moved that Bill C-22, An Act to amend the Constitution Act, 1867 (Democratic representation), be read the second time and referred to a committee.
Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to open debate on the Constitution Act, 2007: the democratic representation bill.
This bill reflects the government's commitment to modernizing Canada's democracy and strengthening our federation through democratic reform. It fulfills the government's commitment during the last election to restore the principle of representation by population in the House of Commons, while protecting the seat counts of provinces with slower population growth.
The bill will amend the formula set out in the Constitution for the readjustment of seats among the provinces, which happens after every 10 year census, so that it is more responsive to population growth in faster growing provinces. According to current population projections, this will mean that the provinces of Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta will receive additional seats after the next redistribution.
Consistent with the approach taken since Confederation, these seats will be added after the census in 2011, through the regular electoral boundaries redistribution process.
I would like to spend my time today addressing three points. First, I will outline the problems with the existing formula passed by Parliament in 1985.
Secondly, I will discuss the principles underlying the democratic representation bill.
Lastly, I will provide a technical overview of the formula being proposed in the new bill.
To understand why we have introduced the democratic representation bill it is necessary to understand the existing formula for the readjustment of seats in the House of Commons. The 1985 formula is based on three main steps.
First, a basic representation by population formula is used. The total population of the provinces is divided by 279, which was the number of MPs from the provinces in the House at the time the formula was adopted. The quotient, known as the national quotient, is then applied to the population of each province to determine its seat allocation.
The second step is not based on population. It requires adding extra seats to some provinces based on constitutional seat “floors”.
There are two such floors.
The first, known as the Senate floor, requires that a province have at least as many MPs as it does senators. The second floor is known as the grandfather clause. Every province is guaranteed as many seats as it had when the 1985 formula came into force, even if its population has subsequently declined. As a final step, a seat is added for each territory.
The current formula was debated and passed in 1985 and was intended primarily to restrict the rate of growth of the chamber. Indeed, if the 1974 formula were still in place, we would now be sitting in a House of about 369 members rather than one of 308. However, the 1985 formula limited growth in the membership of the House entirely at the expense of the faster growing provinces that do not enjoy seat floors for their seat counts.
With the passage of time, this has resulted in a serious representational imbalance in the House of Commons. Allow me to explain. For example, in the last readjustment, British Columbia had 13% of the population of the provinces and received 36 seats, which is 13% of the 279 in the House in 1985. If the current number of seats had been used, British Columbia would have been entitled to 40 seats.
In addition to this, once extra seats are accorded to provinces under the seat floors—currently, only Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia do not rely on seat floors to maintain their seats in the House—the relative representation of faster-growing provinces is further diminished.
What it means in practical terms is that Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia are the only provinces that are significantly underrepresented in the House of Commons. All other provinces are overrepresented in the House relative to their populations. What it means for Canadians in those provinces is that on average their members of Parliament have larger populations to serve than anywhere else in the country.
For instance, based on recently released 2006 census results, an average MP from Ontario, Alberta or BC represents 26,000 more constituents than the average MP from the other seven provinces.
This disparity in representation will only get worse over time if we stay with the existing formula.
Based on 2011 population projections, an average MP from Ontario, Alberta or BC will be called upon to represent over 29,000 more constituents than an MP in the other provinces.
Looked at another way, an average MP in Alberta represents almost 3.5 times as many constituents as an average MP in Prince Edward Island.
The electoral district of Brampton West has the unfortunate status of having the most constituents in a riding, with 170,422 people, based on the 2006 census. Currently, the riding of Labrador has the fewest constituents with only 29,084.
When I hear from Canadians in rapidly growing provinces, the issue of under-representation is very real for them. It creates a sense of distance and alienation from Ottawa. That is not good for our country or our democracy. That is why this government has introduced the democratic representation bill to restore fair representation in the House of Commons for all Canadians.
In developing the new formula, we sought to restore the principle of representation by population while respecting the constitutionally protected principle of the proportionate representation of the provinces in the House of Commons, which cannot be disturbed without the consent of seven provinces representing 50% of the population, a constitutional amendment threshold.
The principle of proportionate representation is a principle that has a democratic basis.
It is how, at the federal level, we balance the representational interests of Canadians that live in a country as large as ours, with a host of diverse regional, cultural and economic interests.
The principle of proportionate representation requires that all provinces be represented in the House roughly in proportion to their populations, in other words, that representation by population be generalized so that Canadians and the provinces have an equal voice in their national Parliament.
This balance between strict representation by population and protection for provinces with slower growing populations is not always an easy one. That is probably why the readjustment formula has been amended so many times since Confederation.
The balancing of principles was part of the debate when Canada was created by Sir John A. Macdonald, George-Étienne Cartier and the Fathers of Confederation. Their balancing of representation by population, with respect for the proportionate representation of the provinces, made possible the agreement that both forged our country and allowed it to grow over time.
As we all know, it was Canada West, as Ontario was then called, that sought to base the House of Commons on representation by population at Confederation, by the obvious fact that its population was larger than that of Canada East, as Quebec was called at the time.
However, decades later, it was Quebec that was calling for representation by population when its representation in the House was diminished by seat protection for other provinces.
Similarly, while Ontario is now significantly underrepresented, during the first half of the last century, from 1914 to 1946, it benefited substantially from constitutional seat protection provisions because its population was in relative decline.
In developing the formula proposed in the democratic representation bill, there were three additional considerations that we took into account in achieving our objective of proportionate representation.
First, the formula had to be more responsive to population changes so that Canadians would be more equitably represented in the House of Commons.
The current formula does not allow rapidly growing provinces to have their representation increase with their populations. This puts them in an unfair position and puts their constituents at a disadvantage.
At the same time, of course, the formula must recognize and be sensitive to the representation of provinces with slower-growing populations.
Therefore, we have updated the formula to ease the constraints on the representation of faster growing provinces, while maintaining protections for other provinces and territories.
As a second consideration, we needed to ensure the seat distribution was sensitive to the context and dynamics of the House. Canada is a country of small, medium and large provinces that all need to have an effective voice in the legislature.