Bill C-11 (Historical)

Human Pathogens and Toxins Act

An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins

This enactment creates measures to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins and all activities associated with them. It establishes a comprehensive legislative regime that extends beyond the present importation regime. It requires every person conducting activities involving human pathogens or toxins to take all reasonable measures to protect the health and safety of the public.

Human Pathogens and Toxins Act

[Chuck Strahl, Conservative, Chilliwack—Fraser Canyon, BC]

moved that Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins, be read the third time and passed.

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health]

Madam Speaker, I want to start off by taking the opportunity to thank the opposition parties, especially the critics from the NDP, the Bloc and the Liberal Party, for all their hard work and co-operation in working on this very important piece of legislation.

I am pleased to be here today to update members on the progress of Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins.

As we have heard at second reading, there is strong support for strengthening safety and security with regard to human pathogens and toxins in Canada.

We had an opportunity at the Standing Committee on Health to discuss the key elements of the bill, which would provide the new authorities required to safeguard Canadians from the risks that dangerous human pathogens and toxins pose.

The Standing Committee on Health heard from a wide variety of witnesses about the importance of Bill C-11. Following witness testimony, as well as appearances by government officials from the Public Health Agency of Canada, amendments were made to Bill C-11 that have strengthen the bill and addressed many of the concerns raised by witnesses.

I would like to give members a quick overview of the bill.

The intention of the bill is to try to balance biosafety and biosecurity requirements with the need to advance science and research. The intent of the bill is not to restrict research and development, but rather to introduce a risk-based approach to the management of human pathogens so that they are handled safely and accounted for across Canada.

Because of the risk posed by dangerous human pathogens and toxins, Bill C-11 relies primarily on the criminal law jurisdiction of Parliament. In this regard, Bill C-11 includes a range of prohibitions, penalties and security screening requirements designed to protect the health and safety of Canadians.

The program and regulatory framework to be developed under Bill C-11 will include requirements for licensing, inventories, biological safety officers, information gathering and transfers of human pathogens and toxins, among other matters. The legislation has been drafted with care to ensure that the bill fully respects the rights and freedoms of Canadians entrenched in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and privacy rights protected via the Privacy Act.

There were certain amendments to the bill. In studying Bill C-11, several issues were raised from various witnesses concerned about the impact of the bill on their work. These issues included concerns about the oversight of risk group 2 laboratories, concerns about how the suite of regulations for Bill C-11 would be developed, concerns about the reporting requirements, as well as concerns about the schedules under the bill and how they would be amended over time.

We listened to these concerns, and I believe we have worked together at the health committee to develop a piece of legislation that addresses these concerns and more precisely reflects the original policy intent of Bill C-11.

Now I would like to speak about risk group 2.

With regard to the concerns that the committee heard about the oversight of risk group 2 human pathogens, several amendments were made to clarify that these relatively less harmful agents would be treated less stringently than the more dangerous risk groups 3 and 4 human pathogens, in the bill and in the program and regulatory framework. Four specific amendments were made for this purpose.

The first amendment clarifies in the preamble that human pathogens and toxins pose varying levels of risk to the health and safety of the public. This change reflects what was heard in committee, that not all human pathogens and toxins are the same from the perspective of risk, that some pose a greater threat than others.

The second amendment dealing with risk group 2 agents clarifies clause 33 explicitly so that security clearances will only be required for persons who have access to prescribed risk groups 3 or 4 agents or toxins as prescribed in regulations. It was never the program policy intent to security screen individuals who only have access to risk group 2 human pathogens, and this amendment clarifies this intention.

The third amendment regarding risk group 2 agents creates lesser general penalties for offences under the act or regulations related to risk group 2 human pathogens. This includes no provision for a prison sentence for a first offence involving only risk group 2 agents. This change to clause 53 reflects concerns voiced that persons carrying on activities with risk group 2 human pathogens should be treated more leniently than those carrying on activities with risk groups 3 or 4 human pathogens.

Finally, the fourth amendment, in clause 66, makes explicit that the regulatory regime will treat risk group 2 human pathogens in a way that is consistent with the fact that they are less dangerous than human pathogens in risk groups 3 and 4. Taken together, these changes signal that the level of risk associated with risk group 2 human pathogens is lower than risk groups 3 or 4, and they will therefore be treated less stringently in the overall legislative and regulatory framework.

Regarding reporting requirements, another important amendment that was made at the health committee clarifies that subclause 12(1) of the bill only applies to releases of human pathogens or toxins from a facility. This stems from concerns that were heard from stakeholders that minor spills contained within a licensed facility would have to be reported. This amendment recognizes that releases from the facility itself pose greater risks to public health. Once again, we believe this will help to improve the clarity of the bill, specifically with regard to what will be required of licensees.

Another important amendment requires the formation of scientific advisory committees under clauses 9 and 10 to advise the minister regarding changes to the lists of human pathogens and toxins found in schedules 1 through 5. As part of the consultations on the program and regulatory framework, the Public Health Agency of Canada will consult with stakeholders concerning the makeup of these committees, which be will formed under the authority in section 14 of the Public Health Agency of Canada Act.

Concerning privacy amendments, during hearings on Bill C-11, the health committee received a letter from the Privacy Commissioner noting, amongst other things, the need for a more objective test of what constitutes relevant information collected by the minister under clause 38, as well as the need for situations in which recipients of information disclosed by the minister pursuant to subclause 39(2) may be compelled by law to disclose it further. These two amendments were made based on suggestions from the Privacy Commissioner.

The last of these important amendments requires the tabling of the regulations in both houses of Parliament. This amendment reflects what we heard from witnesses about the need for greater accountability and transparency in the making of regulations. In reviewing the wording of this particular amendment, the government noted some inconsistencies between the intention of what was stated in the health committee and what was written into the revised Bill C-11.

Specifically, it was agreed that the amendments would require tabling of the regulations in both houses of Parliament in order to provide an opportunity for review by a committee in each house. The wording of the bill after committee stage only required the referral of the proposed regulations to a committee in the House of Commons. There was no similar requirement regarding the referral of the regulations to an appropriate committee in the other place.

The government therefore clarified that the regulations would need to be tabled in both houses of Parliament and referred to a committee of each house. We believe this was the original intention of committee members in agreeing to this amendment, and we tabled an amendment at report stage from committee to clarify this intention.

There is a need to move forward. We believe this new legislation is needed now. It is required to safeguard the health and well-being of all Canadians, including those persons working in laboratories. It is also required to demonstrate to the Canadian public and to our international partners that the Government of Canada is taking the issue of security related to human pathogens and toxins very seriously. The proposed legislation represents a made-in-Canada approach that addresses both safety and security.

Clearly, the urgency in moving ahead with expanded federal oversight over human pathogens and toxins has been widely recognized. I believe the study of Bill C-11 in the health committee has resulted in a clear piece of legislation, and I look forward to moving it on to the Senate.

[Jim Maloway, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

Madam Speaker, I know the NDP critic takes this issue very seriously and I know she has worked very hard on the bill.

I wonder if the member could tell the House which of her amendments were accepted in the bill.

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

Madam Speaker, indeed, the member is correct. The NDP critic worked very hard and co-operated with the government and the entire committee to move this very important piece of legislation forward.

As I said in my opening statement, I want to thank all the critics and members of the committee, the NDP, Bloc and Liberals. By working together, we came up with an improved piece of legislation.

The amendments that the NDP member put forward were included. We listened to her suggestions because we felt it made a better piece of legislation and I want to publicly thank her for her input and good work.

[Paul Szabo, Liberal, Mississauga South, ON]

Madam Speaker, I am glad to see the committee has done good work to get some clarifying changes.

I want to ask the member for a little extra information with regard to subclause 12(1), the addition of the words “from the facility” following the words “reason to believe that a human pathogen or toxin has been released inadvertently”.

The point is that “facility” is not a defined term in the bill. I do not know whether that has any import, but it would seem to me that if it is not a defined term, facility could in some cases turn out to be something other than what would normally be the case under a licence arrangement. I would ask the member for clarification as to whether just adding the words “from the facility” is substantive enough or whether there should be a definition added for what constitutes an authorized facility?

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

Madam Speaker, this very issue was brought up in committee. There was concern with some of the researchers who were working with these pathogens and toxins. As the member would know, even though researchers working in laboratories take the utmost precautions, spills can occasionally happen.

The intent of this legislation is not to force laboratories and workers to report what we would call usual spills in conducting their research but if there are inadvertent releases from the laboratory into the public domain. The idea of this legislation is to improve biosafety and biosecurity in Canada. There is still a very strong concern that these pathogens and toxins will not be released to the general public and will not cause a concern to our health and safety in Canada.

This was something put forward by the government and that all opposition parties were in agreement with. We were happy to clarify that wording because that definitely is the intent.

[Joy Smith, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Madam Speaker, I too want to commend the parliamentary secretary for all the work he did on this bill, as well as the committee. It was very good. One thing that came up in committee was the risk 2 category that was of grave concern to the entire committee. I believe there were marked changes in the approach to the risk 2 category.

Would the parliamentary secretary please expand a bit on the risk 2 factor because the contribution that the committee made to that one aspect was very important?

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

Madam Speaker, I would like to thank the hon. member for her wise oversight as chair of the health committee. It was through her leadership that we were able to move forward with this legislation. She was very good at working collaboratively and developing consensus with the different witnesses as well as the members of committee. I thank her for that.

She brings up a very important point. It was acknowledged that the intent of the legislation was to treat risk group 2 human pathogens differently than groups 3 and 4, so it was very important to clarify exactly what was meant. There were three amendments included that recognized that facilities dealing only with risk group 2 human pathogens should be treated less stringently under the bill, the program and regulatory framework, as they are less risky than human pathogens in risk groups 3 or 4 or toxins.

There was also an amendment included which specified that there will be no requirement for security screening of persons with access to only risk group 2 human pathogens, as well as an amendment to lower the possible penalties for contraventions of the act or regulations involving only risk group 2 human pathogens.

The government also proposed two further amendments to respond to the concerns expressed by the Privacy Commissioner and moved those forward as well. I hope that answers the hon. member's question.

[Luc Malo, Bloc, Verchères—Les Patriotes, QC]

Madam Speaker, I have a question for the minister's parliamentary secretary.

He said that in our study of the bill in committee, we heard from various stakeholders directly affected by Bill C-11. He also seemed to be saying that the amendments he read met the demands and expectations of those very stakeholders, that is, the researchers who work daily with the micro-organisms targeted by this bill, specifically group 2 micro-organisms.

However, although the various researchers were aware of the amendments, how can he explain the fact that, on the last day of consultations with them, before clause by clause study began, the researchers still had reasonable, legitimate, well-founded fears lingering in their minds? How can he explain the fact that the government nonetheless decided to go ahead with the clause by clause study knowing that those particular stakeholders were dissatisfied with the final product?

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

Madam Speaker, the member is quite correct. There are stakeholders who feel that this legislation, like any piece of legislation, is not perfect. However, I think the member realizes that in any type of legislation there has to be a balanced approach. We have to decide and debate what we want in the legislation and whether we want to move forward with the regulations.

I was impressed with Health Canada when it said that it would consult with us and give strong consideration to this piece of legislation through the implementation phase. We also brought forward an amendment for an advisory committee.

The member may be totally correct in saying that not all stakeholders believe that this is perfect legislation, but it did pass committee and we did have a good debate.

Overall, we have come up with a good piece of legislation, a balanced piece of legislation. The Canadian public deserves legislation that would protect their biosafety and biosecurity. This government and all opposition parties are in line with that intent, that is for sure.

[James Lunney, Conservative, Nanaimo—Alberni, BC]

Madam Speaker, I want to compliment the parliamentary secretary on his management of the committee and for the way he steered the bill through committee. He had a lot of co-operation from opposition parties along with the chair who spoke just a moment ago.

Canada really has a stellar international reputation in managing pathogens as evidenced by the H1N1 worldwide crisis. Canada is receiving pathogenic material from Mexico and helping it to analyze the bug that has been causing problems down there.

I wonder if the parliamentary secretary would comment on whether the provisions in Bill C-11 would help to ensure that we maintain our leadership role and would help to secure Canada's position as a leader in managing human pathogens.

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

Madam Speaker, there are about 3,500 laboratories that import these agents into Canada and they are covered under the existing importation regulations. However, there are approximately 4,000 other laboratories in Canada that work with human pathogens and toxins, but they do not import them and they are not subject to the same federal regulation and oversight. These laboratories may be applying national laboratory safety guidelines on a voluntary basis, but the precise extent of this application is unknown.

That is why we have this legislation to ensure that Canada's reputation remains stellar worldwide.

[Kirsty Duncan, Liberal, Etobicoke North, ON]

Madam Speaker, today I rise to speak to Bill C-11, the human pathogens and toxins act, adopted by the Standing Committee on Health on March 31 and presented to the House on April 2, 2009. The bill is important and significant because infectious disease remains among the leading causes of death worldwide and the greatest killer of children and young adults.

Today, new infectious diseases such as HIV-AIDS, SARS and now swine influenza A(H1N1) are emerging. Old infectious diseases such as malaria, plague and tuberculosis are re-emerging, and intractable infectious diseases remain an ever-present threat. Research to combat infectious diseases has resulted in over 5,000 laboratory-associated infections and almost 200 deaths over the last 70 years. Most recently, in 2008, the Bush administration acknowledged that the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, the only U.S. facility allowed to research highly contagious foot-and-mouth disease, experienced several accidents with the virus.

Fortunately, Canada has not experienced a large intentional or unintentional release of a dangerous agent. However, we have had some close calls. In April 2005 a facility in Canada imported a live virus sample under a risk group 2 permit. However, laboratory analysis showed that the material was contaminated with a risk group 3 pathogen: namely, influenza A(H2N2). Once the contamination was confirmed, the Public Health Agency of Canada's importation office, in consultation with the World Health Organization, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and the provincial health ministers contacted the supplier of the material and all facilities in Canada that had been issued a permit for the same panel and advised them of corrective action.

It was only because the material was imported that the federal government was able to track who had the affected materials. Should this situation happen today in Canada, with a domestically produced product, there would be no authority or ability to track materials and advise affected parties of corrective action. This could result in a biosafety and biosecurity risk as Canadians would likely have no immunity to the influenza A(H2N2) virus, possibly creating the conditions for the next influenza pandemic. This is why the legislation is so important.

Currently, PHAC has knowledge of laboratory-acquired infections, but has no national reporting mechanism to capture them. Our laboratories must have strict facility safeguards, microbiological practices and safety equipment to protect laboratory workers, the environment and the public from exposure to infectious micro-organisms and toxins that are stored in the laboratories. We must ensure the safety of all Canadians.

Therefore, we must be diligent in creating a legislative base that balances biosafety without impeding scientific advancement. We must also provide assurances to the Canadian public and our international partners that Canada takes biosafety and biosecurity seriously.

Bill C-11 will only succeed in making Canadians more secure if the scientists it regulates are consulted thoroughly and if the bill is implemented in close partnership with them. Canadian economic and social prosperity depend on scientific study. We must be wary of a regulatory regime that would interrupt discovery, as happened in the United States following publication of similar legislation. Many laboratories simply stopped working with listed pathogens rather than face the costs and hassles of complying with the legislation.

I believe Bill C-11 strikes the necessary balance between mitigation of risk and scientific freedom, which must then be maintained in the regulations. This balance will require, in the words of one witness, “constant attention and rebalancing that can be done only through ongoing dialogue with the scientific community”.

Witnesses from PHAC assured the committee that consultations will help determine what the regulations regime will look like. Witnesses were optimistic that they could move forward together with partners and that they would continue to take action to address their concerns.

The committee recommended the creation of an external advisory group, perhaps consisting of representatives from private industry, provincial public health agencies, universities and others to ensure that the regulations and the subsequent implementation of the bill proceed with the input and the support of the scientists.

The proposed external advisory group could also be instrumental in categorizing pathogens, as there was discussion regarding, for example, whether or not certain risk group 2 pathogens should be removed from the schedule. Removing risk group 2 from the legislative framework would take away the ability to know who has those pathogens, which are the majority of pathogens in Canada, the ability to assess whether they are handled in an appropriate manner and the ability to measure laboratory-acquired infections and their impacts.

There was general agreement that risk group 2 should be handled in a safe manner, which is not necessarily happening now, but less stringently than risk group 3.

Witnesses from PHAC also addressed stakeholder concerns regarding financial expenditures. It was pointed out that these costs must be balanced against the cost of taking no action, mainly loss of credibility, dollars and human life, which are significant in this case.

Other stakeholder concerns included duplicate laboratory licensing regimes, security checks, licences and privacy issues. The potential for duplicate regulatory licensing and inspection regimes is significant, as is the possible impacts on workload and scheduling which could drastically affect the operation of clinical, public health and research laboratories.

Witnesses from PHAC agreed that opportunities for harmonizing licensing with existing regimes must be considered. Witnesses from PHAC also agreed to clarify the requirements for security clearances for different categories of workers.

Security checks were thought to be burdensome by stakeholders due to significant impacts on students and training, as well as the lab's ability to hire additional staff during an outbreak. Stakeholders would like PHAC to clarify who the inspectors will be, how they will be trained and how they will carry out their tasks.

Partners would also like PHAC to address the important issues regarding licensing. For example, to whom a licence should be awarded, the institution, the group or the individual? What conditions will be required for awarding licences? Will there be an appeals process? Will custodial staff have access to labs? Will they require security clearances?

The last concern I will address is that of privacy, as clause 38 of the bill identifies extremely broad powers for the minister to order an applicant to disclose personal information. It is the committee's understanding that conversations have taken place with the Privacy Commissioner to satisfy stakeholder unease.

I would like to draw attention to the fact that strengthening global surveillance is not enough to eliminate or eradicate infectious disease. We need close ties among public health, trade and transportation organizations. We also need better collaboration with those monitoring the biological weapons convention, because bioterrorism remains a very real threat.

In 2004, The National Academies committee issued a report entitled, “Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism”. The report identified experiments of concern, such as rendering vaccines ineffective or turning non-pathogens, which are not found anywhere in the bill's schedules, into pathogens.

We need to ensure that granting agencies and medical journals are sensitive to these matters and have processes for addressing them. The same National Academies committee recommended creating, through legislation, an independent science and technology advisory group to the intelligence community. Does such a group exist in Canada to monitor and study the next generation of threats in a comprehensive, systematic way, as is being undertaken in the United States?

Finally, the bill is only part of the web of protection needed to make Canada more secure and prepared for bioterrorism. What is being done to promote a common culture of awareness, a shared sense of responsibility to prevent misuse within the scientific community?

We need more than legislation. We need a code of ethics, role modelling and teaching with a particular focus on the biosecurity agenda in Canada.

We have had multiple wake-up calls. Complacency cannot be an option when it comes to biosafety and biosecurity, which is why this legislation is important. The committee did work hard together to make necessary modifications to the bill.

[Jim Maloway, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

Madam Speaker, when we dealt with the bill dealing with the overhaul of the Charities Act, we were told that while the bill had been through two or three parliaments, several iterations and people had made presentations, that there were thousands of charities in Canada that were probably still unaware that the bill even existed.

We are dealing with the fact that the lab facilities would need to be licensed. I am sure we are dealing with a much smaller group than we were in the case of the charities, but does the member know how many labs we are talking about, what the procedures would be for licensing them and what sort of fees they would be paying?

[Kirsty Duncan, Liberal, Etobicoke North, ON]

Madam Speaker, we learned through our committee work that probably several thousand labs need this legislation. We currently do not know which labs, for example, hold pathogens below level four. It is important that the government knows this information because if there is a problem it needs to respond.

The legislation is important because it will protect laboratory workers and the communities.

[Bonnie Crombie, Liberal, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

Madam Speaker, as I know the member is a renowned expert in the field of pandemics, could she outline for us the threat of an influenza pandemic in Canada and the evolution that we have witnessed so far.

[Kirsty Duncan, Liberal, Etobicoke North, ON]

Madam Speaker, we are currently facing a very serious threat in Canada with influenza A(H1N1) that started in Mexico. It is a new virus. It has segments from avian, swine and human flu. We started with clusters in Mexico which then spread to the United States and Canada.

The pandemic alert level has been raised from a phase 3 to a phase 4 and now phase 5. This means that in Canada we are looking at rolling out our pandemic plan. Organizations throughout Canada that have developed a plan over the last several years will also be working on rolling out their plan.

Pandemics can be very serious. In the last century, we had 1918, 1957 and 1968. The latter two pandemics killed three million people. In stark contrast, the pandemic in 1918 killed 50 million people worldwide.

[Paul Szabo, Liberal, Mississauga South, ON]

Madam Speaker, I thank the member for her input because she raised a very important point.

Under the bill there is a matter to do with releasing private information. I guess the issue arose in committee about violating the privacy rights of individuals. As the chair of the ethics committee that deals with the Privacy Act and the Access to Information Act, I have some concern about this from the standpoint that currently a person does not have access to the federal court to appeal a decision on a requirement to release personal information nor, if they have a complaint, can they have remedy to the courts at this time, and this is causing some concern.

I want to ask the member whether the Privacy Commissioner appeared before committee to provide some input as to the concerns she had in terms of potential violations under the Privacy Act and whether there should be an indication that the person would have the right to appeal to the federal court, which is not currently permitted under the Privacy Act.

[Kirsty Duncan, Liberal, Etobicoke North, ON]

Madam Speaker, these were certainly questions that were raised in committee. It is our understanding that we received a letter from the Privacy Commissioner and that conversations are ongoing with the government to address those concerns.

[Bonnie Crombie, Liberal, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

Madam Speaker, I have a question for the member for Etobicoke North on bioterrorism. She mentioned that bioterrorism was a real potential threat in Canada and I wonder if she could elaborate as to the extent of that threat.

[Kirsty Duncan, Liberal, Etobicoke North, ON]

Madam Speaker, bioterrorism is a real threat. I will give a recent example. In October 2001, letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to American news media offices and to senators. The letters killed five people and infected twenty others. Broad public health measures were implemented to treat thousands who were potentially exposed and the decontamination of buildings and post offices took years. The total cost to the United States was more than $1 billion.

We certainly need to be vigilant about bioterrorism. Diseases we would be concerned about, for example, are anthrax and plague, to name two.

[Luc Malo, Bloc, Verchères—Les Patriotes, QC]

Madam Speaker, I am rising to speak at third reading of Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins.

At second reading, the Bloc Québécois voted in favour of the principle of this bill. It is obvious that public health and safety are everyone's concern. However, as was even admitted by the government, in announcing the introduction of Bill C-54, the ancestor of this Bill C-11, the Minister of Health 's press release explained that the risk to Canadians from human pathogens and toxins used in laboratories is low.

There are also other laws, an anti-terrorism law and others, which could house some of the provisions of Bill C-11. It is, for example, obvious that a malicious intent in releasing toxic and dangerous products into the environment would be covered already by a number of laws. Offenders would be prosecuted under the Criminal Code. There was therefore no reason to stir everyone up and trample over all those who wanted to see changes to the legislation in favour of greater mutual respect. The provinces were muzzled and not properly listened to. Neither were the researchers and scientists.

Yet those very researchers and scientists are the ones who will have to live with the consequences of Bill C-11. I will quote, if I may, from what Peter Singer, director and professor of medicine at the University Health Network and University of Toronto, told us in committee in connection with this bill:

It lowers the background noise of what's happening in laboratories so the signal of aberrant activity can stand out better. But we also need the help of the thousands of scientists in those laboratories, very few of whom, if any, intend to misuse human pathogens, to make sure that 99.99% constitute a network of vigilance to bring that signal to the attention of authorities. Because biosecurity is achieved by winning the scientists' hearts and minds, not through legislative compulsion but by fostering a scientific culture of awareness and responsibility, it's extremely important to have them on side.

That is what the government did not try to do before moving forward. It did not try to get laboratory researchers on board. It did not try to win them over and obtain their unconditional support. When the government raises the spectre of bioterrorist attacks and mentions laboratory workers in the bill, they just might think that they are being branded as potential terrorists. Calling people names and insulting them is not a good way to win them over.

The government did not conduct a proper impact study to understand the consequences of Bill C-11. We asked public officials whether proper impact studies had been conducted, and from the comments we heard in the committee, we discovered that the government did hold information sessions, but did not take a more thorough look at researchers' criticisms and concerns.

There would have been time to do it. We tend to forget that, according to the government's timeline, this bill will not be implemented for another four or five years. Instead of acting blindly, without a solid, credible foundation, the government should have acted responsibly by conducting an impact study and holding proper consultations with all stakeholders, including researchers, the provinces, and private health labs. That would have been the right thing to do.

Mr. Raymond Tellier appeared before the committee, and he raised a very important point. He said that, after a similar law was passed in the United States, there was a brain drain. Before going ahead with this bill, it would have been very useful to know how it might affect people working as researchers and teachers, those who pass on their knowledge to future researchers and Ph.D.s. On that basis alone, it would have been nice to have had more information.

Just before proceeding to a clause-by-clause study in committee, we heard from witnesses who told us that they were still not happy. For example, we heard from Professor Greg Matlashewski of McGill University's department of microbiology and immunology. He said:

The bill will mean very little without real regulations within it, as far as I'm concerned. I think there's a real danger in passing this bill without having the regulations, because I've seen some of the amendments, and these amendments have not changed the bill substantially.

He was not satisfied with the amendments because, in his opinion, they were still not specific enough about the consequences to carrying out his job, which is very important and useful in developing new procedures and new medications and for advancing science.

Mr. Albert Descoteaux, a professor at the Institut Armand-Frappier, Institut national de la recherche scientifique, voiced his concerns about HIV:

Bill C-11 would destroy all the financial commitments from government in the fight against AIDS. Paradoxically, that remains a federal government priority. I would really like that considered when you decide your position on Bill C-11.

Unfortunately, not enough consideration was given to that point by our NDP, Liberal and Conservative colleagues. In fact, they decided to move forward and adopt this bill even before knowing its impact, especially on AIDS research.

Mr. Descoteaux continued:

If the goal of lawmakers is to promote public health and safety in the area of micro-organisms and to protect Canadians from potential bioterrorist attacks, Bill C-11 is not the solution. I feel that the bill could well create havoc by establishing a repressive system that lumps all micro-organisms together, whereas the vast majority of them pose no problem at all for people's health and safety.

And what about his comments? They want to forget them, ignore them, and pretend that Dr. Descoteaux said nothing. It is deplorable that members of other political parties would act this way when, as I stated earlier, there was no reason to expedite this bill, as the government had said in a press release.

We also proposed an amendment, at report stage, asking that the provinces be consulted before the schedules were amended.

When they came to discuss the proposed amendments with us, public officials told us clearly that the provinces would not be consulted before the drafting of these amendments. The experts and researchers were from research labs and the federal government. This whole exercise completely ignored the skills that we have in the public service of Quebec and of the provinces.

The Bloc Québécois' amendment sought to consult Quebec and the provinces, before amending the schedules, that is before adding a pathogen or changing its classification. This was to ensure that the impact of any change would be known and adequately evaluated by the government.

The committee heard the concerns clearly expressed by members from all parties and from the various provinces. The Conservative member for Sarnia—Lambton told us about the fears of the Ontario legislature, while the member for Vancouver Quadra spoke eloquently and vigorously about the very legitimate concerns of the B.C. government, since she served as a minister in that provincial legislature.

However, we did not get any answer, despite the fact that Conservative and Liberal members raised the legitimate concerns of the Ontario and British Columbia legislatures, and despite the fact that the member for Vancouver Quadra spoke eloquently, asked many questions and demanded answers.

Indeed, despite all this, she and her Liberal Party colleagues decided to support the government in its will to rush Bill C-11 through. This is rather unusual. It is puzzling to see members from this House, who heard, understood and then conveyed the fears expressed by provincial legislatures, end up ignoring them and rejecting the legitimate expectations of the provinces.

We learned, in the presentations made to the committee by the members for Sarnia—Lambton and Vancouver Quadra, that they were already exercising—as regards safety, security and the monitoring of laboratories—a number of responsibilities related to constitutional requirements that come under Quebec and the provinces.

Talking about the constitutionality of the bill, the committee heard an expert who told us that, in her opinion, there was every reason to believe that some provisions in Bill C-11 were unconstitutional. It is a very serious matter when, after the committee heard an expert express concerns regarding this issue, the government decides to use its prerogative to legislate criminal law, ignores those recommendations and moves forward nevertheless.

I would now like to read a letter addressed to the Minister of Health, on April 6, 2009, by the Quebec health minister, Dr. Yves Bolduc.

Dear Mr. Minister,

I am writing to you today to express the Quebec government's serious concerns about Bill C-11, the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act, which is currently being examined by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Health. The Quebec government notes that the measures proposed in the bill would have serious repercussions on the organization of medical laboratory services and medical diagnostic services, which are provided by Quebec’s health care system and which come under Quebec's jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the Government of Quebec is calling on the federal government to reconsider its approach to ensuring the biosafety and biosecurity of human pathogens and toxins, rather than pursuing the parliamentary work currently underway. It is important that that approach better reflect the respective roles of both levels of government in this matter.

Yours truly,

This letter went completely unheeded. The NDP, the Liberals and the Conservatives all ignored the remarks made by the Quebec Minister of Health, these very wise remarks calling for a review of all the provisions of the bill, rather than pursuing the committee's examination, in order to ensure that it respects the jurisdictions of both levels of government.

When the Standing Committee on Health was doing its clause-by-clause review of Bill C-11, I had proposed an amendment whereby the bill would not apply to any facility regulated, operated or funded by a province.

You can object, shout, ask questions and insist that your home province's fears be taken seriously, as the member for Vancouver Quadra did in committee, but you have to do more than just that.

I find it deplorable that this member did not do what should be done in such a situation and ask the government, as I am doing, to take a step back and consider all the facts when making a decision about a bill like Bill C-11.

Are we going to have to go through the same thing with Bill C-11 that we went through with the Assisted Human Reproduction Act? The Government of Quebec, with the support of other provincial legislatures, applied to the court to rule on the act's constitutionality.

The public should not have to pay for lawyers and judges to examine the constitutionality of legislation. I believe that, as parliamentarians, we have a duty to make sure, before we introduce or vote on a bill, that it complies fully with the Constitution.

The Quebec Court of Appeal ruled that the Assisted Human Reproduction Act is unconstitutional. Now, I am sad to see—

[The Acting Speaker, Denise Savoie]

The time allotted to the hon. member has expired. We will now proceed to questions and comments.

The hon. member for Elmwood—Transcona.

[Jim Maloway, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

Madam Speaker, I will give the member an opportunity to finish his sentence when he comments of this.

I agree with him to the extent that too much discretion has been left to the government in the act's regulations. We see this with governments in general. However, an hour ago we were discussing Bill C-6, and that was a criticism of it as well. The government is getting too much leeway and putting too much into regulations. I would prefer as few regulations as possible to any bill. We should pin legislation down. Regulation should be incorporated into bills and there should be as little reliance on regulations as possible. To that extent, I agree with the member.

In terms of consultation issues, consultation is very important but it is impossible to consult with everybody. A decision has to be made at some point, although a bill should be done right. There is no harm in delaying a bill for a period of time to allow people have their say and to proceed after as much consultation as possible.

I want to give the member the opportunity to respond to that and finish his thoughts.

[Luc Malo, Bloc, Verchères—Les Patriotes, QC]

Madam Speaker, I find it very regrettable that our colleagues from the New Democratic Party, the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party would vote on legislation without first making sure that it is constitutionally sound.

The hon. member is right to say that there is too much reliance on regulations, but he also suggested that not everyone need be consulted. Without necessarily consulting with everybody, I would guess that those who will have to work with the legislation day in and day out should be consulted. Efforts must be made to ensure that they can do so properly as well as give courses in support of science. We in this place boast about Canada having the best researchers and promising students. It would be a shame to pull the rug out from under them, thus preventing them from doing their jobs. That is what the NDP is doing by refusing to hear these witnesses.

At the very end of the committee stage, there were still people telling us that it made no sense. Why was a decision not made to go through things thoroughly and check them over before putting them in the regulations? I have no idea when these regulations will appear, and the legislation will not be enforced for another four or five years. Why not make sure that these people have been heard and that they are satisfied? I think that this would show a minimum level of respect for these people who, day in and day out, work at ensuring that Quebec and Canada are at the leading edge of technology and that we benefit in our daily lives from the greatest advances in science and technology.

The House resumed consideration of the motion that Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins, be read the third time and passed.

[Luc Desnoyers, Bloc, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

Madam Speaker, I would like to congratulate my colleague from Verchères—Les Patriotes for presenting arguments on this matter with conviction, passion and clarity. The arguments regarding consultation show that researchers, scientists and the provinces are being flatly ignored. My colleague also read a letter from Mr. Bolduc in Quebec. Without an impact study having been done on this, how can the opposition parties support this bill so easily?

I would like my colleague to tell us about what the repercussions might be for education, for health services buildings, for health care and for the research and development industry.

[Luc Malo, Bloc, Verchères—Les Patriotes, QC]

Madam Speaker, I would like to thank my colleague for his question.

I will simply read what Professor Greg Matlashewski told us:

We have 350 undergraduate students in microbiology and immunology at McGill. We teach them how to use level 2 pathogens. The way this bill is written we couldn't teach them any longer.

Before we enact a bill, we have to be sure that these kinds of things cannot happen. We have to reassure our researchers. As I said just now, Professor Matlashewski came to see us right at the end of the process and he still had a number of concerns.

My colleague was also right when he told us that the provinces will be completely excluded from any form of consultation, when those provinces have hospitals and universities doing these kinds of cutting-edge research and these institutions are under the constitutional jurisdiction of Quebec and the provinces.

In my opinion, while the government tells us about its openness, about how it respects the jurisdiction of Quebec and the provinces, this bill, the way it is written, clearly seems to us to be taking a different path. As I said, the government likes to say things, but when it comes time to do something and make sure that all of the stakeholders are properly heard and will be able to carry out their responsibilities as properly as possible, it stops listening and it does not do what elementary logic would dictate.

[Robert Vincent, Bloc, Shefford, QC]

Madam Speaker, we know that in committee the Bloc Québécois raised certain questions with officials on the possible repercussions of the bill. According to the responses from the government, there was no impact study concerning Bill C-11.

So, how can we discuss a bill when we do not even know where we are going in terms of the bill? No regulations have been linked with this bill; instead, that is to be done after its adoption.

Is it not unthinkable to establish regulations after adopting a bill? We have no idea what regulations will be attached to the bill.

I would like to know my colleague’s opinion on that point.

[Luc Malo, Bloc, Verchères—Les Patriotes, QC]

Madam Speaker, it is indeed somewhat incomprehensible, and my colleague is perfectly correct.

That is why we would have wished that the government, of its own accord, would withdraw this bill and do the proper homework. As I said at the start of my remarks, there was no urgency. The government itself mentioned that fact in its news release at the time the bill was introduced.

Therefore, why force the issue? We would be inclined to impugn the motives of the government simply because basic logic would insist that the real impact of the bill be identified and that the research carried out in all our laboratories can go forward. If, after promulgation of Bill C-11, there are additional costs to modify the laboratories, who will pay? The universities? The laboratories? The hospitals? We know very well there is no money. They have only the strict minimum to carry out the research that they have to do. How will they be able to continue? They will have to draw on their operating funds. They will be forced to reduce the number of teachers and the number of students who receive training in order to adapt their premises. This is an important question and we still do not have an answer.

The government is asking us today to vote on a bill without knowing its impact. That is not right and it makes no sense.

As parliamentarians, we assume certain responsibilities when we vote on a bill in this House. We cannot be expected to vote in good faith when we do not know the consequences. As I said previously, the consequences could be very serious. One witness told us there had been a brain drain from the United States precisely because of certain fears. They were afraid they could unintentionally cause damage that would be considered criminal.

[Judy Wasylycia-Leis, NDP, Winnipeg North, MB]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to address this House on Bill C-11. First, I want to thank Bloc Québécois members for their contribution to the debate on this legislation. They did a lot of work. We proposed many changes to this bill.

We too, like the Bloc, have many issues with this legislation. However, unlike the Bloc, the NDP has proposed some changes. In fact, Bloc members opposed the proposals that we made in committee.

Moreover, we proposed an amendment to this bill, dealing precisely with the issue raised by the Bloc Québécois member today. We proposed an amendment to eliminate human pathogens. That is exactly what we did, but the Bloc said no. That is the only thing that researchers and members of the scientific community asked for. That is precisely what we tried to do, but we did not succeed because of the Bloc's opposition. It is as simple as that.

I want to be absolutely clear. We have some problems with this bill and, like the Bloc, we listened to witnesses and, since they were opposed to this legislation, we proposed amendments to it. Two of our three amendments were accepted by the committee and by all the members of the parties sitting in this House. We accomplished a couple of important things, such as asking that regulations be presented to the House of Commons, for monitoring purposes.

That is something we always ask for regarding any legislation. It is absolutely critical to ask that government regulations be referred to the Standing Committee on Health and to the House of Commons. That is what we accomplished. This is not a Bloc proposal. It is an NDP proposal, and the Bloc supported these amendments. So, this is very important, and it is something that we achieved.

We also dealt with the Bloc's concerns through another amendment that I am going to read. This is precisely the proposal that the Bloc rejected. It reads as follows:

That Bill C-11, in Clause 7, be amended by adding after line 22 on page 5 the following:

(c) any activity involving a micro-organism, nucleic acid or protein that falls into Risk Group 2, if the person who conducts the activity provides the following elements to the Minister:

(i) the location of the places where the activity is conducted and the name of a contact person, and

(ii) a signed document certifying that the activity is conducted in accordance with the Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines of the Public Health Agency of Canada.

This is an amendment that all scientific researchers asked for, in order to eliminate human pathogens that fall into risk group 2, and we made that proposal. Bloc members voted against it and now we have a bill that includes all human pathogens that fall in risk group 2.

It has to be pretty clear about what we do in the House and how we accomplish change. The government's job is to bring forward a bill. Yes, it made many mistakes in this case because it claimed to have done all kinds of consultations and to have done a thorough analysis of this area and the government was prepared to tell us that the whole community supported it. The government did not tell us the truth. It did not do the proper consultations because the minute Bill C-11 was tabled, we were inundated with concerns from scientists and researchers that research in this country would be denied. They were concerned that research would be cut off and would not be undertaken because people would be very concerned that they would fall under this criminal rubric and be subject to all kinds of criminal penalties because of their laboratory work with level 2 pathogens.

We accepted the arguments the researchers and scientists made, which was that there has to be a differentiation between the different levels of toxins and pathogens. Therefore, we proposed an amendment to do just that.

Many of the scientists we heard from said that the work that was done by the government's amendment was a step in the right direction and they also said that the proposition we had made was a good one. Yet the Bloc accepted neither.

Our job is not to do the job of government. Our job is to amend and change the bills it brings before us. We cannot simply say every time we do not like something that we are going to send it back and start all over again.

In this case we heard multiple times from those witnesses. Some of us called them and spoke to them individually apart from the discussions at committee. It was clear that this issue about including level 2 pathogens in this whole umbrella of punitive measures around safety in our laboratories was a major concern and had to be addressed.

Many of them said as we went through the process that they could live with the government's amendment. We did not think that was good enough and we proposed one step further. That was the one that was rejected by the Liberals because they were not part of the discussion at all, but most surprisingly it was rejected by the Bloc members. This actually would have addressed their concerns.

We did our best. We put the proposal on the table and we were turned down. We did our part to try to make this a better bill but it is certainly not our job to hold up everything ad infinitum because we did not get our way. We do our best to work within a minority Parliament. We work to make changes and that is exactly what we did. We accomplished two important changes. We did not get the third change. We will continue to find ways to address the concerns raised by scientists and researchers.

It is very important to note that the NDP's amendment to get all regulations before the House is a significant breakthrough. The Bloc members are quite right when they ask how we can vote for something when we do not know the regulations. We deal with that each and every day. Every time we have a piece of legislation we deal with it.

We did it with Bill C-9. That bill deals with the transportation of dangerous goods. It is a very similar situation to this bill dealing with laboratories handling dangerous toxins and pathogens. We tried through a motion to get the House to amend that bill to ensure that all regulations would go before the committee. Where were the Bloc members on that? Where were the Bloc members on each and every other bill where we were trying to get regulations under the purview of the House and we raised concerns about the discretion of the minister and the latitude he or she may have in terms of implementing a bill and for which we do not know the full consequences? It is a legitimate concern but the normal parliamentary way is to amend a bill so that the regulations go to committee.

Now, all regulations for this bill will come before committee as a result of the NDP amendment before the bill is finally approved. It may not be perfect. It may mean the Conservative government can still try to do some things for which it has no authority and where it is taking advantage of grey areas in the bill, but we have a major role to play in terms of overseeing the regulations before allowing the bill to go any further. I think it is important to note all of that.

I will talk a bit about the bill as a whole and put it in the context of the present swine influenza outbreak because the two are very much connected.

We are talking about the precautionary principle in whatever we do. One of the fundamental principles behind Bill C-11 is that Canadians, health workers and all who come into contact with pathogens and toxins are safe beyond a reasonable doubt. Our first premise in dealing with the bill was to ensure that this safety provision was a part of it, but not in any way that would try to prevent research in important areas. We did not get what we wanted on that bill, but we made a good try.

With respect to the do no harm principle in the current context of the swine influenza outbreak, it is important to note that, because we have such capable and competent individuals in our national laboratories, especially our level 5 laboratory in Winnipeg, the National Microbiology Laboratory, we can feel somewhat confident that scientists are doing their job, ensuring that Canadians are protected in the event of a pandemic and that work in labs for which they have oversight are operating according to the highest principles and standards.

In that context, I want to single out Dr. Frank Plummer. He was the individual to whom Mexicans sent their concerns and samples once this soon-to-be-identified swine influenza broke out in Mexico. Dr. Frank Plummer and his team identified this new strain, which became known as the swine influenza. This laboratory is overseeing much of the work in this area. In fact, it is working very stringently on the development of a vaccine, which could happen, as reports show today, much sooner than actually expected. There could be a vaccine developed within a couple of weeks for the swine influenza, thanks to the work of Dr. Frank Plummer and his whole team of scientists and their collaboration with the CDC in the United States, with public health agencies across the country and with public health officers in every province and territory.

I want to mention the work of Dr. Frank Plummer because he also helped us identify the issue around listeriosis. Through Dr. Frank Plummer, the electronic surveillance system detected the listeriosis outbreak. We were able then to take measures to deal with this very serious pathogen and ensure further containment of it.

Dr. Frank Plummer is known to us all for his work, especially, in the area of HIV and AIDS. He is one of the internationally renowned scientists who have done leading and groundbreaking research in getting to the bottom of HIV and AIDS. He has been recognized for that work in many parts of the world. In fact, as members will know, he was recently appointed an Officer of the Order of Canada. Probably more important than anything, he was inducted into the Royal Society of Canada. He has received a grant from the Grand Challenges in Global Health, an initiative of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which continues studies on HIV resistance and work on the HIV vaccine. He was named Canada research chair of the Canadian Institutes of Health Research and has been elected to the American Society of Clinical Investigation and the Association of American Physicians, and I could go on.

We are talking about someone who is world renowned, who is providing groundbreaking research on new unidentified pathogens and toxins. He has been behind the developments around listeriosis. Now he has been identified as the key researcher with respect to the swine influenza. He will ensure that we have a vaccine for that latest epidemic in short order.

He is a person with whom we consulted regularly throughout the debate. He took the time to come to our committees, along with Dr. Butler-Jones, the head of the Public Health Agency of Canada. As a result of their efforts, particularly Dr. Frank Plummer's, we were able to get a better handle on the nature of level 2 pathogens versus level 3 and level 4 pathogens and, in fact, begin the process of trying to put in place a modified regime with respect to level 2 pathogens so research would not be stymied and scientists would not feel any encumbrances around their work.

That has been accomplished, in part, thanks to all the scientists who came before us. They were very vigilant in their work at our committee. In fact, I want to mention the efforts by a number of them with respect to this bill, as the Bloc also referred to, and indicate that they were instrumental in our understanding of this whole area.

I hope the government has learned some lessons from Bill C-11, that it must ensure thorough consultations before it proceeds with legislation. I am glad it listened to some of our amendments. I hope it will take seriously our concerns about the regulations and will act quickly and promptly to bring those regulations before the House.

We have the unfortunate example of human reproductive technologies legislation that was passed by the House some five years ago. It still has not been finally approved, nor are the regulations forthcoming. Here is an area where changes are happening every day, by the minute. There are all kinds of concerns about the new groundbreaking innovations in fertility treatments as well as concerns with respect to identity of anonymous sperm donations. Back five or six years ago, our committee tried to address numerous concerns and provide good advice to the government. We are still waiting for those regulations.

We hope the government has learned something from this most recent chapter in its legislative pursuit around protecting Canadians and has learned the lessons from the witnesses we heard at our committee. We hope it will ensure that all legislation brought to the House in the future is done so only after thorough consultation with stakeholders has been provided and with all regard for and taking into account the concerns raised by those people most directly affected by this legislation.

The government has failed to do that in this case and we have ended up with less than perfect legislation.

We are prepared to support the bill in the final analysis. I know Bloc members will go into conniptions over that. We believe we have done our job in trying to improve the bill. We have spoken to the same scientists they mentioned in the debates. We believe we have addressed their concerns, to a large measure, through the amendments to the bill by the government and then by ourselves.

We know it is a less than perfect legislation. There will be concerns identified along the way. We will ensure, through the regulatory process, absolute vigilance and complete oversight to ensure the government is true to its word about bringing forward regulations that meet the specific concerns of the scientists, researchers and laboratory workers.

We will hold the government to account every step of the way to ensure the health and safety of Canadian researchers, laboratory workers and patients are always at the top of the equation and that nothing in the legislation gets in the way of good research and groundbreaking scientific endeavour.

We will continue to raise the need for more government assistance, not less as was the case with the government in the last budget. I think all scientists were shocked by the cutbacks to research. They are crying for the government to pay attention to the need for Canada to be involved in the continuation of groundbreaking research and investigative studies, which will enhance the health and well-being of all Canadians.

[The Acting Speaker, Denise Savoie]

I can see that members are coming into the House, but I would ask for a little order.

The hon. member for Kildonan—St. Paul.

[Joy Smith, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Madam Speaker, I thank the member for Winnipeg North for her contribution to the health committee and to this bill. I have to agree with her that Dr. Butler-Jones did astounding work on the committee. I commend his work on the swine flu and the challenges that are there right now. Scientists who came to meetings on Bill C-11 were very helpful in their scientific analysis of the bill.

What does the member for Winnipeg North think would be most important things we need to address very quickly to get Bill C-11 finished and through committee? I know the member has worked very hard on the committee, as all members have, and I value her input.

[The Acting Speaker, Denise Savoie]

Again, I would ask members for a little order.

The hon. member for Winnipeg North.

[Judy Wasylycia-Leis, NDP, Winnipeg North, MB]

Madam Speaker, besides Dr. Butler-Jones, Frank Plummer and the staff of Health Canada, I also wanted to mention the good work of the other scientists who were so vigorous in their representations before us. They are Professor Greg Matlashewski, Dr. Peter Singer, Professor Marc Ouellette, Dr. Albert Descoteaux and Professor Elaine Gibson. All of them have provided valuable advice. They have asked us to ensure that the regulations are drafted as quickly as possible and that they be involved in the process for the development of those regulations. They have also asked that members of the House and the Senate see those regulatory proposals as soon as possible so we can finalize this project and get on with ensuring that all of our laboratories are operating to the highest standards without encumbering any kind of research or groundbreaking scientific endeavour.

[The Acting Speaker, Denise Savoie]

The hon. member will have seven minutes left after question period to pursue other questions.

The House resumed consideration of the motion that Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins, be read the third time and passed.

[Joe Volpe, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Mr. Speaker, like many MPs and members from the public, I listened to the various speeches on Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins.

I found that some of the interventions being made by my colleagues addressed not only the substance of the bill itself, but one very important and perhaps insufficiently appreciated issue. That is the matter of the Privacy Act and the issue of the Privacy Commissioner offering her views for the benefit of the committee that studied the bill.

I had the good fortune to be associated with one of my colleagues who had a lot of the information immediately at hand. It seems to me that in a situation such as this one, where we are dealing with an extremely important bill and one that is to be viewed in the context of a potential pandemic that is afflicting the world, and I refer to the swine flu, we would take all measures necessary to ensure that we would be adequately prepared, but also that we would follow the appropriate procedures so that individuals will be protected from incursions on their privacy as we go forward.

I listened as my colleague from Winnipeg North waxed very aggressive, I might even dare say eloquent, on the importance of having this particular bill dealt with expeditiously in the House. Like every member in this place, she is of course entitled to an opinion, valid or less, according to the view. But it struck me as I was listening to her that she was making an argument for ensuring that the bill would be receiving immediate and quick attention and approval in the House, even though there were members from that committee, and I guess I can say it because they have been standing up all day on this, the members from the Bloc Québécois, who disagreed with some of the substance, but equally important, on the procedures followed, in order to ensure that the bill would reflect all the needs of Canadians everywhere.

I think she kind of regretted that the Bloc Québécois members were employing a tactic that had in fact been used by her own party on other bills, specifically on safety management systems, a bill that suggested that we would impose a particular ethic, a culture of checks, balances and due diligence on the people who are providing a service.

In this instance, perhaps we would say that this is even more serious. As the safety management systems involve the aviation industry and those who provide carriers and other vehicles for air transportation, whether it be passenger or cargo, of course it involves the potential for putting human life at risk. This is no less so, and perhaps some would argue, much more so.

I found it really interesting that the arguments to rush forward on the bill ignored a letter sent by a member of the government side, who is in fact the chair of the committee dealing with the bill, the Standing Committee on Health, to the Privacy Commissioner asking for her input on the bill.

Note that I said the Privacy Commissioner sent a letter inviting reaction. She did not say that she was invited to appear before the committee to offer her opinion to address issues that might be raised by members of the various parties, including the government party, to address those issues that related not only to the substance that was being discussed but to the procedures that lead to the consideration of the substance and the consequences of that process.

The chair wrote a letter, and in a letter dated March 11, 2009, received a response. The response said:

We would be pleased to appear before you to discuss the comments we make in this letter....

The Privacy Commissioner did not get a response to appear.

The Privacy Commissioner is responsible for two federal privacy laws: the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, otherwise known as PIPEDA; and of course the Privacy Act itself. The issue here is that it applies to government institutions, agencies and crown corporations, as well as the lab in Winnipeg.

This is not designed to in any way diminish or take away from any of the great work that is being done in that lab or in fact in other places that are concerned with people's health.

That letter is available to everybody in that committee, because it was distributed to everybody in the committee. I do not think there is any need for me to table it. It is already a public document, and certainly everybody who wishes can get it from the committee and from the Hansard.

Let me just quote this one little item. The Privacy Commissioner says, “Our suggestions for improvements”, which according to some of the interveners were not even considered, because they were not accepted as amendments even though they were proposed by other members, “are aimed at ensuring the appropriate balance of privacy rights and regulatory powers as well as transparency, notice and accountability to those officials subject to the legislation and to the public”. It is as simple as that.

I do not serve on that committee. It is not for every member of this place to serve on every committee, but when we come into this House and get the benefit of the deliberations of the various members who do serve on these committees, we need to take that into consideration. If there is a vacuum, if there is a lapse, if there is something missing in the consideration or something left out, that is why we have report stage and third reading considerations.

So in this third reading consideration, I, like some of the other members, would like the House to reflect on what was left out of the deliberations or at least put over to one side.

The Privacy Commissioner, remember, is responding to a written request by the chair of that committee and said, “We had hoped to see a privacy impact assessment (PIA) to understand how any privacy risks in this Bill had been mitigated”, and as of March 11, she adds, “we have not yet received one”.

If one is going to consider legislation that deals with toxins, human pathogens and their impact on the public health of all Canadian citizens no matter where they are, certainly one needs to consider as well how that information is gathered, the impact on the individuals from whom that information is derived, and what are some of the other considerations that flow from it.

The Privacy Commissioner, an officer of this House, established to help members of Parliament in their deliberations in the public interest, then goes on to say, “Our Office should be seeking PIAs”, or privacy impact assessments, “well before the decisions have been implemented so we can provide feedback early in the process”.

It seems reasonable. Yet she says, “Without having met with the officials,” and I might add from a personal perspective, without apparently being provided the opportunity to meet with officials, “who developed this Bill and without having received a PIA, it is challenging for us to understand the full privacy implications of Bill C-11, such as the scope of the application of this proposed legislation to patient information”.

If the Privacy Commissioner, with all the resources at the disposal of that office in order to provide members of Parliament with that advice, is unable and unwilling, perhaps, to provide speculative observations, why should a member of Parliament rush to make a decision in the absence of such information? In fact, the Privacy Commissioner goes further and says, “We would appreciate participating in a consultation process”, but that has not happened.

She addresses clause 38, which gives the minister certain powers in order to derive the information required, obviously through his or her officials, and she observes that subclause 38(1) could be improved. Again, without having had the benefit of the consultation and without having had access to public health officials, she says this is a concern, so please address it.

Some of the members from the Bloc party today gave us an indication that it had not been addressed, or when it was, it was put over to one side, regrettably, because the Privacy Commissioner says, “We would suggest that reasonableness should inform the Minister's opinion and that the personal information should be 'directly relevant'”, and not refer specifically to personal information. In fact, she says that information should be made anonymous in order to accomplish a stated goal.

The Privacy Commissioner went even further than that. She took the trouble to provide additional input and observations on clause 41, which offers to an inspector the kinds of powers that we think reside only with the minister. However, even if it is in the effort to amass information that may be used for the public good, we do not know because we do not have the cause and effect consequential action of some of those decisions.

For example, she says:

the inspector's powers to collect documents, materials and information, may well extend to the examination and collection of personal information and personal health information of individuals and patients.

That might serve a purpose, but she says:

We are concerned about the protection of patient information and transparency around this process to the public.

We have left out an individual who has the expertise and the resources to define for members of Parliament the shortfalls of the legislation, the potential pitfalls, and at the same time, of course, to suggest whether they are going in the right direction.

She goes further to say that clause 67 of the bill presents a problem with respect to interim orders for the minister. She says, “this mechanism is of concern as it could diminish controls over personal information”. In other words, once that information is out, it is out in the public domain and individuals from whom it has been derived no longer have the safety and security afforded to them under the Privacy Act and under PIPEDA.

She says the externally produced documents that flow from this “could result in a reduced level of control over extremely personal information”.

She did all of this on March 11, underscoring, underlining and emphasizing that she and her office would be prepared to be engaged in the public consultation process, in the consultation process being conducted by the Standing Committee on Health, and offered those services.

She said in that letter, thank you for calling us; here are our first thoughts, but let us sit down and discuss this, because we have not had a chance to speak with public health officials or with officials mandated to address this issue.

The chair wrote again and received a response on March 30. That is exactly one month ago today. In that letter, the assistant privacy commissioner said she wanted to follow up on the chair's letter concerning Bill C-11, the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act. In order to avoid confusion, she further said, “Regarding the confusion as to prior consultation”, because obviously she herself was very clear, “there seems to have been a preliminary exchange of emails between the Public Health Agency of Canada, PHAC, officials and some of my officials in May 2008”.

There was an exchange of emails. She went on to say, “Even though I have offered you my expertise and my resources now”. Subsequent to May 2008, guess what:

Overall, however, we did not have many details and did not receive materials, other than what was then Bill C-54, at that time.

In other words, “You have not availed yourselves of the opportunity to engage us deliberately in consultations as a committee or as a department”. The letter says, “get us engaged”. Did the committee get them engaged? We know the committee deliberated on the bill, entertained some amendments, rejected some, unhappily according to the Bloc members, happily according to the government members, expediently happily for the NDP members and we ask why.

The assistant privacy commissioner took the trouble to say, “We also learned that the main objective would be to collect information about people who work in laboratories to ensure that they meet security requirements,” which is all good, “and that the security screening will be consistent with the processes that are already in place”.

These are assurances that they are given verbally or that they read are to be provided. She went on to say something that I think should cause every member in this place some concern:

We recognize that the intent of the legislation is to deal with the personal information of laboratory workers; however, we still have concerns that there is nothing in the Bill to restrict the collection of ancillary personal information, such as patient information.

Another ancillary collection would be the personal information about laboratory workers' family members, should they come into contact with a regulated pathogen or toxin. A member of a patient's family has no privacy protection under this act. She went on to say, “As well, we are aware of the potential for function creep,” a term that was made popular in the House by what was then an opposition party that talked about taxation creep, “and would therefore prefer to limit”. I want to repeat that part. She said:

We would therefore prefer to limit the collection of personal information. We look forward to these issues being addressed in the privacy risk assessment work to come.

I am sure those who are following the debate today, as I was following it from the lobby and from my seat in this place, are asking themselves, has that privacy risk assessment been done? She repeated for emphasis, “We believe that clause 67...may diminish controls over personal information,” and that a reasonable grounds test would be helpful in this situation. Did it take place?

She went on to say that the agency, in her view, “currently has sufficient information to engage in a high-level privacy risk assessment in anticipation of the more formal privacy impact assessment process”. So what has been holding everything up? Her closing words, in a little bit of frustration, were that she looked forward to meeting with public health officials in order to address these issues.

I can only add that addressing those issues would enhance the views of members of Parliament about how to deal with this legislation at this stage of its progress through Parliament, and I hope we get it.

[Bruce Stanton, Conservative, Simcoe North, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I listened to the comments and suggestions from the member for Eglinton—Lawrence in his intervention this afternoon.

He will know, certainly as a member who has been around this place for a considerable time, that committees have the ability to make determinations as to which witnesses they will hear. Members from both sides of the committee make those determinations.

I apologize, Mr. Speaker, I am late coming to the proceedings here this afternoon, but I was given to understand that two of the amendments at least were put forward to address concerns by the Privacy Commissioner. Those were amendments that the committee supported. The report of the committee was supported by the committee in its entirety.

I would say to the member that given the committee has made these determinations, these full considerations, clearly the committee must have known or at least been satisfied that the concerns of the Privacy Commissioner were addressed.

[Joe Volpe, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my hon. colleague for reflecting on the quality of time that I have spent in this place. That quality of time has given me an opportunity to witness how many committees operate. All colleagues on these committees, whether they deliberate on legislation or whether they try to do something else, always try to do their best.

I suppose the issue is whether the committee actually brought in officers of the House. In my time in this place, we did not always have these officers of Parliament at our disposal. That is why those offices were created. There are several of them that serve parliamentarians. The best way to serve them is the way we serve each other, sometimes in an adversarial fashion, by being present as we challenge some of their perceptions and some of their expertise and then make decisions.

From my perspective, I wanted to understand what happened in that committee, given the way that the debate has developed in the House today. Most members, I think, and I am one of them, say that if the committee has dealt with the issue, then we can make the appropriate decision when it comes before the House. We borrow from the expertise the committee has developed during the consultation process.

The two letters from which I read from the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, suggest that that consultation was not as ample as the members of the House might have wanted. I could be wrong, because members of Parliament may already have made up their minds and this would already, in their view, have been given its due weight, but if that is the case, I do not understand why there is contrasting opinion from members of that same committee from different parties. The parties that have objected to this thing not being given immediate attention are ones who have, to their merit, objected in the past that the full complexity of the dynamics have not been considered to their satisfaction.

If members of this place are satisfied that the complexities--

[The Acting Speaker, Barry Devolin]

Questions and comments. Resuming debate, the hon. member for Shefford.

[Robert Vincent, Bloc, Shefford, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to address Bill C-11, which seeks to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins.

I want to begin by pointing out that there are four categories of risk, namely risk groups 1 to 4. Risk groups 3 and 4 are already covered by the legislation. I am going to provide some explanations on these groups.

Schedule 3 — Risk Group 3: human pathogens

means a category of human pathogens that pose a high risk to the health of individuals and a low risk to public health...

Schedule 4 — Risk Group 4:

means a category of human pathogens that pose a high risk to the health of individuals and a high risk to public health...

Only those major labs working with human pathogens must comply with the Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines. Labs dealing with risk groups 3 and 4, which pose a high risk to the health of individuals and either a low or a high risk to public health, are already covered by these guidelines.

What are these guidelines? They are a specialized document produced by the Office of Laboratory Security of the Public Health Agency of Canada. That document was written for those individuals who are responsible for designing or operating labs in which anthropopathogens are handled for diagnosis, research or development purposes. Labs or individuals who do not use these pathogens in Canada are not subjected to these guidelines.

We can understand the government's concerns regarding risk groups 3 and 4, and the precautions put forward. However, are labs 3 and 4 not already complying with the safety measures set in the guidelines and proposed in this legislation?

Bill C-11 would apply to risk groups 1 and 2, which pose a moderate risk to the health of individuals and a low risk to public health, and for which effective treatment is available. The idea behind this change is to better protect public health.

We can see where we are headed. The idea is to monitor risk groups 1 and 2. What do groups 1 and 2 include? Group 1 includes toxins, while group 2 deals with human pathogens. However, these groups only pose a moderate risk to the health of individuals. As I mentioned earlier, they pose a low risk to public health and they would rarely cause serious disease in a human being. Even if this were the case, such disease could easily be prevented or treated, and the risk of that disease spreading is low.

In addition, Bill C-11—and this is where the dynamic of this bill the other parties cannot understand lies—would impose the obligation to have a licence—meaning that all laboratories will have to have one—for the following “controlled activities” related to a human pathogen or toxin; possessing, handling, using, producing, storing, permitting any person access, transferring,importing or exporting, releasing or otherwise abandoning or disposing.

This bill requires any person carrying out activities involving a human pathogen or toxin to take all reasonable precautions to protect public health and safety.

The federal government justifies this bill by its jurisdiction over criminal law. Speaking of criminal law, we must understand that the Conservatives are champions as far as introducing such laws is concerned, and that from that point on there is no point in any other parties getting involved in a system which is, I will state it clearly, exaggerated. Here again we see the Conservative desire to control everything.

In short, the purpose of Bill C-11 is to make the Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines mandatory.

The second intention is to make it mandatory for licences to be obtained for the activities it covers in order to trace existing agents, determine where they are and with whom.

The third intention is to put in place a system of offences and fines. In the backgrounder to Bill C-54, introduced by the government during the last Parliament, and the ancestor of C-11, it was stated:

The risk to Canadians posed by the presence of human pathogens and toxins in labs is low.

Why was it low then, and different now? Why is the government trying to control everyone and everything everywhere in Canada? I do not get it. The text continues:

Safety guidelines exist and the laboratory community is committed to the safe handling and management of human pathogens and toxins as a part of their regular work. Nevertheless, we must be sure the appropriate legislation, protocols and practices are in place to protect Canadians from this risk.

Since the guidelines were introduced over 15 years ago, there have been no incidents in Canada, regardless of whether labs have been following those guidelines.

Nevertheless, the researchers have certain reservations, not about the safety of their research, but rather about government control over everyday research. Not only does the government want to control journalists and information, but it also wants to control laboratories and people. Has the government conducted studies to determine the impact this new legislation would have on university courses, on how our hospitals operate and on the research industry in Quebec and Canada? No.

The government is asking for carte blanche concerning regulations that will not be examined by Parliament. The bill establishes a legislative framework that imposes certain requirements on research done on pathogens and toxins, as well as criminal sanctions and fines for non-compliance.

We must ask ourselves certain questions about these regulations. How is it that a bill, now in third reading, has no regulations? No one knows what will happen with this bill. They are bringing something to a vote before the House, something that will happen at a later date, but we do not yet know what these regulations will be based on. It makes no sense.

According to the universities we consulted—unlike other parties in this House, we conducted a consultation—Bill C-11 will demand huge investments in universities that have laboratories.

These investments will not be used to update laboratories for group 3 and 4 pathogens; these will be new provisions concerning group 1 and 2. Those are the only categories that are not problematic. Also according to the universities, billions of dollars will have to be invested across the country, at the universities' expense. Did the government assess the kind of impact this will have on university teaching and research, on health care institutions and on private laboratories? Once again, the answer is no.

It is important to point out that all laboratories, including universities, hospitals and other government institutions, can be forced to pay fines. This government has a tendency to impose fines and prison sentences. It constantly focuses on those two points. Does the government really want to impose fines on universities and hospitals, when they are already desperately short of funding? It makes no sense.

The bill also establishes penalties and fines for anyone who shows wanton or reckless disregard concerning pathogens and toxins.

Clause 55 reads as follows:

Every person who contravenes section 6 and who shows wanton or reckless disregard for the health or safety of other persons and, as a result, creates a risk to the health or safety of the public is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years.

We are talking about students, not researchers who wear protective clothing. We are talking about people in a university or hospital. We are talking about viruses, which are not very big. This is the smallest category in existence that the government is going to try to control. It wants to control people, control information, control those who have these groups of pathogens. This is terrible. But there is more. And it is even worse.

Clause 56 reads as follows:

Every person who contravenes subsection 7(1) or 18(7) is guilty of an offence and liable

(a) on conviction on indictment, for a first offence, to a fine of not more than $500,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than six months, or to both, and, for a subsequent offence, to a fine of not more than $1,000,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years, or to both;

Think about the student who, as a joke, touches something and is fined half a million dollars. It makes no sense.

The Bloc Québécois wonders why it is necessary to introduce new measures and new penalties when they could be part of existing laws. These laws already exist, and the government is trying to add more. It is piling on more laws. Once again, it is hard to follow these parties here in the House. They pay no attention to the bills we discuss here, and they are ready to vote on anything. Are the measures in this bill on breach of duty, wanton or reckless breach of duty and intentional release not already included in the Criminal Code and the Canadian Environmental Protection Act? Yes, they are. Are the measures to prohibit intentional misuse of pathogens not already included in the Anti-Terrorism Act?

We already have plenty of laws. The government is trying to create more fines. It is talking about imprisoning these people. I cannot see how we can think about these things and decide what falls into groups 1 and 2. Everything the party in power is proposing is already covered by existing legislation. I cannot understand why we need to go any further than what we have now. Even worse, the government does not know where it wants to go with this bill because it has not consulted anyone.

When we asked departmental officials about the consequences, it was clear that the government had not studied the impact of Bill C-11. When we asked them about how it would affect universities and hospitals, they candidly told us that they did not know because there had been no impact study. They had no idea what might happen because there had been no study. However, it seemed that everyone was quite happy to have new laws, new fines and new prison sentences. That is the only thing we were able to find out. The only answer we got was that the government planned to take experts' and researchers' concerns into consideration while drafting regulations so as to minimize potential negative impacts. That is not saying much. They will consult experts, but will they take their comments into consideration? They might, or they might not. They might decide to accept the recommendations they like because the bill was passed anyway. We have no idea how the regulations will deal with risk groups 1 and 2. We still have no idea.

I do not understand why, in 2009, the government has introduced a bill without regulations in the House of Commons, where laws are made, nor why we should vote for a bill without knowing the regulations that are to be part of it. Moreover, the government says that even if it consults experts, it will make its own decisions about what to do anyway. Regulations will not be submitted to the House of Commons.

How can we vote on regulations if we never see them? How are we supposed to propose amendments if the regulations are not defined? It makes no sense.

I do not know where we are going with this. Nor do I know how this is in Quebeckers' and Canadians' best interest. We cannot protect them from risk group 1 and 2 pathogens because, in Bill C-54, this government said that these two categories were not a problem.

Why study risk groups 1 and 2 if they were not a problem? I still have not heard an answer to that question.

The Bloc Québécois would have preferred that the government had acted responsibly instead of blindly charging ahead with the implementation of Bill C-11. That would have meant conducting an impact study and consulting properly with stakeholders in each province, including researchers and private health laboratories. As far as the regulatory framework and cooperation with the provinces go, those are other matters.

Certainly, the Bloc Québécois endorses the idea that the government should consult with stakeholders affected by the bill before preparing regulations. We have no choice because the other political parties are in favour of adopting this bill without regulations.

However, we had proposed, during clause-by-clause study in committee, that the government consult the provinces before amending the schedules. When we questioned officials about the effects of this amendment, they indicated there would be no consultation with the provinces before preparing the amendments. Did anyone think of that? They do not even consult the provinces and they are going to make regulations without any consultation with people in each of the provinces.

Those officials also said that the experts and researchers were found in research laboratories and within the federal government, while ignoring the expertise within the public service of Quebec or the other provinces. We have expertise as well, but the Conservatives do not want to recognize it. They just want to listen to their own experts; and they will only take into account what they like.

They also pointed out that British Columbia had serious reservations about the bill, and these were the same officials who had reassured the province by promising to consult B.C. on the scope of the bill. They will do the consultation later.

The Bloc amendment called for consultation with Quebec and the provinces before any modification of the schedules; that is, before adding a pathogen or revising its classification. The purpose of this amendment was to ensure that the federal government properly evaluated the impact of any such changes.

It must be said that the Conservatives and the Liberals decided that amendment was not necessary, and in doing so dismissed the expertise of Quebec and other provinces on the subject.

The Liberals, who cried wolf in committee because of a failure to respect British Columbia’s jurisdiction and the repercussions of the bill on the people of British Columbia, put their trust entirely in the regulations under the Act, and make no provision for British Columbia to give its views on the classification of pathogens.

In a news release on April 29, 2008, announcing the introduction of Bill C-54, the minister insisted that there were no risks. Yet, today, suddenly, there are many risks.

The Bloc Québécois calls for in-depth study of Bill C-11. We want to put questions to experts to ensure that the details of Bill C-11 will not adversely affect the research community in Quebec.

[Nicolas Dufour, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to congratulate my colleague, the member for Shefford. He has a deep knowledge of this issue and he clearly demonstrated that during his remarks.

He spoke earlier about the attitude of the Conservatives. I would like to have his opinion about the attitude of the Conservatives. In the beginning, they thought Kyoto was a socialist plot. Next, they made cuts in education and university research. Then, they brought forward Bill C-11, another slap in the face to universities. One could say that the government has a desire to attack the scientific community. They cut $160 million in the area of scientific research.

I would like my colleague from Shefford to tell me how he feels when he sees the Conservatives acting in this dogmatic way.

[Robert Vincent, Bloc, Shefford, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his pertinent question.

I am pleased to answer him since I did not have an opportunity, in the time allowed me, to talk briefly about the legislation of the Conservative government. Do you know why the government wants to include risk groups 1 and 2? It is not complicated.

At first, it did not want any consultation. Moreover, the government never stops advancing the spectre of a bioterrorism attack; very nearly casting researchers as potential terrorists. We have heard about the flu virus, which presents no problem in risk groups 1 and 2. There is not even a risk. Even if there were a low risk and the virus were to spread, we already have all the science necessary to control it and medical care to deal with it.

Once again, the government wants to frighten people by trying to exercise control and by saying there could be a risk of terrorism. Terrorists are not going to steal pathogens of some flu strain and send them to British Columbia. That makes no sense. The government, however, wants to control the students who will practice medicine. It tells them not to touch that area because there is a risk. Does it think, perhaps there is a student who would take the flu virus and spread it within a school? Moreover, if a student did such a thing, he or she could be put in prison for six months and fined half a million dollars. At some point this is stranger than fiction.

[The Acting Speaker, Barry Devolin]

It is my duty, pursuant to Standing Order 38, to inform the House that the questions to be raised tonight at the time of adjournment are as follows: the hon. member for Nanaimo—Cowichan, Aboriginal affairs; the hon. member for Repentigny, University Scholerships.

Resuming debate, the hon. member for Repentigny.

[Nicolas Dufour, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure for me today to rise and present my position and that of the Bloc on Bill C-11. As a member of the Standing Committee on Health and the Bloc’s youth critic, I can say that this bill is of great concern to me. I am concerned because it has to do not only with public health and safety but also with the research done in our universities.

The predecessor of this bill was Bill C-54, which died on the order paper when the election was called last October. The purpose of the bill is to create measures to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins.

In case any of my colleagues do not know, pathogens are micro-organisms that can cause illness in human beings. Some toxins, produced by micro-organisms, can also cause illness. Pathogens are divided into five categories. The least dangerous are in risk group 1 and the most dangerous in risk group 5.

When I said that Bill C-11 concerned both public health and our scientific community, it was because these micro-organisms are used in both scientific research laboratories and in health care facilities in Quebec and Canada.

At the present time, the regulations on importing pathogens make it necessary to obtain a licence in order to bring them in from foreign countries. Only laboratories that import pathogens have to observe a set of guidelines on laboratory biosafety. Those that use pathogens already present in Canada do not.

The purpose of Bill C-11 is, in short, to make the laboratory biosafety guidelines obligatory for everyone and to require everyone to obtain a licence for controlled activities so that the existing pathogens can be followed. The purpose is to determine where these pathogens are and who is in possession of them and also to institute a system of offences and punishments for people who violate the guidelines.

Bill C-11 would therefore require everyone in the scientific community to obtain a licence in order to conduct research on pathogens and toxins. Whether in order to manipulate, possess, or import them, everyone would need a licence.

As I pointed out earlier, there are guidelines for the possession and handling of pathogens and toxins.

In short, Bill C-11 would require that low-risk laboratories, those using agents from groups 1 and 2, which entail, according to the Public Health Agency of Canada, “moderate risk to the health of individuals and a low risk to public health” obtain a licence. That is interesting. According to the agency once again, “They are able to cause serious disease in a human but are unlikely to do so. Effective treatment and preventive measures are available and the risk of spread of disease caused by those pathogens is low.”

Naturally, we understand the government's concern with respect to groups 3 and 4 and the precautions proposed as they could affect the health and safety of the general population. However, there is a problem in that laboratories that handle agents in groups 3 and 4 already observe the provisions in the guidelines.

The guidelines were established more than 15 years ago and, since then, there has not been an incident in Canada in laboratories that use groups 3 and 4 or those that use groups 1 and 2. Mr. Marc Ouellette, a professor at Laval University, appeared before the committee twice and was very clear on that point.

Bill C-54 and then Bill C-11 sent shock waves through the research community. No one was prepared for them. When we examined the bill—and I even read the document explaining it—we thought it was ridiculous, because people had been following the guidelines for 15 years.

In fact, the only major incident involving improper use took place in the United States in the early 2000s and it was in a laboratory run by the American government. Scientists already comply with the framework put forward by the federal government for the use and importing of pathogens.

As I mentioned earlier, Bill C-11 would impose a new framework for university and hospital laboratories as well as private laboratories. At the Standing Committee on Health, we spoke to a number of scientists who work in these laboratories and who have serious doubts about the impact of Bill C-11, and I can understand them.

Nevertheless, when it comes to the new obligations on the circulation of pathogens within a facility such as a university, researchers wonder, not about the safety aspect of their research, but about the way the government is taking control over their everyday research activities.

Once again, the Conservative government is trying to use a variety of tactics to interfere in scientific research, exactly as it did by granting new funding to the Humanities Research Council, but limiting them to economic research. I will return to that point later. That decision, once again, was reached without consultation and without taking the opinion of those most concerned into consideration.

Did the government do any impact studies on the effects such legislation would have on university curricula, on the operation of our hospitals, on the research industry in Quebec and Canada?

Not in the least.

In addition to cutting $162 million in funding to granting agencies, the Conservative government is imposing a legislative framework on researchers, which will require major additional investments for the thousands of facilities wishing to use pathogens with a low level of risk to the public.

The Conservative government is again after carte blanche as far as the regulations are concerned; they will not be reviewed by Parliament. I have serious misgivings about the potential repercussions of this bill on the development of pathogen research in Quebec and on the positive contributions this would make to public health.

We need only think of the swine flu that is rampant at this time. Will scientists be able to work as effectively in future to find solutions to such a virus? I think this issue is worth examining.

Once again, it seems that the Conservative government is introducing a bill without evaluating its direct repercussions on the community. We are beginning to get used to it.

Did the government reflect on the impact that Bill C-11 will have on university teaching? Did it reflect on the investments required to set up a teaching laboratory using groups 1 and 2?

For example, E. coli is currently listed in schedule 2 of the bill. According to the academics, this pathogen is widely used by students in laboratory experiments. The fact that it is in schedule 2 would force universities to step up security in classrooms, although not all types of E. coli are potentially hazardous.

It is true that the government introduced some distinctions in Bill C-11 compared to former Bill C-54 and it could change the classification of pathogens in the schedules. However, that example illustrates the general upgrading problem that will be necessary in some teaching laboratories.

Moreover, the bill restricts the access to licensed facilities. Clause 31 of Bill C-11 says that:

A licence holder shall establish and maintain a list of all persons authorized by the licence holder to access the facility to which the licence applies, including persons holding a security clearance for that facility and visitors. The licence holder shall provide the Minister with that list if requested to do so.

Where teaching is done in laboratories, will the university have to give the list of all students who can access the laboratories or of all students of the university? I do believe that there are still too many questions and not enough answers in that bill.

According to the academics we consulted, Bill C-11 would require major investments in universities where there are laboratories. These investments will not be used to make the necessary upgrades to allow the laboratories to work with groups 3 and 4 pathogens, but to make them conform to the new provisions concerning groups 1 and 2. They told us that universities in Quebec and Canada will have to spend billions of dollars—and I repeat, billions of dollars, in the middle of an economic crisis—to do the necessary upgrading.

Many witnesses also asked the government to eliminate schedule 2 from the bill to reduce the impact on everyday research work. According to scientists, that would considerably change the content of Bill C-11. Indeed, 90% of pathogens used in university laboratories are from group 2.

A scientist at McGill University's Department of Microbiology and Immunology even issued a serious warning about the direct impact of implementing the act if schedule 2 is not repealed:

Removing level 2 would not put Canadians at any greater risk than they face now. Canadians are well protected with what is already present. Keeping level 2 in this bill will certainly slow research in this country and slow our ability to compete internationally and our ability to attract biotechnology and major industries...

In a time of economic crisis, it seems that the worst thing we could do would be to put even more constraints on our universities, which are already faced with serious funding problems. Especially since, as I said, there have been no incidents since the guidelines were introduced 15 years ago. The government is once again trying to impose its right-wing ideology and to control research as much as it can without spending anything. That is completely unacceptable.

As I have mentioned, the handling of pathogens is carried out for diagnostic purposes and for research and development. The Bloc Québécois is concerned with the effects of this bill on the future of research and development in this country related to pathogens. At the risk of repeating myself, I want to say that the Conservative government, in addition to cutting research budgets, is trying to exert maximum control over the scientific community.

It is also important to be concerned about the effects of Bill C-11 on health institutions, such as hospitals, that use laboratories to carry out diagnostic tests. That could have a direct impact on the health services of Quebec and the provinces. The bill also seeks to impose penalties on anyone who contravenes the law. It is important to mention that laboratories, including universities, hospitals and other government establishments, could be forced to pay a fine. Does the government really want to inflict fines on universities and hospitals that already have a crying shortage of funds?

The bill also provides fines and penalties for anyone guilty of careless acts or lack of precaution in the handling of pathogens and toxins. Such action would be liable to a maximum of five years in prison and a fine of up to $500,000 for the first offence. A second offence would attract a maximum fine of $1 million or up to two years in prison, or both of those penalties. Are the measures in Bill C-11 to prohibit intentional misuse of pathogens not already contained within the Anti-terrorism Act?

While we had questioned officials about the possible repercussions, it is now clear that the government did not conduct any study of the impact of Bill C-11. The only response we received was that when it was drawing up the regulations the government would consider the concerns of experts and researchers, to reduce any possible negative impacts. Even though the government still has not conducted an impact study or else is refusing to make it public, the government appears so anxious to have Bill C-11 adopted that it is forgetting that enforcement of the law will not begin for another 4 or 5 years.

I sincerely believe that the government should have acted responsibly before blindly jumping into the implementation of Bill C-11. It should have conducted impact assessments and properly consulted the stakeholders, specifically, researchers, the provinces, medical laboratories and the entire scientific community. Of course the Bloc Québécois supports the notion that the government must consult the stakeholders affected by the bill before drafting any regulations. However, in the clause by clause study conducted by the health committee, of which I am a member, the Bloc proposed that the government consult the provinces before amending the schedules, which obviously was not done.

When asked about the consequences of this amendment, the officials said there would be no consultation with the provinces before the amendments were drafted, thereby forgoing the expertise of public servants from Quebec and the provinces. I would also remind the House that British Columbia has expressed serious reservations about the bill, and that it was these same officials who reassured them, promising that they would be consulted about the scope of the legislation.

This sentiment was echoed by the Government of Quebec. The Quebec health minister, Yves Bolduc, wrote a letter to the Canadian Minister of Health to express his concerns.

The Liberal members who were tearing their hair out in committee because of the failure to respect British Columbia's jurisdictions and the repercussions the bill would have on the people of that province decided to put their trust entirely in the regulations, thereby denying British Columbia the opportunity to give an opinion on the classification of pathogens. The Liberals have a habit of trampling on the provinces, and this is just one more example.

In her speech earlier, the hon. member for Winnipeg North seemed to be saying that the NDP were the only ones to try to change Bill C-11 in committee by proposing amendments.

Perhaps this amnesia is due to the energy she spent on justifying her position.

I would also like to remind the NDP members and all members of the House that the Bloc Québécois also proposed amendments at the report stage calling for the removal of level 2 pathogens and calling on the government to table the regulations before the House before they are adopted. We therefore supported the other parties' amendments that were along the same lines. However, that was not enough.

It would be interesting to know why the hon. member for Winnipeg North and the Liberal and Conservative members of the Standing Committee on Health did not support the amendment put forward by the Bloc Québécois calling for the activities carried out in any facility regulated, operated or funded by a province to be excluded, when Quebec's health minister as well as Ontario and BC officials expressed serious concerns about the impact of Bill C-11 on activities in Quebec and the provinces.

Given that the risk to Canadians posed by the presence of human pathogens and toxins in labs is low, according to the Conservative government; that the bill is designed to make the laboratory biosafety guidelines mandatory through licensing, without the government first consulting the primary stakeholders and assessing the impact on such things as university teaching and labs in health facilities; that the government's goal is to address a potential terrorist risk by regulating pathogens and toxins and that the Anti-terrorism Act and other acts can already cover some of the provisions of Bill C-11; and that this bill can potentially invade the jurisdictions of Quebec and the provinces, for all of these reasons, the Bloc Québécois is calling for an in-depth review of Bill C-11.

We will question experts to make sure that the details of Bill C-11 do not adversely affect Quebec's research community. We will ensure that the proposed provisions are respectful of Quebec's areas of jurisdiction in that they take into account potential implications with respect to university teaching and research as well as health services provided to the people of Quebec.

[Richard Nadeau, Bloc, Gatineau, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask a question of my colleague.

Did I hear correctly that Quebec's health minister is opposed to this bill because it encroaches on the province's jurisdiction?

We know that pathogen issues fall under provincial jurisdiction. If I understand correctly, Quebec's health minister, Mr. Bolduc, is strongly opposed. He is not the only one, since I believe other provinces also voiced their opinions. I would like to hear more about this.

[Nicolas Dufour, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my hon. colleague from Gatineau for his excellent question.

Let me read from the letter sent by minister Yves Bolduc to the Minister of Health:

Quebec realizes that what is proposed in the bill would have major impacts, most notably on the management of medical laboratory and diagnostic services, which are normal services within Quebec's health system. However, these services fall under the jurisdiction of the government of Quebec.

Once again, the Conservative government, despite its promise of open federalism, is engaging in piecemeal federalism and trampling the role of the provinces in the federal system. I must say this is one of the main reasons why I am a sovereignist.

[Robert Carrier, Bloc, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I want to congratulate my colleague from Repentigny for his excellent speech on Bill C-11. We just heard that the government is not very interested in the position taken by the Quebec Minister of Health and his opposition to this bill for reasons related to provincial jurisdiction. This is not surprising from a Conservative government that constantly ignores the interests of Quebec and its areas of jurisdiction. However, what concerns me more is the support the Liberal Party seems willing to give to this bill. I would like to know what the hon. member thinks of the position of the official opposition.

[Nicolas Dufour, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to congratulate my colleague from Alfred-Pellan for his election and to thank him for his excellent question.

I have to admit that, while he was asking this question, I was already thinking of the disappointing way the Liberals have acted in this matter. In committee, they were completely against the bill. They asked many scientists and researchers to come and testify against inclusion of group 2 pathogens. And what did they do when it was time to vote? It was all the same thing. They supported the government, as they have done for many other bills and motions. The Liberals talk to the media about how terrible and scary this is. They say they will vote against it, but the first thing they do is to vote with the government. So, would it be that different if they were the government? I really doubt that because it is always the same with them. Anyway, when they were in power, the Liberals did what the Conservatives are doing, that is, demeaning the role of the provinces within Confederation. So, I have said it and will say it again: it is always the same thing.

[Richard Nadeau, Bloc, Gatineau, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask my colleague to elaborate on a point. Why do we find ourselves in a situation where the federal government will once again attempt to interfere with Quebec's areas of jurisdiction?

[Nicolas Dufour, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I am being asked many very good questions today and I appreciate it. That allows me to elaborate on the actions of the Conservative government on that issue.

[An hon. member]

A good government.

[Nicolas Dufour, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

I am not so sure about that. The member across the way says that it is a good government, but I have my doubts. However, in all honesty, I must admit that we would not be better off with the Liberals.

The problem with the fact that the government interferes with provincial areas of jurisdiction is that most universities and health facilities doing research with group 2 pathogens are financed by the provinces. Guess what the government will do when the act is implemented? It will wash its hands of it. It will say that it is not its problem anymore and that provincial governments must invest in universities and hospitals to upgrade the laboratories to comply with the new regulations. Of course, as usual, the provinces, and particularly Quebec, will not get one red cent from the government to help them.

[Richard Nadeau, Bloc, Gatineau, QC]

Mr. Speaker, first, I would like to know how young university researchers who are learning their skills in our institutions and universities in Quebec and the rest of Canada will be affected by this bill.

[Nicolas Dufour, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I can tell from his many interesting questions that my colleague from Gatineau knows a lot about this issue.

The problem for young researchers is that they work in labs with human pathogens. I specified in my remarks that over 90% of these human pathogens are in group 2. If these group 2 pathogens are removed from the schedule, there will not be any problem. But the government insists on keeping them there. The problem is that young researchers will no longer have the bacteria and toxins they need to pursue their studies. It is easy to figure out what the impact will be.

It is as if I wanted to teach carpentry to somebody, but without giving him a hammer. How could he become a good carpenter if he does not have the tools of his trade? The problem will be the same with Bill C-11 as long as schedule 2 is there. Scientists and young researchers will again be penalized.

We know that this Conservative government is cutting funds for research. And now, with Bill C-11, it is taking control over scientific research.

Guess who is going to be penalized? Those affected will again be young students, researchers and academics, who are working in good faith and want to contribute to the medical community in Quebec and Canada. And what does the government do? It is making things difficult for them and it is making sure they will go abroad. All our potential to develop new knowledge, all those who could help Quebec and Canada forge ahead, will leave for places and countries where it is recognized that the knowledge economy is the economy of the future. But the Conservatives do not know what the knowledge economy is all about.

[Richard Nadeau, Bloc, Gatineau, QC]

Mr. Speaker, can my colleague from Repentigny tell me how universities and medical institutions could be affected by Bill C-11?

[Nicolas Dufour, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from Gatineau for his question.

The problem is that universities and hospitals, both in Quebec and in the rest of Canada, are already experiencing a serious funding problem. Because of Bill C-11, these universities and hospitals will need several billion dollars—according to a university professor—to improve their laboratories. That will be very costly for the provinces and they will not get any federal assistance.

[Nicole Demers, Bloc, Laval, QC]

Mr. Speaker, today I listened very carefully to my colleagues from the Bloc Québécois who demonstrated clearly that this bill is irrelevant and should go back to the drawing board to be re-examined and reworked to meet the real needs of the community in terms of risk management.

Everyone knows that I am curious. When I see a bill that is irrelevant, that leads nowhere, that will solve nothing and that will only interfere with the work of specialists and researchers, I am curious and I look for anything that could enlighten me as to where exactly the danger lies. Why is the government looking now to pass a bill that would suddenly make risk group 1 and 2 pathogens more dangerous and require a licence for these pathogens? I asked myself that question.

I looked to see what was being done in the United States because we know of course that, since 9/11, our American friends are very fond of all these laws and measures that are nothing but cumbersome. I understand their anxiety and their need to put forward legislation aimed at preventing terrorist acts on their territory.

I came across something quite interesting, and I believe that our Conservative, Liberal and New Democrat colleagues should hear it. Words could be a useful pathogen if, by reproduction and transmittal, they could contaminate our colleagues from these parties and disseminate more wisdom among them.

I will read some excerpts from a report by Mr. Nicolas Moquin, of the Laboratoire d'étude sur les politiques publiques et la mondialisation. The title is “Analyse des impacts de la mondialisation sur la sécurité au Québec, Rapport 4 — L'arme biologique et ses vecteurs”. The author is not the member for Laval or just anyone talking through their hat about things they do not really know. The study was done by a very knowledgeable group of people. Here is how the report begins:

The erosion of frontiers, the increasing ease of travel, the free circulation of goods and people as well as migratory movements are characteristics of globalization. The new information and telecommunication technologies, such as satellites, cable broadcasting and the Internet, also promote rapid information sharing and allow for the coordination of various activities taking place at great distances. Western democracies are therefore more vulnerable to transnational threats. Transnational terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda, can acquire tools which allow them to better target their attacks.

As I read this, I cannot help thinking about the day, not so long ago, when our distinguished colleague across the floor went to the airport in Toronto. With some of his colleagues in charge of public safety, he was able to gain access to areas where, normally, he should not have been able to go. This represents a much greater threat of bringing biological weapons here than the threat of reproducing those weapons in a laboratory where we have pathogens from the risk groups 1 and 2. In spite of this, nothing has been done yet to make airports safer.

Western states are very concerned about terrorism. On October 5, 2001, shortly after the September 11 tragedy, the United States lost yet more lives when five people died of anthrax.

Anthrax is considered a risk group 4 pathogen. It is not a risk group 1 or 2 pathogen. It is very dangerous and should not be in just anyone's hands. However, even though the United States has very strict and specific rules, the pathogen was found in envelopes addressed to elected members of the U.S. Congress and Senate. Unfortunately, police in the U.S. had been unable to intercept the envelopes.

This incident illustrates the degree to which the proliferation of nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical (NRBC) weapons constitutes a threat to national and international security.

These are weapons of mass destruction, much like the weapons that were not found in Iraq, weapons that justified the American government's military action in that country.

Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and NRBCs can have a destructive impact on all levels of society and the environment.

The introduction explains these problems. Further on, it addresses biological weapons, bioterrorism and agroterrorism. I would like to talk about bioterrorism, because pathogens are what interest us today.

Security experts agree. Actions against civilians or even property by individuals or groups belonging to large organized networks are characteristic of terrorism. These organizations claim adherence to a political or religious cause, orchestrate attacks, or employ intimidation tactics to create a climate of fear. There are many forms of terrorism; we will focus on biological weapons.

Biological weapons have not yet been used on a large scale, but some states have pursued the development of biological weapons and their antidotes. These weapons use living organisms or products derived therefrom.

These states are not terrorist groups; they are governments that have developed biological weapons.

These organisms may multiply within another living organism, which then becomes a vector for contamination [...] There are four categories of biological agents: viruses (smallpox, Ebola), bacteria (anthrax), fungi, and toxins produced by living organisms (ricin, botulism bacillus).

Each of those appears in risk group 4.

Vaporizing or mixing biological agents with drinking water or food increases their capacity for mass destruction. These agents can also be incorporated in goods or postal packages.

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), some 50 viruses, bacteria and toxins could be used to manufacture biological weapons... Manufacturing a biological weapon requires little specialized knowledge. Advances in biological research and even the access to Internet have made it increasingly possible to procure the equipment necessary to manufacture such a weapon. It is even highly likely that the number of instances where strains of smallpox are stolen will increase. As it turns out, there is a real threat, and the use of such weapons of mass destruction is cause for great concern. Currently active terrorist groups could resort to biological weapons in attacks.

When we say that it is easy to make a biological weapon with the help of Internet, it is important to realize that we are not talking about scientists or researchers working in laboratories to serve mankind by developing universal remedies for the various diseases known to man. We are talking about terrorists who, in the comfort of their own bedroom or living room, find recipes for putting together these so-called biological threats.

Bioterrorism means the spreading of germs susceptible of causing deadly diseases. Recent advances in genetics and molecular biology make it possible to turn innocuous bacteria into pathogens through the insertion of toxic genes. These bacteria can be made even more virulent so that they can bypass the immune system or become antibiotic resistant.

I do not think that the kind of bacteria and terrorist activities we are talking about here will be the fields of interest of our young researchers and scientists, who are so dedicated and so anxious to improve the lives of their fellow citizens by looking for new methods of treatment.

Included in this report is the notion that, being aware of these problems, risks and potential difficulties, the United Nations as well as the United States, Canada and Quebec have developed alternate approaches that now allow us to make sure that we will not be the victims of bioterrorism or agroterrorism.

For example, in 2003 in the United States, the FDA or Food and Drug Administration, which is the agency that oversees drugs, arms and foodstuffs, established an obligatory registration system for foreign and local producers who handle, process, deal with or transport foodstuffs. Foreign companies in the agri-food sector that export perishable foods to the United States must provide the Food and Drug Administration with a minimum of two hours advance notice.

American importers of agri-food products must also notify the FDA before crossing the border of another American state. If imported food products might constitute a health risk, the FDA reserves the right to quarantine them for a period of 20 to 30 days.

Members will recall that we had a serious problem two years ago with spinach imported from the United States. Even though there are very strict rules in the United States governing the transportation of food, its quality, and its relative risk, here in Canada we ended up, despite all that, with very dangerous spinach contaminated with a coliform bacillus that was a threat to human health. It is not enough to have very strict rules. We have to be certain that those rules work.

The bioterrorism legislation in the United States also attempts to secure institutions that stock toxins and biological viruses. The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service has established a list of viruses that could be used to produce biological weapons. States, universities and private laboratories must therefore abide by certain conditions if they want to hold and handle these type 4 viruses, as was previously mentioned.

Canada has also become involved at the United Nations in a group of countries that are concerned about these problems because some states have developed viruses, bacteria and human pathogens that can be very dangerous and that can reproduce very quickly.

Today, most of these viruses are in a Russian laboratory, where they are monitored. For a few years, there has been an oversight committee made up of people from Canada, the United States, Europe and even Quebec. These people have a responsibility to protect the viruses against terrorism and make sure that the viruses kept in this facility are not removed for any reason.

Responsibility for planning and for Canada's response to the threat of bioterrorism rests with Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), the Departmental of National Defence (DND), the RCMP and the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), which are all part of the joint response team. The national readiness and response system of PSEPC coordinates all response activities. Internationally, Canada responds to biological threats by working with its international partners.

In 2002, to follow up on Canada's proposals at the Kananaskis summit, the G8 member countries adopted the global partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction. This partnership has primarily focused on co-managing Russia's chemical and biological military complex, a legacy of the Communist era. Canada and the other G8 members want to prevent any terrorist group from acquiring or developing biological weapons.

These chemical weapons are not found in small hospital or research laboratories. Chemical weapons do exist, but it is governments of certain countries that have developed them to use them themselves or to scare their neighbours or other countries by threatening to produce and export them. Generally, researchers and lab technicians are not the most diabolical minds behind threats of bioterrorism.

In Quebec, we are fortunate to have a public health agency.

Canada's and Quebec's initiatives to combat the vectors of biological weapons and protect themselves against the effects of such weapons primarily take the form of cooperation on safety and public health and compliance with FDA requirements by agri-food companies in Quebec and MAPAQ regarding food traceability.

I am certain that my colleague from Marc-Aurèle-Fortin is well aware of this situation, because:

—September 11, 2001 and the anthrax incident resulted in major changes to civil security in Quebec. Not long after these events, the governments of Quebec and the state of New York decided to establish the Quebec-New York Committee, a working group to examine new measures to be adopted for communications and security in emergency situations... The work of the committee led to the establishment, within the Ministry of Public Safety, of the roundtable on management of nuclear, biological, radiological and chemical threats.

The Parti Québécois—a sovereignist party—was in power in Quebec at the time.

Representatives of Montreal, Quebec City and Gatineau were members of the roundtable. Each city was represented by a police officer, a firefighter and a municipal civil security officer. Other members of various ministries and organizations also participated, including the Quebec provincial police, the SQ, which was responsible, together with the Montreal police force, for examining nuclear, biological, radiological and chemical threats.

I only have one minute remaining. That is not long enough. It is not enough to make my colleagues understand, no matter whether they are Liberals, Conservatives or New Democrats, that they are not making the right decision by voting for this bill. This bill must be reviewed in its entirety. It must be studied and witnesses must come and explain what they need, in order to have a real policy to prevent bioterrorism.

[Robert Carrier, Bloc, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague from Laval for her presentation on this important and very technical bill that has an impact on the entire scientific and medical community in Canada.

I want to refer specifically to a letter sent by Quebec's health minister, dated April 6, in which he states his opposition to the continuation of this bill's consideration because of its impact. Measures proposed in the bill would have major repercussions, especially on the management of medical laboratory and diagnostic services. This letter says, “Accordingly, the Government of Quebec is calling on the federal government to reconsider its approach to ensuring the biosafety and biosecurity of human pathogens and toxins, rather than pursuing the parliamentary work currently underway.”

That was exactly the amendment proposed by the Bloc Québécois in committee during the study at second reading. It was rejected.

I would ask my colleague what she thinks of the negotiation in good faith proposed by the current Conservative government regarding the harmonization of the QST and GST and this other situation where the Government of Quebec wants to be consulted before this bill is passed. What does she think about this attitude, especially considering that the Liberals are also thinking of supporting the bill?

[Nicole Demers, Bloc, Laval, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for his question which is quite relevant.

I am not surprised that the government rejected this amendment. Any pretense of openness towards Quebec is just that, a pretense. But I must admit I was surprised that the Liberals and the NDP refused to support this amendment.

This amendment stated that, in Quebec, we have a public security agency and that we know very well how to protect our own citizens. We do it with great openness and transparency. We have always done it.

I wish that, at least once, this Parliament would be transparent and true to itself and that it would respect Quebec’s demands. I would be quite surprised if it did, but I would be very pleased.

[Nicolas Dufour, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Madam Speaker, much has been said in my able colleagues’ remarks and mine on Bill C-11.

I would like to know whether the hon. member feels a renewed sovereignist commitment when she sees the federal government interfering, with a bill like Bill C-11?

As my colleague from Alfred-Pellan said, we have seen this happen in the issue of tax harmonization, and in other issues like cuts in scientific research and so many other issues over the years.

Does my colleague feel a renewed commitment to sovereignty every time she sees this kind of interference and incompetence on the part of the federal government?

[Nicole Demers, Bloc, Laval, QC]

Madam Speaker, my young colleague displays great eloquence for his age. What a fire and what a passion for such a young colleague!

My answer for my young colleague will be brief. As we know, I am a keen admirer of the late René Lévesque, who said that, after all, Quebecers are something akin to a great people. This may explain why others have a hard time working with us and understanding the Quebec people, the Quebec nation.

An African proverb says that you can go faster by yourself, but that we can go farther together. Quebecers have decided to go farther together, towards sovereignty. And it is true that my desire for sovereignty becomes greater when I am here.

[Richard Nadeau, Bloc, Gatineau, QC]

Madam Speaker, I would like to ask my colleague for Laval how the different provinces and the Quebec nation react to Bill C-11.

[Nicole Demers, Bloc, Laval, QC]

Madam Speaker, unfortunately, I am not a member of the Standing Committee on Health. However, if I understood what my colleagues said today, there is abundant questioning coming from all provinces, be it British Columbia, Quebec or other provinces. I am sure of that.

We must not forget that the most important thing is freedom, no matter what the Prime Minister might be saying. Presently, all sorts of means are being used to reduce freedom. We do not want to have the type of limited freedom the Prime Minister is calling for in his speeches. We want true freedom, without barriers so that people can go farther and higher, and achieve their full potential.

[Bernard Bigras, Bloc, Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie, QC]

Madam Speaker, something strikes me about Bill C-11. The federal government once again is using its power to legislate in criminal law to impose regulations in provincial areas of jurisdiction. We often see that in the tax area. Here is my question. Is it not unfair for Quebec and the other provinces that the federal government uses the principles of criminal law and the Criminal Code to impose regulations in areas of provincial jurisdiction, such as laboratories, hospitals and research centres? Should we not rely instead on the Anti-terrorism Act, as it is done in Australia, for example?

[Nicole Demers, Bloc, Laval, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank the member for Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie for his question.

I know how involved he is not only with the environment but also with everything related to ethics. I know how important it is for him and how much time he has spent studying those issues. Indeed, that should be part of the rights of the provinces in a real federation. Unfortunately, we all know that we do not have a real federation. The government is more centralizing than it appears. It pretends not to be, but it really is. A real federation would not be as centralizing, it would allow us to use the tools we have developed the best way we can, and it would give us the money to continue developing those tools.

[Nicolas Dufour, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Madam Speaker, first I want to congratulate my colleague from Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie on his excellent question and also my colleague from Laval on her excellent answer. Once again, she spoke with the kind of eloquence that only she is known for.

My question is very straightforward. She said earlier that the Conservative government is centralizing. It is probably the worst government we have had in that regard in the history of this country. I would like her to give me some other examples that show how centralizing this government is.

[The Acting Speaker, Denise Savoie]

The hon. member for Laval has one minute to answer the question.

[Nicole Demers, Bloc, Laval, QC]

Madam Speaker, would you give me 20 minutes to answer my colleague's question? I will be able to give just a few examples if I have only one minute.

We voted this week on the harmonization of the GST with the QST. That is another example. We also had to ask the government on several occasions to stop trying to manage education, health care and wait times in our province. We asked the government several times to stop taking money that belongs to Quebeckers and using it to its own ends. There are so many measures, whether they have to do with child care, social housing or other things.

In closing, this government is definitely not in favour of decentralization. It is a centralizing government.

[The Acting Speaker, Denise Savoie]

Resuming debate.

The member for Rosemont—La Petite Patrie has the floor. I would advise him at the outset that I will have to interrupt him at 5:30.

[Bernard Bigras, Bloc, Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie, QC]

Madam Speaker, it is important that we have this debate today on Bill C-11, An Act to—allegedly—promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins.

There is a paradox right in the title the government has given this bill. This government is talking about the safety of pathogens, and yet in a media release dated April 29, 2008, when Bill C-54, the predecessor of Bill C-11, was introduced, the Minister of Health at the time said: “The risk to Canadians posed by the presence of human pathogens and toxins in labs is low .”

In 2008 they were saying that the risk to the public was relatively low. And now the government is introducing a bill to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins, as if there were numerous risks.

So what does the bill that is before us do? First, it makes the guidelines that have been presented by the Public Health Agency of Canada mandatory. Second, it makes it mandatory that licences be obtained for regulated activities, so that existing pathogens can be monitored, to determine where they are and to know who has them. Third, it institutes a scheme of offences and penalties.

We are not opposed to oversight of these pathogens. That is a basic principle: the risk has to be managed, we have to ensure that the precautionary principle can be applied, of course.

In reality, however, what impact would the implementation of this bill have? It would create operating methods in workplaces like universities, research centres, clinics and hospitals. It seems clear to me that these sites are under Quebec’s authority. And today we have a federal government that would use the Criminal Code to get directly involved in how our hospitals and clinics operate, in the name of criminal law.

As I said, the precautionary principle must be applied, of course, but at the same time, the federal government has to understand where its authority to act begins and where it has to end.

We on this side of the House are not the only ones who think the government is going too far. This is an excerpt from a letter written on April 6, 2009, which makes it very recent, barely three weeks ago, by the Minister of Health of Quebec, Yves Bolduc, to the federal Minister of Health, concerning Bill C-11:

Quebec notes that the measures proposed in the bill would have a significant impact on the organization of medical laboratory and diagnostic services, which are normal services within Quebec's health system. However, these services fall under the jurisdiction of the government of Quebec.

Health Minister Yves Bolduc wrote further:

Accordingly, the Government of Quebec is calling on the federal government to reconsider its approach to ensuring the biosafety and biosecurity of human pathogens and toxins, rather than pursuing the parliamentary work currently underway. It is important that that approach better reflect the respective roles of both levels of government in this matter.

This is a letter dated April 6, which the federal health minister has received. Unfortunately, our colleagues on the Standing Committee on Health, who merely tried to get the government side to approve an amendment to ensure that the provinces would be consulted during the development of the regulations, got a resounding no for an answer.

Not only did the minister not deign to withdraw her bill but the members of the government party and some opposition members refused, I firmly believe, to make sure that at least those concerned by the application of it, that is the Government of Quebec, the hospitals and research centres, were consulted. It was a categorical no. The federal government is trying to use the terrorist threat in order to meddle in areas of provincial jurisdiction. That is the reality.

The federal government has all the tools it needs to handle pathogens of this kind. It can do so under the Terrorism Act. At least three countries have done so. The United Kingdom decided to take action under its terrorism act to regulate pathogens of this kind. But the government refuses to use the legislative tools at its disposal. It decided to go further and meddle directly in areas of provincial jurisdiction.

There is clearly a constitutional problem with the bill. This is not the first time this has happened. The government already used its power to legislate in the area of criminal law to make some laboratory biosafety guidelines obligatory through the issuing of licences. However, the bill exceeds the federal jurisdiction, as happened as well in the case of the federal bill on assisted reproduction, among others.

On June 19, 2008, the Quebec Court of Appeal handed down a judgment in the reference from the Government of Quebec on the constitutionality of sections 8 to 19, 40 to 53, 60, 61 and 68 of the Assisted Reproduction Act. The Court of Appeal stated that the sections in question exceeded the authority of the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution Act, 1867. In short, the judges said that the basic, overriding purpose of the part of the act that was challenged was to protect health and not to right a wrong. The provisions that were challenged could therefore not qualify as pertaining to criminal law under the Constitution Act, 1867.

There are precedents, therefore, for the federal government trying to use its power to legislate in the area of criminal law to introduce bills concerning health that are obviously outside its jurisdiction. Workplaces, universities, clinics and hospitals are clearly provincial jurisdictions.

We would have hoped today that the government would listen to reason at the stage the bill is at and withdraw Bill C-11, as requested by the Quebec health minister.

[The Acting Speaker, Denise Savoie]

It being 5:30 p.m., the House will now proceed to the consideration of private members' business as listed on today's order paper.

[Paul Szabo, Liberal, Mississauga South, ON]

Mr. Speaker, on Thursday when this bill was last debated, I asked a question of one of the hon. members about the privacy implications that are included in the bill on human pathogens and toxins. I was not quite sure whether I got a full answer but I did ask what the disposition of the concerns were with regard to privacy. The indication was that there was a letter from the Office of the Privacy Commissioner responding to a couple of points.

That letter was written on March 11 and was sent to the chair of the Standing Committee on Health. To make a long story short, it appears that the health committee had arranged its affairs in order to look at the health implications of Bill C-11.

In Bill C-11, in clause 38(1) and some ancillary matters to do with the Privacy Act the Privacy Commissioner had indicated an interest to appear before the committee to discuss the concerns with the committee. In addition to the letter of March 11, there is a letter dated March 30. I may want to table both of them. In the letter, the Privacy Commissioner's office laid out the process it went through. There was some consultation with that office. They met with officials. They did not receive a privacy impact assessment. That is a critical element that is required to do a proper assessment of whether or not the activities related to the Privacy Act are going to be handled in a matter which is appropriate and also in a manner which does not conflict with other areas of the privacy legislation.

In going through these, the Privacy Commissioner's office had a couple of suggestions right off the bat, for instance, including the word “reasonableness”. It says, “the minister has the authority to order private personal information and confidential business information to be disclosed without limit and without any conditions, simply to order it to be”. That raised some concern in my mind. The Privacy Commissioner indicated there probably should be the normal wording that there was a test of reasonableness, that the minister should have reasonable cause to believe that this information was vital to the administration of the act.

That change was made. In fact, based on the written input of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, an amendment was made by the government at committee.

There was a subsequent letter, and a few other changes were proposed.

The reason I am rising is not with concern related to the health aspects, the safeguards that are being proposed in the bill to ensure the safety and security of human pathogens and toxins and those who have access to, custody of, or responsibility for them. My concerns relate to how this piece of legislation impacts on privacy rights of Canadians.

The member for Eglinton—Lawrence gave a wonderful speech last Thursday. Members may want to consult it to see more detail about the concerns that have been raised. I think that would be a very good place to start. I will not repeat the points made there, but the argument was made very clearly that there were some holes.

In fact, subsequent to the March 11 letter, based on which some government amendments were made, the letter dated March 30 I think was written on same day the committee did its clause-by-clause study and passed the bill and sent it back to the House. I did not get a chance even to read this letter, for the members' edification, and I am pretty sure that the members probably received or at least were advised of the letter of March 11. I am pretty sure, also, that when the members voted on the bill clause by clause they were not even aware of the March 30 letter.

That raises a very significant problem with regard to the manner in which the committee conducted its affairs. The members of the committee were not apprised of relevant information to do with that on a matter which did not even have a witness before it for them to even make the necessary enquiries. This raises some concerns about whether or not that committee discharged its responsibilities in a fashion which is expected by the House. That is a matter the committee members may want to review as a committee.

It also raises the issue that should the other items incorporated in the letter of March 30 from the Office of the Privacy Commissioner raise substantive items, and I believe they are substantive, it puts us in a situation where, very quickly, somebody had to decide whether we do something about this. There are a couple of ways to deal with it. One way would be to make a motion to send this bill back to the health committee. That process requires that we identify the specific clause or clauses for reconsideration. I am prepared to do that, but I am not sure whether it would get the support of the House because the details are not there. For all the members having to deal with this, the details are not there.

I hope the government members, the government House leader and the government whip will consider the options. One is to send the bill back to committee to hear a witness who knows what he or she is talking about when it comes to protecting the privacy rights of Canadians. The second option would be to say that we do not have much choice, and if we cannot send it back to committee, we will have to either defeat the bill or pass it. I think it is unlikely that the members will want to defeat this bill. It is an important bill in that we are dealing with health implications here.

However, in my view, there are some changes that are necessary with regard to the Privacy Act implications. A privacy impact assessment was not, and has not been, provided to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner to enable it to give an informed opinion on whether or not the scope and the intent of the content of the legislation as it stands now are compatible with our obligations to protect privacy rights.

In the absence of the option of defeating the bill, I would suggest we have to pass it. That means this bill would go to the Senate. There is no doubt in my mind that the Senate does good work on legislation review. The Senate would look at the speeches of the day. It would look at the speech given by the member for Eglinton—Lawrence and see that some very serious questions have been raised. The member quoted extensively from both letters. If that is the case, it is my view that the problems in Bill C-11 as they currently exist are such that the Senate may have no choice but to make amendments to the bill and send it back to the House. Then we could send it back to committee for the committee to hear a witness and to fix the bill and then bring it back to the House and go through the process. It would be much more extensive.

I am calling out right now, in the middle of my speech, to the government House leader, to the whip, to the health critic, to the parliamentary secretary and to the Minister of Health to have a quick look at the situation. If they agree that this is the best opportunity for us to repair this bill, then a motion should come forward by a member speaking to this bill at this time to send the bill back to committee with regard to clause 38 and the clauses to which it relates. That is the reason I am rising, to ask the government to quickly consider the options before us.

I think the fastest route is to revert to committee to look at the matters, to consult with the Privacy Commissioner, not by exchanging a letter but by having representatives from the Office of the Privacy Commissioner appear.

It is a very substantive portion of this bill. It means that disclosure of personal information and confidential business information, not only of a person who has access or custody or responsibilities for human toxins or pathogens, the bill is so broad it could also lead to the disclosure of information about the person's family members. On top of this, the bill also allows this information to be shared with foreign governments.

One of the key issues the commissioner raised in this letter was what she termed “anonymize” the information about those who have custody or access or responsibilities related to human pathogens or toxins. That would mean instead of having the person's name disclosed to those it is necessary to disclose to so that we have the tools necessary to properly administer Bill C-11, it would not put on the record tes person's name, personal information, family's information, confidential business information or anything else it would dig up without explanation, limits or conditions on the minister.

The reason it just twigged with me is that I happen to be the chair of the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics. The Privacy Act comes under my committee's purview. We meet with the the Privacy Commissioner regularly. We are now working on some quick fixes to the Privacy Act, because it has not been touched in over 25 years.

These are important issues, and if we allow another bill to compromise the privacy rights of Canadians and effectively undermine the intent of the Privacy Act, then we have a ripple effect. It is not right.

I want to highlight a couple of things in the letter of March 30, which I do not believe the committee members even saw. It was sent directly to the chair of the committee. It would have been very difficult to have it go through the process of going through the parliamentary secretary and the government officials for health, maybe even the health minister, and then to distribute it to the committee members, who are entitled to get copies of all correspondence related to the matter before them.

In this case the assistant privacy commissioner actually signed the letter, thanking the committee for including some of the suggestions they had. They said there seemed to be a preliminary exchange of emails between the Public Health Agency of Canada and some of their officials. That was in May 2008. It was almost a year ago that they were talking about this. The privacy officials, the Privacy Commissioner, and Dr. Butler's agency, the PHAC, were aware of this.

It causes me great concern. If the Ministry of Health and the Public Health Agency of Canada, the PHAC, were aware of these items, these concerns on the Privacy Act, and still put forward a bill to the House of Commons that did not take into account the substantive concerns that the Privacy Commissioner had, it causes me grave concern. Somehow the system failed the House of Commons. Or, there is a reason. I am not going to speculate on whether someone wanted to pass by the input of the office of the Privacy Commissioner or pass by the prior consultations from almost a year ago with the Public Health Agency of Canada.

This is serious. Something has gone wrong in the operation of the committee, in the drafting of legislation, in the circulation of correspondence, and in the assessment, getting a privacy impact assessment so that the Privacy Commissioner could actually do the job.

It does say, “...we did not have many details and did not receive materials other than what was then Bill C-54, at that time”. That was the bill from the last Parliament.

That is all they received. How could we expect the Privacy Commissioner to do her job when there is no consultation and no communication with her on this bill specifically, until afterwards, where someone somehow picks up on a couple of items?

This involves two acts. One is the Privacy Act, which has the oversight with regard to the government departments, but also there is the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act; it is referred to as PIPEDA. These two acts together are related, and they are involved in this matter. It is not straightforward.

The letter goes on to say:

We recognize that the intent of the legislation is to deal with the personal information of laboratory workers; however, we still have concerns that there is nothing in the Bill to restrict the collection of ancillary personal information, such as patient information.

We are getting into areas that are so sensitive.

Another ancillary collection could be personal information about a laboratory worker's family members, should they come into contact with a regulated pathogen or toxin. As well, we are aware of the potential for function creep and would therefore prefer to limit the collection of personal information.

It goes on to say:

We look forward to these issues being addressed in the privacy risk assessment work to come.

They still have not received the privacy impact assessment. That is the tool, the approach in which we look at the implications to the Privacy Act of any legislation that touches on it. There is a protocol to go through here. It is the way we do our business, because Lord knows that members of Parliament cannot be experts in every statute we have responsibility for.

We have a responsibility to make sure that the work is done. We second the responsibility for the detailed knowledge, the day-to-day knowledge, to the people who work on it in the departments, in the agencies, we have established to do this.

But the matter has not come forward. It did not come forward to the committee. It did not come forward to the House. It was not disclosed by the parliamentary secretary in his speech. It was not disclosed by the minister at any point. No release. No information. We have done a very, very poor job as the House. It is a reflection on all of us.

However, we now have an opportunity. We have identified a potential problem here. It may be nothing. I may be wrong, but the Privacy Commissioner does not think so.

I believe the best course of action is to remedy the concerns that have been raised in the letter of March 30 by the commissioner, to ensure we learn from this example, to ensure that legislation, before it is signed off by all of the cabinet, that members did their due diligence. Did they check off on every piece of information? We have the formal checklist. Are they representing that this is constitutional, that it does not contradict any other laws of Canada, that it follows the model or the protocols we have established to make sure our bills and statutes work?

We also have a grave concern about the regulations. Bill C-11 requires substantive regulations. But if there is no consultation on the bill, I am not sure we will see any consultation related to privacy when the regulations are drafted and gazetted and promulgated.

One of the other areas is clause 67. It says that this may “diminish controls over personal information”. I guess that is the point of all this.

Having said that, I would like the unanimous consent of the House to table photocopies of both letters to the chair of the Standing Committee on Health: one dated March 11, one dated March 30, both in relation to Bill C-11.

[The Deputy Speaker, Andrew Scheer]

Does the hon. member have the unanimous consent of the House to table these two letters?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

No.

[The Deputy Speaker, Andrew Scheer]

There is no consent.

Questions and comments, the hon. member for Eglinton—Lawrence.

[Joe Volpe, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I am rather perplexed by the suggestion that the House would refuse to accept a motion to table two documents, which can be made public and which were solicited by the chair of the Standing Committee on Health, forwarded to the chair of the committee, and in the context of the way that Parliament and committees work should have been distributed to all members of the committee prior to the consideration of those clauses of the bill in question.

A member of Parliament stands before the House and says he would like to make them available to every member of Parliament so that he or she can take the consideration of this bill in its fullest context, keeping in mind that the health issues are not the ones being addressed but really the privacy concerns associated with the gathering of data pertinent to health issues. And members of the House have said, no, they do not want that information.

It might be well worth our while to ask the member to propose that again, given that members have now had a few brief moments, because that is all they would require to make an intelligent decision. If he were to present that motion again, we might find that members of the House may be disposed more favourably to receiving information that is for the public benefit and for a mature decision on this bill.

[Paul Szabo, Liberal, Mississauga South, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I am pretty sure that I cannot make a motion during questions and comments. I thank the member for the chance, or at least the gesture.

I can say that I am not here to put blame on anybody. I am here, as a member of this place, to suggest that there may be a problem with this bill. There are a few ways to handle it, as I indicated. Let me review them.

Number one is to make a motion to send the bill back to committee with specific reference to clauses 38, 67, and any other clauses that flow from those, for the health committee to hear the appropriate witnesses, to remediate the bill as necessary and to return it to the House.

The second thing would be simply to defeat this bill and make the government come back with another bill that has the changes in it.

The third thing is to pass the bill with the potential or alleged flaws in it and let it go to the Senate. Then the Senate will have an opportunity to review these matters in some detail, and it will send the bill back to us and we will probably have to send it back for consideration at the health committee anyway.

The most expeditious way to find out whether we have a serious problem is to send it back to committee. If anybody would like the letters, I would be happy to provide them. I am asking hon. members to rise in their place to debate Bill C-11 and make the motion to revert it to committee. I know my Liberal colleagues would be prepared to support that.

At this point we need members to review the information, look at the options we have and try to find the best manner in which the House of Commons can dispose of an important health bill.

[Joe Volpe, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I welcome the opportunity to reflect on the intervention by my colleague, the member for Mississauga South, that the hands of the House are tied and that we would be essentially dependent upon the decisions made in the other place for how to address this bill, keeping in mind that one is talking about protecting the rights of citizens to information that is personal and private, while we take a look at all of the issues that are important from a health perspective with respect to transporting and dealing with human pathogens and toxins.

The House would owe, from my perspective, very humbly, a debt of gratitude to members of the House, like the member for Mississauga South, who underscores sometimes occasional problems associated with issues that are related to the importance of citizens' interests on privacy.

I wonder whether we can have his comment on that as well.

[Paul Szabo, Liberal, Mississauga South, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I would think this is potentially a bit of an embarrassment to some people, but the bottom line is that the members of the health committee did not receive the second communication from the Privacy Commissioner, which laid out at least four different areas of concern. One of them is this has no limits on how long that personal information can be kept.

That is fundamental to any legislation. If a person leaves the employ and is no longer involved, there is no sunset date as to when it has to dispose of this information. That has to be changed because it is consistent with every other treatment we have with regard to matters as it touches on the Privacy Act. I know some members are a little concerned about whether we will open up a problem area here.

I am not convinced the privacy commission is satisfied with the bill in its current form, but I do know they will participate in the continuing activity of this review. If the House is not prepared to deal with it, I am pretty sure hon. members of the red chamber, the other place, will look at this carefully to make absolutely sure that the legislation we pass in the Parliament of Canada is the best possible.

[Cathy McLeod, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Cariboo, BC]

Mr. Speaker, as a member of the health committee, I would like to reassure the hon. member opposite that we have had great, lengthy conversations regarding the privacy assessment and privacy issues. At the end of the day, we also know that the regulations will address some of the issues about which we need talk. There was consent, both by his party and ours, to move the bill forward.

This is very important legislation. Yes, the privacy issues need to be dealt with and I feel very sure that we will move forward in a proper and proactive way.

[Paul Szabo, Liberal, Mississauga South, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I am 100% in agreement except for one thing. Regulations cannot fix this. Regulations are drafted after the legislation receives royal assent. Regulations cannot change the bill in any manner that is not enabled by the bill itself.

The bill has to say that the minister has the authority to make regulations to specify the details and conditions, et cetera under which regulations can be made. Respectfully that is not in the bill now. It still needs a change.

[The Deputy Speaker, Andrew Scheer]

Is the House ready for the question?

[An hon. member]

Question.

[The Deputy Speaker, Andrew Scheer]

The question is on the motion. Is it the pleasure of the House to adopt the motion?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

No.

[The Deputy Speaker, Andrew Scheer]

All those in favour will please say yea.

[Some hon. members]

Yea.

[The Deputy Speaker, Andrew Scheer]

All those opposed will please say nay.

[Some hon. members]

Nay.

[The Deputy Speaker, Andrew Scheer]

In my opinion the yeas have it.

And more than five members having risen:

Call in the members.

And the bells having rung:

The recorded division on the motion stands deferred until the end of government orders tomorrow.

The House resumed from May 4 consideration of the motion that Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins, be read the third time and passed.

[The Deputy Speaker, Andrew Scheer]

It being 5:30 p.m., the House will now proceed to the taking of the deferred recorded division on the motion at the third reading stage of Bill C-11.

Call in the members.

(The House divided on the motion, which was agreed to on the following division:)

Vote #59

[The Deputy Speaker, Andrew Scheer]

I declare the motion carried.

(Bill read the third time and passed)

[The Acting Speaker, Barry Devolin]

Order, please. It being 6:00 o'clock, the House will now proceed to the consideration of private members' business as listed on today's order paper.