelletier]

I know that even among the experts there are many points of view. So I ask you, isn't that a reason for clarifying everything and making sure that we do not make any mistakes? That's the bottom line.

As I said, some experts do pretend that the reference of 1980 of the Supreme Court of Canada on the upper house does not apply any more. They pretend that it was replaced by section 42 or section 44 of the Constitution Act, 1982. They look at the bill and say it does not fit within section 42, so it must fit within section 44. But what about section 38, the residual amendment procedure? Why wouldn't that residual amendment procedure apply when a bill affects a fundamental feature of the Senate that is not mentioned in section 42? If it's a fundamental feature and it's not mentioned in section 42, it should not be within section 44; it should be somewhere else. If it's not in section 44 and it's not in section 42, it must be in section 38.

I did not see a commentary that was made in favour of Bill C-20 that could not, on some aspects at least, be put into question. For that reason, I invite you to be extremely cautious, extremely prudent with that matter. Even if the objectives that you, being the federal government, are pursuing might be extremely legitimate, there is a constitutional process in Canada that must be respected. At some point, what you see here is a province that asks for a verification of respect of the Constitution to which it adhered in 1867.

[Benoît Pelletier]

I think the current process has some value. It brought to the Senate many prominent people, people who have served the country and people who are an asset for the federal Parliament. So there is some value, in my view, in the current appointment process.

At the same time, if you want to change the method of selecting senators, then it is clear that you get into something that needs a constitutional amendment. I'm not even saying this is the case with Bill C-20, because it's very subtle. What I'm saying, though, is that it is substantial enough so that it affects the fundamental features of the Senate, and for that reason the reforms should be done through a formal and multilateral constitutional amendment.

[Benoît Pelletier]

History shows that unanimity is impossible when it comes to constitutional amendments or the reform of Canadian institutions. Can the political parties reach a consensus, even two of the three parties? I don't know. Is there a consensus among the public? It is possible.

I do not under estimate the difficulty of the constitutional amendment mechanism. However, we did not introduce Bill C-20. This bill presents a problem that affects us and to which we are reacting. I cannot say that these are easy issues or ones that elicit great public interest, particularly not in June.

[Benoît Pelletier]

The powers of the Senate should also be reviewed. We cannot allow a Senate that has been transformed into a chamber of the provinces to have an absolute power of veto on the adoption of federal bills. This would really have to be a suspensive veto rather than an absolute veto.

At this time, we are facing the same problem with Bill C-20, on a more or less short-term basis. Let us suppose that the bill is adopted and that the Senate, bit by bit, is transformed into an elected chamber. This Senate would claim its democratic legitimacy, and then we'll have to settle the entire issue of relations between the Senate and the House of Commons. The Senate's powers could indeed be challenged, in such a situation. There would be two chambers, both claiming democratic legitimacy. Some senators might even claim more legitimacy due to the fact that they have been elected by an entire province.

These issues must not be taken lightly. These are fundamental issues facing federal parliamentarians. Those who are sitting in the House of Commons should get to work on this issue on a more or less long-term basis.

[Benoît Pelletier]

I will tell you that we are aware of the will to modernize the Senate that is being manifested across Canada, and to some extent we subscribe to that. The Government of Quebec is not against modernizing the Senate. We say that, if the Senate is to be modernized in a way that affects its fundamental characteristics, that modernization has to be carried out in accordance with established rules. And those rules are constitutional rules. In other words, we are demanding respect for the Constitution of Canada.

Our arguments are based on a premise which we consider to be well-founded and not challengeable. The Senate as such is not a strictly federal institution, or a federal institution in its strictest sense. It is a federal-provincial institution. The Supreme Court said so in 1980. It is an institution that is close to the very core of the federal compromise achieved in 1867, which was federal-provincial in nature, and thus cannot have its essential characteristics modified unilaterally by the Government of Canada. It is as simple as that.

Even if a legal or constitutional expert told me that the 1980 decision no longer applied because the amendment procedures established in 1982 have superseded them, I would still say that the decision contained the following observation: when Canada was created in 1867—I am not talking about 1980 here—the existence of the Senate was one of the conditions Quebec imposed in order to come into the Canadian federal compromise. The same held for the Atlantic provinces. This is a historical fact. Even if it was concluded that the 1980 reference no longer applied, historical reality cannot be reviewed or revised. The Senate is a federal-provincial institution in its essential nature.

That brings us to the second question. Are the bills we have before us substantive enough for us to say that they modify essential characteristics of the Senate? If we conclude that bills C-20 and C-19 do not affect essential characteristics of the Senate, then the federal government's unilateral powers would most likely apply.

If, however, we were to conclude that the bills do indeed modify essential characteristics of the Senate and are substantive, then the rules of procedure for multilateral decisions on modification would perforce have to apply.

This is a bill that will basically change the nature of the Senate gradually, and over time transform it into an elected chamber. Thus, I believe that it is attempting to modify an essential characteristic of the Senate. That is the conclusion I reach. The more we change things, the more multilateral constitutional amendment procedures have to apply.

[Raymonde Folco, Liberal, Laval—Les Îles, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Minister, you had promised us a presentation that would be vigorous, unequivocal, lucid and clear. I must admit that it is all of these things.

Several committee members noted to what extent the process that is being proposed to us would neglect or could forget minorities. I do not mean only the linguistic minorities on a numerical basis—Quebec within Canada—but also the other francophones and the other Canadian minorities, especially people in rural regions who have little chance of being elected in any province that has large urban centres.

As the Minister for Intergovernmental Affairs, you represent the Quebec government before the committee. Could you explain to us what the Quebec government would do if ever Bill C-20 were adopted by the House of Commons and then sent to the Senate? How would the Quebec government react? What kind of role could be played by the Quebec government and the other provincial and territorial governments? I am not asking you to speak on their behalf, but could you give us a picture of what might happen?

[Benoît Pelletier, Minister, Canadian Intergovernmental Affairs, Government of Québec]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ladies and gentlemen, members of the committee, I will first of all introduce you to the person accompanying me, Mr. Jean-Guy Côté, who is the political attaché in my Quebec City office.

I will begin by thanking you for your invitation to take part in the work of your committee in its deliberations on Bill C-20. I will repeat what I said in 2007 when I stood before a senatorial committee—the Government of Quebec does not usually appear before a federal parliamentary forum unless exceptional circumstances warrant it, as is the case today. This is the third time Quebec has come before the Parliament of Canada to express its opinion on the measures put forward by the federal government to reform the Senate.

Quebec presented its viewpoint at a sitting of the Special Senate Committee on Senate Reform in the autumn of 2006, and in a brief submitted in May 2007 to the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs. Quebec's positions are thus well known. We demanded the withdrawal of Bill C-43, today's Bill C-20, by which the federal government would introduce an electoral system applicable to the selection of senators. We also demanded the suspension of proceedings on Bill S-4, now Bill C-19, concerning the tenure of senators. These two measures are presented separately but are indeed components of a single initiative.

For the Government of Quebec, however, transformation of the fundamental features of the Senate is not a matter of ordinary statutes. It is a fully constitutional issue that therefore begs recourse to multilateral procedures of constitutional amendment.

It is perfectly clear to Quebec that the federal government's underlying intention in these bills is to do indirectly what it cannot do directly, namely, to transform the method of selecting senators and, by extension, transform the nature and role of the Senate which, since 1867, has been an appointing chamber of legislative sober second thought.

It seems equally clear to us that the system envisaged in Bill C-20 is electoral in purpose and effect. We have noted that, during the committee's works, it has been pointed out that Bill C-20 had been "carefully drafted" to comply with the Constitution. But the Constitution is more than form. It is more than drafting techniques. It goes to the very heart and nature of things and to the very purpose of rules that govern our society.

Constitutional jurisprudence was quick to emphasize the importance of going beyond form and appearance in assessing the constitutionality of power-sharing measures. The formalist approach was rejected. The courts had the wisdom to recognize that subtle wording can sometimes be tantamount to concealment. They made the pith and substance of the rules of law the centrepiece of constitutional logic.

As I see it, this legal tradition applies just as aptly to the limits of unilateral federal jurisdiction in institutional matters in relation to the multilateral procedures of constitutional amendments. What counts are the purpose, subject and effect of this bill, and not the care taken in drafting it or the ingenuity of the notions involved, such as consultative election as a means of appointment, a notion that appears to have no precedent.

The Government of Quebec maintains that the purpose of Bill C-20 is, beyond a doubt, to transform the method of selecting senators. This is the clear intent of the federal government. The system considered in the bill is not workable or viable unless it is electoral. Otherwise, how does one ask citizens to stand as candidates and campaign throughout the province, with the personal and financial commitments that candidacy entails? How does one justify the involvement of Elections Canada and the use of public resources for a complex voting process that must comply with all the requirements of an electoral system, and ask citizens to exercise their right to vote and to cast a ballot? What is there to prevent candidates from considering themselves and from being considered as elected directly by the population, taking into account the recourse to universal suffrage?

The notion of consultation, therefore, strikes us as artificial. If, after such a process, there is a pool of candidates, as certain federal representatives have put it, that would be a pool of elected persons and this does not change the fundamental impact of the bill on the nature of the Senate. Even if the seats for which these persons have been elected are not all available immediately, these persons would have been chosen by voters through universal suffrage. The idea of a pool does not mitigate the consequences of the institutional change that is sought through this bill.

In my previous interventions, I touched on the link between sections 42 and 43 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and the Supreme Court's 1979 Reference on the Upper House. Further to this opinion that gave rise to the principle of the exclusion of the fundamental features, or essential characteristics, of the Senate from unilateral federal jurisdiction, the framers of the Constitution expressly specified certain exceptions to the federal jurisdiction under today's section 44, including the method of selecting senators, the powers of the Senate, and regional representation, incidentally, three closely interconnected elements in terms of institutional balance and architecture.

With the framework of current debates on the federal bills, some have questioned the contemporary relevance of the Reference on the Upper House. We reiterate that this Supreme Court opinion is just as relevant now as it was then. Constitutional protection of the fundamental features of the Senate is enshrined in the Constitution through the exceptions laid out in section 42 and, in addition to these exceptions, through the required use of the 7/50 general procedure under section 38 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The federal compromise at the basis of Canada's political system is expressed in the fundamental features of the federal institutions created in 1867. In its original mandate, by virtue of the regional distribution of senatorial seats, the Senate was designed to be a forum for representing the interests of the components of the federation within federal institutions.

For Quebec, those interests take on special meaning in relation to its national identity. Bill C-20 also raises concerns about the francophone presence in the Senate and the role of this chamber regarding the Canadian duality, a point emphasized in the brief presented to this committee by the Fédération des communautés francophones et acadienne du Canada. The Government of Quebec agrees with this position.

The Senate also fulfils the role of providing sober second thought with regard to the legislation submitted by the House of Commons. This role is reflected in the powers of the Senate, which has to approve every piece of federal legislation. As we know, the manner in which the Senate exercises these prerogatives is largely inflected by the fact that it is an appointment chamber.

Bill C-20 would very likely encourage the Senate to make concrete use of the many powers still available to it, even though there are no mechanisms for resolving a potential deadlock between the two chambers. We were taken aback by the argument that Bill C-20's drawbacks are seen by some as a means, in some ways positive, of destabilizing the status quo, of triggering change. We do not think it is possible to embark upon such fundamental constitutional change in this way, without taking into account the complex connections between the various fundamental features of the institutions concerned.

The Senate exists in a complex and coherent constitutional environment that is tied to considerations underlying the federal compact and the balance of intergovernmental relations. The federal government's current bills are not mere experiments or pilot projects. Were they to be implemented, they could lead to sweeping political changes which we cannot safely assume would be easily adjusted or rectified should the need to do so arise, especially if there were to be unexpected consequences.

What we can foresee, however, are possible impacts of an elected Senate on the balance of intergovernmental relations, without improvement in the defence of provincial interests by the Upper Chamber. The new senators would in all likelihood be less effective in representing provincial interests, for they would tend to integrate with the political dynamic proper to the federal scene, in particular, the dynamic of the federal political parties, even if certain variations on the Australian model, the template for the federal government, have been written into to Bill C-20. Here the comparison is with the Australian Senate, an institution in which partisan polarization is particularly prevalent.

What we should be examining is the impact of the electoral system advocated by the federal government on the basic constitutional mission of the Canadian Senate. When the issue is viewed from this angle, it seems obvious that partisanship within the Upper Chamber would intensify.

The provinces have a direct interest in the unilateral changes the federal government proposes to make to the Senate. The argument to the effect that the process of constitutional amendment is too demanding has no place in a federal system in which constitutionalism and the rule of law are recognized as basic principles. It is an untenable argument in a federal system in which the purpose of more complex procedures for constitutional amendment is to ensure that minority interests are taken into account when fundamental constitutional elements are at issue. Consideration of minority interests is of particular importance for the Quebec nation, given its situation within Canada.

The future of the Senate, and changes to its fundamental features, cannot be envisaged outside of the constitutional context to which it belongs, one of constitutional changes in which the provinces are called upon to share the exercise of constituent authority.

It is odd indeed that we have to engage in a procedural debate on a subject as patently constitutional as the nature and role of the Senate and that we are here to demand that the provinces be part of the process.

The provinces must be participants in reforms pertaining to the fundamental features of federal institutions. Quebec is not averse to the idea of modernizing the Senate. It is aware that its federative partners have certain aspirations in this regard. Naturally, it is interested in the question of the role of the Senate within the federal system, and, notably, that of closer relations between the provinces and the Upper House. But a single Parliament cannot monopolize this undertaking of institutional modernization.

In concluding, allow us to reiterate before this committee the message expressed unanimously by the National Assembly of Quebec in its May 16, 2007 resolution. Bill C-20, which the federal government is attempting to present as a minor amendment over which the federal Parliament would have exclusive jurisdiction, in fact masks an in-depth change in the nature and role of the Senate. Under no pretext whatsoever does such a reform lend itself to unilateral action by the federal government. The provinces, and Quebec in particular, cannot be excluded from fundamental debates concerning the evolution of the Canadian federation.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Albina Guarnieri]

Seeing quorum, I call the meeting to order.

Pursuant to our order of reference of February 13, 2008, we will continue our study of Bill C-20.

Today we are fortunate to welcome a witness who knows Ottawa very well.

Benoît Pelletier was associate dean and professor of the year at the University of Ottawa Law Faculty, where he obtained a master's in law. He then obtained his PhD from the Université de Paris in 1996. Mr. Pelletier is the Minister of Canadian Intergovernmental Affairs for the province of Quebec. He is also responsible for Indian Affairs and appropriately, the reform of democratic institutions.

Thank you for your patience. We had to hold a vote today and that is why we are starting a little bit late. That being said, I would like to invite Minister Pelletier to make his comments.

The floor is yours.

[Roger Gibbins]

They came very close on the free trade legislation, the GST, and others.

In the back of my mind is the danger of us getting into that confrontation with the existing Senate, because we have such different partisan distributions in the two houses. So I think there are some real risks.

If I were king for a day, I would like to have a House of Commons elected on the basis of representation by population, and get rid of some of the distortions we have right now as we try to accommodate regional representation within the House. It gets awkward. I would like to have a tie-breaking mechanism that gives additional weight to the House of Commons, because I think it reflects the most crystal-clear expression of the democratic will of the people. You want to get that right.

It requires a change from the status quo. People assume now that the Senate doesn't have power and legitimacy. It doesn't have legitimacy, but it does have power. I'd like to strengthen the legitimacy of the Senate but constrain its power. I think that can be done. There are mechanisms for doing so. I don't shy away entirely from the notion of deadlocks, confrontations, and so on, because democratic government tends to be messy. It's not clear-cut, but we have to sort those things out.

I come back to the responsibilities of this committee, as I see them. The questions that have been asked today that I have confronted seem to be extraordinarily important and thoughtful ones. These are not trivial matters that have been raised by people. I would hate to see the discussions shut down at this point by the committee, rather than pushing us—Canadians, the government of the day, whoever—to begin addressing those questions in a thoughtful fashion.

How you do that as a matter of parliamentary procedure is something I don't know. But rather than slamming on the brakes, I would prefer to raise those hard questions and try to think through a mechanism by which they can be answered. Because they are important questions, and Canadians would feel you were negligent in your own responsibilities if you went ahead pell-mell, without raising those questions and thinking through a mechanism by which we might be able to answer them. All those answers won't be found in Bill C-20 itself.

[Raymonde Folco, Liberal, Laval—Les Îles, QC]

There are two things, Mr. Gibbins. First, you said earlier that we have to start the process, and as we go along we'll get the process to be better and better. I agree with that, but if I look at what we're doing here as a legislative committee, we are starting the process. In fact, the bill we have in front of us is that first step toward reforming the process. But our task as members of the legislature is to look at that bill and make the process already better at this level. That is why we're looking at the details of the bill. I can see that what we're doing falls in step with the kind of thinking you've been exposing to us, in terms of les grandes lignes, if you like. In our thinking, we have to take into consideration all the questions that have been asked here today and on the other days.

We've talked a lot about how you become a senator. But once you have become a senator, once that new Senate is elected, or whatever is done, and all the senators are sitting in that new red room, what is their relationship to the House of Commons? How do you avoid having two groups with the same amount of power jostling one another? What powers do you give to one that you don't give to the other? One necessarily has to supersede the other, it seems to me. One has to take precedence over the other, otherwise you're at a deadlock. It's one of the problems the United States have in their legislature.

Seeing that there's nothing in Bill C-20 to give us an indication of where the Conservative government wants to go in that, do you have some ideas on the relationship between that new Senate and the House of Commons?

[Roger Gibbins]

My understanding of how this electoral system would work is that if you had a preferential ballot and all 24 Ontario senators were elected at once, you would be assured of election if you received just over 3% of the popular vote. That's a very low threshold, so it wouldn't squeeze out the small communities.

Small communities would get into more trouble if you increased that threshold by having a smaller number of senators elected. It's like the issue of representation by population and proportional representation systems. Where do you want to set the threshold? Do you want it so you can get elected to the Ontario Senate with 3% of the vote? Or do you want a threshold to be somewhat higher?

It depends on your definition of democracy. Do you want those thresholds to be radically different across the country, where you can be elected as an aboriginal candidate in Ontario with 3% of the vote, but in Saskatchewan it takes 12% or 14% of the vote?

These are the design details that I think are hinted at in Bill C-20 but are not fully explained. To my mind, they're important decisions to be addressed. They're not incidental.

[Roger Gibbins]

That's a difficult question. Let me begin with the one I think is the most important--I'm not suggesting the others are not important--and that's figuring out what the appropriate size of the senatorial districts would be.

My concern with districts that are represented by a single senator is it doesn't provide a lot of opportunity for an electoral system to break up some of these large blocks.

To take an example, if Alberta had six Senate districts, each one electing one senator, we would get this uniform partisan representation from Alberta we have in the House of Commons.

If you have three districts or three senators per district, under the electoral system that is being proposed here, you would guarantee those three elected senators would not all be from the same party, unless Alberta was so overwhelmingly in public sentiment in that direction, which we're not.

So getting the size of the constituency right is very important, and that's what we haven't shaped up, as I read it, in Bill C-20.

[Roger Gibbins]

We can go a long way in moving towards an elected Senate without having the formal consent of the provinces. We can go a fair distance, as Bill C-20 does. However, on the distribution of the Senate seats, we need the consent of the provinces. There are hard constitutional constraints on what can be done without the consent of the provinces.

This is the trump card the provinces play. To use a baseball analogy, you can get to first base by yourself, but you can't get to second without bringing the provinces in. So the question is, when do you bring the provinces in? I think you bring them in after you have the process going. People could well differ on that assessment.

[Roger Gibbins]

To me it's pretty clear where we want to go on this. We want the same norms and conventions that apply to electoral financing in the House of Commons to apply in the Senate. It doesn't seem to be overly difficult to figure out how to get there.

The catch is that, since Bill C-20 would allow the election of senators in conjunction with provincial elections, it's not clear whether the federal financing legislation would apply. The provinces are not wildly out of line with federal legislation on this, but this is one of the soft points. If we rely on provincial elections, we're getting beyond the ability of Parliament to set election financing. That's why I think that in the long term provincial elections are a bad alternative.

But this committee would do well to tighten up what may be financial loopholes in the existing legislation. If they're closed, so much the better.

[Roger Gibbins]

The small step is that the Prime Minister will now, under Bill C-20, accept advice from the people of the provinces rather than from his own conscience, advisers, or whatever. To my mind, that's a very fundamental change.

The difficulty, and I think an area where this committee may well have an important role to play, is getting through a transition period. As I mentioned, I can think of electoral systems that would work very well for a lot of the concerns that have been expressed in this room, but in the short term it will be incomplete and messy.

Quebec, incidentally, poses a particular problem, and probably not in a bad way, because Senate constituencies are specifically defined in the Constitution, whereas they are not for the other provinces. Within Alberta you could have an election for all six Alberta senators at once, but it's not clear to me how this would take place within Quebec, with constitutionally defined senatorial districts. So for Quebec there is some hard work to be done.

Bill C-20 also provides an important olive branch to the provinces, in that it proposes, if I read it correctly, that the elections would be held either at the same time as a federal election or at the same time as a provincial election. There are supporters of the triple-E movement in my province who are very adamant that the elections should be held at the same time as provincial elections. Personally, I think that's the wrong way to go, but I can see us moving forward where we retain some of that distinction, where some of the elections are held nationally and some are held provincially.

As we work through how to make this sensible and sellable within Quebec, there are a series of design issues that I think offer some flexibility.

The last point.... I'm so hesitant to use terms like “back door” or “change by stealth” and so on, because it makes it seem illegitimate in some way. Yet I look at what has been a stalemate on Senate reform, with no movement, and I think there is an opportunity for some creativity here, some imagination, some ability to sort of get this discussion going.

I've been talking about Senate reform issues for 35 years as an academic, and I would like to think that before my death there will be some modest movement. I like to think that within my children's lifetime there would be some modest movement, but I'm not sure about this. If the Senate were working well, I wouldn't care, but I don't think it is working well, and therefore I do care.

I'm sorry, that's a long answer to your question.

[Pauline Picard, Bloc, Drummond, QC]

Welcome, Mr. Gibbins.

I am in favour of the abolition of the Senate. I do not believe in a second chamber. I believe that the House of Commons is capable of taking charge of its own responsibilities.

You stated earlier that Bill C-20 was a small step in the right direction. You however see in it elements that to your mind are inconceivable. You stated that after the holding of an election for senators, the Prime Minister could decide to snap his fingers at democracy and appoint someone else. This, to your mind, is inconceivable. You say that we are attempting to do something through the back door. Most constitutional lawyers have told us exactly the same thing. You also underscored the fact that the provinces would not be consulted. In the end, with Bill C-20, no one would be consulted; legislation devised for Lord knows what would simply be imposed. Furthermore, it will be very difficult to enforce.

What is that small step on the road to reform that Bill C-20 offers and that you mentioned earlier?

[Joe Preston, Conservative, Elgin—Middlesex—London, ON]

Across this country, if you bring up Senate reform, you're certain to get an opinion. Whether it's in a bar or in a church basement or wherever you might be, you're going to get a strong opinion. In my time in this place, I've never got the opinion, “Gee, I like what we have”. I think that's pretty safe to say.

You've already stated that change is what needs to happen, that it's the start down the road to the change, that the public demand is there and the people are certainly saying that what we have isn't right.

You were just asked some questions about appointments and that being the method to maybe get the best representation in the place. Well, I'll tell you, sir, that the largest complaint I hear is that people are appointed to the place. That may be what Bill C-20 really does--one of the best pieces is trying to fix that.

The public demand is there. You said we must start the change, even a little bit. We've got to start down the way, and then we might have the provinces stand up and take notice and see that the change is happening and they'd like to be part of it. I like the thought process of doing that.

I'm not certain that the public demand is from the premiers. That's not what I'm hearing. I'm hearing the public demand on the street. So I agree with you that starting the change is maybe the best way to go.

Maybe I'll stop there and ask you where we are, but I also loved your thought that our two choices are to wait for the implosion to absolutely happen of what we have or to actually start down the road of change and get going, and that change itself will bring on further change.

I'll leave that and let you speak to what I've said.

[Joe Preston, Conservative, Elgin—Middlesex—London, ON]

First of all, Dr. Gibbins, I thank you for being here. I've gone through a couple of meetings with constitutional experts, and it's a breath of fresh air to hear someone attacking this from a different side, a more popular side.

I have to agree with some of what you've said, and I'll try to bring it together into a question. You've certainly said there's strong public support for what Bill C-20 is trying to do. If I can quote you, you may have been incorrect that it's not talked about in the bars on the weekend. Maybe we attend different bars.

[Roger Gibbins]

Those are good questions.

The Prime Minister at the present time takes advice from who knows where when he makes appointments. We have no idea who advises him. We have no idea if he accepts or rejects the advice. It's an entirely internal process in the head of the Prime Minister. We look at the results. We applaud some and condemn others, and we have no idea what the process is.

I think it is inconceivable--and I can't underscore that more--that a Prime Minister would hold or cause elections to be held and then reject that advice. As a convention, this sinks so quickly into the Canadian set of expectations that the Prime Minister would be bound. One of the constitutional arguments made about this is that the Prime Minister would be bound. You can't have it both ways. The Prime Minister is either bound by an electoral process or not. I think for better or worse, the Prime Minister would be bound in this way.

So the prospect of an election--and I'll use that term advisedly--being held and then the Prime Minister ignoring the result of that to me is remote at the outset, and rapidly becomes inconceivable as the convention sets in. That doesn't concern me.

The back-door argument is certainly more troubling--about why the provinces are not being pulled into this at the outset. I guess there are two responses I would make to that.

If the Senate was functioning well and we did not run what I consider to be a very real risk of confrontation between an elected House and an appointed Senate because we have such partisan imbalances in the two, then I would say let's be as slow-moving about this as we want.

I don't think it is working well at the present time. The way to bring the provinces to the table is to start the process in some way. This is again where I think Bill C-20 catches your interest. If you tell the provincial governments we're not going to do anything on our own initiative and we're going to wait until they sort of rally around and come up with something, nothing is going to happen.

[Roger Gibbins]

The single transferrable vote system, and indeed most forms of proportional representation, if we were to go that way, work least well.... Pardon me. The smaller the constituency, the worse they work. If you have a single transferrable vote and you're only electing one member, you get basically the same outcome--not exactly, but similar.

One of the things that's unclear in Bill C-20, at least in my reading, is that it doesn't define what the appropriate collection of constituencies would be for the Senate election. It doesn't define, because we can't define it at this point, what the number of elected senators should be and whether they should be at one time or another. We're going to have a phase-in period where none of this is going to work terribly well.

The basic point is that if you want to ensure diversity of representation in the Senate and that we don't replicate the kinds of regional blocks we get in the House of Commons, then you need a reasonable number of people elected at the same time in the same constituency. Getting there in an incremental fashion is not straightforward. I don't think the electoral system proposed in Bill C-20 will work flawlessly from the get-go. It won't. But I think it will create the opportunity to begin to get this right.

I also want to note--and this really goes back to the question on a referendum--that our Constitution does not require that major constitutional changes be put to the people. It simply requires the consent of the provinces--either all, or seven. However, my guess is that the Charlottetown referendum has set more of a constitutional precedent than we realize. In fact now that we've put one major constitutional package before the people, I suspect that in the future, no matter what the constitutional change might be, if it's major and if it's significant, governments will be compelled to go back to some sort of popular consent. I think we've made a decision in the Charlottetown referendum that we will not go back on; I don't think we can go back on it.

[Roger Gibbins]

My understanding—and I don't speak with a great deal of insight—is the western provincial governments have not yet waded into this.

If you want to get a general sense of the political landscape in western Canada, I would describe it in the following terms: a commitment by provincial governments to move ahead of Senate reform, but not with a whole lot of enthusiasm. At the public level, there is very strong public support, but this is not a top-of-the-mind issue, so it's not something people are marching in the streets about. It's not an acute issue. If you put it to the test, if you poll people, if you ask people, you find very strong support, but it's not something people are talking about in the bars on the weekend. It doesn't have that high saliency at the present time.

My sense of the landscape is that this specific bill, Bill C-20, has not yet sunk into regional discussion within the west. That would be my sense, anyway.

[Raymonde Folco, Liberal, Laval—Les Îles, QC]

If I have time, I would like to ask what you would propose. Do you have anything to propose in order to avoid this kind of problem?

Because what we've heard so far is the Prime Minister say “I think we need more women”, or “I think we need more senior citizens”, or we need more of this group or that group, and then he goes ahead and names these people. And of course that's not where we're going with Bill C-20.

[Roger Gibbins, President and Chief Executive Officer, Canada West Foundation]

Thank you very much.

I want to apologize for the absence of my colleague, Robert Roach, who was going to be here. He took ill from some weekend travelling in Winnipeg, so I'll be here by myself.

I'm pleased to have this opportunity. Senate reform has been an interest of mine since about 1973. It's been a longstanding interest of the Canada West Foundation, which I am associated with right now. I want to stress that this is not a Canada West Foundation position. As an organization we do not have a formal position on either the bill or Senate reform itself.

I also want to stress by way of preamble that I am a political scientist by training, not a constitutional lawyer. That doesn't mean I don't have constitutional opinions, but they are based more on political instincts than legal training.

My notes will be available to the committee once translation has been completed, perhaps by the end of the week. I will speak to them fairly briefly at this point, and of course will be happy to answer any questions.

Let me set the stage for my remarks by emphasizing the importance of context for Bill C-20. The context that's important to me is the Government of Canada's commitment to pursuing comprehensive Senate reform. It's only within that context that Bill C-20 makes sense, and I'll come back to this in the bulk of my comments.

In the written draft I go through the case for Senate reform in a general sense. I won't repeat the details of that, because these arguments will be well known to the committee. I'll just mention the three points that are highlighted. One is the need for more effective regional representation. The second is to have a counterweight to majority governments in the House of Commons. Parliamentary government tends to concentrate power, and the Senate provides at least the possibility of a counterweight, in a sense.

The third argument is really a democratic argument. The language I would use is that of environmentalism: that the Canadian Senate is not sustainable for the long run. I would stress that although my original interest in this topic came from failures in regional representation, to my mind now the most compelling argument for Senate reform is for democratic renewal. I think the arguments for regional representation are still important, but they're not as compelling to me as the need for democratic renewal.

Although the power of the arguments for Senate reform has grown over time, we've made no progress in reforming a 19th century institution so it can better take on the challenges of the 21st century. We are spinning our wheels while the world changes around us.

In thinking about this, it seems to me we're faced with two options. We can wait until the Senate implodes in some crisis of democratic legitimacy, some major conflict with the House of Commons; or we can try to re-engineer the Senate to bring it more into line with liberal, democratic values. To my mind at least, to do nothing only postpones the inevitable. We've passed down the status quo to our children and our grandchildren in an irresponsible fashion. The image of the Senate that comes to my mind is that of an institution cobbled together 141 years ago and now frozen in time like an insect trapped in amber.

So where does this lead me with respect to Bill C-20? My comments here are pretty straightforward. I think Bill C-20 is a reasonable step forward. It's consistent with federal states, such as Australia and the United States. It's consistent with even the most rudimentary understanding of democratic government. It's consistent with recent public opinion polling and Canadian values.

I recognize that Bill C-20 does not take us very far along the path to comprehensive Senate reform, and you're aware of the things it doesn't touch. It doesn't touch a whole bunch of things about the Senate. So it's not a final destination, it's only a small first step, but it is a first step, and it does show that incremental reform is possible.

For years Canadians have been told that Senate reform may be desirable, but it must be approached comprehensively rather than incrementally. We're then told that comprehensive reform requires constitutional amendment, and that constitutional amendment is impossible, and therefore Senate reform is impossible.

So we have a neat and tidy circular argument from which the perfect becomes the enemy of the good. We're told that any incremental reform, even a small step, is to be shunned in case we are pushed onto the slippery slope of constitutional reform. To my mind this has fostered a somewhat dishonest public debate, because if everyone lines up in favour of Senate reform it just divides those people who say it's really desirable but can't be done from those people who argue for incremental reform, and I'm certainly in that latter group.

Concern has been raised that Bill C-20 might turn out to be the final destination, that it might not only be the first step but the last step, and therefore the election or selection of senators could lock into place the existing regional distribution of Senate seats and the legislative powers of the Senate. I think this concern rests on the assumption that newly elected senators would be even more resistant to change than the existing senators. I don't accept that argument. I think the existing senators have set the bar for resistance extremely high, and I can't imagine any combination of elected or appointed senators who would be more resistant than the status quo.

I do admit, and I think this is a critical point, that the changes proposed by Bill C-20 would leave us with a bit of a dog's breakfast in terms of the Senate. But I see this as a virtue of the bill rather than a fatal flaw. The bill would destabilize the status quo and therefore force Canadians to come to grips with the design of a modernized and democratic upper house. The process has to start somewhere, and Bill C-20 sets out a reasonable starting point. I do believe the modest changes today make it more likely that we'll be able to generate the political will to confront more substantive changes tomorrow. If we begin chipping away at the status quo, we can set in motion the political dynamics that will enable us to carry the process forward.

I recognize that Bill C-20 pushes the envelope of constitutionality, although the constitutional constraints are at best unknown in the context of a living-tree Constitution. We know the Constitution is unfolding over time. We know the courts are not bound by the black letter of the law. We saw this in the way in which courts have progressively expanded the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In any event, I stress I'm not a constitutional lawyer, but perhaps because of that I'm unwilling to dump the whole issue of Senate reform into the lap of courts, who, in my view, are not well equipped to deal with what is ultimately a political question. The democratization of parliamentary institutions and the design of an effective regional representation are not fundamentally legal questions; they are political questions.

In a similar fashion, some would argue we should not proceed without first securing provincial support. However, I'm reluctant to concede that the design of national parliamentary institutions should rest with provincial governments. I do not believe the federation should be decentralized to the point where provincial governments can, in their own interests, pre-empt the democratic reform of national parliamentary institutions. Nor do I believe the potential opposition in provincial governments to Senate reform necessarily reflects the desire of provincial populations, and it's those provincial populations we want to represent.

I'll just draw your attention to a useful analogy to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Many of the provincial governments were initially resistant to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Government of Canada proceeded, and it turned out the provincial populations were overwhelmingly in support of this and the provincial governments caved.

If Bill C-20 gets the ball rolling with respect to Senate reform, what might the next steps be?

I'll end with this set of points. We are confronting a major problem. We don't have an acceptable model of what a comprehensively reformed Senate might look like. We simply don't have something we can pull off the shelves.

My organization has been associated with the triple-E model. I think the triple-E model is increasingly shopworn, and I think it now lacks relevance to the country we are becoming.

It's not a surprise to me that we don't have an acceptable or consensual model of what a reformed Senate might look like. We've devoted so much of our intellectual energy to blocking Senate reform that we've had very little left over to think through what a reformed Senate might look like.

If we're able to move forward, we have to figure out an appropriate form of election. If we don't get the election format right, we can dig ourselves into very serious trouble. We need a formula for regional representation that captures the complexity of this country and figures out how to deal with a very unequal distribution of population across provinces. We have to figure out how to work the sparsely populated northern territories into a reformed Senate.

We have to think through how we can have non-territorial representation in the Senate—how we can have an electoral system that ensures, for example, that the aboriginal population of Saskatchewan, the Acadians in New Brunswick, or the Liberals in Alberta are represented in some way within the Senate.

We haven't worked out what the impact of a reformed Senate might be on the House of Commons. I think Senate reform would set in motion some fairly fundamental reforms within the House of Commons, including a move to finally have full representation by population within the House of Commons.

I'm happy to discuss this at length, because you're the only group I can discuss it at length with. I believe that if we can get it right, we can create a Senate that will be a truly national legislature, reflecting not only regional diversity but also diversity within provincial communities. If we get the design details wrong, however, we could make a bad situation worse.

Some argue that we should stop until we have everything figured out, but past experience shows that Canadians will not even begin to tackle these critical design questions until the Senate reform train leaves the station. If we do not build on the momentum that Bill C-20 will create, nothing will happen. There must be a stimulus to creative thought, and this is what Bill C-20 provides.

To conclude, some would argue that we should be cautious, that we should wait for the premiers to fall into line or wait for the courts to chart a path forward. However, we have been cautious, excessively cautious, for generations, and nothing has happened. Nothing has happened for 141 years.

In quoting from the bill, I would argue that the Parliament of Canada has a primary responsibility to ensure “that Canada’s representative institutions, including the Senate, continue to evolve in accordance with the principles of modern democracy and the expectations of Canadians”. The abdication of this responsibility by Parliament will inflict serious damage on the very fabric of democratic political life in Canada.

Thank you. I'd be happy to respond to any questions you might have.

[Yvon Lévesque, Bloc, Abitibi—Baie-James—Nunavik—Eeyou, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you, gentlemen, for having given us your expertise and for having travelled here to do so. Thank you also, Mr. Simeon, for making yourself available.

I have several questions, all of equal weight. Parliament should sit in your class for a week to get a clear idea of the factors involved in passing the bill as it is presented.

Among other things, the House of Commons is being compared to the upper house, or the Senate. The Senate is called the upper house precisely because, I believe, in the spirit of the conventions and the law...

Might the Supreme Court be tempted to consider the spirit of the conventions if it were to decide on the legitimacy of a bill like this?

If we compare Bill C-20 to Bill C-19, which has also been brought forward, do we not automatically have to open the Constitution? But there is one major change. To my knowledge, no negotiations have taken place with the provinces. We are moving towards an upper house with powers not greater than but equal to the powers of the House of Commons. At the same time, we are exposing senators to the pressures of civil society, the same pressures that members of Parliament are under today. In that context, the quality of decision-making in the Senate... Doubts start to creep in. Mr. Simeon and Mr. Heard spoke about that too.

I would like to hear your comments.

[Jay Hill, Conservative, Prince George—Peace River, BC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I just want to perhaps pick up on where Mr. Simeon left off a couple of seconds ago.

One of the things that really frustrates me, maybe a bit more because I'm a westerner, has been this whole defence of the status quo in particular by the Liberal Party of Canada over my political lifetime—I've been here almost 15 years now—by both Prime Ministers Chrétien and Martin, where every suggestion that was made to make any change to the status quo situation of the Senate of Canada was met by, “We're not going to do anything piecemeal”. That was their standard response in question period, in interviews, every time they were asked during debate, during election campaigns. In other words, it kind of fits in with what Mr. Watts is suggesting, which is that if we want to bring about meaningful Senate reform, the only way to do it is to open up the Constitution and do it “properly”.

I can tell you that this is very frustrating for vast numbers of Canadians, I believe, who want to see our institutions evolve somewhat. I think what we have to deal with sometimes is what is within the realm of the possible. I think that's what Bill C-20 is dealing with--what is possible.

I don't have in front of me today the full list of how many times over the last 100-plus years successive governments and parliaments and scholars have tried to initiate some substantive constitutional change to the Senate, but I think all of us would agree, as would anybody who's taken even a superficial look at it, that it's been an extraordinarily frustrating exercise to go through, and that's even with the people who are still alive that have gone through that, whether it was the Charlottetown accord that led to the referendum, or before that the Meech Lake accord, which are the two in recent memory.

My understanding--and this is where I would look for some direction from the three gentlemen--is that even in the United States, their elected Senate evolved in a piecemeal fashion, if I can call it that. My understanding, at least, is that the individual states began to elect their senators. Over a period of time, and as Mr. Simeon was trying to indicate, I believe it gradually evolved to become the norm, as opposed to appointment. Eventually, it created enough of a groundswell from the public that it became the accepted standard, and they ended up with a fully elected Senate south of the border.

I would ask the learned gentlemen if they could point to other democracies in which Senate reform came about in a piecemeal manner. It started slowly and grew as public pressure said, well, maybe there is a better way to do this.

[Pierre Paquette, Bloc, Joliette, QC]

Thank you.

The possibility has been raised that the regions of Canada could use the legislative provision that was passed after the Quebec referendum of 1995, that is, the right of veto. Quebec, which has already come out squarely against Bill C-20, would have the right to veto it because of the legislation passed after the 1995 referendum.

What do you think?

[Prof. Ronald Watts]

Your statement is exactly what I've been trying to argue— that Bill C-20 is an example of Parliament's trying to do indirectly what it can't do directly. My argument is that if an institution as fundamental as the Senate is going to be altered, we ought to do it directly. I think it needs to be done, but I think it ought to be done directly, difficult as that may be. Richard is right in pointing to the difficulties, but just because it's difficult doesn't mean we should be devious about it. The difficulties are inserted in the amendment process of the Constitution to ensure a broad consensus in support of amendment. That's why it's important to have the provinces concur. That's why it's important to have widespread public discussion.

My concern is not with the objective of the bill, but with the means. And I don't think the objective justifies the means.

[Prof. Ronald Watts]

I will be brief on this. I don't have anything to add on the second question, other than the fact that it does point to one of the reasons we have the process of constitutional amendment that we do, requiring provincial participation in the process.

With regard to the first, I'm assuming that the reason it's not necessary or has not been put into the bill to state whether the Prime Minister has obligations or not is simply the assumption that once you have the electoral process operating, public pressure will force the Prime Minister to follow the expression of public will. In other words, the assumption, I think, in Bill C-20 as it's currently worded, for all the criticisms I make, is that public pressure will create the convention that a Prime Minister will always have to follow whoever is nominated by the consultative process.

[Raymonde Folco, Liberal, Laval—Les Îles, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I would like to thank all three of you for being here. Your knowledge of and insight into the Constitution and the bill we are considering today are distinguished indeed.

I have two major questions to ask you. The first deals with executive power in relation to the appointment of the people winning the elections. Nowhere in Bill C-20 does it say that the Prime Minister is required to appoint the people who have been elected by popular vote. He may, at his discretion, submit the list to the Governor General. So he could choose half of the people on the list, or more, or none, or give the Governor General a list of people who have not been elected by popular vote.

This bill does not affect the Constitution and could therefore be passed like an ordinary bill. Why does it not give more details about the Prime Minister's responsibility vis-à-vis that list? That is my first question.

My second question deals with the power of the provinces. I think that it was Mr. Heard who told us, and let me read his last sentence:

...the Senate is not something for the national Parliament to radically reform without the consent of the provinces.”

However, we know that the way in which senators currently represent their provinces is not the same in all provinces of Canada. For example, in Quebec, senators represent a specific region, which is not the case in the other provinces. How can we change the role, the appointment process and the responsibilities of senators without asking the Government of Quebec for its position on the matter?

The questions go to whichever of the three witnesses wants to reply.

[Professor Richard Simeon, Professor, University of Toronto and Harvard University, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. It's certainly a privilege to be able to testify before this committee, and I thank you very much for the opportunity. I also apologize to you and to my colleagues present that the press of commitments means I have to talk to you via video.

I confess that I am deeply ambivalent about Bill C-20 as well and about how to respond to it. I share most of the concerns that have been raised by my colleagues, but I think I do perhaps come down at a slightly different point.

There is much to be said in favour of Bill C-20, I think. After decades of frustration in our debates about Senate reform, it does break a logjam and opens the possibility of real change without plunging us into yet another round of failed constitutional negotiations. It does bring an element of real democracy into the process of selecting senators, thus potentially making the Senate more representative, responsive, and accountable.

It promises a check on the excessive concentration of the power of appointment in the hands of the Prime Minister—a major part of the democratic deficit in Canada and the fundamental reason for the weakness of the Senate as an effective body representing regional and provincial interests in central institutions.

It creates the possibility of a Senate that is perhaps more effectively able to represent provincial voices in the federal Parliament. Professor Watts referred to Tom Kent's argument, and I think I agree with him that the legitimacy of the central government will be enhanced by election, and that will place some sort of potential check on the ability of premiers to have a monopoly of representing the provincial views on national issues. I think that would make for a healthy federalism.

So there are some good things to be said here, but of course I have some real doubts about Bill C-20 as well, and they are partly procedural and partly substantive.

First, on procedure, there are several elements here. The two reforms under discussion, consultative elections and a fixed term for senators, are a very limited second best to more fundamental reform. I realize the scope of the bills is sharply limited by the government's desire to find a way to make changes by Parliament alone, rather than through formal constitutional amendment.

But the cost of that is that a full review of the Senate, as Professor Watts said—one that would include the roles and powers of the Senate and the allocation of seats across provinces—will not take place. And yet all these factors are linked and need to work together. For example, do we want to enhance the power of the Senate, as this bill likely does, without addressing the gross underrepresentation of western provinces in Senate seats?

Second, we have not had a full public discussion about Senate reform here. There's been virtually no public involvement in this process, even though over the years many imaginative proposals for different kinds of reform of the Senate have been made.

In addition, as has been pointed out, the Senate is a vital element in federalism, so the lack of intergovernmental consultation here is a problem. A number of provinces, including a unanimous Quebec legislature, have objected to the bill. Several provinces already have or are considering their own legislation to generate potential Senate nominees. Indeed, I think that suggests an interesting alternative avenue that we might explore.

What if all provinces were to hold elections for nominees, the results of which would be submitted to the Prime Minister? He would retain his constitutional discretion over appointments and could ignore the result if he felt the provincial processes were undemocratic, but it seems to me a way to achieve a lot of what's intended here without raising quite the same constitutional difficulty that this bill does.

The federalism perspective casts another light on the issue of the constitutionality of Bill C-20. I do defer to those legal experts, such as Peter Hogg and Patrick Monahan, who have told you that the bill is drafted narrowly enough that formal amendment is not necessary, but even they admit we could easily find ourselves in a constitutional grey area, especially if the bill is strengthened.

But the reason we require the amendment for major change in the Senate is that the interests of provinces are so deeply engaged. Whether or not this bill is constitutional in the large “C” sense of that word, it does suggest, as has been pointed out, a new set of rules that could in the long run significantly affect the role and powers of the Senate and thus would be a change in our operating or conventional Constitution, with potentially important implications for federalism.

So, yes, there are real procedural problems.

Next I'll make some observations on the substance of the bill.

Perhaps the most troubling aspect for me is its uncertain character: the government may or may not decide to hold a consultative election; it may or may not decide to appoint those who have won the election; elections may be held in some provinces and not in others.

It seems to me that if we are to have Senate elections, let's do it. They should take place everywhere. The results should be binding, and so on. It would be a major confusion for citizens if, whenever there was a vacancy, they were unsure about whether there would be a vote and what its effects would be. It also seems odd that we would legislate the complex and detailed rules set out in the legislation and mobilize all the resources of Elections Canada to manage an election whose status and effect are unclear.

Second, I raise the question of when senatorial elections would be held. The bill contemplates holding them at the time of either a federal or a provincial election. The Chief Electoral Officer has argued persuasively that coordinating with provincial election law could be very complicated, so it's most likely that senatorial elections would coincide with federal elections, but there are problems with that: the likelihood is that the Senate election would be lost or drowned in the broader focus on the general election; Senate election results would be driven by the preoccupations of the national parties; and it would be difficult to keep funding and other activities of the Senate apart from general elections.

It would be far better, I believe, to conduct Senate elections separately, on fixed dates. Perhaps one day every two years could be set aside as Senate election day, with elections held for all vacant Senate seats on that day. That would make it simpler to administer, it would reduce partisanship, at least somewhat, and it would provide provincial electorates with a much greater ability to reflect on how they wish their interests to be represented in Ottawa.

I also have a word or two about the single transferable vote system that is provided here, but I don't want to say much about that because I'm running out of time. Let me just say that if we're going to introduce two major sets of changes--a change to the electoral system and fundamental changes to the Senate--then we should realize that an enormous public education process is necessary here. We've had two failed referendums about electoral reform in Ontario and B.C., and that's partly because in neither case was there proper provision for an educational process.

There are a number of other issues. The funding provisions are unclear, and campaigning will be expensive, so it's unclear why political parties can contribute services but not direct funding, or why there are no direct limits on direct contributions to candidates, which is different from other elections. And should there not be some form of public subsidy for senatorial election candidates? These kinds of questions all have a bearing on whether and how much we want Senate elections to be inoculated against party influence, and indeed how seriously we take these elections. Much clarification is necessary.

The most important question is, of course, what the effects of the changes would be in the very long run. Political scientists and constitutional designers have a very poor track record in predicting the consequences of institutional change, but clearly, as has been said, this is pretty fundamental. Once the system is in place and accepted, the Senate would have far more legitimacy, and hence influence, than it has at present. It would be a significant alternative centre of power, especially since its powers would remain intact. We might say that the House of Commons would remain the confidence House, with the power to make and unmake governments, but that's a convention, and it could easily change with a more legitimate Senate. However, I'm not sure that these doubts and uncertainties about the long-term future should stop us from doing something now to get this ball rolling.

Let me conclude by saying that I do not love this bill. I see it as an incremental ad hoc effort whose main outlines are shaped by the desire to make some change without falling into the pit of constitutional change. One certainly might argue that we should have the larger debate, even if it does take a long time; after all, there's no outcry in the streets for urgent reform, no crisis calling out for action, and so on.

Nevertheless, on balance, I would say, despite my misgivings and my preference for an alternative route, let us make this change but with a few alterations. I would like to see the following happen: that the bill be strengthened in some of the ways I've already suggested; that elections be held in all provinces, for all senatorial appointments; that they be honoured by the Prime Minister; and that there be an election day, and so on.

I realize that such strengthening might well tip this over into a change that does require formal amendment. Perhaps the best way would be to strengthen the bill in the Commons; seek a Supreme Court reference on its constitutionality; and see where it does or it does not transgress the amendment procedures. Then the court would be able to clarify for the House the scope and limits of what Parliament can do unilaterally and thus guide the final debate on this bill.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

[Prof. Andrew Heard, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University, As an Individual]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

First of all, I would like to thank you for inviting me. It is a pleasure and an honour to be here today.

Bill C-20 represents a novel attempt at Senate reform that deserves substantial attention. Unfortunately, unlike many bills before Parliament, serious questions arise about whether this piece of legislation is within the legislative powers of Parliament. On balance, I'm persuaded by the argument that Bill C-20 is unconstitutional.

It can be readily agreed that Bill C-20 does not alter any provisions of the Constitution Act. Bill C-20 directly conflicts, however, with the Constitution Act, 1867, in specific details relating to the qualification of senators. These conflicts relate to citizenship, residency, and financial assets. While these conflicts are substantive, they could and should be easily corrected.

On the broader details of the election of nominees, however, there are no substantial conflicts with the wording of the relevant constitutional provisions. However, the constitutional validity of legislation hinges on much more than the absence of manifest conflicts between the wording of an act and that of the Constitution. Fatal conflicts can also involve a clash with judicial interpretations of the substantive content of constitutional provisions.

Potential problems for Bill C-20 arise principally from the Supreme Court of Canada’s opinion in the upper house reference. The court held unanimously that Parliament could not alter any “essential characteristics” of the Senate, and neither could Parliament legislate direct elections for the Senate.

When the Supreme Court examined the issues in the upper house reference, the relevant powers of Parliament were then found in subsection 91(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867. This section declared that Parliament could amend the Constitution of Canada with five exceptions. Read literally, subsection 91(1) appeared at the time to have granted power to Parliament to alter or abolish the Senate, because the Senate is not mentioned in the five exceptions to Parliament’s unilateral powers. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the essential characteristics of the Senate were beyond the powers of Parliament.

Several legal authorities have argued that the repeal of subsection 91(1) and its replacement by section 44 of the Constitution Act, 1982, have rendered the upper house reference moot. It is not clear, however, why this should be so. The essential characteristics referred to by the court that required protection were not mentioned in subsection 91(1). Indeed, they were read into or drawn from the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867. These characteristics were not changed by the enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982.

Furthermore, the limitations on Parliament’s power to legislate on the Senate were read into subsection 91(1) by the court when no such restrictions were present. The new unilateral amending powers of Parliament found in section 44 now contain several explicit prohibitions against Parliament acting unilaterally to pass amendments relating to the Senate, including the method of selecting senators mentioned in paragraph 42(1)(b). Rather than consigning the upper house reference to the dustbin, the constitutional changes in 1982 appear to actually reinforce that decision.

The ultimate question that must be resolved is whether the indirect nature of the popular consultation process does in fact save Bill C-20. Clearly, legislation to institute direct elections would run afoul of the upper house reference and paragraph 92(1)(b) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The answer to this question hinges on how literal an approach one takes to constitutional jurisprudence. Some argue that Bill C-20 is constitutional because of the absence of a direct conflict with the legal powers and discretion of the Governor General in sections 24 and 32 of the Constitution Act, 1867. However, there is considerable evidence that the Supreme Court of Canada would not take such a literal, black-letter approach. The history of Bill C-20 and its predecessor, C-43, clearly shows that the pith and substance of the bill is to achieve an elected Senate.

When trying to establish the true nature of legislation, the courts often ask what deficiency the legislature is trying to remedy. In the case of Bill C-20, numerous government statements plainly declare that the problem they wish to address is the unelected nature of the Senate.

It is the government's intention that only those individuals chosen by the electorate will take seats in the Senate. In essence, the remedy provided by Bill C-20 could not be any different than if direct elections were instituted.

Bill C-20 does contain legal discretion on two key matters, which supporters of the measures say are crucial to its constitutionality. There is no obligation—no legal obligation on a government—to hold an election for Senate nominees, and there is no legal obligation to appoint any nominee once they have been declared winners. One can point to the history of senatorial elections in Alberta for evidence that future governments might exercise discretion not to recommend that the Governor General select elected nominees for the Senate. Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin ignored the winners of Alberta's senatorial elections for eight Senate appointments between 1996 and 2005.

However, Prime Ministers may well not be able to ignore Bill C-20 once enacted. First of all, it makes a tremendous difference that this election process would be enacted by the Parliament of Canada and not by a provincial legislature venturing out of its legislative domain. Secondly, a question arises as to how the courts would react to a suit brought by a nominee elected under the Bill C-20 process but overlooked for Senate appointment. Clearly, in my view, the courts would not issue a writ of mandamus requiring the Governor General to appoint the nominee; there simply is no legal obligation under Bill C-20 to enforce.

However, there is every likelihood that the courts would not leave the matter there. In the Quebec secession reference, the Supreme Court could have simply stated that Quebec does not have the right to secession under either Canadian or international law. Instead, the court went on to declare that the Government of Canada would have a moral obligation to negotiate separation if a clear majority of Quebec voters had agreed to separation in a clearly worded referendum. In the patriation reference, the Supreme Court also could have simply said that the federal government can, in law, unilaterally request changes to the Constitution that affect provincial powers, but it went on to declare that substantial provincial consent was required by convention. Thus it is highly probably that the Supreme Court of Canada would also comment on the government's political obligations to respect the people's wishes under the Bill C-20 regime.

It would be all but impossible for a government to ignore the clear wishes of the people in a nominee election process conducted with all the seriousness and substance of a regular election for members of the House of Commons. If Bill C-20 were enacted, it would not take long for a constitutional convention to be established that prime ministers should only recommend elected nominees for selection to the Senate. The democratic principle would impose a moral and political obligation from the outset. In the end, then, the theoretical discretion left to the Prime Minister and the Governor General in Bill C-20 may quickly prove to be a mirage.

In conclusion, for all intents and purposes, Bill C-20 creates an electoral process to transform the Senate from an appointed body into an elected chamber. Bill C-20 represents an attempt to radically alter the essential characteristics of the Senate as it was created and has operated since 1867. The chosen method for this drastic reformulation is also intended to exclude the provincial governments, whose consent would be required if this reform were proposed through a formal amendment. The Senate was a foundational institution in Confederation, over which considerable debate was expended in order to create this country.

In 1982, the first ministers agreed that amendments to the powers and methods of selecting senators should only be done through the general amending formula. As such, the Senate is not something for the national Parliament to radically reform without the consent of the provinces.

Thank you.

[Professor Ronald Watts, Professor Emeritus of Political Studies, Principal Emeritus, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University, As an Individual]

Madam Chair, let me express my appreciation for this invitation to present my views on Bill C-20.

l wish to draw attention to two concerns about Bill C-20 in its present form. The first has to do with the legislative procedure, and the second with the lack of context in terms of the relation of the selection process to the character, functions, and role of the Senate within Parliament.

Turning to the first, the first concern relates to the use of ordinary legislation to effect what is, in substance, a constitutional amendment. The explicit objective outlined in the preamble to Bill C-20 appears to be to replace patronage in the appointment of senators by a more democratic electoral element in the process of selection. Bill C-20 indeed appears to have been very carefully crafted to create a procedure that neither contradicts nor purports legally to alter in any way the Governor General's power of appointment or the Prime Minister's right of advising the Governor General.

But it violates the spirit of the Constitution Act, 1982, which explicitly states in subsection 42(1) that an amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to the following matters may be made only in accordance with subsection 38(1), and specifically lists the powers of the Senate and the method of appointing senators in paragraph 42(1)(b).

Subsection 38(1) requires not only a resolution of the Senate and House of Commons for such amendments, but resolutions in two-thirds of the provinces that have, in aggregate, at least 50% of the population of all provinces.

The purpose of this amendment procedure, outlined in subsection 38(1), is to ensure a broad consensus for amendments to the basic features of our constitutional structure. Difficult as this may make amendments, nevertheless, this requirement is fundamental to Canadian federal democracy. The effort to avoid this procedure by reforming the Senate on the sly through the devious use of ordinary legislation constitutes, in my view, an anti-constitutional process. It purports to seek a democratic objective by resorting to a non-constitutional and hence ultimately anti-democratic process.

The Supreme Court, in 1978, declared that, “To make the Senate a wholly or partially elected body would affect a fundamental feature of that body”, and the Supreme Court went on to give clear and unanimous guidance that Parliament could not unilaterally alter “the fundamental features or essential characteristics of the Senate”. No matter how democratic the objectives of Bill C-20 may be, and no matter how difficult the process of constitutional amendment may be, those objectives should be pursued by the appropriate constitutional process, rather than in the devious manner proposed by Bill C-20.

A second concern arises from the proposal in Bill C-20 to alter the appointment process for senators without relating these alterations to the broader context of the role, representative basis, functions, and powers of the Senate as a part of the parliamentary structure. Any reform of the Senate must take account of three factors that are in fact interrelated: the representation of the regions and provinces, the mode of possible election, and the powers of the second chamber.

To consider just one of these aspects--without its relation to the others--by a piece of discrete legislation is likely to create unintended consequences in the relationship between the Senate and the House of Commons. For instance, if the current powers of the Senate--equal to those of the House of Commons except for the introduction of money bills--remain for a Senate whose members gain the legitimacy of an electoral base, this could produce a serious challenge to the principle of House of Commons primacy and of cabinets responsible to it.

It is no accident that in virtually all federations with parliamentary institutions elsewhere, even in those parliamentary federations with relatively strong second chambers such as Australia and Germany, the constitutional powers of the second chamber have been more limited. It is only in federations with separated executives and legislatures, not parliamentary ones, such as in presidential congressional systems, that equally powerful second chambers have proved sustainable. Furthermore, of the seven federations in which all the members of the second chamber are directly elected, only Australia is parliamentary in form. In other parliamentary federations elsewhere, other than Canada--some eight of them--most rely on election by state legislators, appointment by state governments, or by a mixture of processes.

In Canada, despite the almost equal formal constitutional powers of the Senate in practice, its lack of electoral legitimacy has induced senators generally to play a secondary role on most occasions, because of the democratic legitimacy accruing to the House of Commons. That raises the question, would a Senate composed of ambitious politicians with what becomes an electoral base, and with their individual importance enhanced by a smaller chamber than the House of Commons, willingly eschew exercising their full constitutional powers? There's a very real risk that senators with an electoral mandate, even if provided indirectly by legislation but without modification of the current formal powers, would exercise those powers that they have not dared to exercise in defiance of the House of Commons when they were clearly unelected.

Here we might note our pre-Confederation history in the united Canadas. In 1856, with John A. Macdonald's support, an elected second chamber was adopted. But after eight years of its assertiveness complicating the operation of responsible government, Macdonald admitted publicly that the elective system did not, and I quote, “fully succeed in Canada as we had expected”. Consequently, in 1864 it was he who introduced into the conference at Quebec the resolution for appointed members of the Senate.

Does this mean that I support the status quo and am opposed to the reform of the Senate? Not at all. First of all, my own comparative study of some 25 federations throughout the world has convinced me of the importance of an effective federal second chamber toward making a federation effective, including parliamentary federations.

To those in Canada who would argue for abolition of the Senate, I would point out that of 25 federations in the world, only five do not have federal second chambers. These are: the United Arab Emirates; Venezuela; and three small island federations, each with less than one million in total population, of Comoros, Micronesia, and St. Kitts and Nevis. Virtually all the other federations, although in varied forms, have found a federal second chamber desirable and necessary for at least two functions: legislative review, and the inclusion of distinctively regional views in the federal decision-making process.

For information on this federal experience elsewhere, I am leaving with the clerk of the committee copies of a recent paper of mine entitled “Federal Second Chambers Compared”, which will lay out in much more detail the experience of other federations in relation to second chambers.

As far as the function of independent legislative review and related activities are concerned, such as investigative reports, the Canadian Senate has in fact, as pointed out in many of the contributions to the book edited by Serge Joyal entitled Protecting Canadian Democracy, provided a very useful complement to the House of Commons. Indeed, individual senators such as, to name a few, Hugh Segal, Lowell Murray, and Michael Kirby have made a superb contribution to the work of Parliament.

But as to the second major function of second chambers in federations generally--that is, providing a channel for the involvement of distinctly regional viewpoints in policy-making within institutions at the federal level--the Canadian Senate's lack of political legitimacy has meant that by comparison with other federations it has fallen short of the functions performed by second chambers in most federations. These are the functions that Canadian political scientists have come to refer to as intra-state federalism.

That these functions are important was recognized by the Canadian Supreme Court when it declared, in 1978, and I quote:

The Senate has a vital role as an institution forming part of the federal system....

It went on to say:

Thus, the body which had been created as a means of protecting sectional and provincial interests was made a participant in this legislative process.

Given the current weakness of the Senate in performing this federal role, Senate reform, in my view, is important and urgent. Here I would draw attention to the paper by Tom Kent entitled “Senate Reform as a Risk to Take, Urgently” in the “Special Working Paper Series on Senate Reform 2007-2008” of the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations at Queen's University.

Reform is needed to make the federal coherence of Canada more effective. As one of the most decentralized federations in the world, we not only need provincial autonomy, but federal institutions that bring provincial views more inclusively into federal decision-making rather than depending solely on the processes of executive federalism.

To achieve this reform may require elections to the Senate by a different electoral process than that of the House of Commons, but also a more rational basis of representing regional and provincial interests and an adjustment of the Senate's constitutional powers to avoid deadlocks. One possibility is along the lines proposed in the Charlottetown agreement. This is not the place to go into that prescriptive detail.

Reform requires looking not only at the method of selecting senators, but relating this to the role, functions, and powers of the Senate within Parliament. While such full reform is urgent for the welfare of Canada as a federation, it will require constitutional amendment, difficult as that may be, to redefine not only the method of electing senators but also the basis of representation and powers of the Senate.

Piecemeal reform by stealth, unrelated to the broader functions of the Senate, such as proposed by Bill C-20, not only does not go far enough, but it is even risky and dangerous insofar as it does not take into account its likely effect upon the relative role and powers of the Senate.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Albina Guarnieri]

I call the meeting to order. Good morning, everyone and welcome to our witnesses.

Pursuant to the order of reference of Wednesday, February 3, 2008, the committee will resume its study of Bill C-20.

Today, we are fortunate to have three professors as witnesses.

Today we are joined by a delegation from Kingston, Ontario, the old capital of Upper Canada. We have Ronald Watts, professor emeritus at Queen's. He's a former director of the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations and president of the International Association of Centers for Federal Studies. As we all know, our federal system needs a lot of study these days, so welcome.

We have Richard Simeon, by way of video. Mr. Simeon was also a professor of political studies at Queen's and was director of both the school of public administration and the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations. Among his many national and international achievements is his publication, Small Worlds: Provinces and Parties in Canadian Political Life. We always say it's a small world here on the Hill, so we're fortunate to welcome Professor Simeon.

We have with us Andrew Heard, the author of many publications, including Canadian constitutional conventions: The marriage of law and politics. Of course, around here lately, the two have been on trial separation. Welcome.

Without further ado, we'll begin with Mr. Watts.

[John Whyte]

Madam Chair, with respect to Ms. Fry's concern about provincial objection, there would be the general concern that arises around the central accommodation of Canadian federalism being altered unilaterally.

The very specific concern is to remember that clause 13 of Bill C-20 allows for consultations to occur in the context of a provincial general election. One can imagine a province establishing a general election and having it, so to speak, hijacked by the federal Senate election—a bigger, louder, more weighty election than anything the poor province was trying to pull off. That would be unhappiness. We can predict provincial push-back on that very pragmatic basis as well as on the more theoretical basis.

As for a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada, I think one could just ask them the question: Is it within the legislative competence of the Parliament of Canada to enact legislation that establishes non-renewable term limits for senators and that bases appointments to the Senate on an electoral process taken prior to appointment? That would get to the heart of the issues we're discussing today, and they would give you an answer. It's precise enough, I think, and as I say gets to the heart of it.

[Charles-Emmanuel Côté]

If a decision were made to follow the recommendation made by the Canadian Bar Association, the main question would have to deal specifically with the constitutionality of Bills C-19 and C-20. If the questions were to be too abstract, there would be a risk that the Supreme Court might decide not to make a ruling. That is exactly what happened in the 1980 reference, when the Supreme Court refused to reply to a series of questions that it considered too abstract, and for which some factual evidence seemed to be lacking. In my opinion, the reference should deal more specifically with these specific bills.

[Hedy Fry, Liberal, Vancouver Centre, BC]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I always find it extremely interesting to listen to all the opinions we get from legal scholars, none of which seem to agree with each other in many instances.

That aside, we heard from Mr. Hogg, who very clearly fixated on the letter of the law. I found that interesting, because if you view the law as having a spirit--and courts tend to interpret the law as not based purely on the letter, but on the spirit--then the problem here is that if the provinces were to be involved, or if they were not to be involved, to get around the provincial involvement you wouldn't have to challenge the Constitution. Therefore, this is doing that. This is suggesting that.... We're speaking about certain elements of politics, but you have to bring politics into the issue because it is changing a major institution and the way it functions.

The politics of the thing would say that we do not have to listen to the voter. I am using the voter as an advisory committee, so to speak. Now, provinces may get very involved in an election and therefore may not approve of the fact that this bill is not transparent and seeks to get around the Constitution by stealth--some may think it's a good thing and others may not, as you have all rightly pointed out--and therefore provinces may challenge the validity of the election, the validity of the way the selection occurred, and you could have all this debate and argument that could create a huge firestorm in this country. Is that what we really want?

A bill should be transparent. It should say not only what it wants to do in letter but also what it wishes to do in terms of recognizing the spirit of the law.

Given that on July 20, 2006, the Council of the Federation issued a communiqué endorsed by all provinces and territories and asserting the principle that the Council of the Federation must be involved in any discussion on changes to important features of key Canadian institutions such as the Senate and the Supreme Court, and given that this is not being done because there is no consultation, then we could face that as well; the provinces will feel they were slighted, and so will the Council of the Federation. That's a very recent decision.

The Canadian Bar Association made a suggestion. I would like to know what you think of the suggestion, and if you think it's a good idea, what questions would you put? They suggested that Bill C-20 go to the Supreme Court for the Supreme Court to decide whether it is constitutionally valid according to the spirit and the letter of the Constitution. If you think that should be done and if governments are transparent they would have no problem doing that because then they would be proven to be right or accept that they are wrong, what are the questions you would pose to the Supreme Court?

[John Whyte]

This is fairly technical.

I think that this present bill creates a selection process for senators that when implemented will not be able to sustain the constitutional commitment in section 22 of the 1867 act that the senators either hold property or reside in the appropriate one of the 24 electoral regions of Quebec. If it cannot sustain that provision, then Bill C-20 is effecting an amendment of a term of a Constitution that applies to one or more provinces but not all provinces and therefore triggers the requirement of bilateral consent. It seems to me highly arguable that Bill C-20 is not valid unless the Province of Quebec consents.

Now, it could be argued that the exercise of appointing senators under Bill C-20 in the case of Quebec will be constrained less by the election and more by the section 22 requirement that the senator hold property or reside in the appropriate district. But as I said in my initial submission, that's going to be a fairly unattractive position for Canada to be in: where elections determine who is a senator for most provinces except Quebec, where the elections count for little.

I think that Quebec in this particular amendment is in a very strong legal position if it wishes to. It may not. In a more general Senate reform process, almost any reform we can think of will abandon that really obsolete provision relating to the 24 electoral divisions and again would trigger section 43 giving requirement to a Quebec veto independent of the seven-and fifty formula.

I think that if we're going to deal with the Senate, we're going to deal with Quebec. And if we're going to deal with Quebec, we're going to deal with 1982. That challenge is what the country is facing.

[John Maloney, Liberal, Welland, ON]

I have a question.

We are considering Bill C-20 and we also have term limits in Bill C-19. Can we consider these bills separate unto themselves, or do we have to consider them in light of each other?

[John Whyte]

We absolutely could if we sat down and asked what we want our upper house to do. When you have bicameral legislatures, the first reason is to get a second thought. Sometimes it is structured so that you get a second sober thought, a less partisan thought. Finally, it normally has different representational goals from those of straight representation by population, including the representation of the vulnerable or minorities. Of course, all that could be structured.

By the way, the single transferable vote mechanism in Bill C-20 also could have some beneficial effects on diverse representation. It's hard to see exactly how, but it could. Proportional representation is generally thought to have some kind of beneficial effect on broader representation. That part of Bill C-20 could be a plus.

[John Maloney, Liberal, Welland, ON]

Bill C-20 today has come under significant criticism. Is there any way that you feel this bill could be massaged to make it constitutional and credible, or are we just stuck with the suggestion that the bill should be scrapped?

[John Whyte, Professor of Law, College of Law, Law Foundation of Saskatchwan, University of Saskatchewan, As an Individual]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I want to begin by saying that it is a great privilege to be invited to participate in the deliberations of a national government, and I thank you for this invitation.

There is no doubt that the composition of the Parliament of Canada is anomalous. It is unsuited to prevailing principles of political legitimacy. This unsuitability arises from the appointment, not the election, of members of one of the two legislative chambers in a bicameral legislative arrangement; that is, a legislative arrangement whereby each house has the right to veto legislation.

It might be a mistake, however, to see this situation as an acute derogation from the democratic principle as it is typically worked out in complex rule-of-law states. There are always competing statecraft considerations, some that make the appointment of senators tolerable in a democratic state.

First, senators are appointed by the government, and therefore appointments reflect majoritarian preferences. They hold office for life, so the Senate provides a forum less dominated by intense political rivalry that arises from imminent elections. In recognition of the higher democratic legitimacy of the Commons, the Senate is generally careful and restrained in its exercise of veto.

The purpose of the appointed Senate is to represent divisions, regional and provincial, that are less well reflected when there are closer party ties.

The function of the appointed chamber is to consider legislation on bases less partisan than those in the Commons, in which the defeat of a measure can trigger an election.

As Bill C-20 says, it is “a chamber of independent, sober second thought” and there is a good reason for it. Indeed, the composition of the Senate is anomalous, but it is not statecraft without good purposes. It is not something that a democracy like Canada cannot tolerate.

Nevertheless, the case for changing it in order to establish ongoing democratic accountability for legislative actions is strong. A democratic state is one in which popular approval of lawmakers is the norm.

But the changing of the Senate needs to be carefully considered. My friend Professor Mendes has already told you what he thinks are the possible downstream imperfections that are likely to be produced by this change and other changes.

Here are some sensible questions. If elections are not for a term, but until age 75, in what way is ongoing democratic accountability actually enhanced? If term appointments are for 15 years non-renewable, again how is accountability enhanced? Is not the basis on which senators are currently appointed their support by a political party? And is that not the same basis upon which we put people on a ballot for election? And is not the appointer of the senators the party that generates the most votes? And are those not exactly likely to be the senators who win in the consultation process? Are we actually changing anything?

If the Senate is designed to reduce partisanship in the consideration of legislative proposals, will the proposed electoral process undercut that aim? If the Senate is meant to reflect regional interests, will the force of party discipline and loyalty that is generated through elections diminish that purpose? If the fact of appointment of senators creates a restraint on the Senate to not normally frustrate the Commons, will this restraint disappear with electoral choice? Will the rules of responsible government collapse? Will the underlying requirement that a government must be able to achieve its legislative agenda disappear?

But as sensible as these concerns are, as appropriate as it is to worry about what we might be doing with Bill C-20, the bigger question is actually about process. In the past 22 months the nation has been faced with three government initiatives of major constitutional significance with respect to the basic structure of our national Parliament: the idea of term limits on Senate appointments; the refusal, except in one case since the formation of the current government, to fill Senate vacancies; and finally, the establishment of electoral consultations for the appointment of senators. Each of these initiatives presents serious questions concerning constitutionality.

I believe the first violates section 38 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The second clearly continues to violate by the day section 32 of the 1867 Constitution, where there is a mandatory requirement to appoint senators on vacancy. And the last, the one we're considering today, violates sections 42 and 38 of the 1982 Constitution.

Moreover, each alters or will alter the way Parliament works, the way the branches and agencies of the national government represent and reflect interests, the way that interests will be accommodated, and the way political relationships operate. All of these changes in the structure of government are occurring without analysis, debate, or choice among alternatives. We are experiencing an attempt to reconstitute the national Parliament in the absence of constitutional discourse. This makes sense, of course, if the government wishes to precipitate change, any change, but is indifferent to the effects of that change, notwithstanding the permanence of the changes that are being made.

One of the reasons we have a Constitution and a constitutional amending process is to force governments that simply wish things were otherwise not to unilaterally make changes without reasoned debate and the careful building of consent that is meant to be part and parcel of constitutional politics.

It may be that it is cumbersome or inconvenient to amend the Constitution to provide for an elected senate, but making it cumbersome and inconvenient to change a law or process is of course the purpose of putting that law or process into the Constitution in the first place. The inconvenience of changing the law is designed precisely to force us to have those inconvenient conversations that we might not otherwise have, except for the fact that for one reason or another our predecessors judged it was important that we do so.

In this case, we know the reason of our predecessors. It was part of the Confederation bargain with the existing political communities of Canada—an agreement, by the way, whose force and moral meaning in our nation is not spent. Our fidelity to the constitutional text and process dictates that we live with the determinations made by our predecessors. If we want to change Canada’s Parliament, we must engage in the constitutional processes set out in part V of the Constitution Act, 1982.

I don't want to be naive about this. Intergovernmental constitutional reform of the sort required by sections 38, 41, and 42 is likely to be held up by traditional demands: from Quebec, amendments that could produce Quebec’s consent to the 1982 Constitution; and possibly, through convention, from national aboriginal organizations demanding participation and inclusion in the reforms.

Of course, it might be even more difficult than we imagined. Any change to the Senate may well affect the provisions relating to Quebec alone, the ones relating to regional representation from within the province, and might not be satisfied merely by consent of a seven-and-fifty formula but would require Quebec's actual consent. I don't mean to minimize the difficulty.

This difficulty gives rise to the belief that there must be some route for legislated Senate reform. But there isn’t. We need to be nation enough to conduct these inconvenient discussions. We might benefit from them.

When I spoke to the Senate a year or so ago on Bill S-4, I said that the situation of general discomfort with the current Senate, the apparent small space available for unilateral constitutional amendment, the simple appeal to democratic values, and the mistaken popular sense that the Senate is not terribly significant in national governance have all worked to license constitutional reform that may be initially appealing but is being pursued, I think, irresponsibly.

Turning specifically to Bill C-20, the plan to seek electoral advice on whom to appoint to the Senate is quite simply a change in the method of appointing senators: the precise language of paragraph 42(1)(b) of the Constitution Act, 1982, the precise matter that is precluded from unilateral federal change.

There are four reasons legislative reform through Bill C-20 is constitutionally difficult.

First, paragraph 42(1)(b) talks of the ”selecting” of persons for appointment, not the means of appointment. The method of selection will now be that government will consider—and under the normal imperatives of electoral politics—only those who win elections to determine who should be selected for Senate appointment.

Is it not ironic that in seeking to justify this initiative to democratize the Senate, the reformers assert, and must assert, that they do not at all consider themselves to be bound by the democratic process they now so badly want?

Second, by section 32 of the Constitution Act, the discretion to determine who is fit and qualified to be appointed to the Senate is assigned to the federal cabinet--it says the Governor General, meaning the cabinet. Bill C-20 has constructed an electoral mechanism to advise the Senate as to who should be appointed.

A clear constitutional responsibility specifically assigned to a particular agency of government is to be eroded or constrained by another element of public government--the electors. In administrative law we say that the statutory decision-maker has declined its jurisdiction, or it has submitted to dictation from an external source, or it has fettered its discretion. These actions are all ultra vires.

Of course, it will be argued that the consultation process and its results will not curtail cabinet discretion, and that consultation is not designed to limit the list of those considered for appointment, but to add names to that list--one that also contains names not resulting from election.

If one reads Bill C-20 one will see it is not believable that consultation will not determine for the cabinet who is to be selected. The size of the process; the visibility of the process; the context of a federal general election and its heightened political engagement, in most cases; the political energy and the higher public attention paid to province-wide votes--bigger votes than any member would ever experience--all preclude the possibility of cabinets disregarding these electoral results.

The saving clause of Bill C-20, that this process is to ascertain the preferences of electors on appointments to the Senate “within the existing process of summoning senators”, does not save the bill’s constitutionality. Indeed, the precise process of summoning--orders in council--is not altered. It is the method of selecting senators for summoning that the government seeks to alter, and that is exactly what paragraph 42(1)(b) states must be accomplished by formal constitutional amendment.

Third, the electoral process in the bill does not satisfy the specific requirements relating to appointing senators from Quebec. Arguably, the cabinet could overlay the electoral process in the new act with the constitutional constraint that all Quebec appointments will match the electoral districts to be represented, but in province-wide elections this is not likely to be possible, barring, of course, the decision to simply ignore subsection 23(6) of the Constitution Act of 1867. In fact, that would have to happen, since Quebec would not tolerate a voting system that was not followed in Quebec alone.

There are other differences between Bill C-20 and the Constitution. There are differences relating to qualifications, citizenship, and age. There's the difference between section 32, which makes appointments mandatory, and Bill C-9, where it makes the convening of a consultation process discretionary. There are significant differences between the constitutional requirements and the process established by Bill C-20. This is not necessarily unconstitutional. In operation, the chances of its being unconstitutional are almost absolute, but it is not necessarily unconstitutional because it's possible that the administrators of Bill C-20 will ignore, in order to comply with the Constitution, all its provisions. This seems unlikely.

Finally, the Constitution is not a tax code. It requires fidelity to its structures, its relationships, its designs, and its principles. The proponents of the amendment have admitted that they are unable to institute an election process since they have taken what is obviously an election process, kept all its attributes, and then changed it to a “consultation”. Then, in the “whereas” clauses, they seek to deny both the purpose and the effect of the legislation. The process they call consultation is in fact an election in everything but name.

It would bring Parliament into disrepute, and it would do grave damage to the Constitution, to our constitutional commitments, and to the rule of law, if Parliament attempts an obvious and self-confessed sleight of hand to amend the Constitution in contravention of amending provisions.

[Prof. Errol Mendes, Professor, Constitutional and International Law, University of Ottawa, As an Individual]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I am going to present my ideas in English, however I would be glad to entertain your comments and respond to your questions in French. Thank you.

I suggest that Bill C-20, entitled the Senate Appointment Consultations Act, is giving a false impression to the regions of Canada, especially western Canada, that substantial democratic reforms are being attempted by the present government to do indirectly what cannot constitutionally be done directly under our Constitution. As many experts have pointed out, this act will entrench, enlarge, and enliven not the triple-E Senate that Bert Brown talks about, but the gross inequality of western Canada, the provinces, and indeed even Ontario in the Senate.

Let me explain further. The present distribution of seats in the Senate reflects the Canada of the 1860s. Due to the then population figures and the participation of the founding parts of Canada, the maritime provinces, Ontario, and Quebec each got 24 seats. Newfoundland, on joining Canada, got six seats. British Columbia, with a population now of four million, and rapidly growing, has six seats, while Nova Scotia, with a population of less than one million, has ten seats. Prince Edward Island, with four seats, has 21 times more power in the Senate than British Columbia, taking into account population. Alberta's growing population is also under-represented. Even Ontario may rightly feel unequal, as it has only 22% of the seats, but 40% of the population. However, this is expected of a federal government that attempts to deny Ontario's significant number of House of Commons seats under Bill C-22, which I have a lot to say about, given the opportunity and time.

So if the Prime Minister goes ahead with this major betrayal of the spirit of the triple-E Senate, or anything that vaguely resembles it, it would add to the democratic legitimacy of the inequality of western Canada. Indeed, any further attempts at constitutional change to redress the inequality could be blocked by the elected senators of the smaller provinces, in perpetuity.

In addition, the elected senators will rightly feel they have as much legitimacy as the elected members of the House of Commons to veto legislation, which again would put western Canada and Ontario at a disadvantage, not to mention the possibility of a gridlock. Bill C-20 has no provision on how to resolve an impasse between the two Houses. It is indeed astonishing that this could have been overlooked.

A disguised election for the Senate would be, in my view, an unconstitutional attempt to circumvent the express wording of section 42 of the Constitution Act, which clearly states that the general amending formula in subsection 38.(1)--namely the Parliament of Canada, plus two-thirds of the provinces, representing 50% of the population--applies to the powers of the Senate and the method of electing senators. In my view, Bill C-20 is an attempt to do indirectly what cannot be done directly without the clear instructions of section 42. It is patently unconstitutional.

I am aware that the Government of Quebec and indeed other provinces agree with this legal opinion, and that alone should give pause to the federal government, which has so enthusiastically passed the motion recognizing the Québécois as a nation. Surely that nation should be consulted and have a say over one of the Houses of Parliament that oversees legislation that could affect that nation.

It should also be noted that the House of Commons legislation gives a federal veto over constitutional amendments to Canada's regions, following the 1995 referendum in Quebec. Should not that veto power now extend to all the regions of Canada in an attempt to change the Constitution, whether directly, indirectly, or by stealth?

It should be kept in mind that the Supreme Court of Canada, in the famous patriation reference case, informed Prime Minister Trudeau that he would breach constitutional conventions if he did directly what he could do directly--namely, seeking the repatriation of the Constitution without the substantial consent of the provinces. In this case, we may have a more serious attempt to do indirectly what cannot be done directly under the constitutional conventions of this country and indeed under the Constitution Act of 1867.

There is even a question, in my view, as to whether the federal government has any jurisdiction under section 91 of the Constitution Act of 1867 to pass legislation that is intended to do indirectly what it cannot do directly. It is hardly a power under the peace, order, and good government provision to undermine the existing amending provisions of the Constitution.

Some justice department lawyers and other constitutional lawyers advising on this bill have argued that as long as the Prime Minister retains his discretion under the existing Constitution to recommend to the Governor General who shall be appointed to the Senate, an advisory federal election framework would be constitutional.

I would like to ask those experts, what would happen the very first time the Prime Minister refused to recommend an appointment of a duly elected person under the advisory election framework if all the others who had been so elected were appointed? What would the Supreme Court of Canada say about this refusal to appoint someone who has been elected? What if the court declared the whole process unconstitutional, so that those who were appointed were in limbo as to whether they could continue sitting? What would happen to the legislation that the Senate, which may have been partially elected, had passed? Would it be valid, or would it be null and void?

The enormity of these potential consequences requires, at a minimum, a broad consultation with all the partners in the Canadian federal state, and preferably a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada regarding the constitutionality of the entire framework, not only of this bill but the attempted Bill C-19, which deals with the eight-year limited term for senators, on which the Senate, in my view, rightly withheld judgment until the Supreme Court of Canada pronounced judgment.

The greatest of ironies lies in the professed reasons for introducing this bill. It refers to the need for Senate reform to reflect the democratic values of Canadians, one that equitably reflects Canada's regions, and to maintain the Senate as a chamber of independent, sober second thought. I suggest that if this bill passes, it will entrench regional inequality, create democratic gridlock, not enhance the democratic values, and even call into question the independence of the not really elected senators.

As has been pointed out by Chief Electoral Officer Marc Mayrand, there are problems even in the political financing aspects of this bill. While party-sponsored advertising is not permitted under this bill, there is a possibility of massive spending in the transfer of goods and services, which, again, could make them beholden to deep pockets for the elections.

In addition, the House leader, Peter Van Loan, in introducing the original version of this bill, argued that it was the accumulation of the historic struggle for the rights of women, minorities, and aboriginal peoples to vote. Will they be represented under this framework if it passes? Undermining the Constitution is hardly a democratic value of Canadians. And the bill also, as I've mentioned, entrenches the inequity of Canada's regions.

Perhaps most ironically, the principle behind the consultative election for the Senate is that it reserves the right of the Prime Minister to ignore the results of the vote of all Canadians. That is hardly democratic. This may lead many, especially those in western Canada, and perhaps even in the rest of Canada, to the conclusion that the real reason for this attempt at an indirect and, in my view, unconstitutional amendment is to create an illusory perception of actually doing something on Senate reform for election purposes.

In my view, it is very dangerous to play politics with the most fundamental documents and institutions of this country.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

[Prof. Peter Hogg]

I didn't have a good sense, in reading Bill C-20, of exactly how it was all going to work. I notice that the nomination process is not restricted to the parties, so there will obviously be nominees who don't come from parties. The question is, can they get elected if they're not supported by a party? It's going to be interesting to see how it plays out and whether you really need the support of a party to get to the top of that preferential list. If you don't, then we will have a body of independents who ameliorate, to some extent, the partisanship of party political institutions.

[Gary Goodyear, Conservative, Cambridge, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Through you, Chair, thank you to our guests for coming. I've enjoyed the discussions we've had on this bill.

I have a comment and then a question.

I've had the opportunity to travel with the parliamentary Commonwealth group, which has given me a great opportunity to meet some of the smaller countries in the Commonwealth: Barbados, the Turks and Caicos, and so on. What I noticed there was that we have countries that are run, frankly, by small numbers of members of Parliament—15, and in some cases 8 or 11. As good a job as they do, it became clear to me that to have a second upper chamber, an area of second thought to go over some of the decisions made by the members, was probably a good idea. But when we have a Parliament as large as ours, with 308 members, with all the facilities offered to us—the researchers, the analysts, witnesses, the funds to bring in experts like you—I remain unconvinced that we need a Senate to continue.

As you had mentioned, institutions tend to change in time, and perhaps it's time. That's a decision we are wrestling with and will continue to wrestle with, but it's a point that I make.

The question I have here is that as I read through Bill C-20, I understand the issues with constitutionality, but I'm gathering from you, for the most part, that at the end of the day this is not in direct violation of the Constitution. Would you say that this is a significant move in democracy, in a democratic way, toward a Senate that reflects better the nation and the needs of the nation, the opinions of Canadians, and a move toward reforming the Senate in a democratic way that does not violate the Constitution? Would you agree with that statement?

[Rob Moore, Conservative, Fundy Royal, NB]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses. I apologize for having to step out for a bit, and I also apologize if my question covers some of the ground that you've already covered.

Mr. Hogg, I look at your conclusion in your brief that you submitted to the committee: that if the act were challenged in court on constitutional grounds, the challenge would be unsuccessful, and that the Parliament of Canada does indeed have the power to enact Bill C-20, and if it were enacted, it would be a valid act of Parliament. Obviously I agree with that.

I'm looking at the first page, your last paragraph, and you didn't go over that in your opening remarks. So I just wanted a bit of a review.

It says that the bill stops with the counting of votes and the report to the Prime Minister. It does not go on to declare that the successful nominees are elected; nor does it say that they will be appointed. The bill does not impose any duties of any kind on the Prime Minister or the Governor General. And it says that obviously the bill assumes that the Prime Minister would be under a political imperative to respect the outcomes of the consultation that he has ordered, but this is not a legal imperative.

Can you explain how you reached that conclusion, but also explain why that is important for the constitutional validity of the bill?

[Pierre Paquette, Bloc, Joliette, QC]

Your opinion is that Bill C-20 does not affect the provisions of the Constitution. But the government is presenting us with Bill C-20 as Senate reform.

Let me quote once more. It would be a slight exaggeration to say that it is from my favourite author, but it is from my favourite government House leader. He says this:

However, members of this committee should note that if change cannot happen through reform...then we believe that the Senate should be abolished.

If I understand you correctly, your are of the opinion that this is not about a change to or reform of the Senate constitutionally. In fact, you do not think that it is about Senate reform period. You feel that it is simply about a new form of consultation that the Prime Minister could use. Officially, I mean. Am I mistaken?

[Prof. Peter Hogg]

To start, it would be an improvement to Bill C-20 if the consultation were with members of the legislative assembly of the particular province. I suppose that could have been an alternative mechanism. But surely if that person believes that Senate appointments should be made in consultation with the National Assembly of Quebec, the consultation of the people of Quebec would at least be second best, if not first best. And since it doesn't make any changes in the representation that Quebec has in the Senate, which is very large compared with its proportion of the population, it seems to me that there isn't a strong federal-provincial issue here—at least that I can see.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

My question concerns Bill C-20 in light of the upper house reference of 1980, and specifically some of the provincial concerns that have been raised here and previously about these pieces of legislation. I'd like both of you to respond to these concerns and give us your opinion on them.

The Province of Quebec has traditionally demanded that the National Assembly play a role in the selection of senators to the Senate of Canada, and has also raised issues about the constitutionality of Bill C-20 in the Senate committee hearing. At that committee hearing, Mr. Pelletier noted that in his view the federal bills on Senate reform represent not limited change but fundamental change to the nature of the Senate.

So in that context, and in the context of the upper house reference of 1980, which stated that the Government of Canada could not unilaterally alter or change the fundamental features, or central characteristics, of the Senate with respect to its regional representation and its other essential features, do you agree or disagree with Mr. Pelletier's view on this, or do you share some of his views and not others?

Maybe you could tell us what your views are of this.

[Prof. Fabien Gélinas]

There is a question of how risk-averse one is, and people have different temperaments. If it's really a question of how much you want to control the risks, outcomes are never 100% certain--never. It's really a question of degree we're looking at; at least, it seems so to me.

This is a point I had forgotten from your first question concerning the wisdom of going to the Supreme Court. My view is that Bill C-19 is more suspect than Bill C-20, which isn't suspect if taken on its own. Of course, if one goes to the Supreme Court, it would be more effective to send both at the same time to the Supreme Court, but again that is a political decision.

[Prof. Peter Hogg]

I suppose that some alternative to Bill C-20, supposing there's a vacancy in Alberta, could give the Prime Minister the power to consult the Legislative Assembly of Alberta. I don't think that would be very different from what is now being proposed in Bill C-20, so I think it would probably be okay as well, if that were the route chosen.

[Charlie Angus, NDP, Timmins—James Bay, ON]

Thank you.

I think all of us are finding this discussion today very interesting.

I'd like to ask Professor Gélinas, if Bill C-20 stated that the consultation process will be the manner in which senators are chosen, would that put us across the line?

[Professor Peter Hogg, Scholar in Residence, Blake, Cassels and Graydon LLP, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and thank you, Professor Gélinas.

My view is not very different from that of Professor Gélinas, and I will attempt to speak to the particular point that he made before I finish, but let me set out my argument, which is pretty straightforward.

I say that Bill C-20 would be a valid act of Parliament, and it escapes the strictures of paragraph 42(1)(b), the fact that it requires an amendment to change the method of selecting senators. It avoids that because it does not literally amend section 24 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

It could be argued—and Professor Gélinas did not argue this—that Bill C-20 is, in pith and substance, really an amendment to the method of selecting senators and is therefore unconstitutional under paragraph 42(1)(b). My view is that the Supreme Court of Canada would not accept that argument, and I say that because the appointing power of section 24, which only speaks to the Governor General, does not now impose any restrictions on the consultations or considerations that the Prime Minister might take into account before recommending an appointment to the Governor General.

For example, right now the Prime Minister could, if he wished, commission an informal poll as to the wishes of the electorate with respect to an appointment from a particular province. The Prime Minister could right now, and in fact has done, respect the choice of the electorate expressed in a provincial election, as we know has been done in respect of appointments from Alberta, where those elections have been held.

So all Bill C-20 does is make a formal consultation process available to the Prime Minister, should he choose to take advantage of it. As you will know, the Prime Minister does not need to take advantage of the consultation process if he doesn't want to; the bill leaves that as a matter of discretion in the Governor in Council. If the Prime Minister does order the formal consultation process to take place, he does not have to respect the results in making recommendations for appointments.

I fully recognize—and this starts to get me into the area where Professor Gélinas is—and obviously a court would recognize that after Parliament has established the complicated process proposed by Bill C-20, no Prime Minister is likely to continue to make appointments in the old way. But I say that is a truth of politics, not a truth of law. It might be different if Bill C-20 compelled the Prime Minister to follow the statutory consultation process and then compelled him to make appointment recommendations in accordance with the outcome of the process, but as we know, Bill C-20 doesn't do either of those things. Bill C-20 simply gives the Prime Minister a vehicle for consulting the electorate, but does not require him to use it and does not require him to respect the outcome if he does use it.

Getting to the corner of Professor Gélinas' point, section 24 has never attempted to control the decision-making process that precedes the decision of the Governor General to make Senate appointments. So if it did turn out that prime ministers now automatically use the process, and if it came to be accepted, as Professor Gélinas suggests might be a possibility, that this was really a convention, that this ripened into a new convention that appointments would always be made by using this admittedly optional process, section 24 would not speak to that. Section 24 says nothing about the conventions that precede an appointment, and conventions can change in various ways over the years. If this ended up causing a change in the convention, section 24 would simply operate in the way it has always done. That is to say, whoever by convention is supposed to make the recommendations of the Governor General, the Governor General would then go ahead and make the appointment.

Let me raise one other point that I know has been at least mentioned in the proceedings before the committee. The point is this. In the upper house reference, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 1980, the Supreme Court said that the fundamental features or essential characteristics of the Senate were outside the unilateral power of Parliament.

I know it has been suggested, and now is still the case, that any bill--this was suggested, for example, with respect to the term limit bill--that arguably altered the fundamental features or essential characteristics of the Senate would be outside Parliament's power. I just want to briefly answer that point, because I'm sure it will be part of your deliberations.

That upper house re-decision was a decision in 1980, before the Constitution Act 1982. It was the answer to a series of questions that were put to the Supreme Court of Canada by the government of the day about the extent of Parliament's power to change the Senate, including to make provision for elections to the Senate. The court gave very general answers to those questions--it wasn't asked anything very specific, and it didn't have a bill placed before it. The court's answers were particularly concerned with the protection of the provisions respecting regional and provincial representation in the Senate. Of course, Bill C-20 doesn't touch those.

The important point is that that case is no longer relevant. When it was decided in 1980, the Constitution Act 1867, which was the only authority then for making changes to the Senate, said nothing about Parliament's power to enact changes to the Senate. So the court was constructing some general rules in the face of a Constitution that said nothing. Of course, that has now been overtaken by the Constitution Act 1982, which now specifies expressly what has been withdrawn from the unilateral power of Parliament. One of those matters, of course, as we have seen, is “the method of selecting senators”. Another is “the powers of the Senate”. Another is “the number of members by which a province is entitled to be represented in the Senate”. Another is the “residence qualifications of senators”. They're all set out in section 42, the 7/50 provision in the amending powers.

Those explicit provisions are now the governing constitutional law with respect to changes to the Senate. I say the only one that is potentially relevant is the method of selecting senators, and I've explained my view that that provision does not cover Bill C-20.

My conclusion is that the Parliament of Canada does have the power to enact Bill C-20, and if it were enacted, it would be a valid act of Parliament.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

[Fabien Gélinas, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, McGill University, As an Individual]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Good afternoon, everyone.

I would first like to thank the committee for inviting me to participate in your work in this way. It is an honour and a pleasure. Well, maybe we will see about the pleasure later.

I was not able to prepare a written report, for which I apologize, but I did bring some notes that I gave to the clerk to facilitate the work of the interpreters and, as a result, the work of committee members.

We are here to shed light on Bill C-20, An Act to provide for consultations with electors on their preferences for appointments to the Senate.

In order to prepare a sufficiently big picture for the committee, I followed the evolution of Bill S-4, which is now Bill C-19, dealing with the length of senators' terms. In so doing, I was also able to read the comments of Professor Hogg who is here with us and to whom I extend greetings.

The two bills on Senate reform remind me, in a number of respects, of the two best-known lovers in western theatre, Romeo and Juliet. We may ask ourselves whether they are really meant for each other. Are they ever going to end up together anywhere but in the great beyond? Another question comes to mind. Will the death of one, real or feigned, cause the death of the other? Questions like that arise. And everything is still possible at this stage.

So I propose to focus my introductory remarks on Bill C-20 considered separately and apart from the other bill, and to broaden my comments during the discussion if the members of the committee consider that useful.

As a constitutional lawyer, I naturally asked myself if the bill is valid constitutionally. In legal terms, the answer seems quite simple. The bill does not seem to change any provision of the Constitution within the meaning of section 52 of the Constitution Act of 1982. The constitutional amending procedure in section 38 of the act and those following does not come into play. It simply does not apply.

Nevertheless, in our political system, everyone can appreciate the limits of the legal provisions that are enshrined. It is clear that passing the bill may well have a major impact on the functioning and the balance of our political institutions. The impact will be felt by the normative, or conventional, effect of the Constitution, the conventions of the Constitution that are unwritten, and not in the law, but that nevertheless are binding.

Since we are talking about choosing senators, the problem here, in summary, comes from section 24 of the Constitution Act of 1867, which gives the Governor General the exclusive legal power to appoint senators. Section 24 makes no mention of the Prime Minister, however often it is informally said that senators are appointed by the Prime Minister.

We know that the conventions of responsible government establish that Governors General exercise most of their powers only with the advice of their ministers. The conventions stipulate that the special power described in section 24, the power to appoint senators, is exercised with the advice of the prime minister. This is one of the so-called special prerogatives.

The legal power enshrined in the Constitution belongs to the Governor General, therefore. Because of a constitutional convention, he or she exercises that power only in accordance with the advice of the prime minister. The convention exists because of the principle of responsible government, which, in the British parliamentary system, is a means of ensuring the operation of democratic principles.

The Bill under study organizes the mechanisms of an optional consultation process that might well look like an election for senators. These provisions in no way require the Governor General to appoint the senators receiving most popular support at the end of the consultations. They do not even require the Prime Minister to accept the result of the consultation when formulating his advice to the Governor General. In fact, no requirement is placed on the Governor General or even on the Prime Minister. There is therefore no impact on section 24 of the Constitution Act of 1867.

As I have already mentioned, the bill may well have a significant impact on the conventions of the Constitution. The current Prime Minister is almost obliged, politically, to be bound by the results of the consultation. If he so declares himself, either before or after the legislation is passed, and if he then moves to make appointments as a result, he is demonstrably laying the foundation for a constitutional convention. This would be confirmed, in my view, only if his successor saw fit to be bound by the same rules.

The requirements for a convention to be established are generally considered to be precedents, a feeling of obligation on the part of the political actor involved, and a reason for the rule. What I would like to highlight here is this reason for the constitutional norm that is the subject of our attention.

There is a reason for the conventional rule that transfers the Governor General's power in section 24 of the Constitution Act of 1867 to the Prime Minister, and the reason is the democratic principle. The conventional rule apparently sought here, to transfer the power of elected people—the power accorded to the Prime Minister acting with the confidence of the House of Commons—to voters, that is, the people who would be consulted, is the democratic principle too. The concept of democracy is also described in the first paragraph of the preamble to the bill. These are two different concepts—that is what I want to underline here—or at least two very different ways to put the democratic principle into operation. The first takes the familiar and well-paved road of responsible government in the House of Commons. The other cuts a largely uncharted path through our political system.

The Supreme Court has already had the opportunity to study the protection provided by constitutional law to the rules of responsible government. The principle of responsible government is definitely, but somewhat uncertainly, enshrined in the Constitution and protected from unilateral change by Parliament, or by a provincial legislature in the case of an amendment to a provincial constitution. This protection is guaranteed, both federally and provincially, by section 41 of the Constitution Act of 1982 that, as you know, requires unanimous consent to amend the offices of Governor General and Lieutenant Governors. This is a way to protect the principle of responsible government under the Constitution. In the case of the Senate, this protection is guaranteed in section 42 of the procedure for amending the constitution, which protects section 24 of the Constitution Act of 1867 from unilateral amendment.

This leads me to suggest that, if the bill went any further in limiting the Governor General's decision-making under section 24, it would move into an area of constitutional uncertainty.

But, in my view, this is not the case here. If we consider the bill in isolation and in its current form, I believe that no fault can be found with its constitutional validity.

Politically, however, I would say to sum up that the idea that lies beneath the intended reform deserves serious attention. Although it claims to uphold the democratic principle, it introduces a foreign element into our system whose consequences do not seem, to me at least, to be sufficiently clear.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Albina Guarnieri]

I'd like to call the meeting to order.

Pursuant to the order of reference of Wednesday, February 13, 2008, the committee resumes its study of Bill C-20.

We're fortunate to be able to consult with two able scholars and residents here today in committee.

We are joined by Monsieur Fabien Gélinas, associate professor, Faculty of Law, McGill University; and Mr. Peter W. Hogg, scholar in residence, Blake, Cassels and Graydon.

Thank you and welcome.

Mr. Gélinas, we'll begin with you. You each have 10 minutes, and we'll be generous with allotting you enough time to make your comments. Thank you.

[Mauril Bélanger, Liberal, Ottawa—Vanier, ON]

I think the Committee should consider doing so. In fact, I want to suggest that the Commissioner of Official Languages be invited to appear before the Committee, Madam Chair.

In the Constitution, we are dealing not only with what is written in black and white, but also all the written and unwritten principles associated with it. One of the principles outlined in the secession reference relates to the protection of minorities. If Bill C-20 ignores minorities, in my opinion, an official constitutional challenge should be launched against the bill on that basis. I'm not talking about the constitutional challenges that New Brunswick, Quebec and Ontario are preparing. I think it's important to clarify that for the benefit of those closely following this issue.

Mr. Mayrand, I have two questions. First of all, would it be possible for provincial governments, based on the wording of the bill currently before us, to call by-elections in an attempt to influence the result in one region or another? Would it be possible for provincial governments to call a provincial election or by-election when a consultation is underway?

[Marc Mayrand, Chief Electoral Officer, Elections Canada]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I'm pleased to appear today to speak on Bill C-20, the Senate Appointment Consultations Act.

Bill C-20 represents a significant change from at least three perspectives. First, it potentially represents a major reform of Canada's parliamentary institutions by creating a method of consulting Canadians on the recommendation for the appointment of senators. Second, it represents a significant electoral policy choice through its proposed use of a single transferable voting system for the first time at the federal level. Finally, the bill can be seen as raising novel administrative and operational issues related to the conduct of a democratic consultation in conjunction with a federal or provincial electoral process.

My focus today will be on the latter perspective, the administrative and operational issues raised by the bill.

My intent is to raise some matters that the committee may wish to consider in its discussions respecting the bill. In addition, my office has identified other areas that the committee may wish to review for possible amendment.

With your permission, Madam Chair, I will leave a list of all these issues with the members of the committee at the end of my appearance. Since I will not discuss them, I would ask that they be entered into the record of the deliberations of the committee. Thank you.

There are three key matters that I wish to raise for the committee's consideration. First, I will point out the substantive challenges that could be encountered if a consultation were held in conjunction with a provincial election. Second, I would like to discuss the complex problem of harmonizing the existing political financing regime in the Canada Elections Act with that created for Senate consultations. Third, I wish to share with you my concerns about the operational feasibility of the coming into force provisions of the bill.

Before I do that, however, given the novelty, in Canada, at least, of the STV voting system, I will give a very brief description of this voting system.

STV allows electors to rank the candidates in multi-member districts. They do so by indicating their preferences—one, two, or three, and so on—on the ballot beside the names of the candidates. The result is determined through a series of counts. At the first count, candidates who have collected more than a specified quota of first preference votes are immediately selected. This quota is based on the number of available seats and the number of valid votes.

In second and subsequent counts, all votes of elected candidates in excess of the quota are redistributed according to a weighted formula to the next available preference on the ballots.

If after any count no candidate has obtained the quota, the candidate with the fewest ballots is eliminated, and his or her ballots are redistributed to the next available preference. The process continues until all available seats have been filled.

The application of the process is not as easy as its description and there are many complicating details, but what I have provided here is a simple overview of how STV works.

Going back to areas of concern, the first matter I would like to discuss is the possibility that a Senate consultation may be held in conjunction with a provincial election. If such a consultation is to take place, the Chief Electoral Officer is authorized by the bill to enter into an agreement with the provincial electoral body. In that case, he would be required to adapt an element of the Senate Appointment Consultations Act for the purposes of holding a joint event.

If an agreement cannot be reached, two separate processes would be held on the same day in different polling locations, using different workers and applying different rules. This does not appear to me to be a viable option, and it would likely create elector confusion and frustration.

It would therefore be essential to reach an agreement with the provincial electoral body. To achieve such an agreement, it is very likely that the province would require that the Senate consultation run according to rules that are as close as possible to the provincial election rules, including those regarding residency requirements, identification at the polls, polling day registration, vote counting, and political financing.

For example, as no province currently uses STV, such a consultation would likely not take place using that voting system if held during a provincial election. This would also mean that the Senate consultation process could be conducted differently depending upon the province in which it is held. This is something that may be acceptable from a policy perspective and on which I express no opinion. However, decisions as to how to adapt important federal rules to allow their implementation by provincial authorities could result in controversies and possibly legal disputes. As I said earlier, I do not believe this is a viable solution.

Rather than providing for a regime that requires a complex mixing of federal and provincial electoral laws, it may be better to provide in the bill that a consultation process be held according to federal rules, except in a case where a province has legislation that creates a process for a consultation. If such a provincial statute exists, such as Alberta's Senatorial Selection Act, the consultation would be conducted by provincial electoral authorities in accordance with provincial law.

The second matter I wish to highlight is the political financing regime created by the Senate consultations and the impact those rules may have on the existing political financing provisions found in the Canada Elections Act.

Much has been done in the bill respecting the challenge of harmonizing regimes for the two events that will, in many cases, take place at the same time. For example, many of the financing rules in Bill C-20, including those related to the disclosure of financial transactions, would mirror those imposed on candidates during an election campaign. In addition, the bill seeks to prevent contributions to a Senate nominee from flowing into the electoral process by providing that surplus funds of nominees must go to the Receiver General.

However, there are some areas in which the financing regime proposed by Bill C-20 may not be in harmony with the existing political financing law. If it is the will of Parliament that there be no spending limits for the campaign of Senate nominees, as proposed in Bill C-20, it would be important to minimize the impact the proposed financial regime could have over the one governing elections.

Spending by nominees could impact the political financing regime in the Canada Elections Act in several ways. For example, the fact that there is no prohibition against a person being both a candidate under the Canada Elections Act and a nominee in a Senate consultation raises the possibility that unlimited spending under the Senate regime could undermine the candidate spending limits for a person registered as both a nominee and a candidate.

Similarly, there is nothing preventing a person who is running as a candidate in an election from registering as a third party in the Senate campaign. Doing so would allow for spending over and above the candidate's spending limit.

I also note that although, for the most part, the bill seeks to impose a distance between political parties and nominees, subclause 87(2) provides that registered parties and registered electoral district associations may transfer unlimited goods and services other than advertising to nominees. The capacity to pass goods and services to nominees again brings into question the efficacy of party spending limits.

Finally, difficult questions may arise as to the appropriate treatment under the two laws of spending by a Senate nominee who promotes his or her party platform. It is not my intention to suggest that the political finance rules of Bill C-20 must be the same as those of the Canada Elections Act. While we must recognize that perfect symmetry is not possible, Parliament may wish to ensure that the rules for Senate consultations do not have an unintended impact on the financing regime under the Canada Elections Act.

This appears to be the intent of the bill, and I would offer the following points for your consideration to stimulate discussion as to how best to achieve that intent:

(a) consider prohibiting a person from being a registered Senate nominee and a candidate in a federal general election at the same time;

(b) consider prohibiting a candidate from incurring advertising expenses as a third party in a Senate consultation held at the same time as the election in which he or she is a candidate;

(c) consider ensuring that the provisions relating to collusion and prohibiting various entities working together to circumvent spending limits are sufficiently strong in the bill and in the Canada Elections Act; and, finally,

(d) consider prohibiting all non-monetary transfers from registered parties and associations to Senate nominees.

A third matter I wish to raise today is the operational feasibility of the coming into force provisions, as provided in the bill. The requirement to prepare for Senate consultations will be a substantial undertaking which we will need to accomplish in addition to our ordinary activities, which include always being prepared for a general election.

New tools and systems will need to be developed to conduct the consultations and to support an electronic method for counting the ballots under the STV system. In addition, we will be developing training materials and an information and education campaign for parties, other participants and, especially, the voting public.

I anticipate that these problems can be dealt with and that the appropriate systems can be designed. However, I have concerns about the feasibility of doing so within the two-year period. We asked IBM Canada to conduct an external review of the technological developments required, given the implementation timeline provided for in Bill C-20. The firm concluded that a two-year timeline has an extreme risk of failure. On the other hand, it found that a three-year timeline for implementation appears achievable. A three-year coming into force period is therefore essential to Elections Canada to ensure the success of this endeavour.

The coming into force provisions also provide for an interim form of consultation that may be held in a period between one and two years after royal assent. An interim consultation would use a multi-member plurality voting system—that is to say, one in which electors do not rank nominees, but simply place an “X” besides the applicable number of nominees.

As such, Elections Canada would also be required to design systems and materials, and conduct voter education campaigns in preparation for this potential event, at the same time as preparing for the coming into force of the preferential balloting system. There would be a need to prepare for an interim consultation, even though there is no certainty that one would be held during the interim period. The resources required to prepare for one type of consultation would reduce those available for preparing for the full coming into force of Bill C-20.

In my opinion, the impact on readiness for other events, the confusion caused to electors and the cost of preparing for an event that may or may not happen in a one-year window, do not justify this interim method.

I would therefore recommend that the interim method of holding consultations be removed from the bill.

In addition to the three key matters already discussed, I wish to raise two other points for the consideration of the Committee—one, more encompassing, and the other, more technical.

The first relates to the fact that, in many instances, the bill states that key provisions of the Canada Elections Act shall apply to a Senate consultation with any adaptations as are necessary. For example, clause 46 states that the ordinary, advance and special voting provisions of the Canada Elections Act apply with such adaptations as are necessary. Clauses 95 and 96 provide that many of the political financing provisions of the Canada Elections Act apply to a Senate consultation with any adaptations as are necessary.

I understand and agree with the approach that many elements of the Canada Elections Act are to apply to Senate consultations. To the extent that the rules of the Canada Elections Act are well known and respected by participants and Canadians at large, the choice to apply the same rules to a Senate consultation is required and will simplify the administration of both types of events. However, the nature of the instrument by which these rules will be made raises concerns. Indeed, the bill does not provide for any legal instrument, such as a regulation, in which these fundamental rules, as adapted to the circumstances of a Senate consultation, will be made known.

A relatively simple fix to this problem is the approach taken in the Referendum Act. Section 7 of that Act gives the Chief Electoral Officer the authority to make a regulation adapting the Canada Elections Act for the purposes of a referendum. Once made, that regulation is referred to committees of both houses for their comments. The creation of a legal instrument codifying the rules applicable to a Senate consultation would reduce potential confusion or uncertainty. This is desirable for many reasons, but perhaps most important when one considers the matter of enforcement.

Indeed, the Commissioner of Canada Elections has raised concerns with me about the impact of the uncertainty engendered by the absence of a document that has the force of law, setting out the offence and its punishment in the context of a consultation. I therefore recommend that, if Parliament wishes the Chief Electoral Officer to adapt the Canada Elections Act for the purposes of a Senate consultation, a regulation-making power similar to that found in section 7 of the Referendum Act be created to achieve certainty in the law and ensure its enforceability.

The final point I wish to raise today relates to clause 33, which requires the Chief Electoral Officer to compile and distribute information about nominees in the form of an elector guide. The publication of this guide may, in some cases, oblige Elections Canada to become the arbitrator of its contents. There is a fine line between what is perceived as the mere provision of information, and what may be perceived as advocacy. Elections Canada's responsibility for publishing this guide may, therefore, affect perceptions of its neutrality. I would ask, consequently, that this responsibility not be entrusted to Elections Canada. To the extent that the publication of this guide is intended to reduce the costs a nominee faces in making his or her message known throughout the province, an alternative solution might be to provide a subsidy, such as reimbursement of this particular expense to nominees.

In conclusion, I wish to emphasize, once again, that the implementation of Bill C-20 is a significant challenge, but one that I am fully prepared to undertake. That said, the complexities of the proposal should not be underestimated. As this Committee is only beginning its study of the matter, and as the bill has been referred after first reading, I have not gone into details about technical drafting and implementation issues, or the costs of implementing this bill. I would, of course, be happy to come back to discuss these or any other matters when the Committee is more advanced in its study of the bill.

That concludes my remarks, and I would be happy to take your questions. Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Albina Guarnieri]

I will call the meeting to order this afternoon.

Pursuant to the order of reference of Wednesday, February 13, the committee will resume its study of Bill C-20.

Thank you, everyone, for being on time. I know we will want to give the maximum time possible to learn from our special guests today.

We are joined today by a man who might well be preoccupied with preparation for another national consultation process, but today we are focused on the Senate, and we hope the presence of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada will help us identify practical issues with this proposal.

Monsieur Mayrand is joined by a familiar face to those of us on Parliament Hill. He is joined by Diane Davidson, deputy chief electoral officer, and Monsieur Stéphane Perrault, senior general counsel and senior director. Welcome.

Without further ado, I will turn it over to Monsieur Mayrand.

[Jay Hill, Conservative, Prince George—Peace River, BC]

I find it unfortunate that when we have an issue like this where it should be so easy for us to be at least respectful, we have one committee member who decides he has to use terms like “puppet show”. I don't know how that feeds into our trying to operate in a respectful manner. Unfortunately, it's increasingly how the standing committees operate. I was hopeful that perhaps a legislative committee wouldn't be subjected to that. My apologies to the witnesses.

I'd like to pick up on some of the comments Mr. Angus made. I've been here for almost 15 years. I'm a strong advocate for Senate reform--I've said this before--and I find it extremely disturbing that the fallback position for many of my colleagues from other parties always seems to be that if you can't go all the way toward an elected Senate--in other words, change the Constitution.... We know all the hurdles. Many of us, even if we weren't here, certainly viewed the country seized with the machinations of Meech Lake and the Charlottetown accord and where all that led, frustratingly so, in the end.

I find it disappointing that we can't view this, discuss this, and debate this as an improvement, because that's how I see it. It's a step in the right direction. It's not the whole enchilada, so to speak, but at least it would give Canadians some choice.

Mr. Angus asked how do we know that electors are going to buy into this and suggested that perhaps there was no benefit. From my window, I think they will buy in because they're going to be given some choice that they don't have now at all.

The default position is to go back to the system we have, whereby traditionally a Liberal prime minister appoints Liberals to the Senate and a Conservative appoints Conservatives to the Senate. If we want that archaic system in this country, that's what we can have. But I think Bill C-20 is an honest attempt to do what we can, respecting the confines of the Constitution. That's what I hear from the witness as well.

He asked, “How do we suggest the public would buy in?” I don't remember the exact numbers, but I think somewhere around 300,000 Albertans voted in a Senate selection there--far more than the 100,000 or so who ever voted for any single MP in a riding. We're lucky if we get half of the eligible voters out to vote any more.

I think this constitutes a good step forward, and it is a step toward democratic reform. We should try to discuss that within those confines.

I would like to ask the witnesses to comment further on this whole notion that somehow the public wouldn't buy in if they were given an opportunity. I think the experience in Alberta--and I don't think it would be dramatically different in other provinces--suggests otherwise.

[Dan McDougall, Director of Operations, Democratic Reform, Privy Council Office]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

We are pleased to be here today to discuss Bill C-20 — the Senate Appointment Consultations Act. We would like to review with the Committee the policy framework for the bill, as well as discuss the structure of the bill, and any details of this legislative proposal.

In the first instance, in order to set the context, I think it may be useful to start off with a brief description of what the bill does not do.

To start with, the bill does not provide for a process for electing senators. Rather, much like the Referendum Act, it sets out a scheme for consultations with Canadians, without binding the Prime Minister or the Governor General to the results of a consultation.

As well, as was discussed briefly with the committee when the minister appeared before you, neither does Bill C-20 amend the Constitution of Canada. Indeed, the bill has been carefully drafted so as not to affect the Governor General's power to appoint senators, the Prime Minister's prerogative to recommend persons for appointment to the Senate, the constitutional qualifications of senators, or indeed the role of the Senate as arbiter of the eligibility of senators.

However, what the bill does do is provide a bank of names of persons from which the Prime Minister may choose to make a recommendation for appointment to the Senate as vacancies arise. Persons appointed from this list will have the democratic support of voters.

The bill provides that a consultation normally will be held in conjunction with a federal general election. The Governor in Council can make an order for consultation, and the consultation process, which relies extensively on the Canada Elections Act, will be administered by the Chief Electoral Officer.

The bill provides that a consultation could also be held in conjunction with a provincial general election, provided that six months' notice is so given.

Bill C-20 provides flexibility as to whether and when to use a consultation, in how many provinces to hold a consultation during a federal or provincial election, and for how many places. The number of places is not determined by the number of vacancies in the Senate. Even if there are no existing vacancies in a province, a consultation may be held for the number of places specified in the order for a consultation. This flexibility may help to ensure that nominees are available to fill seats as they become vacant.

Canadians may register their nominations at any time with the Chief Electoral Officer. They do not need to wait for an order for consultation to be issued. A nominee must be 30 years of age or older, and must be a Canadian citizen. Of course, prior to being called to take up a place in the Senate, a nominee would need to comply with the other eligibility criteria that are set out in the Constitution.

Once registered, nominees may begin to accept contributions for their campaign. The rules governing contributions are based on the rules applicable to candidates for members of Parliament, as outlined in the Canada Elections Act, with some exceptions. For example, candidates for election to the House must wait until an election is called before they can issue receipts for contributions.

Given the different role of parties in the Senate, as compared to the House, political parties will have a limited role in relation to Senate nominees. The bill provides that parties may endorse a nominee, but may not endorse more nominees in a province than there are places specified in the order of a consultation. Parties will not be able to transfer funds to Senate nominees. There will be no Senate-only parties. To conduct advertising, parties will have to register as a third party, and parties will not control the order of nominees on the ballot, nor will candidates be grouped on the ballot by party.

Consultations will be province wide, allowing voters to indicate their preferences amongst all nominees in that province. The voter will be able to rank his or her preferred candidates as one, two, three, and so on, expressing as many or as few preferences as desired, across or within party lines employing whatever criteria are favoured by the voter. The designed principle of the bill is to provide as much flexibility as possible to the voter. Complementing that principle, the proposed voting system, called a single transferable vote or STV, is also designed to reflect as closely as possible the intentions of the voters.

The bill provides that, after counting the votes, a list of selected nominees for each province in which a consultation is held will be submitted by the chief electoral officer to the Prime Minister for his consideration. The bill also provides that the chief electoral officer must also publish this report, along with other details of the vote, in the Canada Gazette without delay.

In the interests of time, perhaps I could just highlight some of the other key provisions of the bill. There are extensive sections of the bill dealing with advertising and communications, with third-party advertising, with financial administration and, of course, a section dealing with enforcement.

As a general statement, these provisions are complementary to comparable provisions in the Canada Elections Act, taking care always to have the least impact possible on the actual functioning of that Act, and making the necessary adaptations of the provisions to reflect the nature of the process created by the Senate consultations bill.

Madam Chair, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee. We will now be pleased to take questions from the members.

[The Chair, Liberal, Albina Guarnieri]

I'd like to call the meeting to order.

Pursuant to the order of reference from the House of Commons of February 13, 2008, the Legislative Committee on Bill C-20 will now resume its study of the bill.

I would like to inform the committee that it shall reserve the last 20 minutes at the end of the meeting in camera in order to discuss internal matters, such as what has been done by the subcommittee on agenda and procedure regarding the list of witnesses, the upcoming calendar, and the adoption of the budget. Moreover, as everyone knows, the bells will start ringing at 5:15 sharp for votes. Therefore, we'll have between 80 and 90 minutes with our witnesses today.

I know all of you are eager after the Easter break, after consulting with your constituents about this bill. So I know you're eager to pose our Privy Council officials many questions. Please allow me first to introduce them.

We have as witnesses today: Dan McDougall, director of operations; Isa Gros-Louis, director; and Grégoire Webber.

Welcome. You have the floor.

[Raymonde Folco, Liberal, Laval—Les Îles, QC]

I will let Ms. Bourgeois speak, but first, I would like to say two things. First, I appreciate and understand the point of view expressed by my colleague Mr. Kramp. Rather than tell us 10 times though, he could have said it once or twice. We understood him the first time. The same goes for all of my colleagues opposite.

Next, if I understand what Ms. Bourgeois is saying, since the motion was made in French, I am wondering if we could use the French text as the official version. Mr. Kramp has just referred to three words in the second paragraph, namely, “among other things”, which appears to be a rather loose translation. The French word “notamment” is an expression of what Ms. Bourgeois intended to say. I would like to use the French text for the official motion, since I believe that Ms. Bourgeois drafted it herself.

As to the amendment, yes, the minister did appear on numerous occasions, but as my colleague Mr. Holland has said, it is the only way for opposition members to speak to him directly, on the record. When we ask questions in the House, during question period or at some other time, the person who answers on his behalf is his parliamentary secretary, who is an elected member of Parliament.

When the Minister for Democratic Reform was here yesterday to speak to us about Bill C-20 on Senate reform, I asked him how someone could have been appointed by the Prime Minister. The minister was not elected. He ran in the riding of Laval—Les Îles, the riding that I currently represent in the House of Commons, he was rejected by the voters, and the Prime Minister appointed him to his position. After that, the senator even refused to run in a by-election, something that he could have done. This is the only place where we can direct questions to him.

I agree wholeheartedly with my Bloc Québécois colleagues that this person should appear before us to answer our questions. We have more questions for him.

[Peter Van Loan, Conservative, York—Simcoe, ON]

If you're suggesting that somehow there is a difference from today, then you're accepting the notion that the Senate doesn't have legitimacy today. But they do have all the powers that go with that, and those same kinds of impasses can exist.

The strange situation right now is that the resolution of an impasse, as happened in 1988, is by the democratic body seeking a dissolution and going to the voters for a mandate to make it clear and put some kind of moral pressure on the appointed body. That is a bit alarming in a democracy, that an appointed body could effectively force, hamstring, or tie the hands of the duly elected body and create that kind of impasse.

If you move forward with Bill C-20, in a situation where most senators are the product of a consultation process, at least the impasse you have that creates that situation is one that has a democratic body on either side. The solution would still be the same--seeking a dissolution in the House--but at least it would be prompted by others with a legitimate basis for their mandate.

[Jay Hill, Conservative, Prince George—Peace River, BC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I think, in all fairness, this is an excellent discussion today and certainly a good kickoff, if I can call it that, to our deliberations about Bill C-20 and the future of the Senate.

I'm quite interested in the process that led the government to come forward with this bill. In particular, Mr. Minister, perhaps you could enlighten us as to some comments made earlier about the process for actually going about selecting senators, were this bill to come into force. You yourself were remarking earlier about how this differs from the first-past-the-post system, which most Canadians, and certainly most parliamentarians in the lower House, in our House of Commons, are familiar with.

Could you explain a bit more about the process of how this particular system, which seems on the surface to be quite complicated, came about as the preferred method in the bill and why we didn't just go with something that all Canadians are more familiar with, which would be the first-past-the-post system?

[Pat Martin, NDP, Winnipeg Centre, MB]

Thank you, Chair.

Mr. Minister, building off what you were saying, it's not just that the Senate is undemocratic. In recent experience it's anti-democratic in that it's been undermining and stymying the democratic will of the other side of Parliament, the House of Commons.

If I could clarify one thing in the same vein as Mr. Hill, the province of Manitoba, my home province, is listed in research as favouring abolition, and I've heard Premier Gary Doer say that as well. But by the same token, we have just recently put together a legislative committee of the provincial government to explore our options for electing our provincial senators. I don't want it to be overstated that the province of Manitoba is uncooperative in this idea of incremental reform of the Senate.

Minister, I was one of the lucky ordinary Canadians chosen in the Charlottetown accord process, when they actually put an ad in The Globe and Mail and asked...I was an ordinary Canadian once; I still am. I simply wrote a letter to The Globe and Mail, to the Government of Canada that Joe Clark had set up. What I'm getting at is that it was a consultation that was a real engagement for Canadians. There were five--six in the end--conferences across the country where they brought in ordinary Canadians, some selected the way they selected me, others from civil society, first nations groups, labour, and business. We were really seized with the issue for months and months at a time.

So I wouldn't say there's no appetite on the part of the public for a broad consultation, because in that instance the country came out. They really did. They brought their best game and they got into it.

I firmly believe that the problem with the Charlottetown accord is that we tried to take on too much at once and it collapsed under its own weight. If the Charlottetown accord had been limited to what you're putting forward in Bill C-19 and Bill C-20, I think it would have passed. We were talking about the division of power and jurisdiction, shared jurisdictions, the distribution of seats, and the way we elected senators, all at once. People's heads exploded. It just became too much, until one guy raised one feather in the province of Manitoba and said no—oh, that was Meech Lake, wasn't it? I'm mixing up my constitutional reforms here.

But if I could, in the same vein the United States gets by with two senators from Rhode Island and two senators from New York, wildly different populations. So I don't think we should agonize too much about the equal side of it at this point in time. Ours is crazy. I believe New Brunswick has ten senators, if I'm not mistaken, and Prince Edward Island has four for a population of 150,000 people. I don't know how it got so out of whack.

But the 13 failed attempts, I think, are partly because we bit off too much. So maybe with these incremental stages there is some room for optimism that we can address all those irritants that make people cry out to abolish. Maybe they can be dealt with incrementally, so that hue and cry will settle down to the point where Canadians feel this is a problem we can solve if we solve it one step at a time.

I know that's more of a comment than a question, but is there any reaction you'd like to give?

[Hedy Fry, Liberal, Vancouver Centre, BC]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Someone was asking how the Liberals stand on this issue. I think most of us agree, because the Liberal government brought forward particular bills in the past on Senate reform.

One can't dismiss the concept of process in this, and bringing a process from a group of people who believe there should be reform of the Senate. Many of us who spoke very movingly in favour of the Charlottetown accord in the old days, as I did, certainly look at some of the triple-E reforms we talked about. The question is, how do we do this?

We know that scholars have sat on one side or the other of this debate. In 1980, the Supreme Court said that Parliament could not change the fundamental characteristics of the Senate without first getting the Senate to agree that this should be done. Then we had the 1982 Constitution Act, in which it was said that one could amend the Constitution with regard to the Senate, but there was a way of doing it. The process had to have three conditions, and I would like to add that those conditions were fulfilled in the Charlottetown accord. They said that at least two-thirds of the provinces must agree, the Senate must agree, and a minimum of 50% of the population of those provinces must agree.

When we talk about democratic change, we have to ask ourselves first and foremost whether the end justifies the means. If we don't look at what the Constitution tells us we should do, or if you want to sit on the other side and look at what the Supreme Court says we should do, then we need to have a different process. I don't believe that Parliament has it in its power to do this alone. The whole way of amending the Senate, as set out in the Constitution Act, is a good one.

My question comes back to what everyone says. We cannot—no matter how much we wish to as government—do something that is unconstitutional unless we're prepared to open up the Constitution and go into that big debate. I don't think anyone here is suggesting that; however, we can look at many different ways of electing the Senate and of achieving a new type of Senate reform that don't have to go against the constitutional amending processes.

My big question is whether this is the appropriate way to go about it. Is this legislative Bill C-20 an appropriate way? How do we go about getting two-thirds of provinces and 50% of the people to agree? How do we get the Senate to agree?

We cannot do this on our own, and that is my point. Much as I would like to see the triple-E Senate looked at, this is not the process. My concern is that when we speak of democracy we do not do something that is fundamentally undemocratic.

[Pat Martin, NDP, Winnipeg Centre, MB]

Let me say first, Minister, that I'm very pleased we're dealing with this matter today. I find Bill C-19 and Bill C-20 very interesting, and I admire that your government is taking this on. You will know that in the history of my own party since the 1930s, one of the basic tenets of the CCF was to abolish the unelected Senate. That language is important. We reaffirmed that at our most recent convention in September 2006, to abolish the unelected Senate. I don't know what the opinion of my party would be if someone came up with a motion to abolish the Senate; I don't think it would be a view that is as widely held within the party.

I note that there have been 13 efforts to reform the Senate since 1900, all of which have crashed and burned after various periods of time. As a starting point, I think my party would have liked a nation-wide referendum on whether we want a Senate at all. In fact, we put an opposition day motion forward to that effect recently.

Has your government contemplated a consultation of that kind in the lead-up to this legislation?

[Pierre Paquette, Bloc, Joliette, QC]

If you were to poll Quebeckers, you would discover that no one is losing sleep at night wondering if a public consultation should be held to select a senator. However, you would learn that most people feel the Senate should simply be abolished and that the proposed changes will make absolutely no difference because this institution had outlived its purpose. Furthermore—and this was the opinion expressed by the Government of Quebec in its submission—the bill would alter the balance of power between the provinces and provincial and federal institutions. For that reason, constitutional negotiations are needed. We have said many times that these changes cannot be made unilaterally by the federal government and the House of Commons.

You mention that Quebec effectively did away with its legislative chamber in 1968. That is not a good example. The province of Quebec is part of a larger federation comprised of federal and provincial jurisdictions. As such, federal parliamentary institutions cannot be amended without the consent of the provinces.

The National Assembly unanimously passed a motion calling on the federal government and the Parliament of Canada not to make any changes to the Canadian Senate without the consent of the Government of Quebec and the National Assembly. This motion was forwarded to the government and as far as I know, neither the National Assembly nor the Government of Quebec has changed its position on this matter.

If the Government of Quebec opposes Bill C-20 on the grounds that constitutional negotiations are needed, along with the consent of the provinces to the proposed Senate changes, will the government be prepared to move forward if Quebec, which has been recognized as a nation within Canada, is not on board? Quebec's opposition should, in our opinion, be equal to a veto. Would you be prepared to forge ahead without Quebec's support?

[Peter Van Loan, Conservative, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and Minister for Democratic Reform]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I also want to thank in particular the members of this committee, because the work you're doing on this bill is very important. It's significant that it was sent not only to a special legislative committee, indicating the importance the government places on this, but also before second reading, so that you have the fullest latitude possible in considering the important question of how to deal with how we select people to represent Canadians in the Senate, and ensuring that they do actually represent Canadians in the Senate.

The bill, of course, is Bill C-20, the Senate Appointment Consultations Act.

Our government's position has been clear on the question of the upper chamber. We believe the Senate must change. We're committed to leading that change. The bill you're studying represents one aspect of our plan to effect that change.

The Senate must change because it is a body that is not elected by Canadians, and therefore, not accountable to the Canadian people.

Quite simply, the Senate is an artifact of a long ago time where aristocrats and nobles wielded influence and power without being accountable.

Incredibly for an unelected institution, the Senate has powers that are nearly equal to those of the House of Commons. For example, the Senate can block legislation passed by the democratically elected House of Commons. It can compel government officials and Canadian citizens to appear before Senate committees. The Senate can propose and pass legislation and send it to the House of Commons for approval.

As Members of Parliament, I am sure we can all agree that it is utterly absurd for the members of the unelected, unaccountable Senate to have power nearly equal to the equal, accountable House of Parliament that we are all members of, the House of Commons.

This is not healthy for the Senate, it's not healthy for democracy in Canada, and it's not appropriate for the 21st century. That's why we introduced two bills to create a modern and accountable Senate that is consistent with modern and contemporary democratic values, principles, and traditions.

The first bill, Bill C-19, will put an end to terms of up to 45 years for senators by limiting their terms to eight years. The bill before this committee, entitled the Senate Appointment Consultations Act, is Bill C-20, and it creates a process for giving Canadians a say in who they want to represent them in the Senate by holding popular consultations with Canadians to fill vacant Senate seats.

The bill is carefully drafted to ensure that the Senate will remain a chamber of independent sober second thought and that its essential positive characteristics are maintained.

This legislative proposal is drafted so as not to make any changes that would require a formal constitutional amendment.

The formal legal method of selection remains unchanged. The constitutional powers of the Governor General to summon Canadians to the Senate and the conventional prerogative of the Prime Minister to recommend appointments are unaffected. The constitutionally stipulated qualifications of senators are maintained, and the consultation process can take account of whatever length of term Parliament ultimately decides to establish for senators. This legislative initiative does not change the constitutional role of the Senate as the arbiter of questions respecting the qualifications of senators.

This bill provides the government with the flexibility to decide whether and when to use a consultation, in how many provinces to hold a consultation during a federal or provincial election, and for how many seats, be they vacant or not. This flexibility is important. It will help to ensure that nominees are available to fill seats as they become vacant.

For the first time ever, Canadians across Canada will have a direct say in who should represent them in the Senate; however, the bill must become law before that will happen.

That is why, in a serious effort to pass this bill and achieve a modern, accountable Senate, the government asked for this bill to be sent to a special legislative committee—this committee—before second reading.

We want to work cooperatively with the opposition parties—as we did, for example, on extending the mission in Afghanistan—to bring real change, real accountability, and real progress to the Senate. It's something that Canadian people have been consistently supporting in every opinion poll taken since we formed the government—I suspect, actually, in every opinion poll that might have been taken since slightly after Confederation.

In recent public consultations on democratic reform that were completed last year, 79% of Canadians said they supported electing senators and 65% said they supported term limits for senators. The fact is that support for Senate reform is overwhelming in Canada.

Which is why we have consistently stated that we are open to different approaches on the details of Senate reform, but we will not compromise on one fundamental aspect: the Senate must change.

However, members of this committee should note that if change cannot happen through reform, if the Senate and establishment interests demonstrate that they are resistant to the idea of a modern Senate, then we believe that the Senate should be abolished.

It's not our preferred route. We prefer to try to reform the Senate before we resort to abolishing it. But if those vested interests continue to use their unaccountable and illegitimate democratic powers to resist democratization and effectively block it, I believe abolition is a route that Canadians will want us to travel.

At the end of the day, our government is committed to modernizing the Senate to reflect the 21st century democratic principles, values and traditions of our great country.

I hope that the members of this committee will work with the government in a spirit of good faith to advance this important bill, which is overwhelmingly supported by Canadians, to help create a modern and accountable Senate.

I'd be pleased to take any questions that you have.

[The Chair, Liberal, Albina Guarnieri]

I see quorum. I'd like to call the meeting to order.

Pursuant to the House order of reference of February 13, 2008, the legislative committee on Bill C-20 will resume its study of the bill.

Before I give the floor to Minister Van Loan and his officials, I would like to take a few brief minutes to deal with housekeeping matters.

Members will have received their briefing book on the bill, prepared by the Privy Council Office, so we can expect even more profound questioning of the minister.

First, as we embark on our discovery, I would like to welcome our second analyst from the Library of Parliament. His name is Jean-Rodrigue Paré.

A special thanks to the analysts who have prepared this 22-page document. It summarizes the positions adopted by many experts and politicians on provisions similar to the ones we find in Bill C-20.

Secondly, I'd like to remind members to file their witness lists with the clerk. The preliminary one can be sent to her today, and the second and more comprehensive one on Friday. The subcommittee will meet on Monday, leaving time for testimony to be prepared.

That said, I'd like to turn the floor over to Minister Van Loan, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and Minister for Democratic Reform. He is appearing with two officials: Dan McDougall, director of operations, democratic reform; and Warren J. Newman, senior general counsel, constitutional and administrative law section.

Minister, I understand you have a statement of 10 to 15 minutes. You have the floor. Welcome.

[The Chair, Liberal, Albina Guarnieri]

Seeing a quorum,

Welcome to you all.

I'd like to welcome everyone to the first meeting of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-20. Any warm welcome requires a script full of standing orders for a sitting committee, so it is my duty to inform the committee that I have received the following communication from Speaker Milliken:

Pursuant to Standing Order 113, I am pleased to confirm your appointment as Chair of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-20, An Act to provide for consultations with electors on their preferences for appointments to the Senate.

It is my role to attempt to be a Peter Milliken look-alike, neutral in all things and I hope helpful in most matters. But I'm going to rely on my trusty clerk, who has extensive committee experience.

While I will be neutral, I expect and believe this committee wants to be in full gear very quickly. Our mission is to examine a bill about consulting Canadians on Senate appointments, and I know we will want to consult with the most able minds in the country to guide us in this effort.

I look forward to working with all committee members to complete this effort expeditiously.

I would like to move to routine procedures, but first let me introduce the clerk of the committee. I gather she's no stranger to most of you. Christine Lafrance has extensive experience, and she'll be guiding us through our proceedings. The legislative clerk attached to this committee is Marc Toupin, who's also no stranger to you. They are at your service if you have questions related to the process we are about to undertake.

First we have some housekeeping to attend to. A number of routine motions have been recommended. You have been provided with a list, and perhaps we can run through the list and determine which motions you'd like to adopt.

Do I have a mover for the first one? Are you moving a motion, Madame Folco?

[The Chair, Conservative, Barry Devolin]

I will now bring the meeting to order, please.

We are going to be continuing with our hearings on Bill C-30 today.

Before I get to our guests today, I have just a couple of comments. First of all, I'd like to thank Ms. Crowder for taking the chair on Monday in my absence.

One other general comment before we start is that before the break we had a discussion about witnesses and the agenda for the committee, and we agreed we would plan up until the two-week Easter break and for the first meeting back afterwards. There was some concern, obviously, that we might be into an election campaign. I think now it appears that is not going to happen.

I won't make any comments on that score, but it appears that we will be here longer; therefore, I'm hoping that next week we can have a meeting of the subcommittee to discuss the agenda on a go-forward basis for after the Easter break—how we're going to continue working our way through the witnesses for Bill C-30.

Procedure and House Affairs

[Gary Goodyear, Conservative, Cambridge, ON]

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to Standing Order 113(1), I have the honour to present, in both official languages, the 13th report of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs regarding the membership of the legislative committee on Bill C-20, An Act to provide for consultations with electors on their preferences for appointments to the Senate.

Senate Appointment Consultations Act

[The Deputy Speaker, NDP, Bill Blaikie]

It being 5:30 p.m., The House will now proceed to the taking of the deferred division on the motion to refer Bill C-20 to a committee before second reading.

Call in the members.

The Constitution Act, 2007 (Democratic Representation)

[Pierre Paquette, Bloc, Joliette, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I said so during my speech on Bill C-20. The National Assembly, Mr. Pelletier, the Minister for Canadian Intergovernmental Affairs, and Mr. Charest were very clear on this: the government cannot change any mechanisms pertaining to representation, whether in the Senate or the House of Commons, without consultation or constitutional amendments. This is especially true when it comes to the Senate.

Consequently, any vote we have here, especially on Bill C-20, will cause a huge constitutional wrangle. If we open the Constitution to talk about the Senate, as I said yesterday, we will also open it to talk about other aspects that are much more important to Quebec as a nation. I mentioned some of these aspects concerning the application of Bill 101, the Canadian Multiculturalism Act and many other things.

I will close with the second issue that I feel is very important. There is a consensus in Quebec. On May 17, 2007, Benoît Pelletier, the Minister for Canadian Intergovernmental Affairs and a federalist, said this:

I appreciate that the House is based on proportional representation. But I wonder whether there might be special measures to protect Quebec, which represents the main linguistic minority in Canada, is a founding province of Canada and is losing demographic weight. Why could Quebec not be accommodated because of its status as a nation and a national minority within Canada?

While I do not agree with the idea of remaining within Canada, the federalists agree with the sovereigntists: as long as we are part of the Canadian political landscape, the nation of Quebec must have guaranteed representation so that it can make its voice heard, and the federal government and the nation of Canada must respect the tools necessary for Quebec's development.

[Brian Murphy, Liberal, Moncton—Riverview—Dieppe, NB]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciated the member's speech on Bill C-22, but I would like to ask him a few questions to clarify his position. I understand that the Government of Quebec is very concerned about this government's democratic reform agenda. This means that it does not support this bill, Bill C-20 or Bill C-19.

Just so I understand, I would like to know the Bloc's position on this. It is against this bill because it wants Quebec to be recognized as a nation.

Are there any other reasons it is opposed to this bill and to the fact that the government does not consult the provinces, including Quebec? Premier Charest said that we needed to consult before changing the Senate and the number of seats in the House of Commons.

Does the member think it is a good idea for this government, or any federal government, to consult the provinces, including Quebec, about such changes and their implementation?

[Pierre Paquette, Bloc, Joliette, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I have mixed feelings at the beginning of my speech on Bill C-22. On the one hand, I am extremely proud to rise and protect the representation of the Quebec nation in the House and express my total opposition to Bill C-22. On the other, though, I have a hard time understanding the Conservatives’ obsession with repeatedly returning with bills they think are democratic pseudo-reforms.

Earlier this week, we considered the Senate consultation bill. As I said, these bills are not really priorities in my view. In the case of the Senate, we should be talking instead about abolishing an institution inherited from the British monarchy and colonial times. Bill C-22, which we are considering today, is totally at odds with the House’s and Canada’s recognition of the Quebec nation. Instead of talking about this kind of thing, I would have preferred to be here debating a bill to increase the assistance for the manufacturing and forestry industries—something that our fellow citizens need much more urgently than some review of the representation in the House of Commons or an attempt to revamp an irrelevant and completely outmoded institution like the Senate.

We could have been debating the proposals brought forward by the Bloc Québécois over the last few weeks to establish a technological partnership. This program used to exist, but the Conservatives killed it. It could be a $500 million program to encourage technological innovation. There is also the $1.5 billion loan program to help companies procure new equipment, as well as the $1.5 billion investment in the employment insurance fund, especially to establish an income support program for older workers.

Last year, 50,000 jobs were lost in Quebec. Jobs were lost in manufacturing of course. Some 150,000 have been lost over the last five years, most of them since the Conservatives came to power. There is an urgent need, therefore, to debate this plan and implement it.

Instead of that, there are bills being put before us this week, as I said, proposing a pseudo-democratic reform. As I said, I am of two minds. I would have preferred to discuss a plan to improve things for the manufacturing and forestry industries. Now that we have to discuss Bill C-22, I am extremely proud to see that the Bloc Québécois members are the only ones in this House standing up for Quebec’s interests. Even the members in the other parties who come from Quebec are not taking that approach. I would not say they do not have that courage, because that is not their mission. They are here to stand up for Canada and not to stand up for the interests of the Quebec nation. It is unfortunate, however, to see that in this case they are living up to their reputation. The only ones who care truly and without compromise about standing up for the interests of the Quebec nation are the Bloc Québécois members. I believe that the debate on Bill C-22 will provide further evidence of the need for a party like ours here in this House. Its value is undeniable, since no one else here is standing up for the interests of the Quebec nation.

We may well look at Bill C-22 from every angle and every side, and argue about how the various provinces are to be represented based on the changing demographics of Canada, but one thing will remain: objectively, this bill would marginalize the Quebec nation in terms of its position in federal institutions, and in particular, in this case, in the House of Commons.

For example, with the proposal before us, we will in fact be preserving the 75 members for the Quebec nation in this House, but since the total number of members is being increased, the proportion that the members from Quebec represent will fall from 24.4% to 22.7%. Obviously, that will continue, because as we know there is an economic boom happening in western Canada that is attracting large numbers of people who are coming either from the other provinces or from outside the country. So today it is being proposed that we go a step farther, because there have been other steps taken in the past, to marginalize the Quebec nation in the House of Commons.

The House of Commons has recognized the Quebec nation. Canada and the Canadian nation have recognized that there is a nation that is called the Quebec nation.

We have to ensure that the political weight of the Quebec nation is preserved over time.

I would remind the House that in 1840 the Act of Union brought together Upper Canada and Lower Canada, even though Lower Canada had no debt at the time—as I recall—and was much more populous. Lower Canada and its representatives agreed that Upper Canada, which had a large debt that was absorbed and a smaller population, would have exactly the same number of elected members. The people’s representatives at that time believed that there were truly two founding peoples who were coming together in a union.

I recall the speech I have read in which the representatives of Lower Canada, while recognizing that the population of Lower Canada was larger, agreed, in order to create this common political landscape, that Upper Canada would have the same number of representatives as they had.

That is the spirit that should guide all the parties in this House. They must recognize that within the Canadian political landscape there are at least two nations. In fact, there are more than that because there are also our first nations and, in my view, the Acadian nation. At present, they are not asking for any representation. That is their problem. But we feel that it is necessary to ensure that the representation of the Quebec nation, regardless of the distribution formula that may be used, is not reduced and is maintained at 25%.

That is the gist of the remarks that we will be making in the next few days. We are not talking about a province. Quebec is not a province. The Quebec state and territory are the seat of a nation that must be heard in the House of Commons; that must also have a relationship of equals with the Canadian nation. That is the great problem of Canada. It is not relations between Quebec and Canada that are the problem. It is not Quebec that causes problems in Canada as a whole. The problem is that Canada was founded on the illusion that it was made up of 10 provinces that are all equal in law and all the same, which is not true.

Canada is made up of many nations within the Canadian political landscape. It is the lack of recognition of this multinational reality that has caused a crisis in Canada for at least 30 years. The proof is right here in this House. The Conservatives are strong in the west; the Liberals are strong in Ontario; the Bloc has represented the majority of Quebec for several elections—five, if memory serves—and the NDP is all over the map. But, there is currently no pan-Canadian party. There are regional parties that defend different realities.

Had we recognized the existence of different nations within the Canadian political landscape and tried to build a political structure around that, perhaps there would not be the continuing crisis, decade after decade. Now, it is too late.

There have been attempts to tinker with the system during recent years. I am thinking of the Charlottetown and the Meech Lake accords. Now, it is very clear to more and more Quebeckers that the future lies with sovereignty for Quebec; that is a 100% repatriation of our political powers. It is not enough to try to protect, as I am now doing, 25% representation in the House of Commons.

In the meantime, however, as long as we are within the Canadian political landscape, as long as we are paying taxes to the federal government, we must ensure that we are heard as a nation and that we have the necessary representation. In our view, 25% is minimal. That now represents more or less Quebec's population within Canada. Thus, Quebec would have the opportunity to have its say here.

This goes completely against the motion adopted here. In fact, I repeat, they are trying to address the question of electoral representation through the lens of 10 provinces that must have more or less equitable representation in terms of the ratio between the member and the population represented. That is not what we are talking about, nor what we should be talking about. Instead, we should be talking about ensuring that, within each of these nations, there is adequate representation to reflect the reality of all regions of Canada and Quebec.

In that sense, if certain regions of Canada ask to have greater representation because their population has grown, so be it.

We should redistribute the seats for the entire Canadian nation to reflect the current reality. Otherwise, if we increase the number of seats for western Canada or Ontario, we must ensure that the 25% Quebec representation is maintained and proportionally increase that representation. Any number of formulas are possible, but for us, this is non negotiable. As long as we are part of Canada, we must ensure that the voice of the Quebec people can be adequately heard. That means we need a minimum representation of 25% in this House.

I would remind the House that if the government, the Prime Minister and the other Canadian parties were to be consistent with the decision they made to recognize the Quebec nation, they would have no problem voting in favour of the bill introduced by my hon. colleague from Drummond, a bill that aims to ensure that Bill 101 applies to businesses in Quebec under federal jurisdiction. But no, it is beyond comprehension. Yet it is very simple and represents perhaps 8% of the labour force that, at present, is excluded from the application of Bill 101. This could give a boost to francization in Quebec, which has lost momentum in the past few years.

Today I introduced a bill to exempt Quebec from the application of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act. Its vision of integration, assimilation and the manner in which we receive immigrants is not at all shared by Quebec. Canada's approach to integration and immigrants is very Anglo-Saxon. In fact, Canada's model is exactly the same as Great Britain's. I respect that, if that is what Canada wishes to do. We are not interested in adding ethnic groups to the Québécois nation. On the contrary, we believe that every citizen who has chosen to come to Quebec has a contribution to make. This contribution must enrich the common culture and make it possible to forge a nation whose language is French and whose culture is Québécois. This culture consists of the contributions of all citizens who make up this nation, a specific history and a territory that belongs to this nation. We call this interculturalism. It is not the Anglo-Saxon model adopted by Canada. There must be respect for the fact that Quebec, within the Canadian political landscape, constitutes a nation recognized by Canada and by the House of Commons, and can adopt a different model, which will not be thwarted by this desire for multiculturalism, which has plagued Ottawa since the Trudeau era.

It is clear that Bill C-22 completely contradicts the interests of the Quebec nation and the recognition of the Quebec nation by the House of Commons, by the Canadian nation. It should be withdrawn altogether by this government, which is what the Quebec National Assembly is calling for. I will remind hon. members that on May 16, 2007, the National Assembly unanimously adopted a motion. The National Assembly is made up of federalists and sovereigntists—all people who fully recognize there is a nation. It is not like here, in Ottawa, where it is simply a symbolic gesture. The motion reads as follows:

THAT the National Assembly ask the Parliament of Canada to withdraw Bill C-56, An Act to amend the Constitution Act, 1867, introduced in the House of Commons last 11 May;

THAT the National Assembly also ask the Parliament of Canada to withdraw Bill C-43, An Act to provide for consultations with electors on their preferences for appointments to the Senate, whose primary purpose is to change the method of selection of senators without the consent of Québec.

Bill C-56, as the bill was known before the session was prorogued, is now Bill C-22, An Act to amend the Constitution Act, 1867 (Democratic representation). We discussed Bill C-43 at the beginning of the week. Now, Bill C-20 would essentially change the method of selection of senators without the consent of Quebec.

In Quebec, federalists and sovereignists alike agree that Bill C-22 and Bill C-20 are not in Quebec's best interest and undermine the House of Commons' recognition of the Quebec nation.

Consequently, I will submit to the House an amendment to Bill C-20, seconded by the member for Terrebonne—Blainville, that reads as follows:

That the motion be amended by deleting all the words after the word “That” and substituting the following:

This House decline to give second reading to Bill C-22, An Act to amend the Constitution Act, 1867 (Democratic representation), because the bill would reduce the political weight of the Quebec nation in the House of Commons in an unacceptable manner and does not provide that 25 percent of the elected members of the House of Commons must come from Quebec.

Mr. Speaker, with your permission, I will table this amendment.

In conclusion, the Minister responsible for Intergovernmental Affairs summed up what all Quebeckers think about this when he said that as long as we are part of the Canadian political landscape—and this is a federalist talking—we must ensure that the Quebec nation has, at the very least, the minimum representation it needs to make itself heard by the Canadian nation.

Senate Appointment Consultations Act

[André Bellavance, Bloc, Richmond—Arthabaska, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank you. That is what I thought.

Since I have about two minutes left, I will immediately get to the conclusion of my speech on Bill C-20.

I am going to sum things up rather quickly by saying that the government is trying to do indirectly what it cannot achieve directly. The bill provides for the consultation of electors in a province with respect to their preferences for the appointment of senators to represent the province.

The Bloc Québécois feels, as does the vast majority of Quebeckers, that even if it is reformed, the Senate will remain a useless institution. We cannot insult the other place here, but one thing is sure. This is not meant as an insult, but in Quebec it is widely believed that we really do not need the other place.

Initially, the Senate was supposed to be a chamber of sober second thought that also protected regional interests. That is why it was created in the 19th century. Regional equality in the Senate was supposed to counterbalance representation in the House. However, it seems that partisanship has gained the upper hand over regional representation, thus rendering null and void the purpose of the other place, which has a tendency to follow the lead of the House of Commons. This is what we call—and some of my colleagues have pointed it out—duplication. Heaven knows that the Bloc Québécois is opposed to any form of duplication, and particularly so in the case of the Senate.

How can this government justify having a Senate whose responsibilities would be much like those of the House of Commons, at a cost of $81 million per year?

This was my introduction to set the stage for the rest of my speech. In short, we are totally opposed to this bill.

[Shawn Murphy, Liberal, Charlottetown, PE]

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak to Bill C-20, which talks about what I would call an advisory election. It is a piecemeal effort on Senate reform.

First, I am not opposed to Senate reform. The Senate has been with us many years now and it is something on which perhaps Canadians and parliamentarians, both federal and provincial, should have an open and honest debate. We attempted it during the Charlottetown accord and Meech Lake discussions. Unfortunately, we did not make it all the way, but I thought we had some good discussions and very constructive proposals were put on the table, which perhaps would have solved this issue once and for all.

These discussions would have to be broad reaching. They would involve the powers of the Senate. If we look at the constating documents of our country, the powers of the Senate are not really set out as to how senators are appointed or elected, the term of the Senate appointment, whether appointed or elected, and the numbers, which is a big issue for many provinces across Canada. If we look at the United States or Australian models, we would be heading toward an equal effective model. In Canada we do not have that, which is a big issue. All of these issues are worthy of discussion, debate and, hopefully, resolution.

However, to deal with it on a piecemeal basis, is the wrong way to go. At this juncture, when we have never had a discussion about Senate reform or at least a recent discussion, it would be my recommendation for the present government and Prime Minister to call the provinces together and discuss this entire issue. There has been absolutely no consultation, no discussion, no meetings, nothing, zilch, regarding any form of Senate reform and no consultation on this bill.

If we do not have consultation or meet with the provinces, the first thing that happens is the provinces of Quebec, Ontario, Yukon and New Brunswick are up in arms and against the legislation. It is difficult for people to support it. I do not think the piecemeal approach is the way to go. I would urge the government, if it is seriously interested, to try to reform the Senate and move on that basis.

We have to look at the history of the institution when our country was established in 1867. The Senate was created to represent the regions. However, the western regions did not exist at the time. In fact, there was a higher population in the Atlantic region on a percentage basis than there is now. That is the way the Senate was adopted then. It reflected the dual cultural and linguistic nature of the country. Since then, it has not evolved to meet the changing nature or fabric of Canada.

The people who debate this issue should look at what happened in Australia and the United States. United States senators were originally appointed, I believe, by the state legislatures. Eventually there was an evolution to an elected Senate. In that case there is an equal Senate with the powers defined. In this case, we would not have that. There would be nothing to deal with the powers involved, which would be a quagmire. I suggest there be some effort made with the provinces to discuss Senate reform.

I realize there were efforts made in the Charlottetown accord and the Meech Lake accord and these efforts did not bear fruit. I know that. I believe Charlottetown was the last accord. Ever since those accords were voted down, there really has not been an effort. Probably people were sick and tired of it and just did not want to go into the discussion about Senate reform again. It was put on the back burner. It was not a priority for the provincial governments. It was not a priority for Canadians.

However, perhaps it is time to dust off the briefing books. It is time to dust off some of the position papers to look at this whole issue and it is time to call the provinces together. That is the most important point I will make in my debate this afternoon. To try to do this as the federal legislature without any consultation, without any meetings, without any discussions with the provinces, I submit is foolhardy.

I find it a little hypocritical for the government of the day to be doing this. I was really quite offended at the actions of the government, because in his very first item of business upon being sworn in after the election, the Prime Minister appointed to the Senate his campaign chair, who continued to be the campaign co-chair in the federal election of 2006. There was no talk of an election. There was no talk of a consultative process. The Prime Minister appointed him to the Senate.

Perhaps I would not have been offended at that, as it has certainly happened before, but the next thing the Prime Minister did was appoint him as an unelected Minister of Public Works and Government Services. For the last 25 months, he has been around Ottawa as the unelected Minister of Public Works and Government Services. He spends approximately $43 million each and every day. He answers no questions in this House. He answers no questions in the Senate.

I have absolutely no idea what this gentleman looks like. I have no idea what he does and I never will. No one else in this House is any wiser than I am insofar as that particular person. He is, I submit, accountable to absolutely no one.

I do not want anyone here to get me wrong. I do not have any problem with a discussion on Senate reform. I think it would be healthy for the nation, but I certainly think it is not going anywhere unless we involve the provinces. I submit and suggest that the government should call a first ministers meeting with one item on the agenda: Senate reform. They should talk about the powers, the numbers, the appointment process and the term.

The government should put everything on the table and just see if there is any common ground. It should just make an effort. It may be unsuccessful, and it would not surprise me if it were unsuccessful, but the government should see if there is any common ground that can be worked at between the federal government and the provincial governments representing all provinces. So if there is any resolution to this issue, certainly it would be advisable.

Again, on dispute resolution, as I said, when we look at the Constitution we see that there are the powers of the House--and we can only have one confidence chamber--and the powers of the Senate. They really are not delineated, so if we had followed this process to its nth result, we would I guess have a Senate that is elected by advisory elections. How is any dispute to be resolved in future years? These are unanswered and disturbing questions.

Again, let us look at other jurisdictions, especially Australia. I would urge members to look at this and bring Australian experts here to see if there is any common ground so that we can move forward.

As my time is up, let me close by saying that the tenor of my comments and my position are clear. I believe that the time has come and that maybe we should have a broader discussion rather than trying to accomplish this on a piecemeal basis.

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to resume the remarks I had begun concerning Bill C-20 prior to question period. First, I want to repeat for the benefit of those listening that the Bloc Québécois will be opposing this bill.

Everyone knows very well that the Bloc Québécois has always said that it would be a waste of time to reform the Senate and that the only proper reform for this Senate would be to simply abolish it. That would represent real savings for the taxpayers. In any case, there is no longer an upper chamber in any of the provinces. It has already disappeared in Quebec, among others.

I began my remarks by saying that the Conservatives make election promises and then appear to keep them. It is one way of doing things. It is true that during the election campaign the Conservative party decided to promise Senate reform by making it an elected Senate. However, it must be understood that while it is nice to have dreams and make election promises, we are far from the reality.

I gave a first example: yes, the Conservatives promised legislation on transparency, on ethics and all of that. Strangely, the only members of this House who have not had their election expenses reimbursed by the Chief Electoral Officer are more than 60 Conservatives, including three ministers from Quebec, including the Minister of Transport and the Minister of Canadian Heritage. All of them failed to comply with requirements and have made expenditures that are not allowable and contrary to the Canada Elections Act. That is why those Conservative members have not been reimbursed for their election expenses. They promised legislation on transparency, ethics and integrity, and they are the only members whose election expenses have been refused by the Chief Electoral Officer because, obviously, they asked for reimbursement of expenditures they were not entitled to make.

Once again, when we look at the bill before us dealing with Senate reform, we recognize that the Conservatives made a promise. However, there is one problem: the only real way to reform the Senate is to re-open the Constitution, and that is not what they said.

First, in 1970, the Supreme Court of Canada, in a judgment entitled “The Supreme Court of Canada in Re: Authority of Parliament in relation to the Upper House, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 54”, stated that decisions related to the Senate are “essential” and that any reforms affecting the powers of the Senate must be carried out in accordance with the re-opening of the Canadian Constitution. Therefore, the consent of the provinces is necessary.

On this subject, it is all very well to introduce Bill C-20, but, in the end, to get around the Constitution, here is what the Conservative party is doing in trying to keep its election promise: it will hold elections, although the Prime Minister will not be obliged to accept the results of the election. So, they will hold elections for senators and afterwards, the Prime Minister will have the option of choosing senators from among the persons who were elected, since, under the Constitution, he is the one who chooses senators and appoints them.

First, quite simply stated, these amount to phony elections, because there is no guarantee that the Prime Minister will abide by the choice of the electors. Next, it is quite obvious they are simply trying to give a false representation of the principles of democracy. That is how the Conservative government is trying to operate: by distorting democracy.

In one particular case, the Chief Electoral Officer did not fall for that kind of manoeuvre. That is why 67 Conservative members did not have their election expenses reimbursed. They tried to manipulate the Canada Elections Act to go beyond the set limit for the reimbursement of expenses and now they are trying to manipulate the Constitution.

The province of Quebec responded very clearly through its Minister for Canadian Intergovernmental Affairs, Benoît Pelletier, who is not a sovereignist but a Liberal MNA. On November 7, he issued this warning to the federal government. I will read his statement:

The Government of Quebec does not believe that this falls exclusively under federal jurisdiction.

Minister Pelletier was talking about the Senate.

Given that the Senate is a crucial part of the Canadian federal compromise, it is clear to us that under the Constitution Act, 1982, and the regional veto act, the Senate can be neither reformed nor abolished without Quebec's consent.

On the same day that the Quebec Minister for Canadian Intergovernmental Affairs issued this statement, the following motion was passed unanimously by the National Assembly, that is by all parties, both sovereignist and federalist:

That the National Assembly of Quebec reaffirm to the Federal Government and to the Parliament of Canada that no modification to the Canadian Senate may be carried out without the consent of the Government of Quebec and the National Assembly.

And yet it is quite clear. In the opinion of the Bloc Québécois, at least, the Senate is a fine example of why Canadian federalism does not work. No constitutional amendments ever attempted have ever been accepted. The Conservatives are providing an even better example by trying to erode and circumvent the Constitution, by introducing a bill about electing senators. This will not be a real election, because ultimately it is the Prime Minister who will make the choice. He wants to have some kind of consensus through elections and he reserves the right, if he does not agree with the person who is elected, to appoint someone else.

The Conservatives will have invented just about anything. Every day, they pull a rabbit out of their hat. It is quite entertaining to see Conservative members from Quebec, or even ministers, going against the decision of the National Assembly of Quebec and trying, in addition, to distort and circumvent the Canadian Constitution in order to achieve their ends because they had the misfortune to make a campaign promise they could not keep. That is the reality. Quebeckers, who gave the Bloc Québécois a large majority, understood it well.

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak on behalf of the Bloc Québécois on Bill C-20, which provides for consultations with electors on their preferences for appointments to the Senate.

Hon. members will know by now that the Bloc Québécois will oppose any reform of the Senate, because the Bloc simply wants to abolish the Senate.

I am happy to speak, because we hear all sorts of incredible things here, and it makes me smile to hear the Conservative members say that they have kept the promises they made in the last election, when every day their actions tell quite a different story.

I remember that they wanted to introduce a bill on transparency, ethics and integrity. More than 60 Conservative members still have not been reimbursed for their election expenses. Three of those members are ministers from Quebec, including the Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities and the Minister of Canadian Heritage, Status of Women and Official Languages. The Conservatives promised transparency and integrity, but the only members of this House who have not been reimbursed for their election expenses are Conservatives.

So that is the sort of bill the Conservative Party introduces. This bill on Senate reform is another good example.

True, the Conservatives promised that there would be an elected Senate, but what they are proposing is an elected Senate that violates the Canadian Constitution. Everyone, including the Supreme Court, agrees that the only way to have a Senate that is truly elected and complies with the law is to amend the Constitution. The Conservative Party has introduced a bill that provides for electing senators, but allows the Prime Minister to decide whether or not to honour the will of the electors.

Once again, the Conservatives are trying to tell us that they are keeping their election promises, but they have manipulated all the laws, just as they manipulated the law on political party funding and the Canada Elections Act. This is the same thing. The Conservatives are manipulating the laws to serve their own purposes, when the position of the Government of Quebec has always been clear. It is not shared by the Bloc Québécois, but this is the position taken by the National Assembly of Quebec on November 7, 2007. A motion was unanimously adopted in the National Assembly and reads as follows:

That the National Assembly of Québec reaffirm to the federal government and to the Parliament of Canada that no modification to the Canadian Senate may be carried out without the consent of the Government of Québec and the National Assembly.

[Luc Malo, Bloc, Verchères—Les Patriotes, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I rise to discuss Bill C-20, An Act to provide for consultations with electors on their preferences for appointments to the Senate. Like my Bloc Québécois colleagues, I do not agree with the principle of this bill, and therefore, with it being sent to committee.

I would like to remind members that last November, members of the Quebec National Assembly unanimously adopted the following motion:

That the National Assembly of Québec reaffirm to the Federal Government and to the Parliament of Canada that no modification to the Canadian Senate may be carried out without the consent of the Government of Québec and the National Assembly.

Whether or not they share the views of the Bloc Québécois regarding Quebec's future, the three parties represented at the National Assembly all agree on this important point. The Canadian Parliament cannot unilaterally change the Senate.

Despite how quick the Conservative government is to boast about recognizing the Quebec nation, it is infringing the interests of that nation by introducing Bills C-20 and C-22.

First, it is proposing to reform the Senate without consulting Quebec, thus going against the governing consensus in the National Assembly that has been expressed on more than one occasion. Reforming the Senate “piecemeal” by way of legislation allows it to avoid reopening the constitutional debate. Second, the federal government is proposing to reduce Quebec’s weight in the House of Commons, as the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Works in fact made a point of emphasizing in a mailing to his constituents.

Quebec and the provinces must necessarily be involved in any change to the essential characteristics of the Senate, that is, everything relating to the powers of senators, the number of senators a province is entitled to and the residence requirements for senators. Legislation is therefore not the appropriate route for Senate reform, and this is also the opinion of the Government of Quebec.

Obviously, sovereigntists in Quebec have long understood that Canadian institutions could not be reformed and that it was impossible to amend the Canadian constitution in a meaningful way: the political party to which I belong is founded on that understanding.

As well, there are many countries that have adopted a unicameral parliament: Sweden and Denmark are but two examples of countries whose democratic credentials cannot be doubted, and that are even the envy of many nations in several respects. There is also the oldest parliament in the world, the Icelandic Althing, whose origins go back to the 10th century and which abolished its upper chamber in 1991.

It may be worth pointing out that Quebec and the Canadian provinces that had a similar institution in the past abolished their upper chambers several decades ago. In 1968, for example, almost 40 years ago, Quebec chose to abolish its Legislative Council. During the debate on the bill that was introduced for that purpose, a number of speakers rose to speak on the question of whether or not this kind of institution should be retained. Some of the things said in 1968 may still apply today.

At the time, René Lévesque was the member for Laurier. He had been the leader of the unified sovereignist forces under the banner of the Parti Québécois for a little over a month. I would now like to read a passage from the debates of the National Assembly, which was still known as the Legislative Assembly at the time. I will take a few liberties with the speech delivered by René Lévesque, whose easily recognizable intonation and manner of expression come shining through right down to the punctuation in the text. Obviously, I will not attempt to reproduce his very distinctive delivery. Here is what René Lévesque said on November 26, 1968, about the upper chamber:

I think it would be a good idea to remember that the institution we call the Legislative Council, which remains fundamentally unchanged, is rooted, here and elsewhere, in a society that witnessed the birth of democracy. It goes back to a time before our societies' acceptance of democratic institutions. In most cases, regardless of what we call these kinds of institutions—Senate, upper chamber, House of Lords, and so on—they were created at the behest of privileged members of society when it became clear that divine right monarchies everywhere were losing their old absolute power over citizens. These kinds of councils and institutions were created with the intention of reining in the will of the people being freely expressed through universal suffrage.

After hearing that, people may point out that the Conservative government's proposed reform seems to have been inspired by democratic principles because it provides, at least indirectly, for the election of senators. I, however, feel that an elected Senate would only confuse matters and mess up the entire legislative process.

In the beginning, the supposed role of the upper chamber was to protect regional interests. However, it seems that partisanly appointed senators tend to represent the interests of the party that appointed them. To hide that obvious disparity, the member for LaSalle—Émard, when he was Prime Minister, decided to appoint senators affiliated with other parties, so as not to stack the deck too much. Indirectly electing senators would not solve the problem because political affiliations would be even more evident.

In reality, by proposing this Senate reform, the Conservative government is trying to marginalize Quebec. In June 2006, Marc Chevrier, a professor in the Department of Political Studies at the Université du Québec à Montréal, wrote the following:

—equality of the provinces in the Senate clashes with the idea of Quebec being a distinct nation. To enshrine such equality is to finish what was started in 1982: bringing Quebec into line by forestalling its demands as a nation. Basically, the Harper and Trudeau governments, whose ideologies differ so fundamentally—

[Kevin Sorenson, Conservative, Crowfoot, AB]

Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure to speak this afternoon in the House of Commons and to represent the good folks of Crowfoot, Alberta, central and east central Alberta.

This is one of those subjects that is dear to the heart of, I think, most Canadians. When we consult Canadians about the importance for the democratization of Parliament and the democratization of our institutions in Parliament, most Canadians point to the Senate and say that we should reform it or abolish it but that we must make certain that the status quo does not remain.

Consequently, that is what prompted the government to bring forward Bill C-20, to bring forward positive change to an institution that needs it.

I remember many years ago in the late 1980s, probably even the mid-1980s, when there was change sweeping across the country. A new political party started in the west and a new political party started in Quebec. They were new parties with new ideas. Canadians at that point in time were very disappointed when they looked at the Senate. They saw an institution that was not functioning right. We saw cases where there were senators who spent most of their time in Mexico and it frustrated Canadians knowing that they were paying with their tax dollars to allow this type of so-called representation to take place.

At that point in time, Albertans, especially in the area where I live, started to talk about the need for this type of Senate reform. Ideas came forward. At that point in time, a Senate election was held and a gentleman by the name of Stan Waters became the senator in waiting in Alberta.

The prime minister of the day, Prime Minister Mulroney, and that government eventually saw Senator Waters appointed to the upper chamber, the Senate, and we saw representation.

Mr. Waters travelled throughout Alberta, throughout the west and throughout Canada talking about the need for Senate reform. I recall those meetings and I recall having him even to my small community in Alberta. I recall him talking about how the Senate started, how the Fathers of Confederation realized the importance of representation by population. When they formulated the idea of this House, they knew that representation by population was a fundamental in democracy and they wanted to achieve that.

As we have already heard in other speeches today, the body of Parliament was formed into constituencies and that is the way that the House still is.

However, the Fathers of Confederation spent much of their time as well debating, planning and strategizing as to what the Senate would look like. They realized at the time that in a country as large as Canada, a country with the huge differences in geography, the differences from the east to the west, that we needed something to balance out representation by population so that our regions would be protected. They realized at the time that a populace area would have the ability to take advantage of less populated areas, take advantage of those resources and take advantage of many of the issues that less populated areas wanted. Consequently, they came up with this idea of a Senate that would not be as political and as partisan as this House.

We talk about partisanship within the House of Commons. To be quite honest, I think it always will be partisan because we are elected in political parties with very different political agendas.

The balance in all of this was to have a Senate that could sit back, represent regions and ensure their area and their district were not taken advantage of.

I had the opportunity of sitting with a Liberal senator on the plane one day and I appreciated what he said. He talked about how in the very early days, I am not certain if it was in Confederation or perhaps when he started sitting in the Senate, maybe that was even in early Confederation, Senators were not even allowed into caucus meetings because there was a differentiation between the Senate and the House, and it was not to be as political.

We can see that what has happened is that we have moved away from that type of time and we see now where the Senate is very political. We see now where the Senate is halting legislation that the government is bringing forward. We have heard the speeches this afternoon about the number of prime ministers who have only appointed senators from their own political parties. Why? It is because they realized that it was a political appointment. Many of them were nothing more than fundraisers for political parties and now they sit in the Senate.

The current legislation comes along because Canadians are saying that they want their Senate to become more accountable and democratic.

Last Saturday evening in my riding of Crowfoot, I had the opportunity to attend a meeting that was a fundraiser in preparation for a potential election, a fundraiser where we had 300 people on a night that was remarkably cold, probably with a wind chill colder than minus 30, in Trochu, Alberta. Individuals came together to talk about what was happening here in Parliament and what was happening throughout the country.

Senator Brown came to the meeting and gave a speech. He was there with his wife and she received a remarkable ovation, as well. If anyone knows Alice, they would understand why that would be, but Senator Brown gave a clear indication as to why he felt that this hope of Senate reform was still alive.

He talked about speaking to provinces, about going out and talking to premiers, and explaining the reasons why this was not just good for one part of the country but why this was good for all parts of the country, and how premiers now were starting to understand that this kind of legislation, Bill C-20, is doable.

Why do I say it is doable? Bill C-20 is not facilitated by the opening of a constitutional debate. It is legislation that very simply would allow individuals to elect, allow individuals a voice, and allow individuals a say in who would represent their areas in the Senate.

That is why we re-introduced the bill. This is not something that is going to divide our country. Very clearly, one of the priorities of the government is to keep a strong unified country. We will not bring forward any type of legislation that would bring disunity to our country.

Our economy is strong, our government is clean and the country is together. We are unified. We are seeing that today and the legislation is not to pit one area against another but it is to allow all Canadians to have a voice in who would sit and represent them in the Senate.

We promised in the last election, and also brought it forward in the Speech from the Throne, that we would take a step-by-step approach to reforming the Senate. In some ways I wish that we were sitting here today and had a bill that was very similar to what we used to call the triple E Senate. That is not what this bill is about.

Many of my constituents would say the bill is not enough. I would tell them this is an incremental step in the reform of an institution that so desperately needs it. All Canadians recognize that the Senate must change. I think most of us here in the House recognize and realize there has to be some change. The status quo is not good enough.

The government is committed to leading that change. For that reason we bring forward this bill and we are excited to debate it in the House.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I want to voice my support for the bill. It is important that we start modifying and modernizing the Senate.

I do not agree with the Bloc member in wanting to abolish the Senate. The Senate does a lot of good work. If we look at some of the committee work it has done, even in its special interest and the heavy patronage that happens there, it still accomplishes a lot of good work. It is important to have that sober second thought go through the bills and motions that come from this House.

We need to look at the big picture. If we look at other parliaments and congresses across the Americas, almost all of them run in bicameral parliaments, just like we do, and all of them have elected senates. Whether it is Chile, Colombia, Brazil, the United States or Mexico, they all have elected senates.

We need to move down that path and Bill C-20 would help us to do that and to finally get rid of the palace of patronage. It is time for us to look at the hard facts. We are moving forward with proper bills to limit the terms of senators to eight years. We are moving ahead to have an election as a consultation with voters across the country to select the senators they want sitting in the palace of patronage and essentially change that into a functional democracy, the way it should be.

[Richard Nadeau, Bloc, Gatineau, QC]

Mr. Speaker, the Bloc Québécois is opposed to the bill concerning the appointment of senators. Parliament cannot reform the Senate unilaterally or without a constitutional amendment. At any rate, even a reformed Senate is a useless institution.

Canadian institutions cannot be reformed. The numerous attempts to reform the Senate illustrate perfectly the “Canadian dead end.” Proposals to reform the Senate date back as far as 1874. Barely seven years after the creation of the Dominion of Canada, the Senate was the subject of criticism and calls for reform.

A motion in April 1874, by member of Parliament David Mills, recommended that “our Constitution ought to be so amended as to confer upon each Province the power of selecting its own Senators, and of defining the mode of their election”. Now, 133 years later, we are still debating this issue. Senator Serge Joyal, who wrote a book on Senate reform, identified at least 26 proposals for Senate reform in the past 30 years alone.

The Bloc Québécois believes that the Senate reform proposed by the current government is a slap in the face for Quebec federalists. The minimum position of successive Quebec governments has always been clear: no Senate reform without first settling the question of Quebec’s status.

In 1989, Robert Bourassa said he did not want to discuss Senate reform until the Meech Lake accord was ratified. In 1992, Gil Rémillard said that signature by Canada of an accord involving Senate reform would depend on the outcome of negotiations on the concept of a distinct society, division of powers and the federal spending power.

By means of Bills C-19 and C-20, the current Conservative Prime Minister is trying to reform the Senate piecemeal, without having satisfied the minimum conditions stipulated by Quebec.

Clearly the Senate cannot be changed unilaterally and without a constitutional amendment. The Canadian Constitution is a federal constitution. Consequently, there are reasons why changes to the essential characteristics of the Senate cannot be made by Parliament alone and should be part of the constitutional process involving Quebec and the provinces.

In the late 1970s, the Supreme Court of Canada examined Parliament's ability to amend on its own the constitutional provisions concerning the Senate. According to its decision, known as “Authority of Parliament in relation to the Upper House”, in 1980, decisions pertaining to major changes to the essential characteristics of the Senate cannot be made unilaterally.

All reforms of Senate powers, the means of selecting senators, the number of senators to which each province is entitled and residency requirements for senators, can only be made in consultation with Quebec and the provinces.

Benoît Pelletier, the Quebec Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, and MNA for Chapleau, reiterated Quebec's traditional position on November 7, 2007, which was not so long ago:

The Government of Quebec does not believe that this falls exclusively under federal jurisdiction. Given that the Senate is a crucial part of the Canadian federal compromise, it is clear to us that under the Constitution Act, 1982, and the regional veto act, the Senate can be neither reformed nor abolished without Quebec's consent.

That same day, in November 2007, Quebec's National Assembly unanimously passed the following motion—I hope the government is listening:

That the National Assembly of Québec reaffirm to the Federal Government and to the Parliament of Canada that no modification to the Canadian Senate may be carried out without the consent of the Government of Québec and the National Assembly.

Quebec is not alone in opposing the idea of an elected Senate. The outgoing Premier of Saskatchewan, Lorne Calvert, and the Premier of Manitoba, Gary Doer, have called for abolishing the Senate instead of trying to reform it. The Premier of Ontario, Dalton McGuinty, has also expressed concerns about whether electing senators to the Senate might not make the inequalities even worse.

In summary, indirect election of senators would change the rapport between the House of Commons and the Senate. These changes cannot be made unilaterally without the consent of the provinces and without the consent of Quebec, recognized as a nation by the House of Commons. Whether the Senate is reformed or not, it is a useless institution.

Initially, the Senate was supposed to be a chamber of sober second thought that also protected regional interests. Regional equality in the Senate was supposed to counterbalance representation in the House. However, it seems that partisanship has gained the upper hand over regional representation, thus rendering null and void the purpose of the other place, which has a tendency to follow the lead of the House of Commons.

How can this government justify having a Senate whose responsibilities would be much like those of the House of Commons at a cost of $81 million per year? All the provinces have done away with their upper chambers. No province has had an upper chamber since Quebec abolished its legislative council in 1968, and as far as I know, the provinces are able to govern appropriately.

Bill C-20 would not make the Senate democratic. Public consultation is not binding. Bill C-20 provides for public “consultation” to choose senators. The Prime Minister maintains the authority to appoint or not appoint the senators chosen by the public. The Prime Minister could therefore decide not to appoint a candidate selected by the public. The background paper provided by the government concerning this bill states: “The Prime Minister can take into account the results of the consultation when making recommendations to the Governor General regarding future representatives of a province or territory in the Senate”.

Besides, how can we trust this Prime Minister, who did not hesitate to appoint Michael Fortier to the Senate, even though he himself criticized the Liberals' partisan appointments to the Senate? The current Prime Minister's real motivation is to marginalize the nation of Quebec. Under the pretext of an orthodox reform of federalism, the Conservative government is proposing shattering the balance of the federation.

In Australia and the United States, having an elected senate has enhanced the legitimacy of the federal government and has “nationalized” public life rather than serve the representation of the federated states within federal institutions. To be heard in Congress, the American states have been reduced to being lobbyists. Senators elected to represent an entire province would overshadow the authority of the provincial premiers and run the risk of supplanting them as regional representatives. That is what the proponents of a “triple E” Senate want: a federal Parliament that would be more legitimate because its elected members were more sensitive to regional interests. Quebeckers would never stand idly by as their own province blithely accepted Senate reform.

[Gord Brown, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I welcome the opportunity to speak about Bill C-20.

Electoral reform is something that I hear about often from my constituents in Leeds—Grenville. Always at the top of their list is what we are going to do about the Senate. I would like to take this opportunity to give a bit of the history of discussions about changing the Senate in our country.

First, dissatisfaction with the Senate as produced for us by the Fathers of Confederation--the Senate being something which they spent more time talking about than any other subject at the conferences leading up to Confederation in 1867--began almost immediately.

In 1874 there was an extensive debate in the Parliament of Canada about reforming the Senate and in particular, the appointment process, but nothing happened.

In 1887 at the first interprovincial meeting of premiers, there was a call for an elected Senate, but nothing happened.

In 1906 through to 1909, there were extensive debates in both federal houses about Senate reform, but again, nothing happened.

In 1921, Liberal leader Mackenzie King included Senate reform in his party's election platform. This was followed by extensive debates in both houses in 1924 and 1925 on the need for reform of the Senate, and again, nothing happened.

At the 1927 Dominion-Provincial Conference, Senate reform was a main topic of discussion. All the politicians said there was a need for reform, but again, nothing happened.

There were extensive debates in the Senate in 1951 and in the House in 1955 on the need for Senate reform. Again, nothing happened.

In 1965, the Pearson government, following up on a bill introduced by the previous Diefenbaker government, was able to have passed through Parliament an amendment reducing the terms of senators from life to age 75. That was not very revolutionary, to say the least. And that was it. There has really been no change in the formal structure of the Senate since that time.

In 1972, a special joint House and Senate committee, the Molgat-McGuigan committee, held extensive hearings across the country and recommended the need to reform the appointment process for the Senate, if nothing else. Again, nothing happened.

In 1978, the Trudeau Liberal government proposed a bill which would abolish the Senate and replace it with a new body to be known as the house of the provinces, with at least half of the members chosen by the provinces. Again, in the end, nothing happened.

After that, there was a series of commissions and studies: the Pepin-Robarts committee in 1979; the Quebec Liberal Party beige paper in 1980; the House-Senate joint committee, the Molgat-Cosgrove committee in 1984; the Macdonald commission in 1985; the House-Senate joint committee, the Beaudoin-Dobbie committee, in 1992. All recommended basic reform in the appointment process, with election most often as the preferred option, but again, nothing happened.

One of the reasons there was this continued pattern of engaging in public discussion of basic Senate reform followed by no action was that often the argument was made that such reform could only be tied in with other more comprehensive constitutional changes. Thus, attempts at that method, such as what happened in the Charlottetown efforts, failed. The other reason is that the government could then use all of that as an excuse for why nothing gets done.

I am hearing the same refrain and the same arguments coming now from those who still do not want to reform the Senate, in particular, those in the Liberal Party. That is because continued inaction on this file is in their clear partisan self-interest.

However, this government, unlike all previous governments, has chosen not to hide behind these excuses and long history of non-achievement. We have decided to boldly move forward with that incremental reform that we know for sure the federal Parliament and government can initiate and accomplish on its own without going down the complicated path of formal constitutional amendments involving the provinces or some kind of wholesale reopening of the Constitution, something that we know would be very difficult.

In the first session of this Parliament, we introduced two quite modest bills to get the ball rolling in a very serious way to achieve Senate reform. There was Bill S-4, to reduce the term of all future Senate appointees from the current potential of 45 years, something which my constituents find quite offensive, in that someone who is appointed at age 30 is able to sit until the mandatory retirement age of 75. We wanted to change the term to eight years.

The bill would provide for the ability of the Prime Minister to consult Canadians on their preferences as to who should serve them in the Senate before making such appointments.

What is the actual atrocious record of Senate appointments that both major political parties, while in government, not including the current government, have been of guilty since Confederation?

Sir John A. Macdonald, our first prime minister, in 19 years of office appointed only 1 Liberal and 1 Independent. The rest were all Conservative. I would personally not see that as a bad thing.

However, as I go on, Sir Wilfrid Laurier in his 15 years in office appointed only Liberals.

Sir Robert Borden, in his nine years of office appointed only Conservatives, except when he led a union coalition government during the war.

Mackenzie King in his 22 years in office appointed 103 senators and all but 2 were Liberals.

Louis St. Laurent in his nine years in office appointed fifty-five senators and all but three were Liberals.

John Diefenbaker in his six years in office appointed thirty-seven senators and all but one were Conservative.

Lester Pearson in his five years in office appointed thirty-nine senators and all but one were Liberal.

Pierre Trudeau in his 15 years of office appointed 81 senators and all but 11 were Liberals.

Joe Clark in his nine months in office appointed eleven senators, all of them Conservative.

Brian Mulroney in his nine years of office appointed fifty-one senators, some of whom are still sitting in the Senate today, and all but two of them were Conservatives. One of the two was Stan Waters, appointed as a Reform senator by Mr. Mulroney due to his election by the voters of Alberta in the spirit of Meech Lake, which we all know failed in the end.

Jean Chrétien in his 10 years in office appointed 75 senators and all but 3 were Liberals.

Paul Martin in his 23 months in office appointed 17 senators, only 5 of whom were not Liberal.

Neither Kim Campbell nor John Turner appointed any senators, although Turner did Trudeau's bidding in that regard, as we know. It was something that was very prominent in the election of 1984.

I have had an equal opportunity to be a critic of both major parties that have held office. However, when it comes to the current Prime Minister, we finally have a breaking of this historical pattern.

Since taking office only 21 months ago, the Prime Minister has only made 2 appointments to the Senate, and there are currently 13 vacancies. One of those appointments, Senator Fortier, was to ensure that the island of Montreal was represented in the cabinet, with the commitment from that appointee that he would resign his seat in the Senate as soon as the general election was called, and seek election to the House.

The other was the recent appointment of Senator Bert Brown on the basis that he, on two separate occasions, was democratically chosen by the people of Alberta as their preference to be selected to serve in the Senate.

Therefore, the government has done as much as it can to break this pattern of no action on Senate reform. It is now up to the opposition parties in the House and the Liberal majority in the Senate to wake up and smell the political coffee. There will either be reform or Canadians might well choose abolition.

I have laid out quite clearly the history of what has happened in terms of efforts to reform the Senate, but the bill goes a long way toward moving the ball forward, which Canadians support. I I urge the other parties to support the bill.

[Diane Bourgeois, Bloc, Terrebonne—Blainville, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his question.

There is no consensus as such on the idea of totally abolishing the Senate. It is not a top priority. However, the Bloc Québécois has noticed that the minimum condition set by successive governments in Quebec on Senate reform has always been clear: there will be no Senate reform without first settling the question of Quebec's status.

I mentioned earlier that in 1989 Robert Bourassa said that he did not wish to discuss Senate reform before the Meech Lake accord was ratified. In 1992, Gil Rémillard said that Quebec's signing of an agreement on Senate reform would depend on the outcome of negotiations on the concept of a distinct society, the division of powers and the federal spending power.

Finally, with Bill C-20, the government is proceeding with piecemeal reform of the Senate without satisfying the minimum conditions stipulated by Quebec.

[Marc Lemay, Bloc, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I listened intently to my colleague's remarks and I see great logic in her arguments. That it exactly the position of the Bloc Québécois.

However, I heard a Conservative member say this morning that the Bloc wanted to see the Senate abolished because there would be fewer federalists representing Quebec in Ottawa. He added that that was the reason why the Conservatives wanted to make changes and, through Bill C-20reform the Senate.

I would like my colleague to tell me if there is a consensus in Quebec with regard to the potential abolition of the Senate—which some of us hope for.

[Diane Bourgeois, Bloc, Terrebonne—Blainville, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to have the chance to speak to this bill entitled An Act to provide for consultations with electors on their preferences for appointments to the Senate.

From the outset I would like to say that we are against referring this bill to committee before second reading. In fact, we are against the very principle of the bill, and we believe that no amendment in committee could make it acceptable.

I would add that a lot of hypocrisy surrounds the tabling of this bill. To support that claim, consider that the Senate currently consists of 61 Liberals, 24 Conservatives and 4 independents. I say it is hypocritical because the current government is very uncomfortable with the Senate and the people in it. It is also uncomfortable with the work done by the Senate.

We are against this bill because we think that Canadian institutions cannot be reformed. Just look at the Meech and Charlottetown accords. Twice Canada has rejected the aspirations of Quebec.

Furthermore, the Bloc Québécois was born in 1990, as hon. members will remember, precisely because Canada could not be reformed. Even the Harper government admits that Canada cannot be reformed.

[Randy Kamp, Conservative, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to have this opportunity to speak to Bill C-20.

Let me begin with this statement, which members might find familiar: our “federation is only as strong as the democratic institutions that underpin it”. It might be familiar to members because this statement was affirmed by the House when it adopted the government's Speech from the Throne for this sitting of Parliament.

We might not agree on everything in this place. In fact, across the country we disagree on a variety of things related to our political process, but whatever else may divide us, I think we agree that we share a commitment and a loyalty to federalism and to democracy. We have shared loyalties to those things.

As members of the House of Commons, as representatives of Canadians, we are all committed to continuing to strengthen our federation by strengthening our democratic institutions. We can look back at the history of Parliament and see that electoral and institutional reforms aided us as we moved down the pathway of making those federal and democratic reforms.

Because of the efforts of our predecessors in these respects, Canada is a free and democratic society. In fact, we are a model for aspiring democracies the world over. Our federal structure is looked to as a guide for constitution makers and nation builders everywhere.

We have merited this reputation because we have been willing to change. We have aspired to reflect democracy's and federalism's proudest ambitions. As members of the House, we share the responsibility to carry on that proud tradition.

I am proud to represent the beautiful province of British Columbia. From time to time, I speak to people about democratic reform. They might talk to me about proportional representation. They might talk to me about the voting age. They might talk to me about a variety of things, but inevitably what I hear most about is Senate reform. This system that we have today bothers them. We need to respond to that.

The Senate must be reimagined. It must be recreated in the image of a democratic and federal Canada. I believe that our shared commitments to democracy and federalism should lead us all to the conclusion that we need to do something about the Senate.

Maintaining, protecting and promoting the reputation of Canada is a responsibility of Canadian lawmakers. The subject matter of our present debate, the Senate appointment consultations act, gives us an opportunity to fulfill this responsibility.

The extent of reform that is possible is no small undertaking. We could aim for comprehensive reform that will satisfy the full scale of federal and democratic change in the Senate. To do that, though, constitutional change is necessary.

However, short of comprehensive reform, some change can be effected by this present Parliament. I believe it is our responsibility to do what we can now and to hold on to the hope that we can do more in the not too distant future.

I believe the bill before us is a promising legislative initiative. It speaks to both the federal and the democratic ambitions of Canada and seeks to reform the Senate to promote those ambitions.

With this legislative initiative, the opinions of Canadians will be sought on whom the Prime Minister should recommend for appointment to the Senate. That is basically what the bill is all about. With this single act, we can effectuate immediate reform that will answer part of the Senate's democratic and federal deficiencies. To neglect to pursue this opportunity is to fail in our responsibilities as members of the House.

In a democracy, citizens should understand that they are participating in the law-making process and they should have that opportunity. By having the opportunity to choose their representatives, as they do in the House, they engage in that very participation.

In fact, I never lose sight of the fact that I serve here at the pleasure of the people of Pitt Meadows—Maple Ridge—Mission. Citizens have participated in the selection of every member of the House. However, citizens currently have no participatory role in choosing who sits in the Senate.

Given that the powers of the Senate in the law-making process are similar in many respects to the powers of the House, citizens similarly should be participating in the selection of senators. The Senate appointment consultations act would give them that opportunity. To deny Canadians that opportunity is to deny them their proper place in both Houses of Parliament.

In pursuit of Canada's proud democracy, we should support giving Canadians the opportunity to participate in deciding who shall sit in both Houses of Parliament.

Now in days past the decision to divide Parliament into two Houses was made in the light of the federal aspirations of Canada. The House of Commons was designed to reflect proportional representation, or at least mostly so, of all Canadians, whereas the Senate was designed to reflect Canada's regions.

The Senate appointment consultations act proposes not only to give citizens of Canada an opportunity to speak to their preferences on senatorial appointments, it also allows the regions to speak, not just individual citizens. By allowing for consultations per province, the attachment of a senatorial nominee to his or her region will be strengthened.

The member for Skeena—Bulkley Valley who spoke previously is right, I think, that most Canadians cannot name very many of the senators who represent their region. He is right about that, even in B.C. where we have a relatively small number of senators, something that also has to be fixed along the way.

I think part of that is due to the fact that we do not have any way of participating in the process. In fact, if we follow this bill and put in place a consultation process, an election by all accounts would give the opportunity for those nominees to better connect with the people in their region. So the relationship between Canada's regions and Canada's senators will be promoted by allowing citizens to have a say in who should represent them.

This may be the most important point of all, senators will owe their allegiance to the region that nominated them and elected them, and not to the Prime Minister or party that appointed them. That is a very important point. I believe this will allow the Senate to regain its constitutional status.

Some will maintain that Senate reform may well be necessary, while the democratic and federalism deficiencies are obvious, and while change is within our grasp, there are other more pressing matters than Senate reform. No doubt the members of this House face many important matters that warrant our attention. We consider them day after day. However, when properly understood, Senate reform should be recognized by all members of Parliament to be a priority.

First, this House committed itself to Senate reform by approving the government Speech from the Throne. This House committed itself during the lifetime of this Parliament to the priorities set out therein. This House has acted on many of those priorities, and now it is time to devote itself to this one.

Second, Senate reform is not a challenge that will be forgotten should we neglect to act now. The Senate is an essential component of Parliament. Unlike the position of the NDP, I believe it has an important role to play. Few actions of this House and no bill passed by this House may proceed without Senate approval.

It reflects poorly on this House that we have had for so long the possibility of correcting the democratic deficits of the Upper House and have failed to do so. Yet, we now have more than the mere possibility of acting, we now have the opportunity to act. A bill is before us and it would be to ignore our responsibility not to stand behind this legislative initiative.

Third, the call for Senate reform has been expressed both democratically and in each one of Canada's regions. Canadians, when polled, have responded enthusiastically to the proposals for Senate reform put forward by the government, including this bill, the Senate appointment consultations act. In a federal democratic state like Canada, when the democratic expressions of citizens throughout the regions affirm a legislative initiative, that should be the guide by which Parliament should act.

These are all reasons that encourage the members of this House to stand in favour of the Senate appointment consultations act. As for me, I will be proud to tell my constituents that I have fulfilled my responsibility to them as their representative in Parliament. I will be proud to tell them that when given the opportunity to support a measure that would further Canada's democratic and federal ambitions, a measure that enjoys decisive, regional and popular support, I voted in favour. I encourage all members to do the same.

[Nathan Cullen, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I enter this debate with great pleasure but also with great remorse because of the intellectual dishonesty that is being perpetrated by the government in bringing forward this bill at this time.

There is a reason that I make such harsh judgment of the government. I know it is not easy and there are certain government members who endeavour to provide honourable discourse and dialogue in this place. Yet when looking through the many pages of Bill C-20, Canadians might be left with the impression that the government is actually serious about Senate reform, somehow serious about democratic reform. This goes back to the days of the Reform Party and then the Canadian Alliance and various incarnations in between in speaking to what I believe was a sincere desire among Canadians to see some sort of accountability in all levels of office.

If the rules that were given to the Senate were applied to any other official body in this country, Canadians would be absolutely disgusted. They would be unable to understand why we would allow such an important function of government to run amok and have so few rules guiding its own merit and conduct. The ethics rules are not adhered to. On simply showing up for work, the attendance is abysmal. Before I entered politics I ran a small business. After looking at the attendance records for some senators, they would not have been hired, or if they had been hired, they certainly would have been let go as soon as possible. They simply do not show up and when they do, their effectiveness is found wanting.

Clearly there is much speculation in the media and by the pundits that we are on the eve of another election. There is potentially a series of confidence votes. The Prime Minister for some delusional reason seems interested in going back to the Canadian people for a mandate.

The government is showing its true colours in desiring an election because it is clearing the decks of all those bills. The Conservatives want to show some small significance of effort back to their base, that oh yes, they are engaged in the issue and here is their evidence and proof.

Lo and behold, like a gopher, Bill C-20 has popped up its head and pretends at some sincere effort. The government lost any momentum for discussion of the bill because it chose to prorogue Parliament. It chose to suspend Parliament which essentially killed all of the bills on the order paper that were in progress, such as its own crime bill and other bills, including this bill as well. All of that time was lost and it is more than two years since the last election.

The government introduced this bill, but allowed it to fall into the black hole of prorogation, a process which few Canadians understand. However, the government understood it well, and the desperate need for another throne speech was its excuse. It set the bill back 12 months or more and lost any kind of serious discussion.

The New Democrats are deeply interested at our core of finding a way to fix the fundamentally flawed institution that is known as the Senate in order to allow Canadians some sense that democracy is functioning and that they are getting value for money. There are 14 vacancies in the Senate and we get no sense of urgency whatsoever from the government to fill those vacancies, because ultimately those positions are filled through patronage appointments. That is the way it is done.

The government seeks credibility on this issue. It seeks to tell Canadians it is sincere about Senate reform and having true representation in the Senate. One of its first acts as a new government, having just run a campaign on accountability, was to appoint Michael Fortier from Montreal to the Senate. That was one of the first things the Prime Minister did after having spent not just weeks but months telling Canadians how sensible and accountable his government would be, how it would clean up the corruption of the Liberals. How many times did we hear it in this place from the Prime Minister and other people in his cabinet that they would not follow the record of the Liberals and not give crony patronage appointments, that they would do it differently?

One of the things the Conservatives were thinking of doing was reforming the Senate. Lo and behold, when given the reins of power, the first thing the Prime Minister decided to do was to force upon the people of Montreal a representative they did not choose. He chose to put someone into the Senate in one of the most important cabinet positions, one which controls billions of taxpayer dollars, someone who cannot be held to account in this place.

When that ministry, under his guidance, runs amok and spends money unaccountably or perhaps wrongly, he cannot be called to account. He simply cannot be given that direction and focus from this place. Canadians cannot see him, at least on the evening news, presenting his opinions in a place that was constructed to do just that. These walls were built and these desks were put in this place for that. Canadians imbued Parliament with the power to be accountable over many things. One is the law and another is the use of taxpayer dollars.

Yet the government has chosen to put an unaccountable, unelected person into the cabinet and stick that person in the Senate in order to get around this little annoyance called democracy, this little discomfort, which is that people in just about every urban centre in this country decided not to elect Conservative members. Rather than actually appeal to those voters in any kind of sensible way and present a platform on urban transit strategy or the serious issues affecting Canadians living in cities, the Conservatives decided that the appointment process was just so much easier. It is just so much easier to appoint someone to the Senate and allow that person to occupy one of the most critical positions in cabinet.

In this bill, despite the many pages and the many clauses and amendments, the government is clearly playing at the margins. It is clearly tinkering at the edges, because at the end of the day, through all the sections on voting, discrepancy and penalties, it still remains the purview and the power of only one person in this country, and that is the Prime Minister, to choose whom he or she will allow to go into the Senate.

When we craft laws in this place, we do not craft them for any particular current representation or any current manifestation of government. We seek to create laws that will last throughout governments, that will stand the test of time and be a good representation of sound thinking.

It is wrong for the government to present a bill with the pretense that perhaps this Prime Minister may choose to honour the wishes of some of the voters who are constructing some electoral options in regard to it being a truly accountable forum and in regard to this bill somehow fixing a fundamental problem. Earlier in the discussion in regard to the functioning of the Senate, I called it an old beat-up jalopy that simply will not start. It simply will not function. The government's solution is a new coat of paint and some air in the tires, perhaps with windshield wipers if they are needed.

Sometimes there were debates and moments in history where, for some miraculous, rare spot in time, the Senate actually performed a function. It actually did something admirable in one of the current policy debates, but those moments are so rare that they remind me of a strange phenomenon I was looking up earlier. I was trying to find the actual taxonomic name of a flower in the Amazon. It buds only once every 25 years. It is quite rare. No one really knows when that is going to happen and it is a news item every time. Everyone rushes to the Amazon, the cameras show up, the flower buds and shows itself, and then quickly disappears again for some unknown period of time.

When I deal with my colleagues in the Senate, as admirable as some of them may be, I find that as an institution there is absolutely no lever to pull on. There is no accountability measure. I can recall before the previous government fell that the House of Commons, in the midst of an energy concern regarding seniors on fixed incomes, sought to pass a piece of legislation that would assist low income seniors with their home heating bills. I am sure all my colleagues who were here at that time remember that debate. We all remember how the parties got together in one of those rare moments in Parliament and decided to pass a bill at all stages and allow the bill to pass on to the Senate.

I met with a senator that day on entirely another issue. He told me to go back to my leadership and tell them that the bill, which we could find all party agreement to, had no guarantee whatsoever of getting through his chamber because the Senate had to be accountable. That senator was a Liberal, and of course he had no determinants of influence or bias whatsoever in terms of what was happening here in this place electorally with his elected colleagues, and he guaranteed me that if we rushed to an election too quickly, he assured me that this bill would not go through, and how dare the NDP bring down his Liberal government.

In fact, it was a bluff, of course. The bill passed and the money was received by needy seniors across the country, but the fact, and the point of this illustration, remains, which is that the accountability of that gentleman to represent this narrow, biased and partisan view, rather than the interests of this country and the people who vote for members in this place, shows what is so fundamentally dysfunctional about what it is the Senate has come to represent, which is a minority representation, protecting minority views, those of the powerful and the elite in this country.

[Michael Savage, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to discuss Bill C-20, a bill that, by any definition, is purely political, even by Ottawa standards. Like everything we see from the government, the facts play little relevance in what it crafts as legislation or policy. This is all about politics.

Even the name, an act to provide for consultations, shows us what qualifies as consultations in the eyes of the government. It has not had discussions with the provinces and it did not take very long for provinces to speak out against this in its earlier incarnation and again now. As as my colleague from Newfoundland and Labrador mentioned, Conservatives in my province of Nova Scotia very recently spoke out about it.

The bill has little to do with reforming the Senate, but much to do about fulfilling an election promise made by the other side in order to appease their narrow base. Does the leader of the government in the House really believe a discussion, at this moment, on this topic is in tune with the needs and the realities of most Canadians?

In my riding of Dartmouth—Cole Harbour people are worried about the coming economic downturn. Is the government, which squandered away a lot of money it inherited, ready for that economic downturn? Is it ready to provide the support and the stimulus that Canadians will need to get through this difficult time?

Are students interested in this? None who I have talked to have raised this as an issue in the schools I go to on a regular basis. I always ask kids what is on their minds. They talk about the environment, Afghanistan, the high cost of tuition, literacy, social services and infrastructure that provides the social supports for which Canadian is known. They do not talk about the Senate.

It indicates that the government is either trying to waste the time of the House as we go toward an election, or it is using this as a political wedge, or both. The bill and others like it are props to be used to distort or to create the impression that the Conservatives champion change when in fact they do not.

The bill does nothing to address the issue, for example, of Senate representation. I will have that discussion. We should have a discussion about the House of Commons and about the Senate.

When we go back to the original Senate, when we had Confederation, the design of it was not bad. It was a good design. It was such that regionally there was representation in Canada. Lower Canada, Quebec, had 24 members. Upper Canada, Ontario, had 24 members. The Maritimes had 24 members. Then as the west joined Confederation, it had 24 members. Then the north and Newfoundland and Labrador joined and they were accorded seats in the Senate to represent the important regional issues that mattered to the people in those areas.

Yes, the House of Commons has a largely proportional say in voting on all the important measures of the day. The elected members of Parliament made those decisions.

The Senate is designed, not only as a chamber of sober second thought, but to provide that regional balance, and we saw that. My colleague from Timmins—James Bay, for example, suggested that Atlantic senators did nothing on the Atlantic accord. That is entirely untrue. After it passed in the House, the Senate had further hearings on the Atlantic accord. All senators from Atlantic Canada on the Liberal side voted against the budget. They did continue that fight. Probably at the end of the day, they played their role, which was to bring more attention to it. For example, the Premier of Nova Scotia came up for hearings. However, at the end of the day, the will of the elected House prevailed, but that did not make redundant the role of the Senate.

My colleague from B.C. talked about representation. I agree that my province of Nova Scotia, with 10 seats, and B.C. and Alberta with six seats, need to have that discussion. The bill does not talk about that. We need to have those discussions in a serious and positive way throughout the country.

We need to look at Senate terms as well. Let us talk about the Senate terms. Should they be lifetime to 75? I do not know. I suspect probably there is a better way of doing that, but it is not by coming forward and suggesting that we are going to have consultations, ignoring a lot of the important issues that matter across the country.

I would be very open to some kind of Senate reform package that would allow Canadians to feel they were more connected to the Senate, just as I would support some reforms in the House of Commons that would allow them to feel more connected to this chamber as well.

I want to read the May 2007 resolution from the National Assembly of Quebec, when this bill came back in its original incarnation, Bill C-56. It states:

THAT the National Assembly ask the Parliament of Canada to withdraw Bill C-56, An Act to amend the Constitution Act, 1867, introduced in the House of Commons last 11 May;

THAT the National Assembly also ask the Parliament of Canada to withdraw Bill C-43, An Act to provide for consultations with electors on their preferences for appointments to the Senate, whose primary purpose is to change the method of selection of senators without the consent of Québec.

Most recently, in the province of Nova Scotia at the Conservative annual general meeting of the struggling Conservative government of Rodney MacDonald, this proposal for elected senators was put forward to Progressive Conservatives in Nova Scotia. The report in the now defunct Daily News of Halifax the next day headlined “Tories reject Harper's plan for elected Senate”. It lead off:

[The] Prime Minister's dream of an elected Senate suffered a set back yesterday when Nova Scotia Tories defeated a resolution that asked the province's Progressive Conservative government to organize a vote this October. Delegates at the party's annual convention in Halifax voted overwhelmingly against the idea.

And a number of reasons were given.

It is not particularly creative or imaginative to run around the country and bash the Senate. It has been done for years. The language we hear of the unelected and unaccountable Senate, filled with party hacks and all that sort of stuff does not add a lot to the debate.

In fact, if we look at what the Senate has done for Canada and the work that it has done for Canada, it has actually served this country very well, not only as a chamber of sober second thought but also through its committees.

At around the same time that Mr. Romanow prepared his national commission on health care, Senator Michael Kirby produced his. They were both excellent reports and a good synopsis of the current situation.

I would suggest that the Kirby report from the Senate was every bit as good or perhaps even better in some areas than the Romanow commission report. He went on to do work on mental health which has now become sort of the hope of mental health advocates and people who suffer from mental health illness in this country. That came out of the Senate as well as Joyce Fairburn on literacy, Colin Kenny's work on military issues and a whole host of studies, some of which I individually would agree with and some of which I would not, but which no one could deny was important work.

I may be a little bit biased coming from Nova Scotia. We happen to have some pretty good senators. There is the senator from my own riding, Senator Jane Cordy, who is an outstanding senator. On the work I do on post-secondary education, Senator Willie Moore is the champion of post-secondary education.

If we talk to the AUCC, the CFS, the CASA, and the Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences and talk to the granting councils, they can tell us that they can always get a good understanding of what is happening when they talk to many of these senators who are particularly focused on this issue. Senator Terry Mercer from Halifax has done some championing work for post-secondary education.

Again, I want to go to the regional aspect of what they have done. When we talk about post-secondary education, we can talk about tuitions and the unique nature of Nova Scotia where we have the highest tuitions in the country.

We can talk about research and development. If it was not for the work, I would suggest, on the part of senators as well as Atlantic Liberal caucus members, some of the important investments through ACOA in research and development would not have happened. We need to build up the research capacity of our universities in Atlantic Canada which are very good, but they need a certain amount of attention.

I think that is a regional issue that is very important. I mentioned the accord. Even the Progressive Conservatives have nominated good senators. Senator Lowell Murray is actually a senator from Ontario but he is a Nova Scotian and he has been a champion of a lot of issues including the duplicity of this government on the Atlantic accord.

I think it is easy to bash the Senate. In fact, the Senate has done some very important work across this country. We can make changes. There is no question about that. We all want to see changes in how Parliament works. We want to see changes in this House and in the Senate, but here we are talking about this issue, when Canadians are worried about the economy, poverty, the environment, jobs, education, literacy, and the list goes on.

I cannot support this bill. I am open to discussions about Senate reform. This is not the answer. It has not been brought in with consultation. It does not meet the needs of Canadians and I will not be supporting this bill.

[Pierre Paquette, Bloc, Joliette, QC]

Mr. Speaker, as I said yesterday, right off the top, I am not very happy to speak in a debate about Motion No. 3, which would send a message to the Senate about its work on Bill C-2. I would rather have spoken about a bill that the government had introduced to increase its assistance to the manufacturing and forestry industries. If they had done that, we could have been dealing with problems that are much more urgent for our fellow citizens than Senate reform.

In any case, though, this reform does not pass muster in our view. As I said yesterday in the debate on Motion No. 3, we think the Senate is a political institution that is not only undemocratic but in the modern era has lost its very reason for being. It is simply a vestige of colonial times and the British monarchy. For these fundamental reasons we will oppose referring it to committee before second reading.

I think we would have opposed it even after second reading because we are opposed to the very principle underlying this bill. Its purpose is to reform an institution that, in our view, is no longer relevant if it ever was. There is no point trying to amend a bill in some way when it is so unacceptable in content and form and when no amendments could possibly make it acceptable. We will therefore vote against referring this bill to committee.

We disagree with the very principle of this bill because it is obvious in our view—and Canadian and Quebec history make it crystal clear—that Canada’s institutions cannot be reformed. By trying to reform the Senate through bills rather than a constitutional amendment, the Prime Minister is confirming something that was already evident to many people in Quebec. For Quebec sovereignists, of course, it is impossible in any case to make significant changes to the Canadian constitution, even more so when taking into account the national reality of Quebeckers.

It is also deeply shocking to see the Conservative government and the Prime Minister bring in bills with which not only the Bloc Québécois but also the National Assembly of Quebec have said they disagree. This is true of both Bill C-20 and Bill C-22, the latter dealing with a redistribution of seats in the House of Commons.

Each time, it is clear that behind these changes—I am not even talking about reforms, because I think the word “reform” has a positive connotation—there is never any will to take into consideration the existence of at least two nations within the current Canadian political space: the Quebec nation, which was recognized by this House, the Canadian nation, which we readily recognize, and, of course, the first nations and the Acadian nation.

I think this has been the problem since Canada was created, and is why Canada's political institutions cannot be reformed. I am obviously talking about the lack of will from the majority of this political space, meaning the Canadian nation, to recognize, and not just by a motion in this House, the existence of several nations within the Canadian political space.

I could talk about the history, but not this morning. At certain points in the history of Canada and Quebec, it would have been possible to mutually recognize two nations and to recognize the first nations and the Acadian nation, in order to build a political structure representative of this multinational space. Unfortunately, the past, and also more recent history—for example, the Charlottetown accord and the Meech Lake accord—has shown us that there was not a broad enough will, yet alone a majority, within the Canadian nation to change the political balance and reflect this reality.

Unfortunately, the current Parliament seems to be the perfect example of the crisis in the Canadian system. I am not talking about the Bloc Québécois, because we chose to represent the Quebec nation in the House of Commons. I am talking about the political parties that call themselves national, but should call themselves pan-Canadian, the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party and the NDP.

Those parties all have essentially regional foundations: the Conservatives, more in the west; the Liberals, in Ontario and the Atlantic provinces; and the NDP, a bit everywhere. They are not yet sufficiently entrenched in a region of Canada to claim to be pan-Canadian parties. It is not their fault. Quite simply, no one has wanted to recognize this multinational dimension in the past.

The Quebec-Canada relations crisis is not a crisis for the people of Quebec. It is a crisis in the Canadian system, with ups and downs, since history is never linear. It is very clear that, as long as people fail to grasp this reality—and in the case of the Bloc and Quebec sovereignists, we will take this reality into account as soon as Quebec decides to become a sovereign country—we cannot resume discussions with our Canadian neighbours to reorganize an economic space, at least, and perhaps a political space between our two nations.

That being said, within the existing political space, considering the mindset of Canadians, it is obvious that Canadian institutions cannot be reformed. This situation will certainly not be corrected by trying to reform the Senate, especially since Bill C-20 is aimed primarily at marginalizing the Quebec nation more than anything else.

I was saying that we are against the bill because Canadian institutions cannot be reformed. Indeed, in our view, the very spirit of the bill is unacceptable. Nevertheless, there is also the fact that Parliament cannot reform the Senate unilaterally and without making constitutional amendments. As many constitutionalists have said, the National Assembly has confirmed, and Quebec's Minister for Canadian Intergovernmental Affairs, Mr. Pelletier, has said on many occasions, any attempts to change the composition or the method of appointing senators would require a constitutional negotiation. Obviously, for us as Quebeckers, and especially for sovereignists, a constitutional negotiation will not be held on the Senate question alone, since it is far from our primary concern. We often even forget that that institution exists.

It is therefore very clear to us that the bill as it now stands cannot be acceptable to Quebec or to anyone who wishes to abide by the Canadian constitution.

I often find it amusing—it should make me cry, but I tend to be an optimist—to say that the only people who try to ensure that we abide by the Constitution in this House are the Bloc Québécois. For example, when we talk about respecting the jurisdiction of the provinces or combating the federal spending power, we are unfortunately the only ones who stand up for what was set out in a document that may, in fact, be too old, because it does not reflect the present-day reality of the Canadian political space.

The fact remains, however, that as long as the Constitution has not been amended and as long as we are within the Canadian political space, Quebec, Quebeckers and the Bloc Québécois will stand up for the idea that there can be no amendments relating to the specific method by which senators are appointed without constitutional negotiations. Once again, on the question of constitutional negotiations, when that door—some would say that Pandora's box—is opened again, very clearly there will be other matters to be brought in besides mere questions about the Senate.

There is a fourth point that I think it is important to make. Even if it is reformed, the Senate is a useless institution, as I said earlier. It is a legacy of the monarchy, a legacy of British colonialism; it is the fear that the founders of the Canadian political space had of seeing a sovereign people make decisions through elections and elected representatives.

So they appointed these wise and elite people, who are often conservative. I am not speaking here to Conservatives as such. We are talking about elites who often wanted to oppose the desire for social and economic progress felt by a majority of the population. That is true for Quebec and it is also true for Canada.

I will conclude on that point because I have been told that my speaking time will soon be up. The bill itself is full of problems, even though it might have been thought to have some value.

Under Bill C-20, given that indirect election of senators is not going to make the Senate democratic, we are creating senators whom it will be virtually impossible to unseat. This is a non-binding consultation and it is full of holes.

[Brian Murphy, Liberal, Moncton—Riverview—Dieppe, NB]

Mr. Speaker, I gave the minister a few lob ball questions, which I thought he would hit out of the park, but he could only get to two of them and he answered those poorly.

I want to speak today about Bill C-20, about the Senate in general, and what this bill in particular seeks to do. It seeks to establish a national process for consulting Canadians on their preferences for Senate appointments.

The bill will see voters choose their preferred Senate candidates to represent their provinces or territories. As such, it seeks to fulfill a Conservative campaign promise to reform Canada's Senate and move toward an elected Upper Chamber.

I am very confused as to whether the Conservative government is putting forward bills toward Senate reform or Senate abolition. When you hear members of the government speak privately, and I have heard the catcalls across the way that in fact there is quite a bit of foment in the Conservative caucus and in the government in fact for abolition.

I think that is a position that can be held. I think that if the Conservative government is really wanting to abolish the Senate totally, then it should probably say so. Maybe there is a bit of a disconnect now.

Finally, the Conservatives are in government and this party over there has a disconnect between the frontbenchers and the middle and backbenchers. It seems to me that maybe the frontbenchers are not listening to the backbenchers and the middle benchers, people who have been around the block a long time, people who have been advocating for the abolition of the Senate.

I think that is the real debate we are having here, and it seems from the tenor of the remarks by the hon. minister who just spoke here and outside of this House, and by the bills that are being presented, that in fact what the government wishes to do is to abolish the Senate. If that is the debate we are having, why do the Conservatives not just bring forward a bill for the abolition of the Senate, and we can have that debate.

Well, there is a reason. There is division over there on that question. It seems that the Conservative government as elected, and that is the frontbench mucky-mucks, has made promises that it is for Senate reform. Senate reform includes consulting the provinces and looking toward an elected body representing Canada's regions fairly, but also entwining it with issues of representation by population.

Now if the Conservatives truly meant to do that, they would have gone to their first ministers across this country and at least had a conference. We have to ask ourselves, what is the government afraid of?

How bad can it be to have a real meeting with the provincial and territorial leaders, something more than just a main course of bison and a dessert of crème brûlée in a two-hour meeting where they are rushed out to the airport before any real discussion takes place, as we saw from the last conference?

What would be so wrong with sitting down with the territorial and provincial leaders and saying, “This is what we want to do. What do you think?” Then at least we would have on the record, through a conference, certainly not unanimity and certainly not agreement in total, at least a discussion of where the government should go, where the obstacles are, and where the opposition lies.

What we have instead is a patchwork. We have bills rushed through in three days, affecting the future of the Senate. We have television commentary, variously, in Ottawa representing the government's position but also in provincial capitals representing various provincial representations.

With all due respect to the media, they do not play every word that is said. We cannot be sure that what the government mouths, through its spokespersons at night on television, is exactly its position. We cannot be sure that provincial and territorial leaders are being quoted accurately. But it would seem that there is no consensus on this bill and the other Senate reform bills.

A little bit about this bill. It calls for significant Senate reform, this and a companion bill with respect to tenure. Now as my hon. member colleague mentioned, there have been calls for Senate reform since the mid-1970s, when Canada was undergoing major demographic shifts. We had shifts.

I come from Atlantic Canada. There has been a diminution in the population of Atlantic Canada for a generation now, and there has been growth in western Canada for over a generation now, perhaps two generations. With that, the population and the economic clout of Alberta and British Columbia were very evident.

They were growing much faster, for instance, than Quebec. Quebec still had and still does have 24 Senate seats, while Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and B.C. held a combined total of 24 seats. We mean no disrespect to the important primordial position of Quebec within this Confederation, but we must recognize that these regions of Canada require a revisitation of the number of seats in the Senate that they require.

In 1989, as members all know, a Senate seat became vacant in Alberta. The provincial government held an election and Mr. Waters was elected to the Senate, appointed by former Prime Minister Mulroney.

On April 18, 2007, the Prime Minister of this country appointed current senator-in-waiting Bert Brown to fill the Alberta Senate vacancy created by the retirement of a senator there, so there has been some movement with respect to the appointment of selected senators. Bill C-20 attempts to codify the past practice with respect to these two selections.

The process allowing elections or consultations to be conducted to elect senators-in-waiting, however, has four distinct flaws.

First, it was introduced, as I mentioned, without consultations with provincial governments. Again, the Canadian public must understand that provincial governments have a stake in what the Senate is. They should either be for its abolition because it no longer represents provincial interests, which is one position, or they should be for reform as it relates to their own representation within the Senate or the efficacy of the Senate, or they should be for the status quo or some version of modified reform.

We have no record of what the provinces and territories feel about Senate reform and what their position on Senate reform is. Yes, from time to time we will have an interview. Yes, from time to time we will have a letter from a premier or a minister respecting intergovernmental affairs from a province supporting a particular position, but what is the overall position on Senate reform from the provinces and territories?

It is unbelievable that almost one year after its introduction, the Prime Minister has still not engaged his provincial counterparts in meaningful discussions on this legislation.

The second flaw is that it tries to skirt around the Constitution, and haphazardly electing senators in this way will still do nothing to improve the representation of British Columbia and Alberta in Canada's Senate.

Both provinces are, as I mentioned, currently underrepresented in the Senate in comparison to provinces that have not had similar population growth. I do not know if the people of Canada know, or if the ministers in provincial governments know, that there are 14 vacancies in the Senate.

If the Senate is supposed to work to protect provincial, regional and other interests that are not represented by population in the House of Commons, then whether we are going to change the Senate, whether we are going to abolish the Senate, should we not have the Senate as it is working the way it is designed to work?

Many will argue it is not working. I presume that is why the minister has made such bombastic comments and the government has made the drastic step of saying that the Senate, over in the other place, shall do something by a certain date. I am not going to get into the debate on tackling violent crime. We had that yesterday, but just think of that. The minister and the government know, or should know, that this House cannot legally bind the other place, so it is mere puffery.

Think of the situation should this bill pass and in a generation or two be in effect. It would mean that every province would have a form of an election. Every senator would be duly elected directly by the people and we would have a body that would claim, as much as this place, to be the democratically elected representative of the country.

Would that motion, which the government is attempting to pass telling the Senate what to do, be received in the same light? Would it be offered by the government, had it an elected Senate of its own type? Or is this just pure politics? Would we be addressing these bills if there was a Conservative majority in the Senate?

Third, the process to elect senators in large provinces will unfairly benefit urban areas.

Finally, the bill would allow Senate nominees to be elected, but does not make those elections binding.

In this environment, when we have non-political appointees fired, if we were to have a political appointee elected by a province in a non-binding election who is not the flavour du jour of the prime minister, can anyone imagine the prime minister actually selecting that person?

The bill is ripe with flaws. It does not reflect the good spirit of our Constitution and the good flow of provincial negotiations that had to have taken place before the bill was posited.

[Peter Van Loan, Conservative, York—Simcoe, ON]

Mr. Speaker, if I were to answer all of those questions, I believe I would be well through the next speaker's time. However, I will try to address the first two.

The first was a question regarding the consultation with stakeholders. It was whether we have consulted the stakeholders. I obviously have a very different view of how democracy works than my hon. friend on the other side.

I happen to think that the most important stakeholders in Parliament and in democracy are the people of Canada. Those are the true stakeholders, not elected officials, not bureaucrats, and not people who happen to be holding seats in the Senate or even those in the House of Commons. It is the people of those provinces.

The very essence of the bill is to go to the people of those provinces and consult them every time there is a decision made on who should be appointed to the Senate, so that they get to choose who represents them, not some of the other stakeholders, not a prime minister, not a cabinet, not a provincial premier but the people of that province. That is what we consider to be consultation, the most genuine consultation. That is the essence and purpose of this bill.

I know there are those who wish to see the Senate remain unchanged. There are many members in the Liberal Party who want to see it remain unchanged because it has served them very well over the years as an institution dominated by appointed Liberals. However, we believe it should be an institution that serves and represents Canadians in the provinces and that is why our structure is that Canadians in each province would be consulted to select their representatives.

On the question of underrepresentation, he talked about the need to change the distribution of seats in the House of Commons so that the western provinces that are underrepresented could have better representation.

I take it from that point that my friend will be supporting our democratic representation by population bill, Bill C-22, which will be coming up for debate later in the week because that is the objective of that bill: to move toward representation by population, to give them their fair share, to give Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia and underrepresented provinces, more seats than they are entitled to under the existing formula.

I know that because Liberals really do not want that to happen, they will talk about it, say they support it, and then vote against the principle and the bill or obstruct it because that is the way the Liberal Party always works.

It has built institutions that primarily serve the partisan interests of the Liberal Party and does not want to see those institutions change one bit. Liberal members will say one thing and do the other. It has been seen back to the time of Confederation. I do not expect it to change in this Parliament, though I will be delighted if they surprise me by supporting Bill C-20 and Bill C-22 to allow some kind of reform and change to actually happen.

[Brian Murphy, Liberal, Moncton—Riverview—Dieppe, NB]

Mr. Speaker, I have a number of short questions for the minister.

He is right when he says that Senate reform has been a topic bandied about academically and politically for many years. That does not excuse the government from addressing the issue in the way it was intended to be addressed, and that is looking to the stakeholders with respect to the Senate. I am very glad that he refers to the Confederation debates. He will know that the Senate was intended to protect regional and primarily provincial interests.

Why is it, I ask, that the government has not consulted with the province? Can the minister inform us that as a result of consultations with each minister of intergovernmental affairs or premier he can report to the House their position on this bill? We have read accounts about provincial positions on this bill.

Why is the minister and the government fomenting western alienation by not dealing with the number of seats that each province has at a constitutional conference? Alberta and British Columbia are underrepresented. They even have vacancies that have not been filled by the government. There are 14 vacancies in the Senate. If the government wants to abolish the Senate, as many colleagues he sits with do, then should it not be truthful with the Canadian public and say, “We want to abolish the Senate?”

I have two final, very short questions. Are the elections envisioned in Bill C-20, it is very unclear and I ask for a genuine answer, or the selections, so to speak, binding on the Prime Minister? If the Prime Minister does not like the election selection, can he legislatively, constitutionally and legally refuse to appoint that nominee?

Finally, what does one do in a case of a deadlock between the two Houses with two fully elected bodies? What would the government do?

[Peter Van Loan, Conservative, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and Minister for Democratic Reform]

moved:

That Bill C-20, An Act to provide for consultations with electors on their preferences for appointments to the Senate, be referred forthwith to a legislative committee.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to open debate on Bill C-20, the Senate Appointment Consultations Act, which the government is reintroducing from the first session of this Parliament. This bill marks an important step in improving Canada's democratic institutions and is one of two bills advancing the government's efforts at meaningful Senate reform.

Our commitment to provide Canadians with a Senate that is relevant for the 21st century was clearly laid out in the Speech from the Throne and approved by the House:

--our Government will continue its agenda of democratic reform by reintroducing important pieces of legislation from the last session, including direct consultations with voters on the selection of Senators and limitations on their tenure.

Ordinary Canadians agree that the Senate cannot play its role with any credibility when its members can remain there until they are 75 and they are not accountable to the public.

That is why they are so supportive of measures to allow them to vote in a national consultation process for Senate appointments. Canadians were encouraged when they saw Bert Brown take a seat in the other place. He, of course, had been elected popularly by the voters. They were heartened to see the Prime Minister take account of the democratically expressed will of the people.

Reflecting the will of the people as the norm rather than the exception would enhance the Senate's legitimacy and relevance as a modern, vibrant legislative chamber while respecting its important and historic roles of providing sober second thought, which Sir John A. Macdonald indicated as a priority, and a voice for Canada's regions and minorities.

Senate reform has drawn a lot of attention since the 19th century but, unfortunately, the upper chamber is still stuck in that era.

We must repair what we can right now if we want to prevent the Senate from continuing its free-fall into what the Prime Minister has described as insignificance and oblivion.

Canadians expect more of their institutions, and the government will not shrug its shoulders while we wait for the ever elusive national consensus on fundamental reform. Those who insist that we wait for one are really looking for an excuse to leave the Senate just the way it is, although hardly any Canadian will publicly declare that the Senate in its current form is appropriate for a modern democracy.

The desire by Canadians to reform the Senate and make it a democratic and accountable institution was reflected in the government's consultations on democratic reform, which were completed last year. A survey conducted as part of the consultations indicated that 79% of Canadians, that is, four out of five Canadians, supported Senate elections. As a result, the government must and will continue with reforms that fall within the legislative jurisdiction of Parliament.

We have also reintroduced legislation to limit the terms of senators to eight years, a separate legislative measure that can be judged on its own merits. This time, we have laid that bill before the elected chamber first after the other place missed the opportunity to be engaged in its own reform and obstructed our efforts there, delaying it, in effect, for well over a year.

Today, we have before us Bill C-20, which would give Canadians a say in who speaks for them in one of their representative institutions.

The Prime Minister has said that the Senate consultations bill raises complex issues. As with all our democratic reform legislation, we are seeking broad debate at committee about its merits and its details. In this case, we are seeking referral to committee before second reading to ensure the broadest discussion possible. It is important, however, that we be clear now on what the bill contains and, just as important, what it does not contain, especially given what some in the opposition have said about the bill.

Bill C-20 creates a mechanism with which the government could ask electors in the provinces to select the people they would like to represent them in the Senate before the Prime Minister makes his recommendations for appointments to the Governor General.

Like the federal Referendum Act, this bill creates a consultation mechanism that will not be legally binding for the government. The bill gives the government the necessary flexibility to decide whether to use the mechanism, where and when to use it, and in how many places the consultations should be held.

The purpose of the mechanism is not to manipulate the Senate for partisan purposes, but to ensure that the systematic vacancies in the Senate when senators retire could be taken into consideration in the system.

It is essential for the government to have this manoeuvrability because the consultations will be held during federal or provincial elections.

If the consultations are held only on the seats that are currently vacant, then the seats that become vacant shortly after an election could remain so until the next election.

The bill will help ensure that candidates are available to fill seats as they become vacant.

The bill would create a mechanism for people to register as nominees, raise money and campaign, and proposes rigorous accountability for nominees.

It respects what is supposed to be the less partisan nature of the Senate by providing a limited role for parties, both in campaign financing and in not giving parties control over how candidates are listed on the ballot.

It provides for reasonable limits on third-party spending so that organizations cannot exert undue influence on Senate campaigns, while respecting the right to be heard in the political sphere.

It avoids upsetting the carefully balanced campaign financing regime in place for the Commons.

Taken collectively, these are reasonable measures to ensure that Senate consultations are fair, that they invite public confidence, that they respect the less partisan nature of the Senate as an institution, and that the integrity of the Commons campaign financing rules remains intact.

Let me be very clear about what this bill will not do.

It will not make any changes that require resort to formal constitutional amending processes. The bill is not a constitutional amendment. The government's position, supported by eminent constitutional scholars, is that these proposals do not require an amendment and are within the ordinary legislative authority of Parliament to act on its own.

The method of selection remains unchanged. The bill does not detract in any way from the constitutional powers of the Governor General to summon Canadians to the Senate.

It does not change the conventional prerogative of the Prime Minister to recommend appointments identified through this process or any other.

It does not change the qualifications of senators and it does not affect their terms or create vacancies.

It does not change the constitutional role of the Senate itself as the arbiter of questions respecting the qualifications of senators.

The process can take account of whatever length of term Parliament in its wisdom ultimately decides to establish for senators.

I hope that the opposition members will engage constructively in this debate and examine the bill on its considerable merits rather than spend their time on distractions and unrelated matters as they did in the previous debate on the identical bill in the last session.

I am pleased that we have this chance to resume our examination of a bill to give Canadians a say in who represents them in the Senate.

This bill is an important step in the government's unflagging efforts to modernize our democratic institutions and it is a priority for the government.

The bill advances the principle that Canadians should have a say in who speaks for them in the Senate and does do so in a way that is respectful of the Senate itself, respects the primacy of the democratic mandate of the House of Commons, and conforms to the constitutional realities of Canada.

The Senate appointments consultation act will build momentum for further reforms. Meanwhile, it stands on its own as a useful step, indeed an essential one, in furthering the goal of a Senate worthy of the 21st century.

Senate reform is perhaps the most studied and most talked about subject among Canadian political science academics. The talk of reforming the Senate goes back almost to its beginnings. When the fathers of Confederation met, more time was spent on constructing the Senate than on any other subject.

I will go back to an observation made by John Diefenbaker, when he said the following to the notion that Senate reform was always talked about:

I recall very well the election of 1925 when the then Prime Minister, Right Hon. W.L. Mackenzie King, stated that reform of the Senate was a first and foremost course of action needed to assure democracy in this country. He said the same thing in 1926. I recall so well the promises of that day.

But to that Liberal prime minister, Senate reform was not the kind of democratic reform we are talking about. I will go on to quote Diefenbaker, who said about Mackenzie King:

He said he was going to substitute live Grits for dead Tories in the Senate. Some of those appointed were only half qualified....

The fact that this joke rings true today tells us why it is that we need to have this kind of Senate reform. I urge this House to seriously consider Bill C-20 and send it to committee so that a broad study can occur.

[Peter Van Loan, Conservative, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and Minister for Democratic Reform]

moved for leave to introduce Bill C-20, An Act to provide for consultations with electors on their preferences for appointments to the Senate.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to give notice of the government's intention pursuant to Standing Order 73(1) to refer the Senate consultation bill to committee before second reading.

(Motions deemed adopted, bill read the first time and printed)