An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts

This bill was last introduced in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session, which ended in September 2019.

Sponsor

Dominic LeBlanc  Liberal

Status

This bill has received Royal Assent and is now law.

Summary

This is from the published bill. The Library of Parliament often publishes better independent summaries.

This enactment establishes the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and sets out its composition and mandate. In addition, it establishes the Committee’s Secretariat, the role of which is to assist the Committee in fulfilling its mandate. It also makes consequential amendments to certain Acts.

Elsewhere

All sorts of information on this bill is available at LEGISinfo, an excellent resource from the Library of Parliament. You can also read the full text of the bill.

Votes

April 4, 2017 Passed That the Bill be now read a third time and do pass.
April 4, 2017 Failed That the motion be amended by deleting all the words after the word “That” and substituting the following: “Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, be not now read a third time but be referred back to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security for the purpose of reconsidering Clauses 8, 14, and 16 with a view to assessing whether the investigatory powers and limits defined in these clauses allow for sufficiently robust oversight of ongoing intelligence and national security activities”.
March 20, 2017 Passed That Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, {as amended}, be concurred in at report stage [with a further amendment/with further amendments] .
March 20, 2017 Passed 16 (1) The appropriate Minister for a department may refuse to provide information to which the Committee would, but for this section, otherwise be entitled to have access and that is under the control of that department, but only if he or she is of the opinion that (a) the information constitutes special operational information, as defined in subsection 8(1) of the Security of Information Act; and (b) provision of the information would be injurious to national security. (2) If the appropriate Minister refuses to provide information under subsection (1), he or she must inform the Committee of his or her decision and the reasons for the decision. (3) If the appropriate Minister makes the decision in respect of any of the following information, he or she must provide the decision and reasons to, (a) in the case of information under the control of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police; (b) in the case of information under the control of the Communications Security Establishment, the Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment; and (c) in the case of information under the control of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Security Intelligence Review Committee.
March 20, 2017 Passed 14 The Committee is not entitled to have access to any of the following information: (a) a confidence of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada, as defined in subsection 39(2) of the Canada Evidence Act; (b) information the disclosure of which is described in subsection 11(1) of the Witness Protection Program Act; (c) the identity of a person who was, is or is intended to be, has been approached to be, or has offered or agreed to be, a confidential source of information, intelligence or assistance to the Government of Canada, or the government of a province or of any state allied with Canada, or information from which the person’s identity could be inferred; (d) information relating directly to an ongoing investigation carried out by a law enforcement agency that may lead to a prosecution.
March 20, 2017 Passed to sections 14 and 16, the Committee is entitled to have access to ed by litigation privilege or by solicitor-client privilege or the professional
March 20, 2017 Failed That Motion No. 3 be amended by deleting paragraph (a).
March 20, 2017 Passed and up to ten other members, each of whom must be a (2) The Committee is to consist of not more than three members who are members of the Senate and not more than eight members who are members of the House of Commons. Not more than five Committee members who
March 20, 2017 Passed That, in relation to Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, not more than one further sitting day shall be allotted to the consideration at report stage of the Bill and one sitting day shall be allotted to the consideration at third reading stage of the said Bill; and That, 15 minutes before the expiry of the time provided for Government Orders on the day allotted to the consideration at report stage and on the day allotted to the consideration at third reading stage of the said Bill, any proceedings before the House shall be interrupted, if required for the purpose of this Order, and in turn every question necessary for the disposal of the stage of the Bill then under consideration shall be put forthwith and successively without further debate or amendment.
Oct. 4, 2016 Passed That the Bill be now read a second time and referred to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 10:15 a.m.
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Waterloo Ontario

Liberal

Bardish Chagger LiberalLeader of the Government in the House of Commons and Minister of Small Business and Tourism

moved that Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, be read the second time and referred to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to begin second reading of Bill C-22, which would establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians.

This bill is a tangible expression of our commitment towards meaningful engagement with parliamentarians and for enhanced accountability.

It would provide for a structured and responsible framework to share highly classified information with parliamentarians so that they can scrutinize national security activities, hold the government to account, and ensure that our national security agencies consistently act responsibly.

Canada is a free and just society. It is a beacon in the world when it comes to democratic principles. When this government took office, we made a strong commitment to uphold and advance these principles and to enhance our democratic institutions.

National security is one of the most important responsibilities of any government. Canadians expect their government to keep them safe. At the same time, Canadians also expect their government to pursue this objective in a way that respects our fundamental rights and freedoms. This government has always advocated that any renewed powers to government agencies to combat threats to the security of Canada, must be accompanied by strengthened accountability. The protection of both security and our rights and freedoms must be maintained or neither can truly be achieved. In fact, this became a central plank in the platform we set out for the people of Canada in the election held last October.

Within Canada's Westminster system, Parliament is where the opposition fulfills its obligation to hold the government to account. However, the open forum of the House of Commons and its standing committees present a challenge with respect to the review of national security activities. To be effective, such reviews require knowledge and understanding of classified information that, if publicly released, could harm the national interest. Our government found it unacceptable that among the Five Eyes allies, Canada is the only nation whose elected officials do not have a forum to review and examine the classified activities of our national security agencies.

We know the previous government was opposed to giving parliamentarians a role in overseeing the actions and conduct of our national security agencies. However, we believe otherwise. Our Prime Minister long ago recognized the need for increased scrutiny. It was a commitment he made during the last Parliament. It was a commitment he made during the election campaign. It was a commitment for which he asked the Minister of Public Safety and me to work together so that Canadians could see real results. It is a promise made, a promise kept.

I also want to take this opportunity to thank the current Parliamentary Secretary to the President of the Treasury Board for the hard work she did on this file in her previous role as the Liberal critic on national defence.

I also want to highlight the fact that my colleague, the hon. member for Malpeque, introduced a private member's bill to create a committee of parliamentarians in 2013. This goes to show our long-standing commitment to protect both public safety and the rights of Canadians to privacy. The bill aims to establish an effective forum wherein parliamentarians can access classified information in a secure and responsible manner. Better information will lead to more informed parliamentary debate about national security activities and enhance accountability.

We have studied the national security parliamentary committee models of our Westminster allies, namely Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

In fact, earlier this year, my colleague, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, travelled to the U.K. to see first-hand how their committee, the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, is established.

While the models used by our allies where informative, ultimately, this is a made-in-Canada approach.

The bill would create a committee of parliamentarians comprising members from the House and the other place with a mandate to scrutinize our national security and intelligence activities in any department and agency, including ongoing operations, unless the responsible minister determines that the review would be injurious to national security. It would also be able to conduct strategic and systematic reviews of the framework that supports national security and intelligence activities, including legislation, regulatory policies, expenditures, and administrative procedures.

I would like to take a moment to discuss this broad mandate. Canada currently has a number of review bodies that examine the activities of specific government organizations engaged in national security operations and report to Parliament, such as the Security and Intelligence Review Committee, the commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment, and the RCMP's Civilian Review and Complaints Commission. These bodies play an important role in the accountability framework of our three main national security agencies: CSIS, CSE and the RCMP. I would be remiss not to highlight the particularly good work they do in investigating public complaints and ensuring that these these agencies operate lawfully.

However, we recognize that something more is needed. That is why, unlike these review bodies, the mandate of the committee would not be limited to reviewing specific organizations but would instead encompass all national security activities conducted within the Government of Canada.

I would note that this government-wide mandate is unique to Canada, and no other international model we examined provides for such a broad scope. This government-wide perspective will enable the committee to perform strategic and systemic reviews of our national security apparatus and examine the legal, regulatory, policy, and expenditure framework under which it operates. This will help ensure that our national security system as a whole is functioning effectively and efficiently, all the while respecting Canadians' rights and freedoms.

Another key element of our made-in-Canada approach is the ability of the committee to initiative reviews of any national security operations, including ongoing operations. No other Westminster jurisdiction we examined provides this much scope for examination. This exceptional power requires a safeguard to ensure the committee's operational reviews would not disrupt or harm any active operation. The legislation would allow the responsible minister to stop a review if it would be injurious to national security.

To provide a secure venue for the consideration of proposed draft legislation, policy initiatives, or issues of high public interest that require the examination of classified information, the legislation would further allow the government to refer specific matters to the NSICOP for study.

The committee would have the legal right to access all government information it needs to conduct its reviews, including information subject to solicitor-client privilege, to ensure that it can effectively carry out this broad review mandate.

We have limited the exceptions to information access only to areas of absolute need, such as cabinet confidences, identities of informants, sources and persons protected under the witness protection program, and personal and commercially sensitive information relating to personal banking transactions and foreign investments. We also take seriously the need to guarantee the independence of police investigations and avoid harm to military operations.

Though the bill would provide an authority for ministers to withhold special operational information, I want to be clear. Ministers cannot withhold any information, but only special operational information, a specific legally defined category of the most covert national security information, and only if ministers believe it would be injurious to national security. In every instance, ministers must provide the committee with an explanation as to why special operational information must be withheld. In this way, ministers are held to account if they misuse or abuse this authority.

The committee's mandate and powers will be legislated and cannot be altered by the government. The committee will act with full independence from the government in deciding which matters to review, and in reporting its findings and recommendations. In any case where a minister has decided to stop a review or withhold information, and the committee is dissatisfied with the minister's decision, it would be able to report on these matters to Parliament. Ministers would be accountable to Parliament and Canadians for their actions.

I recognize that my colleagues opposite are not only interested in what this committee will do, but also how the membership of this committee will be determined.

The committee of parliamentarians would be a multi-party committee. Members would be appointed by the Governor in Council on the recommendation of the Prime Minister and would consist of nine members: two from the other place and seven from the House of Commons. Among those seven members from the House of Commons, a maximum of four members would be from the governing party. This allows sufficient flexibility to adapt to future changes in the composition of Parliament.

Of course, parliamentarians who would sit on this committee will have a great responsibility to ensure that they maintain the confidentiality of the information that they are provided. Each member of the committee will be a “person permanently bound to secrecy” under the Security of Information Act and may be prosecuted for disclosing special operating information. Members would be required to obtain a security clearance and swear an oath of secrecy before assuming his or her position.

The security requirements proposed in the bill are consistent with those imposed on public officials who have access to highly classified information. Nothing in the bill would limit members' ability to draw perceived deficiencies in government performance to the attention of Parliament and Canadians, so long as they do not disclose classified information.

The committee's annual reports would be tabled in Parliament, including its findings and recommendations. The committee would also have the power to issue special reports at any time if it considers it necessary to do so. The committee's reports would be provided to the Prime Minister prior to tabling for the sole purpose of ensuring that they do not contain classified information. It is important to underline that the Prime Minister would not have the ability to alter the committee's findings and recommendations.

The committee would be supported by a small secretariat that will be established as a separate departmental entity. The secretariat would help ensure that the committee members receive the support they need to perform their mandates. This would include providing research, briefings, and legal and technical advice. It would include preparing work plans, meeting agendas, and draft reports. The secretariat would also liaise with national security agencies and review bodies to facilitate access to information and the appearance of officials.

In short, we intend to provide the committee with the necessary resources and support it needs.

Bill C-22 would fulfill the government's commitment to establish a committee of parliamentarians. The committee would provide parliamentarians with direct access to classified information so that they could directly assess government activities, thus strengthening the democratic accountability of those activities. Through its reports and recommendations, it would help to ensure that national security and intelligence activities are carried out effectively and in a manner that respects our democratic values. The committee would act with full independence from the government in deciding which matters to review and in reporting its findings and recommendations.

This would be a significant addition to the review mechanisms. Compared to our allies in the other Westminster democracies, it goes further to review policies and operations across the spectrum of departments and agencies involved in the national security system. In these ways, Canada would set a new benchmark for parliamentary review.

The bill is exactly what we committed to achieving and what Canadians have asked us to do. We have waited a long time for this kind of committee. It is an idea whose time has come. I hope my colleagues across the way will recognize the importance of the legislation and will support our proposal to include members of their caucus in the review of our national security agencies.

During the campaign, Canadians rejected the politics of fear promoted by the opposition. They decided that openness and transparency were better than preying on people's anxieties. That is the mandate on which we were elected and that is exactly what the bill would help us achieve.

In closing, I want to take a few seconds to acknowledge and thank two more of my colleagues. First, the hon. Minister of Fisheries, Oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard, who previously as government House leader, did tremendous work to bring the bill to the House; and second, the hon. Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness for his close collaboration and hard work on the bill before us. I know my colleague is looking forward to his own remarks on the bill, as am I.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 10:30 a.m.
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Conservative

David Tilson Conservative Dufferin—Caledon, ON

Mr. Speaker, I read in the newspapers that the member for Ottawa South has been named chairman of this committee, which is rather strange because the bill has not even received the approval of Parliament. Second, he is going to receive a stipend of, I believe, $42,000 over and above his member of Parliament stipend. All of this is very strange. Members of standing committees get stipends, but I do not think chairmen of legislative committees do.

The words “open and transparent” are often used by the current government. By naming a chairman before the bill has received approval from Parliament and, not only that, by the Prime Minister naming a Liberal member as chairman of the committee, is the government being open and transparent?

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 10:30 a.m.
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Liberal

Bardish Chagger Liberal Waterloo, ON

Mr. Speaker, as I mentioned in my remarks, all appointments to this committee will be Governor in Council appointments. They will be made with the advice of the Prime Minister. No decisions have been made. What is important is the work this committee of parliamentarians will be able to do.

We will be providing parliamentarians the opportunity to review security agencies in a way they have not been able to do before. This is what Canadians asked for and this is what we are delivering.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 10:30 a.m.
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NDP

Murray Rankin NDP Victoria, BC

Mr. Speaker, the hon. government House leader talked about having a made-in-Canada solution and said that the committee would have all of the access it needs to all of the information it needs to do its important work. In 2004, there was an all-party committee that studied this issue and said that unless the oversight committee had full access to classified information, it would not be able to complete its task.

This bill imposes major restraints on access to information. For example, there are seven exceptions to the rule of access and then there is one that simply says that if the minister is of the opinion that it would be injurious to national security, the committee cannot have the information it needs.

Why would we create a bill that would give less open access to information than existing review bodies have, like the Security Intelligence Review Committee and the CSEC commissioner? Does the government not trust elected representatives on the committee, all of whom will be security cleared, and is it not worried that putting shackles on this watchdog would both limit its effectiveness and its credibility with the Canadian people?

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 10:35 a.m.
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Liberal

Bardish Chagger Liberal Waterloo, ON

Mr. Speaker, if the member looks at the legislation and gives it a chance, he will see that is not the case. Ministers will have to justify why they are withholding information. Parliamentarians will be able to hold them to account in this place. Canadians will also know why they are withholding information.

It is really important that we be able to balance national security with Canadians' rights and freedoms. That is the mandate Canadians have given us, that is the work we are doing, and that is the work we need to do together. I assure the House that ministers will not have blanket discretion and will have to justify why they are withholding information that would be injurious to national security if released.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 10:35 a.m.
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Liberal

Arnold Chan Liberal Scarborough—Agincourt, ON

Mr. Speaker, this is a very important piece of legislation that deals with concerns the Liberal Party had in the last Parliament with respect to the passage of then Bill C-51, now known as the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015.

One of the concerns we raised at the time was how important it was to introduce a committee of parliamentarians to oversee our security services, to make sure there is independent review by an independent body of elected officials. However, one of my particular concerns that I will address as my question to the government House leader is why the reports that would ultimately be prepared by this parliamentary committee would be subject to review by the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister's Office before they can be tabled in Parliament.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 10:35 a.m.
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Liberal

Bardish Chagger Liberal Waterloo, ON

Mr. Speaker, I thank the hon. member for his work on behalf of his constituents and Canadians.

This was not just a concern of the Liberal Party, but one that Canadians shared with us. It is a concern that we take very seriously.

To answer the hon. member's question, I will clarify that the Prime Minister is not authorized to alter the findings or recommendations of the reports tabled. The Prime Minister's role is solely to review the reports to ensure that they do not contain classified information. The Prime Minister will not have the ability to make changes or to alter recommendations. The Prime Minister has a responsibility to the people of Canada to ensure that we are protecting national security. That is the purpose of that review.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 10:35 a.m.
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Conservative

Garnett Genuis Conservative Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB

Mr. Speaker, I appreciated the opportunity to read the bill, as I am sure my friend, the member for Victoria, has.

I have to say that there are some things the House leader said in her speech that do not reflect the text of the bill. One example is that she talked about the Prime Minister not being able to exclude information on any basis, other than national security.

However, I would refer her to subclause 21(5) of the bill, which states very clearly that, “If...the Prime Minister is of the opinion that information in [this] report...disclosure of which would be injurious” and it lists a number of criteria, including “international relations”, he could ask the committee to submit a revised version. The Prime Minister would have the power to remove information even if there is not a negative impact upon national security if, in his judgment, it might have some effect upon Canadian international relations. Indeed, one might expect that anything the committee would cover would have an effect upon Canadian international relations in some way.

Therefore, I want to ask the government House leader what she thinks of that, the seeming incongruity between the legislative text and the way she described it, and why that subclause is in there.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 10:35 a.m.
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Liberal

Bardish Chagger Liberal Waterloo, ON

Mr. Speaker, the committee's reports would be provided to the Prime Minister for the sole purpose of ensuring that they do not contain classified information. The Prime Minister would have no authority to alter the committee's findings and recommendations. The committee would act with full independence from the government in deciding which matters to review and in reporting its findings and recommendations. The committee's annual report would be tabled in Parliament, including its findings and recommendations. It would also be able to issue special reports at any time it considers necessary. I just wanted to repeat some of the words in my original statement so that members could recognize that it is to ensure that these reports do not contain classified information.

I would also remind the member that we have the ability to review this legislation in committee. We can continue this conversation. This government is welcoming debate and different perspectives and is encouraging members to ask questions and to ensure that we have the best legislation possible.

I feel that the member recognizes the importance of such a committee, though, so I will take that as support.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 10:40 a.m.
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Bloc

Xavier Barsalou-Duval Bloc Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC

Mr. Speaker, for the last year or so, the Bloc Québécois has been asking to be part of and included in parliamentary committees. Now another committee is being struck, and a rather important committee at that, since it deals with national security. The RCMP has been known to steal lists from the Parti Québécois. CSIS continues to carry out destabilization activities of all kinds against members of Quebec's independence movement, including harassment.

Why are independent members and Bloc Québécois members not allowed to sit on the committee? Is it in order to hide those activities? Are the Liberals afraid that the Bloc Québécois might start asking questions on the matter? What kind of activities to destabilize democracy is the government involved in and trying to hide?

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 10:40 a.m.
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Liberal

Bardish Chagger Liberal Waterloo, ON

Mr. Speaker, I thank the member for his question.

As I said, the Prime Minister, through the Governor in Council, will be making the appointments to the committee.

This legislation has been needed for a long time. This is what Canadians have asked for. This is the work that we are doing. I am looking forward to the debate on this legislation. I am pleased to be here to be able to share what Canadians have asked us to do, which is to balance national security with their rights and freedoms.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 10:40 a.m.
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Conservative

Erin O'Toole Conservative Durham, ON

Mr. Speaker, as the public safety critic for the Conservative Party, the opposition here in the House of Commons, it is my distinct honour to stand and begin to state our position in this debate on Bill C-22.

I would like to thank the government House leader for her remarks and to start by saying that I agree with one part of what she said in response to several questions and comments, that this is something that probably should have been in place for some time. If my friend looks back at it, she would know that in the past, in the last generation, this has been examined on several occasions by both Conservatives and Liberals.

The MP for Malpeque from her caucus, and the former MP from Pictou—Antigonish—Guysborough, Peter MacKay, from our caucus were supportive of this concept, as was the retired Senator Hugh Segal. Moreover, a number of eminent parliamentarians and scholars have talked about how Canada, as one of the Five Eyes allies, should have some degree of parliamentary oversight of its intelligence and security operations.

That is a ground of agreement. That is hard to carve when there is a minority Parliament and the government is trying to do something that needs to be above politics, because the operations and, indeed, the safety of our security and intelligence personnel depend upon this committee of parliamentarians not being politicized or not being used to advance political ends.

That is why am profoundly disappointed that the minister did not begin debate on this subject. Here I want to congratulate my friend, the MP for Victoria, the NDP critic on this subject, for his own extensive background working as a lawyer on national security matters, including as an adviser to the last Conservative government and with the Security Intelligence Review Committee, SIRC, some years ago.

That member from Victoria and I have collaborated on this subject from the beginning of this Parliament, because we want it to be above politics. Sadly, the government has not participated in that collaboration, despite several entreaties to take the politics out of this.

It is profoundly disappointing that the minister did not appear to introduce his own bill today on something that is supposed to be above politics. I am not overreacting. I have tried to speak to him on this. I wrote the minister on March 1, on behalf of our caucus, after consultations, and said that “the Conservative Party is willing to work with the Government to create this Committee”.

I laid out several recommendations that I thought should be part of a parliamentary oversight committee, a special committee of this unique nature. I got no response. In fact, I collaborated and shared my thoughts and ideas with the NDP critic, the member for Victoria. I wrote the minister again on April 15, outlining some additional considerations on how this committee of parliamentarians should work in conjunction with existing bodies like SIRC. I appreciate the amazing work that SIRC does, and the CSE commissioner, and the constellation of security oversight review that we already have. How can this committee fit within that constellation and not duplicate existing efforts and not to create a competitive oversight environment?

Finally, the minister gave me what I used to call a “thanks for coming out” response letter on April 20, after I had written him twice, and also the NDP member for Victoria, in trying to take the politics out of this. He said:

It remains the Government's intention to engage with parliamentary colleagues as the process of developing the committee of parliamentarians unfolds.

That never happened, despite the opposition's asking for this, to do this right, to do this the way the British, the Australians, and our Kiwi allies do. The minister has really failed in this department, because he has not sat down and taken advice. In fact, he has acted in a very cavalier manner.

As members will see, this bill violates the privileges of members of the House. That could easily have been remedied.

Proposed subparagraph 6(1) of the bill would designate the Prime Minister, not Parliament, as the controlling mind of the committee. I will remind members that the Prime Minister is just the MP for Papineau. He is a member of this chamber, like all of us. He does have a role within the government, but that is separate. Your office, Mr. Speaker, has considered this on several occasions. The Prime Minister should not have full control over this committee. What is ironic is that he also designates the members of the upper house, the Senate. Remember, he tossed the Liberal senators out. The Senate is now independent, according to the Prime Minister, except with respect to this committee. Those members are selected by him as well.

Why is this disappointing? Bill C-22 was dropped on Parliament about four days before we rose for the summer. Not only did the minister ignore opposition requests to discuss, it was tossed in before people left. However, months before that bill was tabled and before the structure of this committee was even understood, the Liberals appointed a chair to the committee.

I have a lot of respect for my friend from Ottawa South, but that has not left a good impression on how he will take the chairmanship role of this committee. If he wanted to be chair, he should have stood before this place or members of that committee and sought the position of chair. In fact, that was the position his party ran on in the election of last year. It was the Prime Minister's position with respect to committees of parliamentarians. I will quote from the Liberals' election platform. It states, “To increase accountability, we will strengthen the role of Parliamentary committee chairs, including elections by secret ballot.”

The Prime Minister talks so much about sunny ways that the glare of the sun allows him to break a lot of promises and people do not see them, and they do not get reported. This is yet another broken promise. The committees are to be more accountable and responsible. If we ever want a committee to be beyond partisanship, it is this one. However, sadly, the Liberals picked the chair months before they even brought the originating legislation to the House of Commons. That is unparalleled in terms of contempt for the House. We did not even know the structure of the committee, yet the deemed chair was travelling around the world with the minister, talking about it.

What is interesting is that in the last Parliament, my friend whose riding was Saskatoon—Humboldt in the last Parliament, introduced Motion No. 431, a motion where the members of this chamber unanimously reaffirmed the desire to have elected chairs of committees. Something ironic about that motion from 2014 is that the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness voted for it. So did the MP for Ottawa South. Where was that good intention from that vote? They stood in this place and said that they wanted committee chairs elected. In fact, that motion from my friend and Conservative colleague was to elect the chairs from the entire chamber, not one person, the MP for Papineau.

This is pretty much everything the government does. It is set up with a facade of sunny ways, accountability, transparency, and it is a mug's game. It is actually not. Everything is done for the Liberals' own partisan advantage, but it is very much captured in a way that presents them in a positive fashion.

The Treasury Board president, the member for Kings—Hants, spoke in favour of the election of chairs. He said that having the election of chairs “has the capacity to render committees more independent, potentially more constructive and less partisan”. Another member of the Liberals' caucus, the member for Coast of Bays—Central—Notre Dame in Newfoundland and Labrador, went further and said that chairs of committees should be elected. However, is it not refreshing that all 308 members of the House have the chance to put themselves in a place where they are the chair of a committee based on their skill of being a member of Parliament and a decent chair?

It is not based on what kind of favours are owed to them in a party structure or a reward given for good behaviour. Quite frankly, that is essentially how it works. This takes control away from the executive and brings it back to the House of Commons.

That member is still in this caucus. I hope he referenced that in the way Bill C-22 has been handled, where the chair was not elected by this place. The chair was appointed before the committee was even struck, in fact, before the committee even existed. It was just an idea before Bill C-22 was tabled. It is profoundly disappointing that my friend for Ottawa South has to start under this cloud. I am quite sure he would have made the case for being the chair.

I will now switch to what renders the proposed legislation essentially ineffective and why we are still trying to work with the government on it. We want to see some substantive amendments, and I have talked to my NDP colleague on it as well.

There are seven exemptions under section 14, including that the committee cannot look at ongoing investigations that may lead to criminal charges. That is pretty much every investigation or operation of law enforcement or security agencies in the country. Defence intelligence cannot be looked at. The Investment Canada Act cannot be looked at. Then section 16, on top of those seven exemptions, piles on two broad “let's catch everything” exceptions. Special operational info is excluded and anything “injurious to national security”.

Once again, the Prime Minister appoints people and then he and his ministry decide. Those ministers are just members of the House like me. They decide what this committee sees. Therefore, the exceptions and outright control of all aspects of this committee by the Prime Minister's Office renders it ineffective and does not render it what my friend for Malpeque or other parliamentarians wanted to see years ago, which was Parliament being supreme and actually conducting oversight of security and intelligence. It is a real missed opportunity.

I now want to show how the bill, particularly the ham-fisted way the minister has not worked with the opposition parties on this thing that should be above partisanship, actually violates the privilege of the members of the House. Who will support me in my argument? The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, because I will be using some remarks from him.

The House leader tried to discount these exceptions by saying that ministers would have to justify why information could not go to the committee. With 20 different doors of exceptions to choose from, it will be simple to have this just as a token committee that will not be effective. I think all parliamentarians want it to be effective. It is supposed to be like it is in the U.K., a cabinet-like level of secrecy with a special room, and with special advisers. However, if they are not even seeing information relating to an ongoing investigation that may lead to charges, this is essentially window dressing.

Why I think this violates the privilege of members of the House of Commons is because your predecessor, Mr. Speaker, declared this, in Speaker Milliken's reading of April 27, 2010. In that widely-covered Speaker's ruling, the question of privilege was considered with respect to the production of documents regarding Afghan detainees.

Members will remember the positions were reversed at the time. The Conservative Party was in government and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness was then a very upset member of the opposition, as many people were.

However, the issues and the privilege attaching to the decision of Speaker Milliken is on the mark for this very issue, because it is the balance of what the House and members of the House should be able to see to perform their job, and how we balanced off sensitive information.

I will quote Speaker Milliken dealing specifically with this sensitive information argument, that the House leader said they would have to justify why information would not be received. The Speaker said:

However, I cannot agree with his conclusion that this obviates the government's requirement to provide the documents ordered by the House. To accept such a notion would completely undermine the importance of the role of parliamentarians in holding the government to account.

He went on to say:

Before us are issues that question the very foundations upon which our parliamentary system is built. In a system of responsible government, the fundamental right of the House of Commons to hold the government to account for its actions is an indisputable privilege and in fact an obligation.

Remember, as members of the House, we are the members holding the government to account. Speaker Milliken was quite clear that the fact there was sensitive information, or intelligence documents, or information relating to an ongoing investigation did not remove the obligation of the government to share those documents with the House.

That is even more pronounced now that the government is setting up a specialized committee of parliamentarians with security oversights and an oath of secrecy. There are even more safeguards for the sensitive information with the committee that wants to be formed by Bill C-22 than that which existed over the Afghan detainee issue in 2010.

Speaker Milliken went on to say:

The right of Parliament to obtain every possible information on public questions is undoubted, and the circumstances must be exceptional, and the reasons very cogent, when it cannot be at once laid before the houses.

Speaker Milliken was talking before the House. There was not even consideration of this highly secret, highly confidential, and protected, designed committee of parliamentarians. However, Speaker Milliken said that members of the House, as it stands, were entitled to that information. Bill C-22 violates that privilege.

The minister could have raised this issue by working with the opposition. We expressed some concerns. He could have raised it with some of the leading experts. He refused to meet with them too. Once again, sunny ways is the slogan but not the conduct.

Finally, I will provide one last quote from Speaker Milliken's judgment, because it is germane to this discussion on why this violates privilege. He said:

The insinuation that members of Parliament cannot be trusted with the very information that they may well require to act on behalf of Canadians runs contrary to the inherent trust that Canadians have placed in their elected officials and which members require to act in their various parliamentary capacities.

Speaker Milliken was clear in saying there could be a balance struck on sensitive information and the absolute right of the House to review information and to hold the government to account. With the apparatus and security safeguards set up around a special committee of parliamentarians, it is even easier to ensure that balance is struck. Sadly, the minister has missed the mark.

Let us see what the minister himself said in 2010, some weeks after Speaker Milliken's ruling. The member from Wascana called the actions of the government of the day's holding back some documents unilateral, arbitrary, and contrary to parliamentary tradition. He then went on to say:

That series of questions of privilege resulted in your ruling on April 27, when, in very eloquent terms, you indicated that Parliament did have the right to information. You indicated, at the same time, that there were sensitivities around issues related to national defence, national security, and international relations and that the House leaders and parliamentary critics should get together and arrive at a process to make information available to members of Parliament and Canadians for the purpose of holding the government to account and to do so in a way that would not imperil national security, national defence, or international relations.

He went on to say that Parliament was entitled to such information if safeguards could be in place. These are the minister's own words in 2010, saying that members of the House were entitled to that information.

I would ask the government, through its Minister of Public Safety, the member from Wascana, why the seven exceptions? Why the two blanket exceptions in section 16 that would not allow parliamentarians to fulfill their duties? Why the absolute control by the Prime Minister's Office?

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 11 a.m.
See context

Liberal

Marco Mendicino Liberal Eglinton—Lawrence, ON

Mr. Speaker, my hon. colleague began by recognizing the historical moment we are in today in the House, with the hon. leader for the first time introducing legislation that will create a national security committee of parliamentarians. He then went on to speak very passionately about how we need to raise the bar on openness, transparency, and accountability to Canadians. I wonder where that passion was over the course of the last 10 years when he, in the last administration, had the opportunity to act in the face of the Air India inquiry, the Arar inquiry, and many other commissioned inquiries, which pointed out the need for more transparency and more oversight. Where was that passion?

I have one last question I would like to put to my friend across the way. He cast a number of allegations against the hon. Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. To put it concisely, he said that there was no dialogue between the time he sent the letter to the minister on this committee and today. I wonder if he might refresh his memory and look back to those occasions when, at the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, he had an opportunity to question the minister about the structure, the membership, and the leadership of this committee and the minister welcomed those comments and the opportunity for feedback to improve this legislation. I wonder if he might recall those occasions when there was a dialogue.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 11 a.m.
See context

Conservative

Erin O'Toole Conservative Durham, ON

Mr. Speaker, my friend from Eglinton—Lawrence certainly knows the importance of such security information. I am sure he has been secretly lobbying to have the Prime Minister select him for this committee. He might bring some good insights to the committee from his work as a crown attorney.

I highlighted the election promise about the election of chairs, because the Prime Minister said that he would act in this way for transparency and accountability reasons. However, at the first opportunity to actually fulfill that promise, he broke it, on a committee that is of the utmost importance to national safety and security.

When the minister, who did not introduce this very important bill, appeared at committee on estimates, he had not tabled Bill C-22. He had appointed the chair. He had travelled the world to consult, and we know that the current government enjoys consulting heavily. However, there was no bill before the committee that I could question the minister on.

The Liberals dropped three security or border bills in this Parliament mere days before we rose for the summer. They did that because they did not want to be held to account, which is what I am doing today.

I could not finish the quote, because I ran out of time, but I will remind the member that in 2010, the minister, following Milliken's decision, stated:

Instead of unilateral, absolute control over information, which was the government's original position, the state of play today is that Parliament has taken charge of the process.

Let Parliament take charge of the process now.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ActGovernment Orders

September 27th, 2016 / 11:05 a.m.
See context

NDP

Murray Rankin NDP Victoria, BC

Mr. Speaker, I would like to salute my colleague and friend, the official opposition critic on public safety and the MP for Durham, for his forceful and I thought very lucid presentation this morning. He said a great deal about his efforts to try to get the government to collaborate on what is obviously a very non-partisan and critical issue. I share his sense of deep disappointment in the government's unwillingness to work with the opposition on this. He said so much about the failure to provide access to information in this bill. He also spoke, I thought, very forcefully about the need for the chair of this committee to be elected as an alternative to being appointed by the Prime Minister.

I understand that the British system, which the government has talked about being one of the models for this, used to allow the Prime Minister to chair the oversight committee, but that was abandoned several years ago in favour of an election. Similarly, other Westminster systems, such as Australia's, allow that. Indeed, Germany alternates between a government-side person and an opposition-side person. A private member's bill from the Liberals, brought by the MP for Vancouver Quadra, suggested an elected chair.

Through you, Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask the hon. member whether he believes there is any chance that the government might get it right, allow that in our bill, and accept an amendment to that effect for all the good reasons he elucidated in his remarks.