Bill C-22 (Historical)

An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts

This enactment establishes the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and sets out its composition and mandate. In addition, it establishes the Committee’s Secretariat, the role of which is to assist the Committee in fulfilling its mandate. It also makes consequential amendments to certain Acts.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act

[Erin O'Toole, Conservative, Durham, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I outlined in my remarks the member for Victoria's extensive background and national renown on security and legal security issues. He has tried to bring a thoughtful and learned approach to debate. He was privy to my March 1 letter, in which, collectively, we tried to engage with the minister in this process to make sure that the committee got off to a start that was not political. The minister was not interested.

Going back to the election of the chair, the credentials of my friend from Victoria are so extensive that he may have wanted to stand for chair of this committee. According to Motion No. 431, he could have justified that to the House, and Parliament could have decided for itself. My friend from Ottawa South could have done the exact same thing, or with a smaller body of MPs on the actual committee. What is ironic, and what I pointed out, is that the minister voted for Motion No. 431, the motion in the last Parliament on the election of chairs, and so did the member for Ottawa South.

Every time we stand in the House to vote on an issue, it is an important decision. If we believe in it at the time, then we should share with Canadians why we no longer believe in it several years later. Since it was also in the Liberal election platform to make committees and chairs of committees accountable and more effective, the Prime Minister and his ministers should justify why they are deviating from that promise and their track record of supporting it in the past.

I quoted the President of the Treasury Board, the member for Kings—Hants, who spoke in favour of Motion No. 431. I hope he is not silent at the cabinet table, much like he must have been when they were taking away an Atlantic Supreme Court justice.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, ever since I have known the Conservatives, they have fought tooth and nail against establishing a committee of this nature. One only need look at the debates we had on Bill C-51. I am glad that they have seen the light and have seen the value of doing this.

The Liberal Party introduced bills in the past. We can talk about 2004 and 2006. We can talk about audits and judicial inquiries. There have been numerous arguments for this committee. Today we are taking a significant step forward in terms of the rights and freedoms of Canadians in every region of our country. I am a bit disappointed that individuals do not recognize how valuable this committee is going to be with respect to protecting us. The Liberal Party is the party of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. We believe in it.

Would the member acknowledge that this legislation was part of a commitment made by our Prime Minister? It is not only the right thing to be doing to ensure those rights and freedoms but is the right thing to do because our Prime Minister made a commitment to Canadians, which demonstrates that we are listening to what Canadians are saying, and we are acting on it. Would the member not agree?

I thank him again for his change in attitude toward this particular committee.

[Erin O'Toole, Conservative, Durham, ON]

Mr. Speaker, there are certainly no members in the House of Commons who use their privilege to speak on occasions more than my friend from Winnipeg North. I would note that my colleague and friend from Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan is on his heels when it comes to speaking the most in the House, so he had better stand up more often to keep that title.

The member spoke about the charter, which we respect a great deal. He should also respect the privilege of parliamentarians. Since he speaks in the House more than anyone else, he should want to make sure that parliamentarians have unfettered access to holding the government to account. Speaker Milliken, the member's former colleague, said that it was an undisputed right of parliamentarians. This bill would violate that undisputed right.

I could have stood on a point of privilege rather than on debate, but I want to work with the government. I have tried since March. I said that this issue is not just a Liberal or a Conservative issue. I mentioned my friend from Malpeque. Huge Segal, the Conservative senator, had a bill on this issue. Conservatives support the supremacy of Parliament perhaps far more than the Liberals do.

In my preparations for this debate, I talked to Ron Atkey and Chuck Strahl, both distinguished former Conservative parliamentarians who have eminent respect and knowledge about security. It is about time the government listened to them as well.

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to rise to address this very important bill.

I want to thank my colleagues for their insightful contributions to the debate already. We agree on a great deal, and it gives me confidence that we will be able to work together to ultimately improve this bill.

Let me be clear: New Democrats support parliamentary oversight to finally bring Canada up to the standard of accountability that our closest allies have enjoyed for decades.

This bill would fulfill recommendations made some 35 years ago and ignored by successive Liberal and Conservative governments ever since. Neglecting that warning and ignoring our allies' examples has not enhanced Canadians' security or protected their rights.

Let us be clear: We face real threats to both our security and our rights. Canadians are concerned about the threat of foreign and domestic terrorism, they are concerned about cybersecurity, and they are concerned about armed violence and unrest around the globe, but they are also deeply concerned about their freedoms and their privacy. They are concerned about government secrecy and surveillance, and above all, they are wondering why, after nearly a year in power, their new government has maintained Bill C-51 as the law of the land without changing a single comma.

I support the principle of this bill and will be voting in favour of referring it to the committee so that it can get on with the study to get it right. However, I have deep concerns about many aspects of it.

I am concerned that this bill would fail to account for the lessons of the last decade and the experiences of our allies. Unless it is fixed, it will create a committee that is neither strong enough to be effective nor independent enough to be trusted.

I have solutions to propose for each of these flaws, and I welcome the input of all members on them, because this is no place for partisanship or politics.

Before we dive into the details of the bill, let us be clear on three important points of context. First, this bill is not a new idea. Rather, it answers a warning made 35 years ago in the wake of a string of high-profile scandals surrounding the RCMP.

One major recommendation coming out of the 1981 McDonald Commission of inquiry was the creation of CSIS as a separate intelligence gathering service. Another major recommendation was the creation of an overarching parliamentary oversight committee. That one has gathered dust for three decades, so the idea behind Bill C-22 is not new. In fact, our allies, including the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Australia, each created similar oversight committees decades ago.

The second point of context is that we should all be clear that the bill before us today is far from a fresh proposal. It is nearly identical to an earlier Liberal bill, introduced in November 2005, in the final days of the Paul Martin government, by the public safety committee as Bill C-81. While the powers of security agencies have grown considerably since that time, the few minor differences between the 2005 oversight bill and this one would reduce the committee's powers and independence. For instance, Bill C-22 introduces security vetting for members and a new power for ministers to halt investigations.

An old bill is not necessarily a bad bill, but the government must surely accept that a proposal drawn up before the Snowden revelations, before the October 14 attack on this Parliament, and before the shocking overreach of the Harper government's Bill C-51 must be open to updates from members.

The third and last point of context is that we should all have a clear picture of how this proposal compares to the practices of our allies so we can learn from them, and, as the government House leader said, create a made-in-Canada solution that works for us.

The body proposed by Bill C-22 is essentially a weaker version of its closest analogue, namely Britain's intelligence and security committee.

In 2013, after public criticism of its many shortcomings, the British government significantly overhauled its committee, strengthening its powers and its independence. The committee emerged with an independently elected chair, operational oversight powers, and a shift in appointment power from the prime minister to Parliament. We heard a great deal about that in the speech from the hon. member for Durham.

These reforms are simply not reflected in the bill before us today, and I do not understand why. The British committee was in fact in Ottawa last week, and its chair warned us to work hard to earn public trust. We do not want to repeat the errors of our allies; we need to learn from them.

Last week, when the previous chair resigned, the head of a prominent British legal advocacy group responded in this way:

From UK complicity in CIA torture to mass-surveillance, the [committee] has missed every [single] major security-related scandal of the past 15 years. It has fallen to the press, the courts and NGOs to expose these events, with the [committee's] members only discovering them by reading the newspapers.

We do not want the same to be said of our committee a decade from now; rather, we should be aiming to be the leading edge of international practice. That was the advice in 2004 of the interim committee of parliamentarians on national security when that committee recommended granting complete access to information far beyond what is considered in the bill before us today. Here is what that committee said:

Though this arguably goes further than the legislation enacted by some of our allies, it is in line with developing practice....

We strongly believe that a structure which must rely on gradual evolution and expansion of access, power, and remit would be inappropriate for Canada.

Therefore, there are examples we can learn from around the globe. Could we give elected representatives a bigger role in operational oversight? Absolutely; in the United States, federal law requires intelligence agencies to keep congressional committees “fully and presently informed” of all covert actions and operations. In Germany, the group that authorizes each interception of private communications is controlled by a committee of parliamentarians.

Could we give the committee stronger investigative powers? Absolutely; Germany's oversight committee can conduct random site investigations, and subpoena witnesses and documents. Belgium's committee can even launch criminal investigations. The committee in our case would not even have subpoena powers.

I raise these comparisons not to disparage the bill before us, but to show that the door must be open to amendments. If the government shuts the door on amendments from other parties, we will be shackling ourselves to a blueprint that ignores the last decade of history and falls short of the current best practices of our allies. To me this is simply unacceptable when our safety and rights are at stake.

With that in mind, let me point to five weaknesses in the current draft and propose some solutions. I have amendments ready for each and would welcome the chance to work with members of all parties to craft a solution by consensus.

First, the government is proposing that the chair be selected by the Prime Minister rather than elected by the committee. As I say, that is what Britain originally did. It changed its way; why can we not? We have to earn the trust of Canadians. It seems like a pretty poor place to start when the government gets to control who runs the watchdog committee in the first place.

The bill should be amended to allow the election of a member from outside the governing party to chair this committee. That was exactly what Mr. Justice McDonald recommended 35 years ago to another Liberal government. It is not unprecedented, as I said; examples are Germany, Australia, and elsewhere. I fear we are going to lose the confidence of the public if we do not get this right.

Second, the committee's access to information, as has been said, is really limited. Full information is a prerequisite to effective oversight and to earning the public trust, which the British chair told us we must earn.

If the government can keep its secrets from the oversight committee, how can Canadians trust its findings? To call the committee's access rights broad, as the minister does, ignores many exemptions that make Swiss cheese of its powers. No fewer than seven different categories of information would be absolutely denied to the committee. Two more, including a catch-all category, could be denied at the discretion of any cabinet minister. Some of these are innocuous, but some of them are not.

The committee would be absolutely denied access to special operational information as defined in the Security of Information Act. This would mean that the intelligence oversight committee could be denied all information on intelligence sources, methods and targets, encryption systems, and information received from foreign partners. If this information is not relevant, indeed central, to the committee's mandate, I do not know what is. Is this not, in fact, the very type of information that the committee was designed to safely handle? Is that not why its members are to have security clearance and be sworn to eternal secrecy?

The worst is what security expert Professor Craig Forcese has called the Mack truck exception: the power of any cabinet minister to withhold information from the committee on the grounds that providing it—are members ready?—would be injurious to national security. This phrase is not defined anywhere, nor is it explained how sharing information with a group of top-secret-cleared individuals inside a secure facility could compromise Canada's security. These holes have simply got to be closed.

The committee must have complete access to information, as was recommended in 2004 by another parliamentary committee. As a solution, we should grant the committee that kind of access with the reasonable exception, I concede, of cabinet confidences, and the power to compel documents and testimony, a glaring omission in the bill. I am preparing amendments to this effect, and again, I would welcome input from members on all sides of the aisle.

Third, clause 8(b) of the bill would allow any cabinet minister to bury an investigation into his or her own department by claiming that the committee's confidential inquiry would be damaging to Canada's national security. The potential for abuse to cover up sloppy management or a scandal within a department is simply overwhelming. This line simply has to be removed if any credibility is to be retained.

Fourth, clause 21 of the bill currently would give the Prime Minister's Office complete power to censor the committee's reports before they are released. Let us pause on that. So far we have learned that the government would appoint the chair, control what information the committee sees, and stop it investigating certain areas. The government proposes to control what it can report to Canadians. It is easy to see how, as the chair of the British committee warned us, the public trust could be so easily lost.

The government has a responsibility to ensure that sensitive information is handled appropriately. We all agree. However, this must be balanced against the need to earn and maintain public trust, and that requires meaningful commitment to transparency and accountability, not verbiage.

I propose a compromise. I would propose an amendment that would require any revised report to indicate the extent of and reasons for any censorship by the Prime Minister's Office. Ideally, this would include a description of the type of information removed so Canadians can distinguish the redaction of confidential sources from the redaction of committee findings, for example.

I would ask the members on all sides to consider the utility of what I call an override clause, such as the power of the German oversight committee to publish a general assessment of an ongoing intelligence operation if supported by a supermajority of the committee. That is an idea we can look at.

Last, I would propose an amendment to give the committee a legal duty to report all suspected non-compliance or illegal activity to the Prime Minister and the Attorney General of Canada. There is a precedent for this. Section 273.63 of the National Defence Act imposes the same whistle-blowing obligation on the commissioner responsible for CSEC, the Communications Security Establishment of Canada.

That kind of duty would not only bolster Canadians' confidence; it would resolve any confusion within the committee over the proper course of action when non-compliance is suspected. To reject that kind of duty, in my view, would send a very worrying signal to Canadians.

As I said, I am prepared to introduce amendments proposing solutions to each of these five weaknesses, as I perceive them, in the current version of the bill. I would, of course, welcome the input of any member from any party. This is not a place for partisanship or ego. All parties have to work together on this committee, and we may as well begin now.

Before I close, I would also like to take the chance to flag one last issue for the government, which I believe requires further consideration but for procedural reasons cannot be addressed through amendments to this bill.

I would urge the government, as part of its broader security review, to amend the CSIS Act and the National Defence Act to require the Communications Security Establishment of Canada, CSEC, to inform the committee every time a ministerial authorization is granted to intercept private communications, and to require CSIS to inform the committee when it conducts threat reduction activities, as that term is defined, or when CSIS seeks a warrant to do so under section 21.1 of the CSIS Act.

Canadians are rightly concerned about the use and abuse of these powers. There is no justification for withholding their use from the oversight committee.

In closing, let me say again that New Democrats welcome this bill and commit to working together with any member of any party to improve it. I have identified five flaws, in my judgment, and proposed five solutions, but I know there are many more of both, and I welcome input from all.

As I said at the outset, this bill is crucial to protecting all Canadians' safety and upholding their rights. Oversight makes security services more effective, and it bolsters public trust in them. This committee will be equally as useful in closing gaps as in reining in excesses, but we cannot take its utility for granted. The bill before us is imperfect. Without amendments, it will fail to give the committee either the strength to be effective or the independence to be trusted.

We cannot settle for good enough when it comes to Canadians' security and rights. I call on every member and all parties to work together to improve this critically important bill. Above all, I urge the government to demonstrate openness to that input and to these amendments. The security and rights of Canadians are not places for partisanship.

If the government demonstrates that openness, all parties may be able to work together to craft a committee that is independent, secure, and effective at strengthening our security, protecting our rights, and upholding Canadian values. However, if the government refuses to work in good faith with other parties to make changes to this bill, I fear the support of parliamentarians and the trust of Canadians will be lost.

Three decades ago, the McDonald commission warned us as follows:

....security must not be regarded as more important than democracy, for the fundamental purpose of security is the preservation of our democratic system.

Every parliamentarian will see that balance differently, but all of us must work together to get it right.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the manner in which the presentation was made by my colleague from across the way. There were a number of points. He has made suggestions in terms of potential amendments. When we take a look at the legislation that the government House leader has introduced, we see it would have an impact on over a dozen, I believe it is about 17, departments and others that will ultimately have some sort of a reporting in to what I believe is a well-warranted committee, which we have been wanting to see established for many years.

Passing the bill through second reading and sending it to committee would afford members the opportunity to put forward amendments, and the member has made reference to a few amendments that he is thinking of. I think that the Prime Minister has been fairly clear that we, as a government, or as a caucus, or even, in this case, this entire chamber, want to see a good, sound piece of legislation. If there are amendments that would enhance the legislation, they will be given due consideration. We have already seen opposition members' amendments pass at the committee stage.

In light of the very nature in which the member has put forward his ideas at second reading, does he actually have the written amendments, which maybe he could share with the House in advance? I think there would be some advantages to that. If he has them, would he do so? I know the government House leader would welcome them.

Earlier, we were questioned as to why it was the government House leader who introduced the bill. Because there are so many departments, the most appropriate person to introduce it is, in fact, the government House leader.

In any event, I know we would welcome the amendments if the member has the amendments already drawn up.

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Mr. Speaker, yes, indeed, those amendments will be forthcoming. I would be pleased to share them with everyone in the House in order to ensure that those are at least starting points for a dialogue about how the bill could be improved.

I think that if we create a committee that has, in an unprecedented way, security-cleared people, in that all nine members will have top secret clearance, they will meet in separate, especially assigned rooms, and they are people sworn to eternal secrecy, and we act in good faith in that way, I think they could be trusted with the kind of information that, sadly, the bill would withhold from them.

I guess the critical point I would make to my hon. friend is that if we do not earn the trust of Canadians with the bill, we have lost an enormous opportunity. It was rightly pointed out that the House has not dealt with this. It has been 35 years since the Macdonald Commission. All of our allies have something like this. We are finally getting it on the order paper. Let us take it to the last step and get it right.

If we do not, if people think this is not a credible oversight operation, then all of the things we are trying to do to improve Bill C-51, which I certainly hope the government is going to fix in due course, and all of the scepticism Canadians have about our national security apparatus is going to be exacerbated.

If we, however, create a committee that has access to information, that has an independent chair, that is not seen to be under the thumb of any government of the day, we can create the trust that Canadians need and it can help our security service do its critically important job with that trust in mind.

[Kennedy Stewart, NDP, Burnaby South, BC]

Mr. Speaker, as always, I enjoy my hon. colleague's very wise words when it comes to redoing legislation and his open sense of really trying to make things better.

I am going to ask my colleague, the member for Victoria, to rank the legislation as it stands at the moment. For viewers and people who are looking at this, it is sometimes hard to understand all the details. On a scale of 1 to 10, where would my colleague currently put the bill? I know we are supporting this, or at least I am supporting sending it to committee, but what revisions would get it to a much higher ranking? What would demonstrably increase the quality of the bill?

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I am always hesitant with my colleague from Burnaby South, his being an old professor and trying to rank and grade things. I would have to say that the bill has the potential to be an A statute. At the moment, I would give it a B- because it has the basis of things that can be built upon if parliamentarians of goodwill and a government with an open mind are prepared to roll up their sleeves and get it right.

The good news is that we have all sorts of analogues, from Australia, Britain, the United States, and Germany, that we can choose from. We can get, as the government House leader said, a made-in-Canada solution that works. However, if we simply leave the bill as it is, this lost opportunity is crushing. It can be improved. It should be improved. With parliamentarians in a non-partisan spirit working together to improve it, we can get it right and it can become an A piece of legislation.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I too would like to thank my hon. colleague for a very thoughtful, calm, and non-partisan response to the bill tabled by the government. There was somewhat less vocal disappointment than the critic for the official opposition in what was promised by the government at any number of levels during the election campaign and compromised by the elimination of the elements that would have given Parliament the full, absolute control of this very important and claimed-to-be non-partisan tool of our Parliament.

However, I wonder if the member could comment on whether he shares the official opposition critic on public safety's disappointment, recognizing the government's excuse that the House leader presented the legislation because of the many departments involved. It is true there are many departments, but I wonder whether my colleague is disappointed that the Minister of Public Safety, who is after all responsible for the legislation, did not appear in the House to present and defend the legislation.

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I guess I share the opposition disappointment that in the last few months efforts that have been made by both recognized parties in the opposition to reach out to the government seem to be not accepted. I find that disappointing. I understand, however, the government House leader being here because this does cover a number of what are called appropriate ministers in the bill, the vast part of our government bureaucracy in all of the departments for which a government House leader would speak.

I am more concerned, however, not about the past. I am concerned about how we work together to get it right in the future. Notwithstanding the very powerful and forceful presentation by the official opposition public safety critic earlier this morning, I know him to have the same desire to work in a non-partisan way to fix the bill. Members have my assurance that the NDP, I and my colleagues, will work in that spirit. We extend a hand across the aisle to the government members, hoping they will agree that this is central and critical if we are going to get this right for Canadians.

[Joyce Murray, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the President of the Treasury Board]

Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to speak to the proposed legislation before us as it would allow us to deliver on the commitment we made to Canadians to improve security and to include scrutiny and review when it comes to the national security and intelligence activities of the Government of Canada.

I was listening to the recent debate and the words of the critic for public safety from the NDP. It occurs to me that some of the concerns the member has assume that there is one right way and one right legislation. I would say that issues of privacy and security are so dynamic in our country and society that having, as he described it, parliamentarians of goodwill and open minds working together is the critical element. In terms of getting something on the table right now, the bill is critical. Therefore, I am very optimistic about the bill.

I want to remind the member for Victoria that the challenges around balancing security and privacy in an Internet age will not stop. There will never be a point where everything is exactly where we can freeze it in time and say, “That's it”. We will have to keep being aware of the issues as they arise and improving our responses to them. The bill is an excellent step forward on that.

As members have heard, Bill C-22 would allow for the establishment of the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians. It is a multi-party committee that would examine and report on the government's national security and intelligence activities across an array of departments and ministries. This is an area that many Canadians feel is far too opaque, and I certainly am one of those parliamentarians.

Before I get into the details of the bill, I think it is worth reminding hon. members about the many calls in the House for this kind of committee to be created, and this has been happening for well over a decade. There have also been repeated attempts to introduce legislation in the House as well as in the Senate in order to address the concerns that the bill would address.

For example, two years ago, I was pleased to create and introduce Bill C-622, which would have created the intelligence and security committee of Parliament, very similar to the committee that we see in the bill today. However, my bill had an additional element of identifying measures that I felt were needed to increase the accountability and transparency of our Communications Security Establishment and link the operations of sharing information among agencies in a more structured and accountable way.

That bill was debated at second reading barely one week after the attack in this building and the tragic shooting of Corporal Nathan Cirillo down the street, and just 10 days after the tragedy of the killing of Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent. Therefore, the timing of Bill C-622 was unfortunate. In fact, I had someone on Twitter say that my Bill C-622 was the worst-timed private member's bill in the history of the Canadian Parliament. I had to say that I agreed.

However, it was fully supported by all of the opposition party members, including one member of the Conservative Party as well, because of the need to address improving security and the protection of privacy, and the way that was embedded in Bill C-622.

As I said in this place at that time:

In the wake of the recent deadly attacks on our soldiers and on Parliament itself, all party leaders confirmed their commitment to protect the rights, freedoms, and civil liberties of Canadians, even as security measures are analyzed and strengthened. Indeed, Canadians expect these fundamental aspects of the very democracy being guarded to be respected, and that is the underlying intention of the bill.

Unfortunately, the legislation, as I said, was defeated by the Conservative government of the day just a few short months before it introduced Bill C-51. At the time, the Conservatives argued that the existing review mechanisms were adequate and that the creation of a committee of parliamentarians to scrutinize national security operations would be, to quote the former Conservative parliamentary secretary, “not in the best interests of national security” and “not in the best interests of Canadians”. I could not disagree more. Time after time, over many years, we have heard from experts, including the Auditor General, judges, MPs, and senators, and from ordinary Canadians that in fact just such a committee is in the best interests of Canadians and vital to our national security and our values as an open, inclusive, and rights-based democracy.

In the course of exploring this issue over a number of months and meeting with key members of the security and privacy networks in Ottawa and across the country, virtually no one thought that this committee of parliamentarians would not be an important and essential next step for the Government of Canada. The arguments made by the Conservatives at that time, that there were already surveillance mechanisms over our security agencies, were weak arguments because while some of those mechanisms were effective in their mandates and had very competent heads who were delivering on their mandates, their mandates were narrow and did not include thinking about the laws and policies being applied to the security agencies.

It was not within their mandates to comment on that, so if there were flaws, holes, or outdated elements of the laws or policies that the commissioners, such as the commissioner for CSEC, were applying in their review, they had no tools or teeth for recommending changes to policy. That meant that the oversight mechanisms had to accept the policies and legislation of the day and the limitations thereof, even though this is such a dynamic situation in our Internet age with the moving targets of the various threats of security breaches in our country. That is part of why it is so important to have a committee that has a broader mandate and looks across all of the security and intelligence functions of the Government of Canada.

The second key missing from the individual oversight mechanisms the previous government argued were adequate was that there was no looking across the board at the various approaches, policies, and operations to see where the gaps and duplications were. If there are gaps in the personal privacy safety net and in the security safety net, it could mean that we do not have adequate security for Canadians. It could also mean not having a robust enough approach to protecting the individual rights and privacy of citizens. If there is duplication, that means that resources are going unnecessarily to do work being done somewhere else and that those resources will not then be available for investing in the full application of the policies of the agencies to protect Canadians while respecting individual privacy and rights.

Indeed, the bill before us today is a key component of our government's ambitious national security agenda focused on achieving a dual objective, keeping Canadians safe and safeguarding the rights and freedoms that we all enjoy as Canadians, and which, indeed, are the hallmark of being Canadian and are looked at by countries around the globe as a model for what they aspire to in safeguarding rights and freedoms. That is why it was the central focus of the Liberal platform and has been put before the House.

I will now speak to the details of this legislation.

In terms of structure, the proposed committee would be a statutory entity whose members would be drawn from the ranks of current parliamentarians across party lines. That structure would create a non-partisan responsibility to other members of Parliament to report on our behalf on these matters in a way that crosses party lines and is in the best interest of Parliament's responsibility to the Canadian public to find the right way forward in balancing security and privacy rights.

The committee would be composed of nine members. That would include seven members of Parliament, with a maximum of four being from the government party, and two senators. Given the nature of its mandate, the committee would be granted unprecedented access to classified material. A dedicated professional and independent secretariat would support the work of the committee to ensure it had the tools and resources it would need to carry out its work.

That last sentence is critical. In some of the previous private members' bills that were proposed in the House, that function was not included. Therefore, the resources to get assistance to be able to dig into things and have research done and perhaps travel and all of the support the committee would need to be able to do its work without major constraints were elements that I added to my private member's bill, Bill C-622. It built on the previous work done by the able Liberal members of Parliament who had put forward a bill to create a committee of parliamentarians. Having this dedicated professional and independent secretariat to support the work of the committee, as I said, is critical to its effectiveness.

Another way the committee would be proven effective is by having a broad mandate. This committee would be able to review the full range of national security activities and all departments and agencies across the Government of Canada. That is a key tenet of the bill and crucial to what we are trying to achieve. I mentioned earlier how important it is to be able to find those duplications and to be able to make our security safety net much stronger thereby.

The committee would be able to look at all of this work crossing some 20 different departments and agencies who all are involved to varying degrees in national security and intelligence activities. It would gain a full picture of what the government agencies and departments were doing in national security and intelligence matters. In terms of this mandate, the model we have envisioned goes even further than what exists in most countries with a similar type of committee.

I am proud that our Prime Minister supported a delegation going to London, Great Britain to look at the British committee of parliamentarians that provides oversight, so that we could learn from and build on that model and improve it based on what the delegation heard. We owe a great deal of thanks to the co-operation of the members of parliament of Great Britain who, over the years, have been willing to share their successes, challenges, and ideas on how to make better legislation. It is worth mentioning, incidentally, that this kind of parliamentary body exists in most western democracies, including all of our Five Eyes allies. That is one of the reasons I was so surprised at the previous Conservative government's intransigence in refusing to support this concept. However, that is water under the bridge, and I hope we will see support from Conservative members today under a different, albeit interim, leadership.

The committee would have the authority to self-initiate reviews of the legislative, regulatory, policy, financial, and administrative framework for national security in Canada. In other words, it would be able to analyze whatever it believed needed analyzing to ensure the effectiveness of the framework, as well as its respect for Canadian values.

That is so important, as I mentioned, and represents an evolution from what a previous Liberal government had contemplated for this committee. It is an evolution to a more effective and more multi-layered approach for the committee's responsibilities, which I felt was exceedingly important when I was doing my work on this issue.

Beyond the power to look at the national security framework, it will be empowered to review specific national security and intelligence operations, including, notably, those that are still ongoing. Due to the inherently sensitive nature of the material examined by the committee, there will be reasonable limits on what the committee can share with the public. Committee members will still be able to bring pressure to bear on the government of the day by telling Canadians if they have uncovered something problematic and by letting Canadians know, thereafter, if the problem had been adequately addressed.

Those are incredibly important accountability mechanisms built into this bill. It is not enough to have parliamentary committee members review and find things that are problematic, and then have those buried under a blanket of security without the public ever knowing there was is an issue that needs to be attended to.

As I noted at the outset, several parliamentarians, past and present, have tried to address these matters with other legislative proposals. We certainly look forward to hearing their input, just as I look forward to providing my own input as one of those members. Indeed, all members, through this legislative process, are welcome to give their input.

I have already addressed the point by some that review and accountability mechanisms are already in place when it comes to national security. We have the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP, the Security Intelligence Review Committee for CSIS, and the CSE Commissioner. However, as I have mentioned, it is incumbent on parliamentarians to be able to meaningfully review Canada's overarching national security framework, to make sure they can identify key gaps and duplications and also ministries that are doing important work on this but in isolation because their key mandate happens to be something completely other than security and privacy.

We will be encouraging the new committee to co-operate and collaborate with the existing review bodies to avoid overlap and to build on the great work already being done. In fact, in the research I did for Bill C-622, I spoke with former heads of the Communications Security Establishment, who supported the idea of a review committee of parliamentarians. I spoke with former and present commissioners for oversight of CSE, who are also doing very important work. I have to say that our current commissioner has really extended, over the last few years, the kinds of information he is providing in his reports, far beyond what was happening in the commissioner's office before.

These are important mechanisms and oversight initiatives. I am delighted that we will be building on the work they do. They will remain autonomous institutions with distinct mandates, and such collaboration that they will provide with this committee is desirable and will be voluntary.

This committee is going to go far in helping us re-establish the balance between democratic accountability and national security that is so hugely desired by the Canadian public. It is of crucial importance to our government. We heard about it throughout the recent election campaign in 2015. It is of crucial importance to Canadians. We look forward to engaging in constructive and thoughtful debate with members on all sides of the House on this and other issues related to improving our national security while defending and supporting the civil liberties and privacy rights of Canadians.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I enjoyed working with the member on the Standing Committee on National Defence in the previous Parliament. She was always a valued contributor to our considerations and discussions.

I thank the member for recalling the private member's bill that she presented, Bill C-622. I apologize for not remembering all of the details of that bill. However, in the last few minutes of her remarks, I did reflect on the details digitally, and there was one point that the member made very emphatically in that bill, which was that the chair of the committee must be elected by the members of the committee.

Could my hon. friend speak to the difference in this legislation, which provides for prime ministerial appointment of the chair of this supposedly non-partisan committee? This is supposed to be a committee unto itself and responsible to Parliament, not the Prime Minister's Office.

[Joyce Murray, Liberal, Vancouver Quadra, BC]

Mr. Speaker, my hon. colleague ably chaired the defence committee for a good part of the time I was the Liberal defence critic and participated on the committee. I want to thank him for his kind words. I would have loved to have kind words of support at the time I was proposing Bill C-622. I reached out to many of his colleagues personally to seek that support, and one member provided it.

One thing our Prime Minister has done is revolutionize the appointment processes in this nation. The kinds of partisan appointments that we were seeing, with justice ministers appointing their former colleagues to judgeships or members of their campaign teams and senators being appointed by a prime minister for their loyalty to a single party, or their ability to fundraise or their potential ability to get crowds in support of the Conservative Party, are over. I am very proud of the leadership of our Prime Minister in his one after another creation of non-partisan appointment processes.

I have every confidence in this committee's ability, with its appointed chair, to work in the best interests of Canadians, and Parliament's responsibility to safeguard and oversee these very important elements of the lives of Canadians.

[Cheryl Hardcastle, NDP, Windsor—Tecumseh, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I was glad to hear my hon. colleague speak about learning and building on legislation of this nature from the Five Eyes allies. The glaring difference is that in Canada we contend with Bill C-51. Therefore, the opportunity we have with the legislation needs to be responsive and allow this proposed committee to be as strong as it needs to be because of Bill C-51.

Is there a concern in order for us to raise the level of openness, accountability, transparency, and responsibility, in light of the global situation and our place in the world? How can we make this bill stronger? As it stands right now, the committee's oversight would not be great, not as great as compared to the review for counterparts, which exist now with the SIRC or with the CSE commissioner. My hon. colleague has discussed some of the amendments that could be brought forward in order to fortify this bill and really make it important for this opportunity that we have.

I would like to hear a bit more about her thoughts on the limiting of the effectiveness for the Liberals to really seize the opportunity to have amendments to the bill so it is accountable and regain that trust after Bill C-51.

[Joyce Murray, Liberal, Vancouver Quadra, BC]

Mr. Speaker, there were certainly deep concerns on this side of the House over some elements of Bill C-51, and an absolute commitment to address those concerns. This committee of parliamentarians is just one of the things to which our government is committed.

I have to congratulate the minister who is putting the bill forward, and that this is being done well within the first year of a brand new government. This is complex legislation. It is a critical improvement, so we are acting very quickly as a government.

However, we are doing other things, and one is an overall review of the whole framework of national security. I was very much in favour of our government doing that. I personally put that forward as a recommendation. Even fixing C-51 and even with adding the committee of parliamentarians, there are still big flaws in our overall framework, what I have been calling our security safety net and our respect for privacy safety net, and those will be identified during an overall review.

However, the member compared this parliamentary committee to these very effective independent oversight bodies and institutions like the commissioner and so on. This strengthens those by adding another element. This committee will work with the existing commissioners and the effective work of their offices. This is not instead of. It adds to the whole effectiveness of oversight, accountability and transparency that the member seeks. I share her aspiration for a better framework, and this would deliver that.