Bill C-11 (Historical)

Human Pathogens and Toxins Act

An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins

This enactment creates measures to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins and all activities associated with them. It establishes a comprehensive legislative regime that extends beyond the present importation regime. It requires every person conducting activities involving human pathogens or toxins to take all reasonable measures to protect the health and safety of the public.

[Mark Warawa, Conservative, Langley, BC]

Mr. Hyer, you're not answering my question. My question was very direct: what amendments, what changes would you be willing to accept on Bill C-311 today to get consensus around this table? You've provided urgency, so what changes would you be willing to make?

Canada Consumer Product Safety Act

[Kirsty Duncan, Liberal, Etobicoke North, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is very encouraging that we have an advisory panel for the bill. We recently passed Bill C-11, which is around biosafety and biosecurity. At that time, we also called for a scientific advisory group, experts in the field who would have the best judgment to suggest which viruses and bacteria belonged in what schedules. Having the advisory panel go forward on this bill will allow the experts to continue this good work.

On her second point, yes, Canadians are very interested in labelling. Recent studies suggested 90% to 95% would like to see labelling and right to know.

[Carolyn Bennett, Liberal, St. Paul's, ON]

Bill C-11--

[Carolyn Bennett, Liberal, St. Paul's, ON]

This is very much in keeping with the amendment that we had to Bill C-11. We believe that the people of Canada deserve to know that the minister is getting the best possible advice, but also what that advice is. We are hoping that we will be able to do the same thing again. This is a bill that is expected to reflect the most recent science, and we want the minister to have very good advice, but the people of Canada need to know what advice the minister gets. Sometimes ministers can't do exactly what the science says, but at least the politics stays separate from the science.

I understand from the briefing last night that because this bill is housed in Health Canada instead of in the Public Health Agency of Canada, which already has an advisory committee policy, the officials may want to add some language concerning reimbursement and these kinds of things, because that doesn't exist right now at Health Canada. But the gist of the bill is the same as that of Bill C-11. The implementation of the amendment may need to be enhanced a little bit based on making sure that it happens.

[Judy Wasylycia-Leis, NDP, Winnipeg North, MB]

Madam Chair, you will be familiar with this proposal. It is somewhat along the lines of the motion that we passed to amend Bill C-11. It allows for parts of this bill that require regulations to come back to the House and to the Senate. So it gives a chance to the health committee, if the House so chooses, to further scrutinize the parts of this bill that are left for very specific drafting and regulatory efforts.

[Leona Aglukkaq, Conservative, Minister of Health]

Thank you.

Good afternoon, Madam Chair and members of the committee. It's again my pleasure to be here with you.

l'm here today to address the health portfolio's main estimates for this fiscal year, which represent an increase of approximately $236 million.

I also want to talk about how our spending and legislative priorities support a stronger focus on the federal role in the health and well-being of Canadians. In particular, this year's main estimates include investments supporting stronger product safety, further recruitment of new health researchers, and better health outcomes for first nations and Inuit.

But before I go any further, I want to address our response to the H1N1 flu virus.

For the better part of a month, public health officials in Canada and throughout the world have been monitoring the development of this virus and responding according to the level of risk. Thankfully, the impact on Canada has been relatively mild so far, but let me be clear: we cannot afford to let our guard down. H1N1 is a new strain of influenza. As a result, we can't be sure of the next turn it will take, so we will stay vigilant and be ready to respond as necessary.

Canadians can take comfort in the fact that we have a well-informed, well-supported, and well-developed pandemic preparedness plan. We will continue working with the provinces, the territories, and international partners, as well as learning from the data we have collected and the research we conduct at the National Microbiology Laboratory.

As precautions, we issued a travel warning advising against non-essential travel to Mexico, stationed more quarantine officers at Canadian airports that receive direct flights from Mexico, and distributed health alert notices to travellers--over 1.5 million a week.

I also want to highlight the achievements of researchers at the National Microbiology Lab who made an important discovery last week by sequencing the genome of Mexican and Canadian samples of this virus, essentially decoding its genetic makeup. This discovery has provided important information for researchers around the world. With this knowledge, we were able to eliminate genetic mutation as a possible reason for why the virus has apparently hit Mexico harder than Canada. Identifying the nature and composition of this virus will also help with vaccine development.

Health Canada experts are working with a vaccine manufacturer on the initial steps toward developing a vaccine. However, it is internationally acknowledged that producing a safe and effective vaccine could take up to six months. It is imperative that we balance the need for speed with quality and safety. In the meantime, should the situation dictate, we have safe and effective anti-viral stockpiles at the ready.

Madam Chair, let me say that so long as this situation persists, we will remain vigilant. As we have from day one, we will keep Canadians well-informed and well-advised as important details emerge. We are constantly considering the effectiveness of everything we do so we can make adjustments and continue to provide the leadership Canadians need and deserve. Providing leadership in protecting the health of Canadians against infectious disease is a key federal health responsibility. It is one we are committed to fulfilling.

As you know, our government has pledged to improve our ability to meet another key federal health responsibility. l'm referring to our commitment to modernize our safety system for consumer, food, and health products. Some of the essential changes we seek are represented in Bill C-6, the Canada Consumer Product Safety Act. This is important legislation that will bring our consumer product safety regime in line with the realities of today's global economy.

Of course, amendments to the Food and Drugs Act remain part of our food and consumer safety action plan, but for now, I want to thank the members on this committee for your careful review of Bill C-6.

I also want to thank you for your thoughtful input on Bill C-11, the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act. That legislation has been improved, thanks to the work of this committee. The bill will increase biosafety and security at Canadian labs that work with human pathogens and toxins. Please allow me to thank all members for their efforts in putting forward important changes to this bill at committee.

I join all of you in hoping for the quick passage of Bill C-6 and Bill C-11 through the Senate, towards gaining royal assent. The sooner this happens, the sooner the health of Canadians will be better protected.

Of course, research is essential in finding new ways of protecting and improving Canadians' health. It is for this reason that our government is providing further support to the Canadian Institutes of Health Research. This government is committed to supporting innovation and research.

Budget 2009, or Canada's economic action plan, contains some $5.1 billion in science investments. With respect to health research since 2006, CIHR has benefited from $117.2 million in permanent budget increases and a further $154.6 million in time-limited, targeted funding, supporting priorities such as pandemic preparedness. Furthermore, I'm proud to say that this year's main estimates include greater investments in scholarship programs designed to recruit and develop the health research stars of tomorrow.

And Budget 2009 commits even more.

In the past, CIHR-funded research has led to improvements in cancer treatment, cardiac care, and patient safety. As a result, l'm confident that the investments we're making today to attract new talent will lead to significant health improvements in the future.

This year's main estimates also include new investments for better first nations and Inuit health--today.

As I said in my opening remarks, we're dedicated to sharpening our focus on federal responsibilities. Among the most important objectives within my portfolio is ensuring the availability of health care services for first nations and Inuit.

Today, health disparities between aboriginal communities and the rest of Canada are apparent, and it's our goal to reduce them. As a result, these main estimates invest more than $200 million for core first nations and Inuit health programs, services, and infrastructure to better meet front-line demands.

Indeed, these investments represent a clear focus on federal responsibility, one of my portfolio's primary objectives since 2006. And future decisions will continue to be made along these lines.

Accordingly, this same approach was taken during the health portfolio's strategic review process. In February, I know, members of this committee had questions regarding this, and my officials and I are committed to discussing details with you today. Across the portfolio, Health Canada, the Public Health Agency, and CIHR carefully reviewed their programs to ensure their efficiency and effectiveness. The goal was to reallocate funding to better meet Canadians' needs.

In doing so, officials were asked to propose ways for making programs and services more effective and efficient, to focus on providing programs that are consistent with federal roles and responsibilities, and to align federal activities with the needs and priorities of Canadians. The portfolio will realize the following savings: $44.6 million in 2009-10, $61.7 million in 2010-11, and $108.4 million in 2011-12.

Additionally in February, some committee members feared there would be cuts to important aboriginal and women's health programs. l'm happy to say that these fears were unfounded. In fact, the reinvestments we were able to make will improve our ability to protect the health and safety of Canadians.

For example, Budget 2009 included $35 million over three years to CIHR through the Canada graduate scholarships program to support future research stars, $440 million for first nations and Inuit health care and infrastructure, and $500 million to accelerate the use of electronic health records in Canada, which will lead to higher-quality, more effective health care. These are important investments that are in line with the priorities of Canadians.

In conclusion, I want to take a moment to salute my officials and all employees who have worked so hard in responding to the challenge of the H1N1 flu virus. I also want to thank our partners, both internationally and within Canada, for their ongoing collaboration.

Let me also thank the committee for your work, past, present, and future, and I look forward to the observations that will come from your study on health human resources as well as from the new subcommittee that will study the impact of neurological disease.

As we take further actions to sharpen the focus on the federal role in health, I look forward to your ideas. Thank you, also, for accepting my invitation to visit Nunavut later this month. In my February appearance before this committee, I said that our vision needs to extend north of 60 if we want to be truly national.

This will represent the first time in history that the health committee has visited my home territory, so I thank you for accepting my invitation to broaden our perspective to account for the full vastness of the country we all love so much.

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

The House resumed from May 4 consideration of the motion that Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins, be read the third time and passed.

[Joyce Murray, Liberal, Vancouver Quadra, BC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thanks for the presentation. It was very clear. It's hard to boil down a complex act into some clear information like that, and I appreciate that. Also, I appreciate the intent of the act. Of course we want to make sure that children are not ingesting harmful substances in toys, so it's the right thing to do.

I have, I guess, four questions, and maybe I'll just lay them all out and the right person to answer can answer them.

One question is, could you outline for us the consultation with stakeholders and provinces and territories that was undertaken in drafting this policy and legislative direction? We have had major concerns for Bill C-11, and we need to assure ourselves.

As well, what, if any, are the implications for information privacy under the act that you're putting forward?

What feedback did you get from stakeholders and the public after having put Bill C-52 essentially in front of the public previously, and was that incorporated into changes?

I'm curious as to what would be the incremental departmental capacity that would be needed to do the information management, the inspectors, the compliance and enforcement of this bill. Do you have an assessment of the extra staff that you'll need and the cost that will be resulting from that?

Human Pathogens and Toxins Act

[Paul Szabo, Liberal, Mississauga South, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I am pretty sure that I cannot make a motion during questions and comments. I thank the member for the chance, or at least the gesture.

I can say that I am not here to put blame on anybody. I am here, as a member of this place, to suggest that there may be a problem with this bill. There are a few ways to handle it, as I indicated. Let me review them.

Number one is to make a motion to send the bill back to committee with specific reference to clauses 38, 67, and any other clauses that flow from those, for the health committee to hear the appropriate witnesses, to remediate the bill as necessary and to return it to the House.

The second thing would be simply to defeat this bill and make the government come back with another bill that has the changes in it.

The third thing is to pass the bill with the potential or alleged flaws in it and let it go to the Senate. Then the Senate will have an opportunity to review these matters in some detail, and it will send the bill back to us and we will probably have to send it back for consideration at the health committee anyway.

The most expeditious way to find out whether we have a serious problem is to send it back to committee. If anybody would like the letters, I would be happy to provide them. I am asking hon. members to rise in their place to debate Bill C-11 and make the motion to revert it to committee. I know my Liberal colleagues would be prepared to support that.

At this point we need members to review the information, look at the options we have and try to find the best manner in which the House of Commons can dispose of an important health bill.

[Paul Szabo, Liberal, Mississauga South, ON]

Mr. Speaker, on Thursday when this bill was last debated, I asked a question of one of the hon. members about the privacy implications that are included in the bill on human pathogens and toxins. I was not quite sure whether I got a full answer but I did ask what the disposition of the concerns were with regard to privacy. The indication was that there was a letter from the Office of the Privacy Commissioner responding to a couple of points.

That letter was written on March 11 and was sent to the chair of the Standing Committee on Health. To make a long story short, it appears that the health committee had arranged its affairs in order to look at the health implications of Bill C-11.

In Bill C-11, in clause 38(1) and some ancillary matters to do with the Privacy Act the Privacy Commissioner had indicated an interest to appear before the committee to discuss the concerns with the committee. In addition to the letter of March 11, there is a letter dated March 30. I may want to table both of them. In the letter, the Privacy Commissioner's office laid out the process it went through. There was some consultation with that office. They met with officials. They did not receive a privacy impact assessment. That is a critical element that is required to do a proper assessment of whether or not the activities related to the Privacy Act are going to be handled in a matter which is appropriate and also in a manner which does not conflict with other areas of the privacy legislation.

In going through these, the Privacy Commissioner's office had a couple of suggestions right off the bat, for instance, including the word “reasonableness”. It says, “the minister has the authority to order private personal information and confidential business information to be disclosed without limit and without any conditions, simply to order it to be”. That raised some concern in my mind. The Privacy Commissioner indicated there probably should be the normal wording that there was a test of reasonableness, that the minister should have reasonable cause to believe that this information was vital to the administration of the act.

That change was made. In fact, based on the written input of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, an amendment was made by the government at committee.

There was a subsequent letter, and a few other changes were proposed.

The reason I am rising is not with concern related to the health aspects, the safeguards that are being proposed in the bill to ensure the safety and security of human pathogens and toxins and those who have access to, custody of, or responsibility for them. My concerns relate to how this piece of legislation impacts on privacy rights of Canadians.

The member for Eglinton—Lawrence gave a wonderful speech last Thursday. Members may want to consult it to see more detail about the concerns that have been raised. I think that would be a very good place to start. I will not repeat the points made there, but the argument was made very clearly that there were some holes.

In fact, subsequent to the March 11 letter, based on which some government amendments were made, the letter dated March 30 I think was written on same day the committee did its clause-by-clause study and passed the bill and sent it back to the House. I did not get a chance even to read this letter, for the members' edification, and I am pretty sure that the members probably received or at least were advised of the letter of March 11. I am pretty sure, also, that when the members voted on the bill clause by clause they were not even aware of the March 30 letter.

That raises a very significant problem with regard to the manner in which the committee conducted its affairs. The members of the committee were not apprised of relevant information to do with that on a matter which did not even have a witness before it for them to even make the necessary enquiries. This raises some concerns about whether or not that committee discharged its responsibilities in a fashion which is expected by the House. That is a matter the committee members may want to review as a committee.

It also raises the issue that should the other items incorporated in the letter of March 30 from the Office of the Privacy Commissioner raise substantive items, and I believe they are substantive, it puts us in a situation where, very quickly, somebody had to decide whether we do something about this. There are a couple of ways to deal with it. One way would be to make a motion to send this bill back to the health committee. That process requires that we identify the specific clause or clauses for reconsideration. I am prepared to do that, but I am not sure whether it would get the support of the House because the details are not there. For all the members having to deal with this, the details are not there.

I hope the government members, the government House leader and the government whip will consider the options. One is to send the bill back to committee to hear a witness who knows what he or she is talking about when it comes to protecting the privacy rights of Canadians. The second option would be to say that we do not have much choice, and if we cannot send it back to committee, we will have to either defeat the bill or pass it. I think it is unlikely that the members will want to defeat this bill. It is an important bill in that we are dealing with health implications here.

However, in my view, there are some changes that are necessary with regard to the Privacy Act implications. A privacy impact assessment was not, and has not been, provided to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner to enable it to give an informed opinion on whether or not the scope and the intent of the content of the legislation as it stands now are compatible with our obligations to protect privacy rights.

In the absence of the option of defeating the bill, I would suggest we have to pass it. That means this bill would go to the Senate. There is no doubt in my mind that the Senate does good work on legislation review. The Senate would look at the speeches of the day. It would look at the speech given by the member for Eglinton—Lawrence and see that some very serious questions have been raised. The member quoted extensively from both letters. If that is the case, it is my view that the problems in Bill C-11 as they currently exist are such that the Senate may have no choice but to make amendments to the bill and send it back to the House. Then we could send it back to committee for the committee to hear a witness and to fix the bill and then bring it back to the House and go through the process. It would be much more extensive.

I am calling out right now, in the middle of my speech, to the government House leader, to the whip, to the health critic, to the parliamentary secretary and to the Minister of Health to have a quick look at the situation. If they agree that this is the best opportunity for us to repair this bill, then a motion should come forward by a member speaking to this bill at this time to send the bill back to committee with regard to clause 38 and the clauses to which it relates. That is the reason I am rising, to ask the government to quickly consider the options before us.

I think the fastest route is to revert to committee to look at the matters, to consult with the Privacy Commissioner, not by exchanging a letter but by having representatives from the Office of the Privacy Commissioner appear.

It is a very substantive portion of this bill. It means that disclosure of personal information and confidential business information, not only of a person who has access or custody or responsibilities for human toxins or pathogens, the bill is so broad it could also lead to the disclosure of information about the person's family members. On top of this, the bill also allows this information to be shared with foreign governments.

One of the key issues the commissioner raised in this letter was what she termed “anonymize” the information about those who have custody or access or responsibilities related to human pathogens or toxins. That would mean instead of having the person's name disclosed to those it is necessary to disclose to so that we have the tools necessary to properly administer Bill C-11, it would not put on the record tes person's name, personal information, family's information, confidential business information or anything else it would dig up without explanation, limits or conditions on the minister.

The reason it just twigged with me is that I happen to be the chair of the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics. The Privacy Act comes under my committee's purview. We meet with the the Privacy Commissioner regularly. We are now working on some quick fixes to the Privacy Act, because it has not been touched in over 25 years.

These are important issues, and if we allow another bill to compromise the privacy rights of Canadians and effectively undermine the intent of the Privacy Act, then we have a ripple effect. It is not right.

I want to highlight a couple of things in the letter of March 30, which I do not believe the committee members even saw. It was sent directly to the chair of the committee. It would have been very difficult to have it go through the process of going through the parliamentary secretary and the government officials for health, maybe even the health minister, and then to distribute it to the committee members, who are entitled to get copies of all correspondence related to the matter before them.

In this case the assistant privacy commissioner actually signed the letter, thanking the committee for including some of the suggestions they had. They said there seemed to be a preliminary exchange of emails between the Public Health Agency of Canada and some of their officials. That was in May 2008. It was almost a year ago that they were talking about this. The privacy officials, the Privacy Commissioner, and Dr. Butler's agency, the PHAC, were aware of this.

It causes me great concern. If the Ministry of Health and the Public Health Agency of Canada, the PHAC, were aware of these items, these concerns on the Privacy Act, and still put forward a bill to the House of Commons that did not take into account the substantive concerns that the Privacy Commissioner had, it causes me grave concern. Somehow the system failed the House of Commons. Or, there is a reason. I am not going to speculate on whether someone wanted to pass by the input of the office of the Privacy Commissioner or pass by the prior consultations from almost a year ago with the Public Health Agency of Canada.

This is serious. Something has gone wrong in the operation of the committee, in the drafting of legislation, in the circulation of correspondence, and in the assessment, getting a privacy impact assessment so that the Privacy Commissioner could actually do the job.

It does say, “...we did not have many details and did not receive materials other than what was then Bill C-54, at that time”. That was the bill from the last Parliament.

That is all they received. How could we expect the Privacy Commissioner to do her job when there is no consultation and no communication with her on this bill specifically, until afterwards, where someone somehow picks up on a couple of items?

This involves two acts. One is the Privacy Act, which has the oversight with regard to the government departments, but also there is the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act; it is referred to as PIPEDA. These two acts together are related, and they are involved in this matter. It is not straightforward.

The letter goes on to say:

We recognize that the intent of the legislation is to deal with the personal information of laboratory workers; however, we still have concerns that there is nothing in the Bill to restrict the collection of ancillary personal information, such as patient information.

We are getting into areas that are so sensitive.

Another ancillary collection could be personal information about a laboratory worker's family members, should they come into contact with a regulated pathogen or toxin. As well, we are aware of the potential for function creep and would therefore prefer to limit the collection of personal information.

It goes on to say:

We look forward to these issues being addressed in the privacy risk assessment work to come.

They still have not received the privacy impact assessment. That is the tool, the approach in which we look at the implications to the Privacy Act of any legislation that touches on it. There is a protocol to go through here. It is the way we do our business, because Lord knows that members of Parliament cannot be experts in every statute we have responsibility for.

We have a responsibility to make sure that the work is done. We second the responsibility for the detailed knowledge, the day-to-day knowledge, to the people who work on it in the departments, in the agencies, we have established to do this.

But the matter has not come forward. It did not come forward to the committee. It did not come forward to the House. It was not disclosed by the parliamentary secretary in his speech. It was not disclosed by the minister at any point. No release. No information. We have done a very, very poor job as the House. It is a reflection on all of us.

However, we now have an opportunity. We have identified a potential problem here. It may be nothing. I may be wrong, but the Privacy Commissioner does not think so.

I believe the best course of action is to remedy the concerns that have been raised in the letter of March 30 by the commissioner, to ensure we learn from this example, to ensure that legislation, before it is signed off by all of the cabinet, that members did their due diligence. Did they check off on every piece of information? We have the formal checklist. Are they representing that this is constitutional, that it does not contradict any other laws of Canada, that it follows the model or the protocols we have established to make sure our bills and statutes work?

We also have a grave concern about the regulations. Bill C-11 requires substantive regulations. But if there is no consultation on the bill, I am not sure we will see any consultation related to privacy when the regulations are drafted and gazetted and promulgated.

One of the other areas is clause 67. It says that this may “diminish controls over personal information”. I guess that is the point of all this.

Having said that, I would like the unanimous consent of the House to table photocopies of both letters to the chair of the Standing Committee on Health: one dated March 11, one dated March 30, both in relation to Bill C-11.

(The House resumed at 12 p.m.)

The House resumed from April 30 consideration of the motion that Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins, be read the third time and passed.

[Bernard Bigras, Bloc, Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie, QC]

Madam Speaker, it is important that we have this debate today on Bill C-11, An Act to—allegedly—promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins.

There is a paradox right in the title the government has given this bill. This government is talking about the safety of pathogens, and yet in a media release dated April 29, 2008, when Bill C-54, the predecessor of Bill C-11, was introduced, the Minister of Health at the time said: “The risk to Canadians posed by the presence of human pathogens and toxins in labs is low .”

In 2008 they were saying that the risk to the public was relatively low. And now the government is introducing a bill to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins, as if there were numerous risks.

So what does the bill that is before us do? First, it makes the guidelines that have been presented by the Public Health Agency of Canada mandatory. Second, it makes it mandatory that licences be obtained for regulated activities, so that existing pathogens can be monitored, to determine where they are and to know who has them. Third, it institutes a scheme of offences and penalties.

We are not opposed to oversight of these pathogens. That is a basic principle: the risk has to be managed, we have to ensure that the precautionary principle can be applied, of course.

In reality, however, what impact would the implementation of this bill have? It would create operating methods in workplaces like universities, research centres, clinics and hospitals. It seems clear to me that these sites are under Quebec’s authority. And today we have a federal government that would use the Criminal Code to get directly involved in how our hospitals and clinics operate, in the name of criminal law.

As I said, the precautionary principle must be applied, of course, but at the same time, the federal government has to understand where its authority to act begins and where it has to end.

We on this side of the House are not the only ones who think the government is going too far. This is an excerpt from a letter written on April 6, 2009, which makes it very recent, barely three weeks ago, by the Minister of Health of Quebec, Yves Bolduc, to the federal Minister of Health, concerning Bill C-11:

Quebec notes that the measures proposed in the bill would have a significant impact on the organization of medical laboratory and diagnostic services, which are normal services within Quebec's health system. However, these services fall under the jurisdiction of the government of Quebec.

Health Minister Yves Bolduc wrote further:

Accordingly, the Government of Quebec is calling on the federal government to reconsider its approach to ensuring the biosafety and biosecurity of human pathogens and toxins, rather than pursuing the parliamentary work currently underway. It is important that that approach better reflect the respective roles of both levels of government in this matter.

This is a letter dated April 6, which the federal health minister has received. Unfortunately, our colleagues on the Standing Committee on Health, who merely tried to get the government side to approve an amendment to ensure that the provinces would be consulted during the development of the regulations, got a resounding no for an answer.

Not only did the minister not deign to withdraw her bill but the members of the government party and some opposition members refused, I firmly believe, to make sure that at least those concerned by the application of it, that is the Government of Quebec, the hospitals and research centres, were consulted. It was a categorical no. The federal government is trying to use the terrorist threat in order to meddle in areas of provincial jurisdiction. That is the reality.

The federal government has all the tools it needs to handle pathogens of this kind. It can do so under the Terrorism Act. At least three countries have done so. The United Kingdom decided to take action under its terrorism act to regulate pathogens of this kind. But the government refuses to use the legislative tools at its disposal. It decided to go further and meddle directly in areas of provincial jurisdiction.

There is clearly a constitutional problem with the bill. This is not the first time this has happened. The government already used its power to legislate in the area of criminal law to make some laboratory biosafety guidelines obligatory through the issuing of licences. However, the bill exceeds the federal jurisdiction, as happened as well in the case of the federal bill on assisted reproduction, among others.

On June 19, 2008, the Quebec Court of Appeal handed down a judgment in the reference from the Government of Quebec on the constitutionality of sections 8 to 19, 40 to 53, 60, 61 and 68 of the Assisted Reproduction Act. The Court of Appeal stated that the sections in question exceeded the authority of the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution Act, 1867. In short, the judges said that the basic, overriding purpose of the part of the act that was challenged was to protect health and not to right a wrong. The provisions that were challenged could therefore not qualify as pertaining to criminal law under the Constitution Act, 1867.

There are precedents, therefore, for the federal government trying to use its power to legislate in the area of criminal law to introduce bills concerning health that are obviously outside its jurisdiction. Workplaces, universities, clinics and hospitals are clearly provincial jurisdictions.

We would have hoped today that the government would listen to reason at the stage the bill is at and withdraw Bill C-11, as requested by the Quebec health minister.

[Bernard Bigras, Bloc, Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie, QC]

Madam Speaker, something strikes me about Bill C-11. The federal government once again is using its power to legislate in criminal law to impose regulations in provincial areas of jurisdiction. We often see that in the tax area. Here is my question. Is it not unfair for Quebec and the other provinces that the federal government uses the principles of criminal law and the Criminal Code to impose regulations in areas of provincial jurisdiction, such as laboratories, hospitals and research centres? Should we not rely instead on the Anti-terrorism Act, as it is done in Australia, for example?

[Richard Nadeau, Bloc, Gatineau, QC]

Madam Speaker, I would like to ask my colleague for Laval how the different provinces and the Quebec nation react to Bill C-11.

[Nicolas Dufour, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Madam Speaker, much has been said in my able colleagues’ remarks and mine on Bill C-11.

I would like to know whether the hon. member feels a renewed sovereignist commitment when she sees the federal government interfering, with a bill like Bill C-11?

As my colleague from Alfred-Pellan said, we have seen this happen in the issue of tax harmonization, and in other issues like cuts in scientific research and so many other issues over the years.

Does my colleague feel a renewed commitment to sovereignty every time she sees this kind of interference and incompetence on the part of the federal government?

[Nicolas Dufour, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from Gatineau for his question.

The problem is that universities and hospitals, both in Quebec and in the rest of Canada, are already experiencing a serious funding problem. Because of Bill C-11, these universities and hospitals will need several billion dollars—according to a university professor—to improve their laboratories. That will be very costly for the provinces and they will not get any federal assistance.

[Richard Nadeau, Bloc, Gatineau, QC]

Mr. Speaker, can my colleague from Repentigny tell me how universities and medical institutions could be affected by Bill C-11?

[Nicolas Dufour, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I can tell from his many interesting questions that my colleague from Gatineau knows a lot about this issue.

The problem for young researchers is that they work in labs with human pathogens. I specified in my remarks that over 90% of these human pathogens are in group 2. If these group 2 pathogens are removed from the schedule, there will not be any problem. But the government insists on keeping them there. The problem is that young researchers will no longer have the bacteria and toxins they need to pursue their studies. It is easy to figure out what the impact will be.

It is as if I wanted to teach carpentry to somebody, but without giving him a hammer. How could he become a good carpenter if he does not have the tools of his trade? The problem will be the same with Bill C-11 as long as schedule 2 is there. Scientists and young researchers will again be penalized.

We know that this Conservative government is cutting funds for research. And now, with Bill C-11, it is taking control over scientific research.

Guess who is going to be penalized? Those affected will again be young students, researchers and academics, who are working in good faith and want to contribute to the medical community in Quebec and Canada. And what does the government do? It is making things difficult for them and it is making sure they will go abroad. All our potential to develop new knowledge, all those who could help Quebec and Canada forge ahead, will leave for places and countries where it is recognized that the knowledge economy is the economy of the future. But the Conservatives do not know what the knowledge economy is all about.

[Robert Carrier, Bloc, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I want to congratulate my colleague from Repentigny for his excellent speech on Bill C-11. We just heard that the government is not very interested in the position taken by the Quebec Minister of Health and his opposition to this bill for reasons related to provincial jurisdiction. This is not surprising from a Conservative government that constantly ignores the interests of Quebec and its areas of jurisdiction. However, what concerns me more is the support the Liberal Party seems willing to give to this bill. I would like to know what the hon. member thinks of the position of the official opposition.

[Nicolas Dufour, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure for me today to rise and present my position and that of the Bloc on Bill C-11. As a member of the Standing Committee on Health and the Bloc’s youth critic, I can say that this bill is of great concern to me. I am concerned because it has to do not only with public health and safety but also with the research done in our universities.

The predecessor of this bill was Bill C-54, which died on the order paper when the election was called last October. The purpose of the bill is to create measures to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins.

In case any of my colleagues do not know, pathogens are micro-organisms that can cause illness in human beings. Some toxins, produced by micro-organisms, can also cause illness. Pathogens are divided into five categories. The least dangerous are in risk group 1 and the most dangerous in risk group 5.

When I said that Bill C-11 concerned both public health and our scientific community, it was because these micro-organisms are used in both scientific research laboratories and in health care facilities in Quebec and Canada.

At the present time, the regulations on importing pathogens make it necessary to obtain a licence in order to bring them in from foreign countries. Only laboratories that import pathogens have to observe a set of guidelines on laboratory biosafety. Those that use pathogens already present in Canada do not.

The purpose of Bill C-11 is, in short, to make the laboratory biosafety guidelines obligatory for everyone and to require everyone to obtain a licence for controlled activities so that the existing pathogens can be followed. The purpose is to determine where these pathogens are and who is in possession of them and also to institute a system of offences and punishments for people who violate the guidelines.

Bill C-11 would therefore require everyone in the scientific community to obtain a licence in order to conduct research on pathogens and toxins. Whether in order to manipulate, possess, or import them, everyone would need a licence.

As I pointed out earlier, there are guidelines for the possession and handling of pathogens and toxins.

In short, Bill C-11 would require that low-risk laboratories, those using agents from groups 1 and 2, which entail, according to the Public Health Agency of Canada, “moderate risk to the health of individuals and a low risk to public health” obtain a licence. That is interesting. According to the agency once again, “They are able to cause serious disease in a human but are unlikely to do so. Effective treatment and preventive measures are available and the risk of spread of disease caused by those pathogens is low.”

Naturally, we understand the government's concern with respect to groups 3 and 4 and the precautions proposed as they could affect the health and safety of the general population. However, there is a problem in that laboratories that handle agents in groups 3 and 4 already observe the provisions in the guidelines.

The guidelines were established more than 15 years ago and, since then, there has not been an incident in Canada in laboratories that use groups 3 and 4 or those that use groups 1 and 2. Mr. Marc Ouellette, a professor at Laval University, appeared before the committee twice and was very clear on that point.

Bill C-54 and then Bill C-11 sent shock waves through the research community. No one was prepared for them. When we examined the bill—and I even read the document explaining it—we thought it was ridiculous, because people had been following the guidelines for 15 years.

In fact, the only major incident involving improper use took place in the United States in the early 2000s and it was in a laboratory run by the American government. Scientists already comply with the framework put forward by the federal government for the use and importing of pathogens.

As I mentioned earlier, Bill C-11 would impose a new framework for university and hospital laboratories as well as private laboratories. At the Standing Committee on Health, we spoke to a number of scientists who work in these laboratories and who have serious doubts about the impact of Bill C-11, and I can understand them.

Nevertheless, when it comes to the new obligations on the circulation of pathogens within a facility such as a university, researchers wonder, not about the safety aspect of their research, but about the way the government is taking control over their everyday research activities.

Once again, the Conservative government is trying to use a variety of tactics to interfere in scientific research, exactly as it did by granting new funding to the Humanities Research Council, but limiting them to economic research. I will return to that point later. That decision, once again, was reached without consultation and without taking the opinion of those most concerned into consideration.

Did the government do any impact studies on the effects such legislation would have on university curricula, on the operation of our hospitals, on the research industry in Quebec and Canada?

Not in the least.

In addition to cutting $162 million in funding to granting agencies, the Conservative government is imposing a legislative framework on researchers, which will require major additional investments for the thousands of facilities wishing to use pathogens with a low level of risk to the public.

The Conservative government is again after carte blanche as far as the regulations are concerned; they will not be reviewed by Parliament. I have serious misgivings about the potential repercussions of this bill on the development of pathogen research in Quebec and on the positive contributions this would make to public health.

We need only think of the swine flu that is rampant at this time. Will scientists be able to work as effectively in future to find solutions to such a virus? I think this issue is worth examining.

Once again, it seems that the Conservative government is introducing a bill without evaluating its direct repercussions on the community. We are beginning to get used to it.

Did the government reflect on the impact that Bill C-11 will have on university teaching? Did it reflect on the investments required to set up a teaching laboratory using groups 1 and 2?

For example, E. coli is currently listed in schedule 2 of the bill. According to the academics, this pathogen is widely used by students in laboratory experiments. The fact that it is in schedule 2 would force universities to step up security in classrooms, although not all types of E. coli are potentially hazardous.

It is true that the government introduced some distinctions in Bill C-11 compared to former Bill C-54 and it could change the classification of pathogens in the schedules. However, that example illustrates the general upgrading problem that will be necessary in some teaching laboratories.

Moreover, the bill restricts the access to licensed facilities. Clause 31 of Bill C-11 says that:

A licence holder shall establish and maintain a list of all persons authorized by the licence holder to access the facility to which the licence applies, including persons holding a security clearance for that facility and visitors. The licence holder shall provide the Minister with that list if requested to do so.

Where teaching is done in laboratories, will the university have to give the list of all students who can access the laboratories or of all students of the university? I do believe that there are still too many questions and not enough answers in that bill.

According to the academics we consulted, Bill C-11 would require major investments in universities where there are laboratories. These investments will not be used to make the necessary upgrades to allow the laboratories to work with groups 3 and 4 pathogens, but to make them conform to the new provisions concerning groups 1 and 2. They told us that universities in Quebec and Canada will have to spend billions of dollars—and I repeat, billions of dollars, in the middle of an economic crisis—to do the necessary upgrading.

Many witnesses also asked the government to eliminate schedule 2 from the bill to reduce the impact on everyday research work. According to scientists, that would considerably change the content of Bill C-11. Indeed, 90% of pathogens used in university laboratories are from group 2.

A scientist at McGill University's Department of Microbiology and Immunology even issued a serious warning about the direct impact of implementing the act if schedule 2 is not repealed:

Removing level 2 would not put Canadians at any greater risk than they face now. Canadians are well protected with what is already present. Keeping level 2 in this bill will certainly slow research in this country and slow our ability to compete internationally and our ability to attract biotechnology and major industries...

In a time of economic crisis, it seems that the worst thing we could do would be to put even more constraints on our universities, which are already faced with serious funding problems. Especially since, as I said, there have been no incidents since the guidelines were introduced 15 years ago. The government is once again trying to impose its right-wing ideology and to control research as much as it can without spending anything. That is completely unacceptable.

As I have mentioned, the handling of pathogens is carried out for diagnostic purposes and for research and development. The Bloc Québécois is concerned with the effects of this bill on the future of research and development in this country related to pathogens. At the risk of repeating myself, I want to say that the Conservative government, in addition to cutting research budgets, is trying to exert maximum control over the scientific community.

It is also important to be concerned about the effects of Bill C-11 on health institutions, such as hospitals, that use laboratories to carry out diagnostic tests. That could have a direct impact on the health services of Quebec and the provinces. The bill also seeks to impose penalties on anyone who contravenes the law. It is important to mention that laboratories, including universities, hospitals and other government establishments, could be forced to pay a fine. Does the government really want to inflict fines on universities and hospitals that already have a crying shortage of funds?

The bill also provides fines and penalties for anyone guilty of careless acts or lack of precaution in the handling of pathogens and toxins. Such action would be liable to a maximum of five years in prison and a fine of up to $500,000 for the first offence. A second offence would attract a maximum fine of $1 million or up to two years in prison, or both of those penalties. Are the measures in Bill C-11 to prohibit intentional misuse of pathogens not already contained within the Anti-terrorism Act?

While we had questioned officials about the possible repercussions, it is now clear that the government did not conduct any study of the impact of Bill C-11. The only response we received was that when it was drawing up the regulations the government would consider the concerns of experts and researchers, to reduce any possible negative impacts. Even though the government still has not conducted an impact study or else is refusing to make it public, the government appears so anxious to have Bill C-11 adopted that it is forgetting that enforcement of the law will not begin for another 4 or 5 years.

I sincerely believe that the government should have acted responsibly before blindly jumping into the implementation of Bill C-11. It should have conducted impact assessments and properly consulted the stakeholders, specifically, researchers, the provinces, medical laboratories and the entire scientific community. Of course the Bloc Québécois supports the notion that the government must consult the stakeholders affected by the bill before drafting any regulations. However, in the clause by clause study conducted by the health committee, of which I am a member, the Bloc proposed that the government consult the provinces before amending the schedules, which obviously was not done.

When asked about the consequences of this amendment, the officials said there would be no consultation with the provinces before the amendments were drafted, thereby forgoing the expertise of public servants from Quebec and the provinces. I would also remind the House that British Columbia has expressed serious reservations about the bill, and that it was these same officials who reassured them, promising that they would be consulted about the scope of the legislation.

This sentiment was echoed by the Government of Quebec. The Quebec health minister, Yves Bolduc, wrote a letter to the Canadian Minister of Health to express his concerns.

The Liberal members who were tearing their hair out in committee because of the failure to respect British Columbia's jurisdictions and the repercussions the bill would have on the people of that province decided to put their trust entirely in the regulations, thereby denying British Columbia the opportunity to give an opinion on the classification of pathogens. The Liberals have a habit of trampling on the provinces, and this is just one more example.

In her speech earlier, the hon. member for Winnipeg North seemed to be saying that the NDP were the only ones to try to change Bill C-11 in committee by proposing amendments.

Perhaps this amnesia is due to the energy she spent on justifying her position.

I would also like to remind the NDP members and all members of the House that the Bloc Québécois also proposed amendments at the report stage calling for the removal of level 2 pathogens and calling on the government to table the regulations before the House before they are adopted. We therefore supported the other parties' amendments that were along the same lines. However, that was not enough.

It would be interesting to know why the hon. member for Winnipeg North and the Liberal and Conservative members of the Standing Committee on Health did not support the amendment put forward by the Bloc Québécois calling for the activities carried out in any facility regulated, operated or funded by a province to be excluded, when Quebec's health minister as well as Ontario and BC officials expressed serious concerns about the impact of Bill C-11 on activities in Quebec and the provinces.

Given that the risk to Canadians posed by the presence of human pathogens and toxins in labs is low, according to the Conservative government; that the bill is designed to make the laboratory biosafety guidelines mandatory through licensing, without the government first consulting the primary stakeholders and assessing the impact on such things as university teaching and labs in health facilities; that the government's goal is to address a potential terrorist risk by regulating pathogens and toxins and that the Anti-terrorism Act and other acts can already cover some of the provisions of Bill C-11; and that this bill can potentially invade the jurisdictions of Quebec and the provinces, for all of these reasons, the Bloc Québécois is calling for an in-depth review of Bill C-11.

We will question experts to make sure that the details of Bill C-11 do not adversely affect Quebec's research community. We will ensure that the proposed provisions are respectful of Quebec's areas of jurisdiction in that they take into account potential implications with respect to university teaching and research as well as health services provided to the people of Quebec.

[Nicolas Dufour, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to congratulate my colleague, the member for Shefford. He has a deep knowledge of this issue and he clearly demonstrated that during his remarks.

He spoke earlier about the attitude of the Conservatives. I would like to have his opinion about the attitude of the Conservatives. In the beginning, they thought Kyoto was a socialist plot. Next, they made cuts in education and university research. Then, they brought forward Bill C-11, another slap in the face to universities. One could say that the government has a desire to attack the scientific community. They cut $160 million in the area of scientific research.

I would like my colleague from Shefford to tell me how he feels when he sees the Conservatives acting in this dogmatic way.

[Robert Vincent, Bloc, Shefford, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to address Bill C-11, which seeks to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins.

I want to begin by pointing out that there are four categories of risk, namely risk groups 1 to 4. Risk groups 3 and 4 are already covered by the legislation. I am going to provide some explanations on these groups.

Schedule 3 — Risk Group 3: human pathogens

means a category of human pathogens that pose a high risk to the health of individuals and a low risk to public health...

Schedule 4 — Risk Group 4:

means a category of human pathogens that pose a high risk to the health of individuals and a high risk to public health...

Only those major labs working with human pathogens must comply with the Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines. Labs dealing with risk groups 3 and 4, which pose a high risk to the health of individuals and either a low or a high risk to public health, are already covered by these guidelines.

What are these guidelines? They are a specialized document produced by the Office of Laboratory Security of the Public Health Agency of Canada. That document was written for those individuals who are responsible for designing or operating labs in which anthropopathogens are handled for diagnosis, research or development purposes. Labs or individuals who do not use these pathogens in Canada are not subjected to these guidelines.

We can understand the government's concerns regarding risk groups 3 and 4, and the precautions put forward. However, are labs 3 and 4 not already complying with the safety measures set in the guidelines and proposed in this legislation?

Bill C-11 would apply to risk groups 1 and 2, which pose a moderate risk to the health of individuals and a low risk to public health, and for which effective treatment is available. The idea behind this change is to better protect public health.

We can see where we are headed. The idea is to monitor risk groups 1 and 2. What do groups 1 and 2 include? Group 1 includes toxins, while group 2 deals with human pathogens. However, these groups only pose a moderate risk to the health of individuals. As I mentioned earlier, they pose a low risk to public health and they would rarely cause serious disease in a human being. Even if this were the case, such disease could easily be prevented or treated, and the risk of that disease spreading is low.

In addition, Bill C-11—and this is where the dynamic of this bill the other parties cannot understand lies—would impose the obligation to have a licence—meaning that all laboratories will have to have one—for the following “controlled activities” related to a human pathogen or toxin; possessing, handling, using, producing, storing, permitting any person access, transferring,importing or exporting, releasing or otherwise abandoning or disposing.

This bill requires any person carrying out activities involving a human pathogen or toxin to take all reasonable precautions to protect public health and safety.

The federal government justifies this bill by its jurisdiction over criminal law. Speaking of criminal law, we must understand that the Conservatives are champions as far as introducing such laws is concerned, and that from that point on there is no point in any other parties getting involved in a system which is, I will state it clearly, exaggerated. Here again we see the Conservative desire to control everything.

In short, the purpose of Bill C-11 is to make the Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines mandatory.

The second intention is to make it mandatory for licences to be obtained for the activities it covers in order to trace existing agents, determine where they are and with whom.

The third intention is to put in place a system of offences and fines. In the backgrounder to Bill C-54, introduced by the government during the last Parliament, and the ancestor of C-11, it was stated:

The risk to Canadians posed by the presence of human pathogens and toxins in labs is low.

Why was it low then, and different now? Why is the government trying to control everyone and everything everywhere in Canada? I do not get it. The text continues:

Safety guidelines exist and the laboratory community is committed to the safe handling and management of human pathogens and toxins as a part of their regular work. Nevertheless, we must be sure the appropriate legislation, protocols and practices are in place to protect Canadians from this risk.

Since the guidelines were introduced over 15 years ago, there have been no incidents in Canada, regardless of whether labs have been following those guidelines.

Nevertheless, the researchers have certain reservations, not about the safety of their research, but rather about government control over everyday research. Not only does the government want to control journalists and information, but it also wants to control laboratories and people. Has the government conducted studies to determine the impact this new legislation would have on university courses, on how our hospitals operate and on the research industry in Quebec and Canada? No.

The government is asking for carte blanche concerning regulations that will not be examined by Parliament. The bill establishes a legislative framework that imposes certain requirements on research done on pathogens and toxins, as well as criminal sanctions and fines for non-compliance.

We must ask ourselves certain questions about these regulations. How is it that a bill, now in third reading, has no regulations? No one knows what will happen with this bill. They are bringing something to a vote before the House, something that will happen at a later date, but we do not yet know what these regulations will be based on. It makes no sense.

According to the universities we consulted—unlike other parties in this House, we conducted a consultation—Bill C-11 will demand huge investments in universities that have laboratories.

These investments will not be used to update laboratories for group 3 and 4 pathogens; these will be new provisions concerning group 1 and 2. Those are the only categories that are not problematic. Also according to the universities, billions of dollars will have to be invested across the country, at the universities' expense. Did the government assess the kind of impact this will have on university teaching and research, on health care institutions and on private laboratories? Once again, the answer is no.

It is important to point out that all laboratories, including universities, hospitals and other government institutions, can be forced to pay fines. This government has a tendency to impose fines and prison sentences. It constantly focuses on those two points. Does the government really want to impose fines on universities and hospitals, when they are already desperately short of funding? It makes no sense.

The bill also establishes penalties and fines for anyone who shows wanton or reckless disregard concerning pathogens and toxins.

Clause 55 reads as follows:

Every person who contravenes section 6 and who shows wanton or reckless disregard for the health or safety of other persons and, as a result, creates a risk to the health or safety of the public is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years.

We are talking about students, not researchers who wear protective clothing. We are talking about people in a university or hospital. We are talking about viruses, which are not very big. This is the smallest category in existence that the government is going to try to control. It wants to control people, control information, control those who have these groups of pathogens. This is terrible. But there is more. And it is even worse.

Clause 56 reads as follows:

Every person who contravenes subsection 7(1) or 18(7) is guilty of an offence and liable

(a) on conviction on indictment, for a first offence, to a fine of not more than $500,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than six months, or to both, and, for a subsequent offence, to a fine of not more than $1,000,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years, or to both;

Think about the student who, as a joke, touches something and is fined half a million dollars. It makes no sense.

The Bloc Québécois wonders why it is necessary to introduce new measures and new penalties when they could be part of existing laws. These laws already exist, and the government is trying to add more. It is piling on more laws. Once again, it is hard to follow these parties here in the House. They pay no attention to the bills we discuss here, and they are ready to vote on anything. Are the measures in this bill on breach of duty, wanton or reckless breach of duty and intentional release not already included in the Criminal Code and the Canadian Environmental Protection Act? Yes, they are. Are the measures to prohibit intentional misuse of pathogens not already included in the Anti-Terrorism Act?

We already have plenty of laws. The government is trying to create more fines. It is talking about imprisoning these people. I cannot see how we can think about these things and decide what falls into groups 1 and 2. Everything the party in power is proposing is already covered by existing legislation. I cannot understand why we need to go any further than what we have now. Even worse, the government does not know where it wants to go with this bill because it has not consulted anyone.

When we asked departmental officials about the consequences, it was clear that the government had not studied the impact of Bill C-11. When we asked them about how it would affect universities and hospitals, they candidly told us that they did not know because there had been no impact study. They had no idea what might happen because there had been no study. However, it seemed that everyone was quite happy to have new laws, new fines and new prison sentences. That is the only thing we were able to find out. The only answer we got was that the government planned to take experts' and researchers' concerns into consideration while drafting regulations so as to minimize potential negative impacts. That is not saying much. They will consult experts, but will they take their comments into consideration? They might, or they might not. They might decide to accept the recommendations they like because the bill was passed anyway. We have no idea how the regulations will deal with risk groups 1 and 2. We still have no idea.

I do not understand why, in 2009, the government has introduced a bill without regulations in the House of Commons, where laws are made, nor why we should vote for a bill without knowing the regulations that are to be part of it. Moreover, the government says that even if it consults experts, it will make its own decisions about what to do anyway. Regulations will not be submitted to the House of Commons.

How can we vote on regulations if we never see them? How are we supposed to propose amendments if the regulations are not defined? It makes no sense.

I do not know where we are going with this. Nor do I know how this is in Quebeckers' and Canadians' best interest. We cannot protect them from risk group 1 and 2 pathogens because, in Bill C-54, this government said that these two categories were not a problem.

Why study risk groups 1 and 2 if they were not a problem? I still have not heard an answer to that question.

The Bloc Québécois would have preferred that the government had acted responsibly instead of blindly charging ahead with the implementation of Bill C-11. That would have meant conducting an impact study and consulting properly with stakeholders in each province, including researchers and private health laboratories. As far as the regulatory framework and cooperation with the provinces go, those are other matters.

Certainly, the Bloc Québécois endorses the idea that the government should consult with stakeholders affected by the bill before preparing regulations. We have no choice because the other political parties are in favour of adopting this bill without regulations.

However, we had proposed, during clause-by-clause study in committee, that the government consult the provinces before amending the schedules. When we questioned officials about the effects of this amendment, they indicated there would be no consultation with the provinces before preparing the amendments. Did anyone think of that? They do not even consult the provinces and they are going to make regulations without any consultation with people in each of the provinces.

Those officials also said that the experts and researchers were found in research laboratories and within the federal government, while ignoring the expertise within the public service of Quebec or the other provinces. We have expertise as well, but the Conservatives do not want to recognize it. They just want to listen to their own experts; and they will only take into account what they like.

They also pointed out that British Columbia had serious reservations about the bill, and these were the same officials who had reassured the province by promising to consult B.C. on the scope of the bill. They will do the consultation later.

The Bloc amendment called for consultation with Quebec and the provinces before any modification of the schedules; that is, before adding a pathogen or revising its classification. The purpose of this amendment was to ensure that the federal government properly evaluated the impact of any such changes.

It must be said that the Conservatives and the Liberals decided that amendment was not necessary, and in doing so dismissed the expertise of Quebec and other provinces on the subject.

The Liberals, who cried wolf in committee because of a failure to respect British Columbia’s jurisdiction and the repercussions of the bill on the people of British Columbia, put their trust entirely in the regulations under the Act, and make no provision for British Columbia to give its views on the classification of pathogens.

In a news release on April 29, 2008, announcing the introduction of Bill C-54, the minister insisted that there were no risks. Yet, today, suddenly, there are many risks.

The Bloc Québécois calls for in-depth study of Bill C-11. We want to put questions to experts to ensure that the details of Bill C-11 will not adversely affect the research community in Quebec.

[Joe Volpe, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Mr. Speaker, like many MPs and members from the public, I listened to the various speeches on Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins.

I found that some of the interventions being made by my colleagues addressed not only the substance of the bill itself, but one very important and perhaps insufficiently appreciated issue. That is the matter of the Privacy Act and the issue of the Privacy Commissioner offering her views for the benefit of the committee that studied the bill.

I had the good fortune to be associated with one of my colleagues who had a lot of the information immediately at hand. It seems to me that in a situation such as this one, where we are dealing with an extremely important bill and one that is to be viewed in the context of a potential pandemic that is afflicting the world, and I refer to the swine flu, we would take all measures necessary to ensure that we would be adequately prepared, but also that we would follow the appropriate procedures so that individuals will be protected from incursions on their privacy as we go forward.

I listened as my colleague from Winnipeg North waxed very aggressive, I might even dare say eloquent, on the importance of having this particular bill dealt with expeditiously in the House. Like every member in this place, she is of course entitled to an opinion, valid or less, according to the view. But it struck me as I was listening to her that she was making an argument for ensuring that the bill would be receiving immediate and quick attention and approval in the House, even though there were members from that committee, and I guess I can say it because they have been standing up all day on this, the members from the Bloc Québécois, who disagreed with some of the substance, but equally important, on the procedures followed, in order to ensure that the bill would reflect all the needs of Canadians everywhere.

I think she kind of regretted that the Bloc Québécois members were employing a tactic that had in fact been used by her own party on other bills, specifically on safety management systems, a bill that suggested that we would impose a particular ethic, a culture of checks, balances and due diligence on the people who are providing a service.

In this instance, perhaps we would say that this is even more serious. As the safety management systems involve the aviation industry and those who provide carriers and other vehicles for air transportation, whether it be passenger or cargo, of course it involves the potential for putting human life at risk. This is no less so, and perhaps some would argue, much more so.

I found it really interesting that the arguments to rush forward on the bill ignored a letter sent by a member of the government side, who is in fact the chair of the committee dealing with the bill, the Standing Committee on Health, to the Privacy Commissioner asking for her input on the bill.

Note that I said the Privacy Commissioner sent a letter inviting reaction. She did not say that she was invited to appear before the committee to offer her opinion to address issues that might be raised by members of the various parties, including the government party, to address those issues that related not only to the substance that was being discussed but to the procedures that lead to the consideration of the substance and the consequences of that process.

The chair wrote a letter, and in a letter dated March 11, 2009, received a response. The response said:

We would be pleased to appear before you to discuss the comments we make in this letter....

The Privacy Commissioner did not get a response to appear.

The Privacy Commissioner is responsible for two federal privacy laws: the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, otherwise known as PIPEDA; and of course the Privacy Act itself. The issue here is that it applies to government institutions, agencies and crown corporations, as well as the lab in Winnipeg.

This is not designed to in any way diminish or take away from any of the great work that is being done in that lab or in fact in other places that are concerned with people's health.

That letter is available to everybody in that committee, because it was distributed to everybody in the committee. I do not think there is any need for me to table it. It is already a public document, and certainly everybody who wishes can get it from the committee and from the Hansard.

Let me just quote this one little item. The Privacy Commissioner says, “Our suggestions for improvements”, which according to some of the interveners were not even considered, because they were not accepted as amendments even though they were proposed by other members, “are aimed at ensuring the appropriate balance of privacy rights and regulatory powers as well as transparency, notice and accountability to those officials subject to the legislation and to the public”. It is as simple as that.

I do not serve on that committee. It is not for every member of this place to serve on every committee, but when we come into this House and get the benefit of the deliberations of the various members who do serve on these committees, we need to take that into consideration. If there is a vacuum, if there is a lapse, if there is something missing in the consideration or something left out, that is why we have report stage and third reading considerations.

So in this third reading consideration, I, like some of the other members, would like the House to reflect on what was left out of the deliberations or at least put over to one side.

The Privacy Commissioner, remember, is responding to a written request by the chair of that committee and said, “We had hoped to see a privacy impact assessment (PIA) to understand how any privacy risks in this Bill had been mitigated”, and as of March 11, she adds, “we have not yet received one”.

If one is going to consider legislation that deals with toxins, human pathogens and their impact on the public health of all Canadian citizens no matter where they are, certainly one needs to consider as well how that information is gathered, the impact on the individuals from whom that information is derived, and what are some of the other considerations that flow from it.

The Privacy Commissioner, an officer of this House, established to help members of Parliament in their deliberations in the public interest, then goes on to say, “Our Office should be seeking PIAs”, or privacy impact assessments, “well before the decisions have been implemented so we can provide feedback early in the process”.

It seems reasonable. Yet she says, “Without having met with the officials,” and I might add from a personal perspective, without apparently being provided the opportunity to meet with officials, “who developed this Bill and without having received a PIA, it is challenging for us to understand the full privacy implications of Bill C-11, such as the scope of the application of this proposed legislation to patient information”.

If the Privacy Commissioner, with all the resources at the disposal of that office in order to provide members of Parliament with that advice, is unable and unwilling, perhaps, to provide speculative observations, why should a member of Parliament rush to make a decision in the absence of such information? In fact, the Privacy Commissioner goes further and says, “We would appreciate participating in a consultation process”, but that has not happened.

She addresses clause 38, which gives the minister certain powers in order to derive the information required, obviously through his or her officials, and she observes that subclause 38(1) could be improved. Again, without having had the benefit of the consultation and without having had access to public health officials, she says this is a concern, so please address it.

Some of the members from the Bloc party today gave us an indication that it had not been addressed, or when it was, it was put over to one side, regrettably, because the Privacy Commissioner says, “We would suggest that reasonableness should inform the Minister's opinion and that the personal information should be 'directly relevant'”, and not refer specifically to personal information. In fact, she says that information should be made anonymous in order to accomplish a stated goal.

The Privacy Commissioner went even further than that. She took the trouble to provide additional input and observations on clause 41, which offers to an inspector the kinds of powers that we think reside only with the minister. However, even if it is in the effort to amass information that may be used for the public good, we do not know because we do not have the cause and effect consequential action of some of those decisions.

For example, she says:

the inspector's powers to collect documents, materials and information, may well extend to the examination and collection of personal information and personal health information of individuals and patients.

That might serve a purpose, but she says:

We are concerned about the protection of patient information and transparency around this process to the public.

We have left out an individual who has the expertise and the resources to define for members of Parliament the shortfalls of the legislation, the potential pitfalls, and at the same time, of course, to suggest whether they are going in the right direction.

She goes further to say that clause 67 of the bill presents a problem with respect to interim orders for the minister. She says, “this mechanism is of concern as it could diminish controls over personal information”. In other words, once that information is out, it is out in the public domain and individuals from whom it has been derived no longer have the safety and security afforded to them under the Privacy Act and under PIPEDA.

She says the externally produced documents that flow from this “could result in a reduced level of control over extremely personal information”.

She did all of this on March 11, underscoring, underlining and emphasizing that she and her office would be prepared to be engaged in the public consultation process, in the consultation process being conducted by the Standing Committee on Health, and offered those services.

She said in that letter, thank you for calling us; here are our first thoughts, but let us sit down and discuss this, because we have not had a chance to speak with public health officials or with officials mandated to address this issue.

The chair wrote again and received a response on March 30. That is exactly one month ago today. In that letter, the assistant privacy commissioner said she wanted to follow up on the chair's letter concerning Bill C-11, the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act. In order to avoid confusion, she further said, “Regarding the confusion as to prior consultation”, because obviously she herself was very clear, “there seems to have been a preliminary exchange of emails between the Public Health Agency of Canada, PHAC, officials and some of my officials in May 2008”.

There was an exchange of emails. She went on to say, “Even though I have offered you my expertise and my resources now”. Subsequent to May 2008, guess what:

Overall, however, we did not have many details and did not receive materials, other than what was then Bill C-54, at that time.

In other words, “You have not availed yourselves of the opportunity to engage us deliberately in consultations as a committee or as a department”. The letter says, “get us engaged”. Did the committee get them engaged? We know the committee deliberated on the bill, entertained some amendments, rejected some, unhappily according to the Bloc members, happily according to the government members, expediently happily for the NDP members and we ask why.

The assistant privacy commissioner took the trouble to say, “We also learned that the main objective would be to collect information about people who work in laboratories to ensure that they meet security requirements,” which is all good, “and that the security screening will be consistent with the processes that are already in place”.

These are assurances that they are given verbally or that they read are to be provided. She went on to say something that I think should cause every member in this place some concern:

We recognize that the intent of the legislation is to deal with the personal information of laboratory workers; however, we still have concerns that there is nothing in the Bill to restrict the collection of ancillary personal information, such as patient information.

Another ancillary collection would be the personal information about laboratory workers' family members, should they come into contact with a regulated pathogen or toxin. A member of a patient's family has no privacy protection under this act. She went on to say, “As well, we are aware of the potential for function creep,” a term that was made popular in the House by what was then an opposition party that talked about taxation creep, “and would therefore prefer to limit”. I want to repeat that part. She said:

We would therefore prefer to limit the collection of personal information. We look forward to these issues being addressed in the privacy risk assessment work to come.

I am sure those who are following the debate today, as I was following it from the lobby and from my seat in this place, are asking themselves, has that privacy risk assessment been done? She repeated for emphasis, “We believe that clause 67...may diminish controls over personal information,” and that a reasonable grounds test would be helpful in this situation. Did it take place?

She went on to say that the agency, in her view, “currently has sufficient information to engage in a high-level privacy risk assessment in anticipation of the more formal privacy impact assessment process”. So what has been holding everything up? Her closing words, in a little bit of frustration, were that she looked forward to meeting with public health officials in order to address these issues.

I can only add that addressing those issues would enhance the views of members of Parliament about how to deal with this legislation at this stage of its progress through Parliament, and I hope we get it.

The House resumed consideration of the motion that Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins, be read the third time and passed.

Business of the House

[Jay Hill, Conservative, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased that today we have already completed the second reading stage of Bill C-6, consumer product safety. We expect to conclude debate on the third reading stage of Bill C-11, human pathogens and toxins. At least, it is the hope of the government to see that bill move along.

Following Bill C-11, it is our intention to call Bill C-3, arctic waters, which is at report stage and third reading. It would be nice to see that bill move along as well and get over to the other place.

As we all know, the House is not sitting tomorrow to accommodate the Liberal Party convention. This will certainly give government members the opportunity to be back in their constituencies doing lots of hard work.

Next week, we will continue with Bill C-3, arctic waters; the second reading stage of Bill S-2, the customs act; and Bill C-4, not for profit, which was reported back from committee on April 23.

Adding to the list are two bills that are at second reading: Bill C-28, the Cree-Naskapi bill, and Bill C-26, auto theft.

I would just respond to the opposition House leader, who referred to the two departments that will be called before the chamber for committee of the whole: Fisheries and Oceans and Agriculture and Agri-Food. Of course, we will be scheduling those debates in good time and within the Standing Orders.

Human Pathogens and Toxins Act

[Joy Smith, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Madam Speaker, I thank the member for Winnipeg North for her contribution to the health committee and to this bill. I have to agree with her that Dr. Butler-Jones did astounding work on the committee. I commend his work on the swine flu and the challenges that are there right now. Scientists who came to meetings on Bill C-11 were very helpful in their scientific analysis of the bill.

What does the member for Winnipeg North think would be most important things we need to address very quickly to get Bill C-11 finished and through committee? I know the member has worked very hard on the committee, as all members have, and I value her input.

[Judy Wasylycia-Leis, NDP, Winnipeg North, MB]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to address this House on Bill C-11. First, I want to thank Bloc Québécois members for their contribution to the debate on this legislation. They did a lot of work. We proposed many changes to this bill.

We too, like the Bloc, have many issues with this legislation. However, unlike the Bloc, the NDP has proposed some changes. In fact, Bloc members opposed the proposals that we made in committee.

Moreover, we proposed an amendment to this bill, dealing precisely with the issue raised by the Bloc Québécois member today. We proposed an amendment to eliminate human pathogens. That is exactly what we did, but the Bloc said no. That is the only thing that researchers and members of the scientific community asked for. That is precisely what we tried to do, but we did not succeed because of the Bloc's opposition. It is as simple as that.

I want to be absolutely clear. We have some problems with this bill and, like the Bloc, we listened to witnesses and, since they were opposed to this legislation, we proposed amendments to it. Two of our three amendments were accepted by the committee and by all the members of the parties sitting in this House. We accomplished a couple of important things, such as asking that regulations be presented to the House of Commons, for monitoring purposes.

That is something we always ask for regarding any legislation. It is absolutely critical to ask that government regulations be referred to the Standing Committee on Health and to the House of Commons. That is what we accomplished. This is not a Bloc proposal. It is an NDP proposal, and the Bloc supported these amendments. So, this is very important, and it is something that we achieved.

We also dealt with the Bloc's concerns through another amendment that I am going to read. This is precisely the proposal that the Bloc rejected. It reads as follows:

That Bill C-11, in Clause 7, be amended by adding after line 22 on page 5 the following:

(c) any activity involving a micro-organism, nucleic acid or protein that falls into Risk Group 2, if the person who conducts the activity provides the following elements to the Minister:

(i) the location of the places where the activity is conducted and the name of a contact person, and

(ii) a signed document certifying that the activity is conducted in accordance with the Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines of the Public Health Agency of Canada.

This is an amendment that all scientific researchers asked for, in order to eliminate human pathogens that fall into risk group 2, and we made that proposal. Bloc members voted against it and now we have a bill that includes all human pathogens that fall in risk group 2.

It has to be pretty clear about what we do in the House and how we accomplish change. The government's job is to bring forward a bill. Yes, it made many mistakes in this case because it claimed to have done all kinds of consultations and to have done a thorough analysis of this area and the government was prepared to tell us that the whole community supported it. The government did not tell us the truth. It did not do the proper consultations because the minute Bill C-11 was tabled, we were inundated with concerns from scientists and researchers that research in this country would be denied. They were concerned that research would be cut off and would not be undertaken because people would be very concerned that they would fall under this criminal rubric and be subject to all kinds of criminal penalties because of their laboratory work with level 2 pathogens.

We accepted the arguments the researchers and scientists made, which was that there has to be a differentiation between the different levels of toxins and pathogens. Therefore, we proposed an amendment to do just that.

Many of the scientists we heard from said that the work that was done by the government's amendment was a step in the right direction and they also said that the proposition we had made was a good one. Yet the Bloc accepted neither.

Our job is not to do the job of government. Our job is to amend and change the bills it brings before us. We cannot simply say every time we do not like something that we are going to send it back and start all over again.

In this case we heard multiple times from those witnesses. Some of us called them and spoke to them individually apart from the discussions at committee. It was clear that this issue about including level 2 pathogens in this whole umbrella of punitive measures around safety in our laboratories was a major concern and had to be addressed.

Many of them said as we went through the process that they could live with the government's amendment. We did not think that was good enough and we proposed one step further. That was the one that was rejected by the Liberals because they were not part of the discussion at all, but most surprisingly it was rejected by the Bloc members. This actually would have addressed their concerns.

We did our best. We put the proposal on the table and we were turned down. We did our part to try to make this a better bill but it is certainly not our job to hold up everything ad infinitum because we did not get our way. We do our best to work within a minority Parliament. We work to make changes and that is exactly what we did. We accomplished two important changes. We did not get the third change. We will continue to find ways to address the concerns raised by scientists and researchers.

It is very important to note that the NDP's amendment to get all regulations before the House is a significant breakthrough. The Bloc members are quite right when they ask how we can vote for something when we do not know the regulations. We deal with that each and every day. Every time we have a piece of legislation we deal with it.

We did it with Bill C-9. That bill deals with the transportation of dangerous goods. It is a very similar situation to this bill dealing with laboratories handling dangerous toxins and pathogens. We tried through a motion to get the House to amend that bill to ensure that all regulations would go before the committee. Where were the Bloc members on that? Where were the Bloc members on each and every other bill where we were trying to get regulations under the purview of the House and we raised concerns about the discretion of the minister and the latitude he or she may have in terms of implementing a bill and for which we do not know the full consequences? It is a legitimate concern but the normal parliamentary way is to amend a bill so that the regulations go to committee.

Now, all regulations for this bill will come before committee as a result of the NDP amendment before the bill is finally approved. It may not be perfect. It may mean the Conservative government can still try to do some things for which it has no authority and where it is taking advantage of grey areas in the bill, but we have a major role to play in terms of overseeing the regulations before allowing the bill to go any further. I think it is important to note all of that.

I will talk a bit about the bill as a whole and put it in the context of the present swine influenza outbreak because the two are very much connected.

We are talking about the precautionary principle in whatever we do. One of the fundamental principles behind Bill C-11 is that Canadians, health workers and all who come into contact with pathogens and toxins are safe beyond a reasonable doubt. Our first premise in dealing with the bill was to ensure that this safety provision was a part of it, but not in any way that would try to prevent research in important areas. We did not get what we wanted on that bill, but we made a good try.

With respect to the do no harm principle in the current context of the swine influenza outbreak, it is important to note that, because we have such capable and competent individuals in our national laboratories, especially our level 5 laboratory in Winnipeg, the National Microbiology Laboratory, we can feel somewhat confident that scientists are doing their job, ensuring that Canadians are protected in the event of a pandemic and that work in labs for which they have oversight are operating according to the highest principles and standards.

In that context, I want to single out Dr. Frank Plummer. He was the individual to whom Mexicans sent their concerns and samples once this soon-to-be-identified swine influenza broke out in Mexico. Dr. Frank Plummer and his team identified this new strain, which became known as the swine influenza. This laboratory is overseeing much of the work in this area. In fact, it is working very stringently on the development of a vaccine, which could happen, as reports show today, much sooner than actually expected. There could be a vaccine developed within a couple of weeks for the swine influenza, thanks to the work of Dr. Frank Plummer and his whole team of scientists and their collaboration with the CDC in the United States, with public health agencies across the country and with public health officers in every province and territory.

I want to mention the work of Dr. Frank Plummer because he also helped us identify the issue around listeriosis. Through Dr. Frank Plummer, the electronic surveillance system detected the listeriosis outbreak. We were able then to take measures to deal with this very serious pathogen and ensure further containment of it.

Dr. Frank Plummer is known to us all for his work, especially, in the area of HIV and AIDS. He is one of the internationally renowned scientists who have done leading and groundbreaking research in getting to the bottom of HIV and AIDS. He has been recognized for that work in many parts of the world. In fact, as members will know, he was recently appointed an Officer of the Order of Canada. Probably more important than anything, he was inducted into the Royal Society of Canada. He has received a grant from the Grand Challenges in Global Health, an initiative of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which continues studies on HIV resistance and work on the HIV vaccine. He was named Canada research chair of the Canadian Institutes of Health Research and has been elected to the American Society of Clinical Investigation and the Association of American Physicians, and I could go on.

We are talking about someone who is world renowned, who is providing groundbreaking research on new unidentified pathogens and toxins. He has been behind the developments around listeriosis. Now he has been identified as the key researcher with respect to the swine influenza. He will ensure that we have a vaccine for that latest epidemic in short order.

He is a person with whom we consulted regularly throughout the debate. He took the time to come to our committees, along with Dr. Butler-Jones, the head of the Public Health Agency of Canada. As a result of their efforts, particularly Dr. Frank Plummer's, we were able to get a better handle on the nature of level 2 pathogens versus level 3 and level 4 pathogens and, in fact, begin the process of trying to put in place a modified regime with respect to level 2 pathogens so research would not be stymied and scientists would not feel any encumbrances around their work.

That has been accomplished, in part, thanks to all the scientists who came before us. They were very vigilant in their work at our committee. In fact, I want to mention the efforts by a number of them with respect to this bill, as the Bloc also referred to, and indicate that they were instrumental in our understanding of this whole area.

I hope the government has learned some lessons from Bill C-11, that it must ensure thorough consultations before it proceeds with legislation. I am glad it listened to some of our amendments. I hope it will take seriously our concerns about the regulations and will act quickly and promptly to bring those regulations before the House.

We have the unfortunate example of human reproductive technologies legislation that was passed by the House some five years ago. It still has not been finally approved, nor are the regulations forthcoming. Here is an area where changes are happening every day, by the minute. There are all kinds of concerns about the new groundbreaking innovations in fertility treatments as well as concerns with respect to identity of anonymous sperm donations. Back five or six years ago, our committee tried to address numerous concerns and provide good advice to the government. We are still waiting for those regulations.

We hope the government has learned something from this most recent chapter in its legislative pursuit around protecting Canadians and has learned the lessons from the witnesses we heard at our committee. We hope it will ensure that all legislation brought to the House in the future is done so only after thorough consultation with stakeholders has been provided and with all regard for and taking into account the concerns raised by those people most directly affected by this legislation.

The government has failed to do that in this case and we have ended up with less than perfect legislation.

We are prepared to support the bill in the final analysis. I know Bloc members will go into conniptions over that. We believe we have done our job in trying to improve the bill. We have spoken to the same scientists they mentioned in the debates. We believe we have addressed their concerns, to a large measure, through the amendments to the bill by the government and then by ourselves.

We know it is a less than perfect legislation. There will be concerns identified along the way. We will ensure, through the regulatory process, absolute vigilance and complete oversight to ensure the government is true to its word about bringing forward regulations that meet the specific concerns of the scientists, researchers and laboratory workers.

We will hold the government to account every step of the way to ensure the health and safety of Canadian researchers, laboratory workers and patients are always at the top of the equation and that nothing in the legislation gets in the way of good research and groundbreaking scientific endeavour.

We will continue to raise the need for more government assistance, not less as was the case with the government in the last budget. I think all scientists were shocked by the cutbacks to research. They are crying for the government to pay attention to the need for Canada to be involved in the continuation of groundbreaking research and investigative studies, which will enhance the health and well-being of all Canadians.

[Luc Malo, Bloc, Verchères—Les Patriotes, QC]

Madam Speaker, it is indeed somewhat incomprehensible, and my colleague is perfectly correct.

That is why we would have wished that the government, of its own accord, would withdraw this bill and do the proper homework. As I said at the start of my remarks, there was no urgency. The government itself mentioned that fact in its news release at the time the bill was introduced.

Therefore, why force the issue? We would be inclined to impugn the motives of the government simply because basic logic would insist that the real impact of the bill be identified and that the research carried out in all our laboratories can go forward. If, after promulgation of Bill C-11, there are additional costs to modify the laboratories, who will pay? The universities? The laboratories? The hospitals? We know very well there is no money. They have only the strict minimum to carry out the research that they have to do. How will they be able to continue? They will have to draw on their operating funds. They will be forced to reduce the number of teachers and the number of students who receive training in order to adapt their premises. This is an important question and we still do not have an answer.

The government is asking us today to vote on a bill without knowing its impact. That is not right and it makes no sense.

As parliamentarians, we assume certain responsibilities when we vote on a bill in this House. We cannot be expected to vote in good faith when we do not know the consequences. As I said previously, the consequences could be very serious. One witness told us there had been a brain drain from the United States precisely because of certain fears. They were afraid they could unintentionally cause damage that would be considered criminal.

[Robert Vincent, Bloc, Shefford, QC]

Madam Speaker, we know that in committee the Bloc Québécois raised certain questions with officials on the possible repercussions of the bill. According to the responses from the government, there was no impact study concerning Bill C-11.

So, how can we discuss a bill when we do not even know where we are going in terms of the bill? No regulations have been linked with this bill; instead, that is to be done after its adoption.

Is it not unthinkable to establish regulations after adopting a bill? We have no idea what regulations will be attached to the bill.

I would like to know my colleague’s opinion on that point.

The House resumed consideration of the motion that Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins, be read the third time and passed.

[Luc Malo, Bloc, Verchères—Les Patriotes, QC]

Madam Speaker, I am rising to speak at third reading of Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins.

At second reading, the Bloc Québécois voted in favour of the principle of this bill. It is obvious that public health and safety are everyone's concern. However, as was even admitted by the government, in announcing the introduction of Bill C-54, the ancestor of this Bill C-11, the Minister of Health 's press release explained that the risk to Canadians from human pathogens and toxins used in laboratories is low.

There are also other laws, an anti-terrorism law and others, which could house some of the provisions of Bill C-11. It is, for example, obvious that a malicious intent in releasing toxic and dangerous products into the environment would be covered already by a number of laws. Offenders would be prosecuted under the Criminal Code. There was therefore no reason to stir everyone up and trample over all those who wanted to see changes to the legislation in favour of greater mutual respect. The provinces were muzzled and not properly listened to. Neither were the researchers and scientists.

Yet those very researchers and scientists are the ones who will have to live with the consequences of Bill C-11. I will quote, if I may, from what Peter Singer, director and professor of medicine at the University Health Network and University of Toronto, told us in committee in connection with this bill:

It lowers the background noise of what's happening in laboratories so the signal of aberrant activity can stand out better. But we also need the help of the thousands of scientists in those laboratories, very few of whom, if any, intend to misuse human pathogens, to make sure that 99.99% constitute a network of vigilance to bring that signal to the attention of authorities. Because biosecurity is achieved by winning the scientists' hearts and minds, not through legislative compulsion but by fostering a scientific culture of awareness and responsibility, it's extremely important to have them on side.

That is what the government did not try to do before moving forward. It did not try to get laboratory researchers on board. It did not try to win them over and obtain their unconditional support. When the government raises the spectre of bioterrorist attacks and mentions laboratory workers in the bill, they just might think that they are being branded as potential terrorists. Calling people names and insulting them is not a good way to win them over.

The government did not conduct a proper impact study to understand the consequences of Bill C-11. We asked public officials whether proper impact studies had been conducted, and from the comments we heard in the committee, we discovered that the government did hold information sessions, but did not take a more thorough look at researchers' criticisms and concerns.

There would have been time to do it. We tend to forget that, according to the government's timeline, this bill will not be implemented for another four or five years. Instead of acting blindly, without a solid, credible foundation, the government should have acted responsibly by conducting an impact study and holding proper consultations with all stakeholders, including researchers, the provinces, and private health labs. That would have been the right thing to do.

Mr. Raymond Tellier appeared before the committee, and he raised a very important point. He said that, after a similar law was passed in the United States, there was a brain drain. Before going ahead with this bill, it would have been very useful to know how it might affect people working as researchers and teachers, those who pass on their knowledge to future researchers and Ph.D.s. On that basis alone, it would have been nice to have had more information.

Just before proceeding to a clause-by-clause study in committee, we heard from witnesses who told us that they were still not happy. For example, we heard from Professor Greg Matlashewski of McGill University's department of microbiology and immunology. He said:

The bill will mean very little without real regulations within it, as far as I'm concerned. I think there's a real danger in passing this bill without having the regulations, because I've seen some of the amendments, and these amendments have not changed the bill substantially.

He was not satisfied with the amendments because, in his opinion, they were still not specific enough about the consequences to carrying out his job, which is very important and useful in developing new procedures and new medications and for advancing science.

Mr. Albert Descoteaux, a professor at the Institut Armand-Frappier, Institut national de la recherche scientifique, voiced his concerns about HIV:

Bill C-11 would destroy all the financial commitments from government in the fight against AIDS. Paradoxically, that remains a federal government priority. I would really like that considered when you decide your position on Bill C-11.

Unfortunately, not enough consideration was given to that point by our NDP, Liberal and Conservative colleagues. In fact, they decided to move forward and adopt this bill even before knowing its impact, especially on AIDS research.

Mr. Descoteaux continued:

If the goal of lawmakers is to promote public health and safety in the area of micro-organisms and to protect Canadians from potential bioterrorist attacks, Bill C-11 is not the solution. I feel that the bill could well create havoc by establishing a repressive system that lumps all micro-organisms together, whereas the vast majority of them pose no problem at all for people's health and safety.

And what about his comments? They want to forget them, ignore them, and pretend that Dr. Descoteaux said nothing. It is deplorable that members of other political parties would act this way when, as I stated earlier, there was no reason to expedite this bill, as the government had said in a press release.

We also proposed an amendment, at report stage, asking that the provinces be consulted before the schedules were amended.

When they came to discuss the proposed amendments with us, public officials told us clearly that the provinces would not be consulted before the drafting of these amendments. The experts and researchers were from research labs and the federal government. This whole exercise completely ignored the skills that we have in the public service of Quebec and of the provinces.

The Bloc Québécois' amendment sought to consult Quebec and the provinces, before amending the schedules, that is before adding a pathogen or changing its classification. This was to ensure that the impact of any change would be known and adequately evaluated by the government.

The committee heard the concerns clearly expressed by members from all parties and from the various provinces. The Conservative member for Sarnia—Lambton told us about the fears of the Ontario legislature, while the member for Vancouver Quadra spoke eloquently and vigorously about the very legitimate concerns of the B.C. government, since she served as a minister in that provincial legislature.

However, we did not get any answer, despite the fact that Conservative and Liberal members raised the legitimate concerns of the Ontario and British Columbia legislatures, and despite the fact that the member for Vancouver Quadra spoke eloquently, asked many questions and demanded answers.

Indeed, despite all this, she and her Liberal Party colleagues decided to support the government in its will to rush Bill C-11 through. This is rather unusual. It is puzzling to see members from this House, who heard, understood and then conveyed the fears expressed by provincial legislatures, end up ignoring them and rejecting the legitimate expectations of the provinces.

We learned, in the presentations made to the committee by the members for Sarnia—Lambton and Vancouver Quadra, that they were already exercising—as regards safety, security and the monitoring of laboratories—a number of responsibilities related to constitutional requirements that come under Quebec and the provinces.

Talking about the constitutionality of the bill, the committee heard an expert who told us that, in her opinion, there was every reason to believe that some provisions in Bill C-11 were unconstitutional. It is a very serious matter when, after the committee heard an expert express concerns regarding this issue, the government decides to use its prerogative to legislate criminal law, ignores those recommendations and moves forward nevertheless.

I would now like to read a letter addressed to the Minister of Health, on April 6, 2009, by the Quebec health minister, Dr. Yves Bolduc.

Dear Mr. Minister,

I am writing to you today to express the Quebec government's serious concerns about Bill C-11, the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act, which is currently being examined by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Health. The Quebec government notes that the measures proposed in the bill would have serious repercussions on the organization of medical laboratory services and medical diagnostic services, which are provided by Quebec’s health care system and which come under Quebec's jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the Government of Quebec is calling on the federal government to reconsider its approach to ensuring the biosafety and biosecurity of human pathogens and toxins, rather than pursuing the parliamentary work currently underway. It is important that that approach better reflect the respective roles of both levels of government in this matter.

Yours truly,

This letter went completely unheeded. The NDP, the Liberals and the Conservatives all ignored the remarks made by the Quebec Minister of Health, these very wise remarks calling for a review of all the provisions of the bill, rather than pursuing the committee's examination, in order to ensure that it respects the jurisdictions of both levels of government.

When the Standing Committee on Health was doing its clause-by-clause review of Bill C-11, I had proposed an amendment whereby the bill would not apply to any facility regulated, operated or funded by a province.

You can object, shout, ask questions and insist that your home province's fears be taken seriously, as the member for Vancouver Quadra did in committee, but you have to do more than just that.

I find it deplorable that this member did not do what should be done in such a situation and ask the government, as I am doing, to take a step back and consider all the facts when making a decision about a bill like Bill C-11.

Are we going to have to go through the same thing with Bill C-11 that we went through with the Assisted Human Reproduction Act? The Government of Quebec, with the support of other provincial legislatures, applied to the court to rule on the act's constitutionality.

The public should not have to pay for lawyers and judges to examine the constitutionality of legislation. I believe that, as parliamentarians, we have a duty to make sure, before we introduce or vote on a bill, that it complies fully with the Constitution.

The Quebec Court of Appeal ruled that the Assisted Human Reproduction Act is unconstitutional. Now, I am sad to see—

[Kirsty Duncan, Liberal, Etobicoke North, ON]

Madam Speaker, today I rise to speak to Bill C-11, the human pathogens and toxins act, adopted by the Standing Committee on Health on March 31 and presented to the House on April 2, 2009. The bill is important and significant because infectious disease remains among the leading causes of death worldwide and the greatest killer of children and young adults.

Today, new infectious diseases such as HIV-AIDS, SARS and now swine influenza A(H1N1) are emerging. Old infectious diseases such as malaria, plague and tuberculosis are re-emerging, and intractable infectious diseases remain an ever-present threat. Research to combat infectious diseases has resulted in over 5,000 laboratory-associated infections and almost 200 deaths over the last 70 years. Most recently, in 2008, the Bush administration acknowledged that the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, the only U.S. facility allowed to research highly contagious foot-and-mouth disease, experienced several accidents with the virus.

Fortunately, Canada has not experienced a large intentional or unintentional release of a dangerous agent. However, we have had some close calls. In April 2005 a facility in Canada imported a live virus sample under a risk group 2 permit. However, laboratory analysis showed that the material was contaminated with a risk group 3 pathogen: namely, influenza A(H2N2). Once the contamination was confirmed, the Public Health Agency of Canada's importation office, in consultation with the World Health Organization, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and the provincial health ministers contacted the supplier of the material and all facilities in Canada that had been issued a permit for the same panel and advised them of corrective action.

It was only because the material was imported that the federal government was able to track who had the affected materials. Should this situation happen today in Canada, with a domestically produced product, there would be no authority or ability to track materials and advise affected parties of corrective action. This could result in a biosafety and biosecurity risk as Canadians would likely have no immunity to the influenza A(H2N2) virus, possibly creating the conditions for the next influenza pandemic. This is why the legislation is so important.

Currently, PHAC has knowledge of laboratory-acquired infections, but has no national reporting mechanism to capture them. Our laboratories must have strict facility safeguards, microbiological practices and safety equipment to protect laboratory workers, the environment and the public from exposure to infectious micro-organisms and toxins that are stored in the laboratories. We must ensure the safety of all Canadians.

Therefore, we must be diligent in creating a legislative base that balances biosafety without impeding scientific advancement. We must also provide assurances to the Canadian public and our international partners that Canada takes biosafety and biosecurity seriously.

Bill C-11 will only succeed in making Canadians more secure if the scientists it regulates are consulted thoroughly and if the bill is implemented in close partnership with them. Canadian economic and social prosperity depend on scientific study. We must be wary of a regulatory regime that would interrupt discovery, as happened in the United States following publication of similar legislation. Many laboratories simply stopped working with listed pathogens rather than face the costs and hassles of complying with the legislation.

I believe Bill C-11 strikes the necessary balance between mitigation of risk and scientific freedom, which must then be maintained in the regulations. This balance will require, in the words of one witness, “constant attention and rebalancing that can be done only through ongoing dialogue with the scientific community”.

Witnesses from PHAC assured the committee that consultations will help determine what the regulations regime will look like. Witnesses were optimistic that they could move forward together with partners and that they would continue to take action to address their concerns.

The committee recommended the creation of an external advisory group, perhaps consisting of representatives from private industry, provincial public health agencies, universities and others to ensure that the regulations and the subsequent implementation of the bill proceed with the input and the support of the scientists.

The proposed external advisory group could also be instrumental in categorizing pathogens, as there was discussion regarding, for example, whether or not certain risk group 2 pathogens should be removed from the schedule. Removing risk group 2 from the legislative framework would take away the ability to know who has those pathogens, which are the majority of pathogens in Canada, the ability to assess whether they are handled in an appropriate manner and the ability to measure laboratory-acquired infections and their impacts.

There was general agreement that risk group 2 should be handled in a safe manner, which is not necessarily happening now, but less stringently than risk group 3.

Witnesses from PHAC also addressed stakeholder concerns regarding financial expenditures. It was pointed out that these costs must be balanced against the cost of taking no action, mainly loss of credibility, dollars and human life, which are significant in this case.

Other stakeholder concerns included duplicate laboratory licensing regimes, security checks, licences and privacy issues. The potential for duplicate regulatory licensing and inspection regimes is significant, as is the possible impacts on workload and scheduling which could drastically affect the operation of clinical, public health and research laboratories.

Witnesses from PHAC agreed that opportunities for harmonizing licensing with existing regimes must be considered. Witnesses from PHAC also agreed to clarify the requirements for security clearances for different categories of workers.

Security checks were thought to be burdensome by stakeholders due to significant impacts on students and training, as well as the lab's ability to hire additional staff during an outbreak. Stakeholders would like PHAC to clarify who the inspectors will be, how they will be trained and how they will carry out their tasks.

Partners would also like PHAC to address the important issues regarding licensing. For example, to whom a licence should be awarded, the institution, the group or the individual? What conditions will be required for awarding licences? Will there be an appeals process? Will custodial staff have access to labs? Will they require security clearances?

The last concern I will address is that of privacy, as clause 38 of the bill identifies extremely broad powers for the minister to order an applicant to disclose personal information. It is the committee's understanding that conversations have taken place with the Privacy Commissioner to satisfy stakeholder unease.

I would like to draw attention to the fact that strengthening global surveillance is not enough to eliminate or eradicate infectious disease. We need close ties among public health, trade and transportation organizations. We also need better collaboration with those monitoring the biological weapons convention, because bioterrorism remains a very real threat.

In 2004, The National Academies committee issued a report entitled, “Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism”. The report identified experiments of concern, such as rendering vaccines ineffective or turning non-pathogens, which are not found anywhere in the bill's schedules, into pathogens.

We need to ensure that granting agencies and medical journals are sensitive to these matters and have processes for addressing them. The same National Academies committee recommended creating, through legislation, an independent science and technology advisory group to the intelligence community. Does such a group exist in Canada to monitor and study the next generation of threats in a comprehensive, systematic way, as is being undertaken in the United States?

Finally, the bill is only part of the web of protection needed to make Canada more secure and prepared for bioterrorism. What is being done to promote a common culture of awareness, a shared sense of responsibility to prevent misuse within the scientific community?

We need more than legislation. We need a code of ethics, role modelling and teaching with a particular focus on the biosecurity agenda in Canada.

We have had multiple wake-up calls. Complacency cannot be an option when it comes to biosafety and biosecurity, which is why this legislation is important. The committee did work hard together to make necessary modifications to the bill.

[James Lunney, Conservative, Nanaimo—Alberni, BC]

Madam Speaker, I want to compliment the parliamentary secretary on his management of the committee and for the way he steered the bill through committee. He had a lot of co-operation from opposition parties along with the chair who spoke just a moment ago.

Canada really has a stellar international reputation in managing pathogens as evidenced by the H1N1 worldwide crisis. Canada is receiving pathogenic material from Mexico and helping it to analyze the bug that has been causing problems down there.

I wonder if the parliamentary secretary would comment on whether the provisions in Bill C-11 would help to ensure that we maintain our leadership role and would help to secure Canada's position as a leader in managing human pathogens.

[Luc Malo, Bloc, Verchères—Les Patriotes, QC]

Madam Speaker, I have a question for the minister's parliamentary secretary.

He said that in our study of the bill in committee, we heard from various stakeholders directly affected by Bill C-11. He also seemed to be saying that the amendments he read met the demands and expectations of those very stakeholders, that is, the researchers who work daily with the micro-organisms targeted by this bill, specifically group 2 micro-organisms.

However, although the various researchers were aware of the amendments, how can he explain the fact that, on the last day of consultations with them, before clause by clause study began, the researchers still had reasonable, legitimate, well-founded fears lingering in their minds? How can he explain the fact that the government nonetheless decided to go ahead with the clause by clause study knowing that those particular stakeholders were dissatisfied with the final product?

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health]

Madam Speaker, I want to start off by taking the opportunity to thank the opposition parties, especially the critics from the NDP, the Bloc and the Liberal Party, for all their hard work and co-operation in working on this very important piece of legislation.

I am pleased to be here today to update members on the progress of Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins.

As we have heard at second reading, there is strong support for strengthening safety and security with regard to human pathogens and toxins in Canada.

We had an opportunity at the Standing Committee on Health to discuss the key elements of the bill, which would provide the new authorities required to safeguard Canadians from the risks that dangerous human pathogens and toxins pose.

The Standing Committee on Health heard from a wide variety of witnesses about the importance of Bill C-11. Following witness testimony, as well as appearances by government officials from the Public Health Agency of Canada, amendments were made to Bill C-11 that have strengthen the bill and addressed many of the concerns raised by witnesses.

I would like to give members a quick overview of the bill.

The intention of the bill is to try to balance biosafety and biosecurity requirements with the need to advance science and research. The intent of the bill is not to restrict research and development, but rather to introduce a risk-based approach to the management of human pathogens so that they are handled safely and accounted for across Canada.

Because of the risk posed by dangerous human pathogens and toxins, Bill C-11 relies primarily on the criminal law jurisdiction of Parliament. In this regard, Bill C-11 includes a range of prohibitions, penalties and security screening requirements designed to protect the health and safety of Canadians.

The program and regulatory framework to be developed under Bill C-11 will include requirements for licensing, inventories, biological safety officers, information gathering and transfers of human pathogens and toxins, among other matters. The legislation has been drafted with care to ensure that the bill fully respects the rights and freedoms of Canadians entrenched in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and privacy rights protected via the Privacy Act.

There were certain amendments to the bill. In studying Bill C-11, several issues were raised from various witnesses concerned about the impact of the bill on their work. These issues included concerns about the oversight of risk group 2 laboratories, concerns about how the suite of regulations for Bill C-11 would be developed, concerns about the reporting requirements, as well as concerns about the schedules under the bill and how they would be amended over time.

We listened to these concerns, and I believe we have worked together at the health committee to develop a piece of legislation that addresses these concerns and more precisely reflects the original policy intent of Bill C-11.

Now I would like to speak about risk group 2.

With regard to the concerns that the committee heard about the oversight of risk group 2 human pathogens, several amendments were made to clarify that these relatively less harmful agents would be treated less stringently than the more dangerous risk groups 3 and 4 human pathogens, in the bill and in the program and regulatory framework. Four specific amendments were made for this purpose.

The first amendment clarifies in the preamble that human pathogens and toxins pose varying levels of risk to the health and safety of the public. This change reflects what was heard in committee, that not all human pathogens and toxins are the same from the perspective of risk, that some pose a greater threat than others.

The second amendment dealing with risk group 2 agents clarifies clause 33 explicitly so that security clearances will only be required for persons who have access to prescribed risk groups 3 or 4 agents or toxins as prescribed in regulations. It was never the program policy intent to security screen individuals who only have access to risk group 2 human pathogens, and this amendment clarifies this intention.

The third amendment regarding risk group 2 agents creates lesser general penalties for offences under the act or regulations related to risk group 2 human pathogens. This includes no provision for a prison sentence for a first offence involving only risk group 2 agents. This change to clause 53 reflects concerns voiced that persons carrying on activities with risk group 2 human pathogens should be treated more leniently than those carrying on activities with risk groups 3 or 4 human pathogens.

Finally, the fourth amendment, in clause 66, makes explicit that the regulatory regime will treat risk group 2 human pathogens in a way that is consistent with the fact that they are less dangerous than human pathogens in risk groups 3 and 4. Taken together, these changes signal that the level of risk associated with risk group 2 human pathogens is lower than risk groups 3 or 4, and they will therefore be treated less stringently in the overall legislative and regulatory framework.

Regarding reporting requirements, another important amendment that was made at the health committee clarifies that subclause 12(1) of the bill only applies to releases of human pathogens or toxins from a facility. This stems from concerns that were heard from stakeholders that minor spills contained within a licensed facility would have to be reported. This amendment recognizes that releases from the facility itself pose greater risks to public health. Once again, we believe this will help to improve the clarity of the bill, specifically with regard to what will be required of licensees.

Another important amendment requires the formation of scientific advisory committees under clauses 9 and 10 to advise the minister regarding changes to the lists of human pathogens and toxins found in schedules 1 through 5. As part of the consultations on the program and regulatory framework, the Public Health Agency of Canada will consult with stakeholders concerning the makeup of these committees, which be will formed under the authority in section 14 of the Public Health Agency of Canada Act.

Concerning privacy amendments, during hearings on Bill C-11, the health committee received a letter from the Privacy Commissioner noting, amongst other things, the need for a more objective test of what constitutes relevant information collected by the minister under clause 38, as well as the need for situations in which recipients of information disclosed by the minister pursuant to subclause 39(2) may be compelled by law to disclose it further. These two amendments were made based on suggestions from the Privacy Commissioner.

The last of these important amendments requires the tabling of the regulations in both houses of Parliament. This amendment reflects what we heard from witnesses about the need for greater accountability and transparency in the making of regulations. In reviewing the wording of this particular amendment, the government noted some inconsistencies between the intention of what was stated in the health committee and what was written into the revised Bill C-11.

Specifically, it was agreed that the amendments would require tabling of the regulations in both houses of Parliament in order to provide an opportunity for review by a committee in each house. The wording of the bill after committee stage only required the referral of the proposed regulations to a committee in the House of Commons. There was no similar requirement regarding the referral of the regulations to an appropriate committee in the other place.

The government therefore clarified that the regulations would need to be tabled in both houses of Parliament and referred to a committee of each house. We believe this was the original intention of committee members in agreeing to this amendment, and we tabled an amendment at report stage from committee to clarify this intention.

There is a need to move forward. We believe this new legislation is needed now. It is required to safeguard the health and well-being of all Canadians, including those persons working in laboratories. It is also required to demonstrate to the Canadian public and to our international partners that the Government of Canada is taking the issue of security related to human pathogens and toxins very seriously. The proposed legislation represents a made-in-Canada approach that addresses both safety and security.

Clearly, the urgency in moving ahead with expanded federal oversight over human pathogens and toxins has been widely recognized. I believe the study of Bill C-11 in the health committee has resulted in a clear piece of legislation, and I look forward to moving it on to the Senate.

[Chuck Strahl, Conservative, Chilliwack—Fraser Canyon, BC]

moved that Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins, be read the third time and passed.

Canada Consumer Product Safety Act

[Luc Malo, Bloc, Verchères—Les Patriotes, QC]

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for St. Paul's criticized the government for how it conducted consultations with regard to Bill C-11, and rightly so. She said they were botched, that they were more like information sessions than meaningful consultations, and that the government must ensure that all of the concerns expressed by the witnesses are heard and properly addressed.

My question is for the member as someone who voted in favour of the bill at the report stage here in this House, as well as for her colleagues. Following the committee's examination of Bill C-11, there were some lingering concerns expressed by expert witnesses who work with pathogens and toxins every day. So why did she decide to ignore those witnesses and vote in favour of Bill C-11 at the report stage?

[Carolyn Bennett, Liberal, St. Paul's, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak today on Bill C-6, An Act respecting the safety of consumer products.

This enactment modernizes the regulatory regime for consumer products in Canada. It creates prohibitions with respect to the manufacturing, and especially the advertising, selling, importing, packaging and labelling of consumer products that are a danger to human health or safety.

The purpose of this bill is to make it easier to identify a consumer product that may be a danger and to more effectively prevent or address the danger.

The Liberal Party has always had a commitment to improving the health and safety of Canadians. We will continue to support measures which reinforce the regulatory process in order to be sure that Canadians are consuming healthy products.

The purpose of Bill C-6 is to protect the public by addressing or preventing dangers posed to human health or safety by consumer products that are circulated within Canada and those that are imported.

The bill was first introduced as Bill C-52 in the 39th Parliament and was part of the package that also included Bill C-51, which dealt specifically with natural health products. While Bill C-51 was considered contentious legislation, Bill C-52, now Bill C-6, was generally more accepted by stakeholders, but I do not have to tell the government that this is still hugely problematic to many stakeholders.

An analysis of the bill makes evident that the current consumer products safety system functions on a voluntary basis. If a product is dangerous or poses a health threat, the corporations can issue a recall. The new would bill prohibit the sale, import, manufacturing, packaging, labelling and advertising of consumer products that might pose a risk to consumers. While voluntary recalls will continue to happen, inspectors named under the act or by the minister will now be able to order the recall of a consumer product.

The proposed bill will give substantial regulating powers to the minister. It will be necessary to further study these powers to ensure transparency, effectiveness and accountability. It also requires further study to ensure that it can be implemented effectively.

Increased numbers of inspectors will have to be named by the minister and we need to ensure that the human resources and funding are available to do the job properly.

As with Bill C-11, I will be proposing an amendment at the committee stage, instructing the Minister of Health to consult with an expert advisory committee with a mandate to give public advice before the minister can restrict access to a product.

We have been hearing from many stakeholders who are concerned that C-6 will negatively affect access to natural health products.

The Liberal Party has a deep conviction that Canadians have a fundamental right to make their own choices as far as looking after themselves and remaining in good health are concerned, and that we must guarantee them access to those choices. We have no intention of limiting the consumption, sale and distribution of safe natural products. On the contrary, we wish to promote and protect the health and safety of Canadians and improve our regulations so that they may have access to the foods, remedies and consumer products that are the healthiest and most effective.

That is why we asked the minister to submit Bill C-6 to the appropriate committee of the House of Commons before second reading. This would have provided answers to most of the questions raised in your letter. Unfortunately, the minister refused to do so.

I am concerned, yet again, that the proper stakeholder consultations did not take place with regard to Bill C-6 as with Bill C-11. It was clear during the Bill C-11 hearings that the key stakeholders were not consulted properly during the drafting of the bill. As we know information sessions are very different to meaningful consultations.

We have already heard concerns from key stakeholders that Bill C-6 needs an amendment to deal with tobacco manufacturers and another amendment regarding hazardous substances and toxic chemicals, as the member for Etobicoke North so eloquently put forward.

We have been transparent with the Department of Health and provided it with copies of these proposed amendments and will insist that they are included in a future bill.

If this was to be a repeat of Bill C-11, where information sessions were substituted for meaningful consultation, I hope the government has learned its lesson and will make the appropriate government amendments and bring back the witnesses with the most serious concerns and ensure the bill, as amended, would be acceptable to them.

In any bill we need to ensure that Parliament is able to do its job to develop the best pieces of legislation possible, which requires thorough stakeholder dialogue and input.

As I said, the Liberal caucus has asked that the bill be brought to the committee before second reading so it would be possible to make substantial changes as asked for by the stakeholders. We will reluctantly support the bill going to committee after second reading, but we want Canadians to be assured that we will be continuing to be vigilant in the study of Bill C-6 as it enters the health committee, as we had successful changes with Bill C-11.

It is very important that politicians do the politics, that scientists do the science and that the transmission of information from the scientists to the politician is done in a way in which citizens of Canada are included in the decision.

Human Pathogens and Toxins Act

[The Speaker, Liberal, Peter Milliken]

The House will now proceed to the taking of the deferred recorded division on the motion at report stage of Bill C-11.

The hon. chief government whip is rising on a point of order.

The House resumed from April 24 consideration of the motion that Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins, as amended, be concurred in.

[Greg Thompson, Conservative, New Brunswick Southwest, NB]

moved that Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins, as amended, be concurred in.

[Paul Szabo, Liberal, Mississauga South, ON]

Mr. Speaker, with regard to Bill C-11, report stage Motion No. 1 ostensibly requires that the regulations being drafted and proposed, and appended to the legislation, go through the appropriate standing committee for review. I want to indicate that I support this very much. The reproductive technology act had a similar proposal. Over 200 draft regulations have yet to come on a piece of legislation that passed many years ago. This means that significant aspects of the reproductive technology act are not even in force yet because regulations have not been propagated.

I want to simply ask the member whether or not he supports Motion No. 1, that the draft regulations go before a committee so it can ensure that they properly reflect the enabling provisions of the legislation in question?

The House resumed from April 22 consideration of Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins, as reported (with amendment) from the committee, and of the motions in Group No. 1.

Business of the House

[Tom Lukiwski, Conservative, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, we will continue with the debate today on an opposition motion. Tomorrow we will begin, and there is an understanding that we will conclude, debate on third reading stage of Bill C-14, the bill to address organized crime. Following Bill C-14, we will continue debate on the report stage amendments to Bill C-11, the human pathogens and toxins bill.

If time permits, we may begin debate on the second reading stage of Bill C-6 dealing with consumer product safety.

Next week, we have opposition days scheduled for Monday, April 27 and Tuesday, April 28. On Wednesday we will return to government legislation with the continuation of business from this week. We will also give consideration to any bills that are reported back from committee or sent to us from the Senate.

Pursuant to a special order and because of the Liberal convention, the House will not sit on Friday, May 1. Mr. Speaker, as you know, it is a long-standing tradition to give up a sitting day to allow a political party to attend a convention and we are very pleased to continue on with that tradition.

Motions in Amendment

[Luc Malo, Bloc, Verchères—Les Patriotes, QC]

Madam Speaker, I too, am pleased to have this opportunity to comment at the report stage of Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins.

I would like to begin by commenting on something the member for Yukon said. After the government moved Motion No. 1, which we will be voting on later, my colleague from Yukon seemed very pleased that the bill now includes a requirement for the government to table the regulatory framework in both houses of Parliament.

I would just like to say that that is the very least we could have agreed to, and that is why I proposed just such an amendment in committee. Allow me to review the beginnings of this bill so that I can explain all of the work that we had to do to improve this bill—even slightly—although I still find it unsatisfactory.

At second reading, after briefings from public servants who told us that they had done an excellent job of consulting all of the stakeholders affected by the bill, that everything had been done according to standard practice and that consultations had been held, we called on a certain number of stakeholders. What we heard from them was an entirely different story, and it did not sound as though they had been consulted properly. Many of them had major misgivings about how Bill C-11 was to be applied to their labs.

I did talk about that during my speech at second reading here in the House. At the time, the parliamentary secretary thought it would be a good idea to hear from these groups in committee, but I think he took it for granted that the debate in committee would go relatively quickly and that the committee would fast-track Bill C-11.

However, that was not the case. We heard witnesses, people who work daily with micro-organisms that fall primarily in risk group 2, which is a category that does not pose a serious risk to public health. We know that a number of standards are being followed in these laboratories regarding handling procedures, because in many cases the provinces have set operating rules.

So, we heard from these groups at committee stage. I will even go so far as to say that, just before the clause by clause study, these stakeholders still had serious and legitimate doubts about the negative impact that Bill C-11 might have on their activities.

At no time did we sense, on the part of the department or of the government, a will to reassure these researchers, and the students who work with them, on the negative consequences that the bill could have on their work.

Therefore, it was necessary to see that this regulatory framework would at least include all the flexibility required to ensure that these people would not be adversely affected.

However, we would have liked to go further in our committee report and to remove from the bill the provisions on laboratories that use pathogens that fall into risk group 2. A number of people felt that the risks posed by these pathogens are already controlled. Therefore, they should not be subjected to very strict standards that could—as I mentioned in my speech at second reading—generate significant costs. Such costs could jeopardize a number of important studies on the development of state-of-the-art technologies. The result would be that studies done by our researchers and by the postgraduate students they supervise would not be conducted, due to a lack of adequate funding caused by the costs generated by the implementation of Bill C-11. At no time were officials or the government able to reassure these people as to who would foot the bill for the improvements that would have to be made to these laboratories.

Another important thing that I would have liked to see included in the bill is the exclusion of activities conducted in any facility that is regulated, operated or funded by a province. Indeed, in many cases, the provinces have already put control structures in place. Therefore, we do not need the federal government to create more paperwork and to add another level of monitoring, particularly for those facilities that come directly under a provincial government, namely hospitals and universities. This is evidence again that the government claims, on the one hand, to want to respect provincial jurisdictions, but, on the other hand—and through its actions—deprives Quebec and the provinces of their ability to fully exercise their authority. Yet, they have already put structures in place to monitor this research.

The second point is that at committee stage we heard experts who told us that, given the way this bill is drafted, it could be deemed unconstitutional. Why move forward with legislation that has not been thoroughly examined by the government before introducing it, and even less so in committee, where we felt that the government was turning a deaf ear, instead of listening to those who did not agree with its bill? Why is it that before introducing a bill and adopting it here, the government does not make sure that it respects every constitutional requirement? We did not get an adequate answer from the government on this.

Clearly, we must ensure that the minimal amendments presented by the government are adopted, so that if Parliament has to deal with Bill C-11, it will see the regulatory framework before the legislation is passed. However, this Parliament could go much further in terms of the assurances that we could give to our researchers. They have told us that and we know it. For the past while, they have been very concerned about whether they can continue to conduct their activities adequately.

[Joyce Murray, Liberal, Vancouver Quadra, BC]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to make comments on Bill C-11, having been part of the committee and the process of reviewing the bill, identifying the strengths and weaknesses of it and taking action, as my Liberal colleagues and other committee members did, in what was, in the end, a very co-operative process.

Everyone in the committee was in accord about the importance of ensuring that the handling of pathogens and toxins in laboratory work and transportation of these goods protect the individual safety and public safety.

We did ascertain that there were risks with some of those products, greater risks with some than with others, and that the public good was best served by laws addressing that. Therefore, there was a common view that this was the right thing and a good thing to do.

My experience as a legislator tells me that the public good is sometimes served by laws addressing a problem, but government always needs to be very aware that there are risks arising from possible unintended consequences of the legislation being proposed.

Pretty classic risks of unintended consequences include things as: stepping into the jurisdiction of another level of government; duplicating existing work and licensing and processes already in place to protect the public; placing a regulatory burden that would be onerous given the benefits; the impacts on the delivery of a public good that we are trying to promote may reduce the delivery of that public good; stepping into information privacy terrain and risking the disclosure of personal and private information that is inappropriate or against the law; or even using, in effect, a sledgehammer to crush a flea by having very onerous provisions and penalties in situations where they are simply not warranted.

Those are classic potential downsides or pitfalls to making laws. I think all legislators would agree that we need to be mindful that we are not over-regulating and we are not creating more problems than we are solving just for the pure joy of addressing problems and making laws.

When the bill was first presented to the committee, there were very severe concerns and, in fact, those concerns fit into that whole range of unintended negative consequences, which I outlined as theoretical ones. They were in fact present in Bill C-11.

Why was a bill, which had so many problems, being pushed through for fast approval at committee? What was clear was the consultation the government should have done with respect to writing the bill to address the risks around the handling of toxins and pathogens had been completely inadequate. Although the committee members were assured that there had been extensive and adequate consultation, when the list of those activities was reviewed, it was clear that there was minimal consultation with the decision-makers in the province of British Columbia. I know some of the other provincial health officers had the same concerns.

A letter from the minister of healthy living and sport in British Columbia, for example, had very strong language of concern about Bill C-11 as it was first presented to the committee, words such as, “The schedules are over-reaching”, “The administrative burden of regulation is felt to be onerous”, and “it is our strong preference that a new bill be considered which is collaboratively developed through consultations with the provinces and territories”.

This is a strong indication that adequate consultation did not occur. The absolute foundation of good legislation, legislation that previews and corrects unintended consequences, is to talk to the very organizations and individuals affected by it. This has been consistent problem with the Conservative government.

I was very involved when Bill C-51 on natural products was brought forward last year. It infuriated organizations because they had been completely left out of the consultation process. Had they been involved, they would have made very constructive representations as to how to improve the bill. The bill was killed when the House, when the Conservative government called an election last September. We will see whether the necessary improvements have been made.

With Bill C-11, several provincial governments felt it was completely inappropriate to step into their jurisdiction, clearly duplicating activities that were already taking place in many of the provincially regulated laboratories, which are already under a very constructive and thorough system of regulation and licensing.

On the regulatory burden, the committee heard from some of the university labs and others. They said that this regulatory burden would be very costly and that there were no provisions to assist with those costs. In fact, we heard that similar legislation in the United States had caused research to stop at some university research facilities. This is an unintended consequence that we do not want in Canada. We know how important primary basic research is. We know the important research these laboratories do on pathogens and toxins. Shutting down a source of research is definitely counterproductive to the goals of the bill.

Concerns were expressed by information and privacy commissioners. There were major concerns with the penalties and the criminalization of what could be an inadvertent misstep on the part of a laboratory staff person, resulting in an action that under that bill could have called for criminal penalties. There were serious concerns about the bill. Opposition members argued very vigorously that the government should take the bill back and redo it, make the necessary amendments and bring it back to the committee with the key concerns solved. At first we were being asked to accept a “trust us” message, that these things would be corrected in committee later in the process. We were not willing to do that, notwithstanding the importance of the issues and the risk that the bill was attempting to address.

After having given that context to the situation, I am pleased to say the committee members from all parties worked very constructively together. The government and the agency that was the author of the bill had the wisdom to make amendments to address some of the grave concerns raised, and those amendments were outlined in some detail by the previous speaker.

The bill that came back to the committee addressed some of those concerns, but not all of them. That is why further amendments were proposed to ensure the regulations would go to Parliament and that an advisory committee would be brought into the process of regulation making. Those were absolutely necessary amendments. I am pleased to say they are part of the bill as it goes forward. This was an occasion where the unintended consequences were serious, but they were addressed. The committee did its work. I want to congratulate all the committee members for the work on this occasion. I look forward to seeing the bill in its next iteration.

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to rise today at report stage of Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins, to speak to the government amendments to clauses 66.1 and 66.2, which are now before us.

We heard at second reading that there is strong support in this House for strengthening safety and security with regard to human pathogens and toxins right here in Canada. We are committed to moving forward with this legislation to address the serious safety and security gaps that we have identified in order to safeguard Canadians from the threats posed by human pathogens and toxins.

Members of the Standing Committee on Health had an extensive opportunity to review all elements of Bill C-11. All told, the committee heard from five government witnesses, in some cases more than once, and from 13 other witnesses over a period of a month. In total there were seven separate sessions devoted almost entirely to review and discussion of Bill C-11. In these sessions, all voices were heard and all opinions were closely considered. The result of the committee's hard work is an amended bill that we think well reflects the underlying policy intent of the bill, as well as other key aspects of concern to some witnesses.

There were 12 amendments to the bill, of which eight were put forth by the government and four were put forth by the opposition. These amendments include a government amendment to clarify technical aspects of the bill, such as the fact that there will be no requirement to report to the minister of health when there is a simple spill in the laboratory, but only when there is a release of a human pathogen or toxin from the facility itself.

As well, two opposition amendments were put forward to require the establishment of scientific advisory committees to advise the minister of health regarding the schedules to the bill. These amendments, which the government supports, go a long way in ensuring there is an evidence base for decision-making on how to treat dangerous, and less dangerous, pathogens.

Two other government amendments responded to input that the committee received from the office of the Privacy Commissioner, which we believe resulted in better privacy protection in this bill.

The bill was also amended to clearly articulate that there will be no security screening of persons accessing risk group 2 human pathogens and to signal that the regulations should be drafted taking into account the varying degrees of risk between risk groups of human pathogens and between toxins. As well, the penalty clauses in Bill C-11 were amended to lower the penalties related to contraventions of the act and regulations related to risk group 2 human pathogens.

These amendments were made to respond to what we heard from numerous witnesses at committee who strongly emphasized that risk group 2 human pathogens, although clearly capable of causing serious disease and death, posed lesser risks. Therefore they warranted less stringent treatment both in the bill and in the regulations.

We heard what these witnesses had to say and the government was comfortable proposing these numerous amendments which were all agreed to at committee.

In addition to the successful amendments put forward at committee, two amendments are related to a requirement for the tabling of regulations made under Bill C-11 before both Houses of Parliament. These amendments were put forward by the opposition and became the new clauses 66.1 and 66.2. They were agreed to by the committee, including the government members, subject to one qualification.

The government responded to these proposed amendments by requesting that the words “and the Senate” be added where the words “House of Commons” appeared in the amendments, to ensure that the regulations would also be tabled there.

After some discussion, the committee agreed to the suggestion, which was considered a friendly amendment, with agreement that the changed amendments would be worded in a way similar to what is now found in the Assisted Human Reproduction Act.

Unfortunately, upon review of the bill as reported from the Standing Committee on Health, it became obvious that this last specific requirement relating to the tabling of regulations in both Houses of Parliament was not included in the amended bill, as was requested by the committee.

Many of the needed references to the Senate, and particularly the fact that the regulations must be referred to a committee of that House, were simply left out. The government has put forward amendments at report stage to address this omission.

More specifically, the government has proposed an amendment to clause 66.1 to require that the regulations be tabled before each House of Parliament and that a proposed regulation that is laid before Parliament shall be referred to the appropriate committee of each House, as determined by the rules.

The new clause 66.2 allows for some specific exemptions from the requirement to table regulations in both houses of Parliament. The proposed government amendment now before us specifies that should the Minister of Health make a regulation without first laying it before either house of Parliament, she must lay before each house a statement of reasons for doing so.

These proposed government amendments to clauses 66.1 and 66.2 are completely in line with the wordings of section 66 and 67 of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act as requested and agreed to by the Standing Committee on Health.

The bill, with these new amendments, reflects the hard work and co-operative approach that was taken at committee, reflecting the need to work together to safeguard the health and safety of Canadians. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the members of the committee for a job well done.

I request that the House agree to these amendments, which simply reflect what the committee had previously agreed was the right way to proceed, in the same spirit of co-operation and concern for the health and safety of Canadians that was apparent in all of the discussions around Bill C-11 that occurred in committee.

As I noted, we believe that the amended Bill C-11, which was reported to the House from committee, is a stronger piece of legislation that well reflects the policy intent of the legislation and concerns expressed by some witnesses at committee. These government amendments to clauses 66.1 and 66.2 will essentially complete the good work of the committee by ensuring that the amended Bill C-11 reflects what was actually agreed to by committee in consideration of the input of many witnesses over a period a month.

Speaker's Ruling

[The Acting Speaker, NDP, Denise Savoie]

There are two motions in amendment standing on the notice paper for the report stage of Bill C-11. Motions Nos. 1 and 2 will be grouped for debate and voted upon according to the voting pattern at the table.

The House proceeded to the consideration of Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins, as reported (with amendment) from the committee.

Business of the House

[Jay Hill, Conservative, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, today, Bill S-3, the energy efficiency bill, was read a second time and referred to the Standing Committee on Natural Resources.

Just before question period, we were debating Bill C-13, the Canada Grain Act, but it appears the coalition of the Liberals, the NDP and the Bloc has been revived and it is supporting a motion that, if adopted, will defeat that bill. It is proposing to kill the bill before it even gets to committee. It is unfortunate that the coalition's first act is to abdicate its role as legislators by denying close scrutiny and study of a bill at a committee.

After my statement, the government will be calling Bill C-5, Indian oil and gas, followed by Bill C-18, the bill respecting RCMP pensions, which is at second reading.

Tomorrow, we will continue with the business that I just laid out for the remainder of today.

When the House returns on April 20, after two weeks of constituency work, we will continue with any unfinished business from this week, with the addition of Bill C-25, the truth in sentencing bill, Bill C-24, the Canada-Peru free trade agreement, Bill C-11, human pathogens and toxins and Bill C-6, consumer products safety. We can see we have a lot of work to do yet. All of these bills are at second reading, with the exception of Bill C-11, which will be at report stage.

During the first week the House returns from the constituency weeks, we expect that Bill C-3, the Arctic waters bill will be reported back from committee. We also anticipate that the Senate will send a message respecting Bill S-2, the customs act. If and when that happens, I will be adding those two bills to the list of business for that week.

Thursday, April 23, shall be an allotted day.

Health

[Joy Smith, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I have the honour to present, in both official languages, the first report of the Standing Committee on Health in relation to Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins.

Your committee examined the bill and has decided to report it with amendments and has ordered its reprint. I would like to thank all members of the committee for their hard work and cooperation.

[Luc Malo, Bloc, Verchères—Les Patriotes, QC]

Parliamentarians are entitled to receive notice of an interim order much sooner than within 15 days. The problem is that in the case of the Quarantine Act, 15 days may be too long a period of time. The time frame should be shortened in that act as well as in Bill C-11.

[Luc Malo, Bloc, Verchères—Les Patriotes, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I just want to come back to the comment made by certain members—including yourself, Madam Chair—to the effect that we could be responsible for some unfortunate incidents that might occur. It is clear to all of the witnesses and to colleagues seated at this table that the safety of the public is our main focus.

Draft legislation, Bill C-54, was tabled during the previous Parliament. Since then, there has been time to do some impact assessments. These would have helped us to determine either that the bill would be damaging to the research, university and scientific community or conversely, that there was no cause for concern, that everything would be fine and that there would be no brain drain as we saw happen in the United States because here, we were going to take a different approach.

However, it is clear that such studies would have proved invaluable to avoid our heading off in many different directions. The concerns that were expressed could have been addressed. When we had our first briefing with the Agency when Bill C-11 was tabled, we were told that consultations had taken place, that everyone was satisfied and that there was no cause for concern. However, as we started to hear from witnesses, concerns were voiced by many different parties.

Madam Chair, the crux of the problem is the fact the government has chosen to focus more on criminal provisions and on putting in place parameters and regulations, insisting that people will be reassured by this. However, the reality is that hundreds of research facilities, universities and hospitals that do research are today asking themselves what will happen to them once Bill C-11 is adopted.

As parliamentarians and as a responsible committee, we should have taken their concerns into account during our study of the bill. It is unfortunate that today, as we proceed with the clause-by-clause study, we are not in a position to reassure the vast majority of the witnesses who came here to testify. That is what saddens me the most today.

[Luc Malo, Bloc, Verchères—Les Patriotes, QC]

Madam Chair, you are going to tell me that it's always the people who are not there that get the blame, but before I talk about the amendment to clause 3, I would just like to say that after reading last week's testimony, I still have a number of questions about the scope of the bill. I'm quite surprised to see us move today to the clause-by-clause study phase and to learn that the government has quite simply decided not to propose any substantive amendments to the bill that would alleviate some of the concerns that were expressed. I'm surprised that the government did not take a step back and review the bill in light of the comments we received and the comments we are likely to hear in the coming days and weeks.

That said, Madam Chair, a vote was taken and I accept that it is time for the committee to move to the clause-by-clause study phase. That is what we will do. Of course, I will be proposing a number of amendments, as several of my colleagues will be doing as well, in an effort to address some of the witnesses' concerns. The proposed amendments to clause 3—in fact, the three amendments— are similar in that they call for the exclusion of the micro-organisms listed in schedule 2 from the definition of “human pathogen“, given that several witnesses have stated that risk group 2 pathogens should not be subject to the same rules as risk group 3 or risk group 4 pathogens. You will tell me that the government has attempted to put in place a number of safeguards further on in the bill to limit the scope of the bill in terms of criminal implications.

However, strictly from the standpoint of risk, because I do think BillC-11 has far more to do with evaluating risk and the implications and consequences of imposing this legislative framework and especially the upcoming regulatory framework the scope of which is still unknown, it is important the any reference to risk group 2 pathogens be removed from the definition, given that— and we heard this from the witnesses—there are costs associated with this reference. There are implications for education, the evolution of knowledge, the exchange of scientific information and the development of research. I did not hear any evidence convincing me that all micro-organisms that are or that could be present or could be present should be included in the definition of “human pathogen“. Further on in the bill, we see that the minister has certain regulatory authority to add certain types of micro-organisms to the list of substances in the schedules.

In my opinion, Madam Chair. . .

[Nicolas Dufour, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Thank you.

From the outset, Dr. Butler-Jones told us that you had looked at legislation in other countries to get an idea of what aspects could be included in Bill C-11. However, the scientists have shown us that the list is much shorter in the United States and that we should perhaps move in that direction rather than the much more rigid structure of Bill C-11.

Just now, the scientists told us that, because of the proposed fines, they feel that they are under attack, even before the bill is passed. They are already being treated like criminals. As you know, people have to be found guilty before they can be fined. We must not forget that legislation exists to be used.

I am surprised by one thing. Fines can be imposed, but on whom? Is it the universities, the hospitals, the professors? We all know that this is provincial jurisdiction.

On the one hand, you tell me that the legislation will not be challenged, that it will move forward and that the provinces see no problem with it. On the other hand, who gets fined? If we start fining hospitals and universities, we are going right into provincial jurisdiction, it seems to me.

[Dr. Albert Descoteaux, Professor, Institut Armand-Frappier, Institut national de la recherche scientifique]

Thank you again for giving me the opportunity to express some fears or concerns about Bill C-11. I would like to take the opportunity to raise a matter that went unnoticed last time: bacterial toxins.

The CDC in the United States consider two or three toxins to be really dangerous. Most of the toxins on the list are very important research tools. We use them to study how cells work in cancer, in neurology and in immunology. Examples are the cholera toxin, the Clostridium botulinum toxin and the pertussis toxin. I am afraid that, if access to these toxins becomes too complicated, it could be very detrimental to research in cellular biology.

I also have some concerns about HIV. In the bill, HIV is classed at level 3. But it is a fact that several research groups and research networks in Canada have established sample banks, with samples taken from thousands of patients infected with HIV. These banks are invaluable for HIV research. One example is the Réseau SIDA et Maladies infectieuses, run by the Fonds de la recherche en santé du Québec. Members of that network have access to various banks of samples: from patients with primary infection, from slow progressors, and from patients infected with HIV and the hepatitis C virus.

Since HIV is now in containment group 3, I seriously wonder about the impact that Bill C-11 could have on the access to, and use of, these thousands of samples by qualified researchers. We can only imagine the bureaucracy and the permits needed for laboratories to exchange strains. And it is not just networks. Hundreds of professors and students need to handle and use these lines. We run the risk of setting up a huge logistical challenge, not to mention the impact on AIDS research.

I have to point out that these sample banks were established with grants from federal and provincial organizations. Bill C-11 would destroy all the financial commitments from government in the fight against AIDS. Paradoxically, that remains a federal government priority. I would really like that considered when you decide your position on Bill C-11.

There has also been talk of micro-organisms potentially being used for malicious purposes like bioterrorism. I have given Mr. Etoka a list from the Centers for Disease Control's website in Atlanta. The list is in English only and has not been circulated to everyone, but you can easily get it. It is a list of agents that can be used in bioterrorism.

The first thing we see is that the list of micro-organisms that are considered very dangerous is very short. There are six: anthrax, botulism, plague, smallpox, tularemia and the hemorrhagic fevers.

The second thing we notice is that these micro-organisms all belong to confinement groups 3 and 4, except smallpox, which is in group 5.

The third thing is this. In the list of micro-organisms that the CDC consider less dangerous because of their moderate morbidity and low mortality but that could still be potentially used for bioterrorism, some are in confinement group 2, like salmonella, some strains of E. coli, like 0157:H7, vibrio cholerae and cryptosporidium. In general, these are the micro-organisms most often responsible for food poisoning or contaminated water. Poisonings and contaminations of that kind are often due to poor hygiene practices or negligence on the part of the people in charge of water quality.

After I appeared here two weeks ago, I have had discussions with my colleagues and I have thought about the matter some more.

I would like to end with a recommendation. If the goal of lawmakers is to promote public health and safety in the area of micro-organisms and to protect Canadians from potential bioterrorist attacks, Bill C-11is not the solution. I feel that the bill could well create havoc by establishing a repressive system that lumps all micro-organisms together, whereas the vast majority of them pose no problem at all for people's health and safety. My recommendation is that lawmakers and the Public Health Agency of Canada concentrate on the few micro-organisms that potentially can be used maliciously and put in place appropriate measures for them.

Thank you for your attention. I will be pleased to answer your questions.

[Luc Malo, Bloc, Verchères—Les Patriotes, QC]

Thank you.

Earlier, Mr. Ghalami testified that the application of Bill C-11 could result in a brain drain. Can you give us any solid numbers as to the potential impact of the bill, given that witnesses have told us about lab closures in the United States? Mr. Ghalami even said that Canada had benefited from an influx of eminent researchers. Have you truly weighed the impact of the bill, to avoid having to contend with a similar situation here?

[Dr. Wayne Conlan]

I do, yes. This was for Bill C-54, not for Bill C-11, but I was certainly apprised very fully of its content and was given the opportunity to comment on it by the Public Health Agency of Canada.

[Dr. Wayne Conlan]

As I receive a lot of my funding from the U.S., I have to abide by the equivalent of Bill C-11 with the select agent rule. That's a little different because pathogens are considered select agents not based on their risk group. So you can be a risk group two pathogen and still be a select agent, and then you are governed by the select agent rule, whereas in Canada you would be a risk group two pathogen, and some risk group two pathogens would certainly be treated even under Bill C-11 with less concern than they would be if they were being handled in the U.S.

[Dr. Wayne Conlan]

Is it going to have some impact on research? Sure, but if you work with animals, the red tape surrounding the use of laboratory animals is far more onerous than the red tape proposed for level two pathogens by Bill C-11. The red tape surrounding the use of radioisotopes in laboratories is more onerous than the red tape for level two pathogens proposed by Bill C-11. We have to have inventories of all the chemicals in the laboratory; why shouldn't we have an inventory of all the pathogens in the laboratory too?

The Public Health Agency of Canada, over the years, has produced MSDS sheets for just about all of these pathogens, with really good, detailed instructions about how to handle them. So there's really no excuse not to go this one extra step and just have a list of who's got what. I would hope that the Government of Canada would like to know who's got what—and where they've got it, as well. That's the whole essence of Bill C-11, knowing where pathogens are kept.

[Ayoob Ghalami]

Absolutely. Change is always hard. One major concern that scientists especially have is the jail term, that if you do something wrong you go to a jail, with a car thief. But I guess this is the only way that bill could be introduced. There are concerns, and the reality is that the consequence of not acting properly is something I personally disagree with, having a scientist go to jail. If we can introduce a bill that has a different kind of consequence, as with the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, I would personally prefer that. But that does not eliminate the fact that we need Bill C-11 yesterday.

We need a federal baseline that tells every single individual who works with virus bacteria, with the potential to make individuals sick, that they have the same rules to play with. Listeria, as I mentioned, is risk group two; E. coli pathogen is risk group two; salmonella is risk group two; varicella is risk group two; HIV in blood is risk group two. These are serious pathogens. We need to regulate them.

[Nicolas Dufour, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Thank you for coming here today.

I have some questions, Mr. Ghalami. You stated that Bill C-11 was a very sound initiative. All of the witnesses who have testified so far have said that while the spirit of this bill is laudable, some of the details are problematic. For example, many scientists have voiced their concerns over the inclusion of risk group 2 pathogens in the bill. They also maintain that some of the concepts are too restrictive and that implementing some of the bill's measures could prove too costly for the laboratories.

You maintain that everything is fine for now, that your laboratories are safe and that you are doing everything you can to avoid any problems. My understanding of that statement is that the existing guidelines are adequate.

[Dr. Wayne Conlan, Principal Research Officer, National Research Council, As an Individual]

My name is Wayne Conlan. I'm a research scientist with the National Research Council, but I am appearing today as an individual. I'm a microbiologist with 27 years' experience working in level two and level three containment labs in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada.

I was a member of the committee that compiled the current Health Canada laboratory biosafety guidelines. Currently, I run a small-animal level three biocontainment facility at the NRC with a focus on highly virulent biodefence pathogens that cause life-threatening infections when inhaled.

I've been the responsible official for the design and implementation of all the biocontainment, biosafety, and biosecurity policies associated with this facility and for training staff in all these areas. And the requisite paperwork occupies more of my file space than all my other activities combined.

Annually, for the past ten years, my facility has been certified for its purpose by the Public Health Agency of Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. I receive significant funding for this work from the U.S. National Institutes of Health, and therefore my lab must also comply with the U.S. select agent rule, on which Bill C-11 appears to be partially modelled. Consequently, our level three containment facility has been inspected by representatives from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, most recently in October 2008, to ensure that it is operating in conditions equivalent to those required by the select agent rule.

In complying with the select agent rule, our laboratory is already fully operating within the limits being proposed by Bill C-11. For instance, all of our staff with access to our level three biocontainment facility have secret level clearance. Likewise, we already quantitatively update our pathogen inventories every three months. So I don't anticipate that compliance with Bill C-11 will impose any undue additional hardship on the operations of current level three containment facilities in Canada.

It needs to be remembered, in this regard, that many thousands of U.S. researchers are having to comply with the select agent rule, since their federal funding depends on it.

Interestingly, the revelation that the anthrax attack conducted by the U.S. Postal Service was an inside job now calls for even greater restrictions on the U.S. research community, including recommendations that staff with access to select agents undergo mandatory psychological screening. But given the innate eccentricity of many scientists, this could lead to the complete dismantling of the entire U.S. research enterprise in this area. So I hope we choose not to go down this road in Canada.

For the Canadian research community, it's the proposed oversight of level two labs that seems to be the most contentious issue. To date, this has been exclusively managed by the host institutions themselves. However, all such labs ought to be complying with the current biosafety guidelines and should therefore be readily able to comply with the provisions of Bill C-11.

In this regard, prior to the anthrax attack, the worst deliberate case of bioterrorism in the U.S. involved a religious cult contaminating several restaurant salad bars with a level two salmonella species, causing over 700 cases of food poisoning. Indeed, under normal circumstances, level two pathogens kill far more Canadians than level three pathogens. So there is a realistic argument to be made for more formal regulation of these organisms. I guess, on the other hand, it could be argued that level two pathogens are so ubiquitous in our everyday lives that they deserve no special consideration simply because they're being used in research. An analogy with this can be drawn between laboratory rodents, the use of which in research is highly regulated, and wild rodents, which anybody is allowed to kill by any means.

Overall, given the level of compliance being sought by Bill C-11 with respect to level two pathogens, it is difficult to argue against their inclusion in the act. However, level two labs are far more numerous than level three and four labs, and the system for regulating these could be overwhelmed if all these facilities try to register at once to comply with the act. It is incumbent on the Public Health Agency of Canada to ensure that the process of online registration of level two labs is an essentially painless experience that does not delay research progress. Allowing organizations to register all their level two labs in a single application should help in this regard.

There are a few issues obviously addressed by the act on which clarification would be helpful for assessing likely impacts of the act on the research community. For example, many labs use crippled strains of risk group two and three pathogens that are completely harmless, but it's not clear that these will be exempted from the act.

Additionally, many labs not involved in pathogen research use certain toxins in small quantities. A lot of immunologists use cholera toxin or enterotoxin in their immunology research as vaccine adjuvants, for example. Will these labs need to register? My own belief is that they should be allowed to possess a threshold limit of such toxins before being expected to register their facilities.

I thank you for your time. I am willing to answer any questions you might have.

[Ayoob Ghalami, Senior Biosafety Officer, Environmental Health and Safety, University of Toronto]

Honourable members, first of all I would like to mention I do not have a PhD; I am not a doctor.

My name is Ayoob Ghalami. I am the senior biosafety officer for the University of Toronto, speaking as an individual today. Thank you for the opportunity to come and talk on Bill C-11. I think it is a fantastic bill. I fully support it, for reasons I will explain.

As a biosafety officer, my job is on a small scale of what the Public Health Agency of Canada does. I look after 250 labs and three campuses at the University of Toronto. I look after animal facilities that deal with biologicals and I also deal with clinical settings that are set within our university-controlled premises.

I think I would be terrified if I were in public health and got supervision of a lab where I don't know what they have, what they deal with, and where they have it. The burden will be on my shoulders to go and deal with it tomorrow if anything goes wrong. How do I do resource management? How do I do proactive means to make sure individuals are trained? And how do I deal with emergencies?

It's really hard to do proper risk management and risk assessment when you do not know the calibre of the stuff you have to deal with. On the other hand, as we all know, we are in a society of licences and permits. You can't drive if you don't have a valid driver's licence. You can't get married if you don't have a valid licence. You can't open a restaurant if you don't have the proper permits to open a restaurant. However, it seems we are all fine if someone doesn't have a valid licence or permit to deal with biologicals that have and could have the possibility of having an enormous impact on our community. That terrifies me.

On one hand, as an institution what we have decided to do is.... I think this bill would level the playing field for everyone. Currently if I have a principal investigator who imported the biological agent, they're under binding contract with the Public Health Agency of Canada to follow their guidelines. But if another lab gets the same bug from a hospital they have no obligation to do anything. As an institution we don't see that visible practical, so we treat everyone the same. Another reason for that is the memorandum of understanding, which as a public institution we have signed by tri-council government granting agencies, provides the university with the financial means to do research. So that is how we practise that.

I would also like to mention to honourable members that I am a father of two. I have an eight-year-old and a seven-year-old. I really think I have to build a legacy for us to do the right thing so our kids have a safer and a better work environment than we had. I think that's the least we can give our kids.

So far I am 100% for the bill and I see it hands-on in the field. I run the biosafety program for the biggest university in the country and I think we have an established program. Having said that, we in the university try to do our best. We have established a biosafety committee that has 14 faculty members. We have a virologist, a prion specialist, a microbiologist, we have a vice-dean of medicine who sits on that panel, 14 faculty members. We have an occupational health doctor, two veterinarians, me, and three other senior administrators on this panel to decide on everything. We have mandatory training. Whoever works with biological has to be fully trained. Even if they're faculty members, they have to write a test so we understand they know their obligations. We have mandatory medical surveillance. What that means is if you work with human blood, you will possibly be exposed to hepatitis C and you have to be immunized before you do that. And we also have planned post-exposure prophylaxis for you so if you splash your ocular membrane with blood you can go to the hospital and get treated, because if you've got HIV in your system you have to be treated very quickly; time is of the essence. These are what we have achieved as an institution. But if there are no guidelines, these aren't following the guidelines.

For that reason, I really feel and hope members see it that I as an individual, a citizen, feel how important it is for us to have it. When you send your young kid to a university, hospital, or workplace, you really want to make sure all those proactive actions have been taken, so they're in safe hands.

These were the positive things I had to say about the bill. Now I'll come to the other side.

Biological agents are extremely fluid. To put it simply, we have researchers who work with HIV, which is an anti-virus; they use it as a viral vector, so they use it for gene therapy. The anti-virus can infect dividing and non-dividing cells, but it has a narrow host range. What they do is they take HIV, change the membrane to make sure the host range is broader. So now the target cells it can infect are not just one cell; it can infect anything. On top of that, sometimes they put an oncogene, a cancer-causing gene, inside it to infect. How do you do a risk assessment on that? How do you put it in a schedule? This is not fluid. Schedules are there, fixed, done. This changes all the time.

We want to make sure the bill meets the needs of industry. We change all the time. To put in a solid schedule without input or without routine change is not going to help us. I think there has to be a provision on that.

We, as the University of Toronto, have met with the Public Health Agency of Canada in Toronto and we have mentioned it, and they have agreed there will be some changes, or at least there will be input from experts in the field when they change the category.

The second thing we have confirmation on and that will be cited is the security clearance. I think it's extremely important that we have a secure country. I am not a sportsman. I don't think I needed to say that—my physical looks show it—but the reality is that if you're not a good soccer player you'll run after every single ball and you'll exhaust yourself. When it comes to the time you're going to go score, you don't have the energy and means.

As an institution they decided, and I as a biosafety officer feel that—and I think public health has agreed—risk group two should be exempt from security clearance and all the other stuff. At the same time, public health should have full authority to go to check the institutions for risk group two. Listeria is risk group two. E. coli is risk group two. Varicella is risk group two. It's extremely important that they do have supervision, and there is a model existent out there already.

The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commissioner gives the institution as a whole a permit, so you have a permit to function and they know what you have. At any given time they have the right to come and audit your operation to see what you're in compliance with and what you're not in compliance with. At the same time, you don't have to get a permit to buy anything that you want to buy at any given time. If we get that model for risk group two and have as much control as Bill C-11 says for risk group three, most institutions would be able to function and we would leave a good legacy for our kids, because they would be in better hands than we are.

I thank you for your time, and I welcome questions when my turn comes.

[Dr. Albert Descoteaux, Professor, Institut Armand-Frappier, Institut national de la recherche scientifique]

First, let me thank you for giving me the privilege of coming to share with you the concerns of a number of my colleagues and myself with regard to many aspects of Bill C-11.

I am a professor and researcher at the Institut Armand-Frappier. Most of the research and teaching activities at our institution are in virology and microbiology. I am also deputy director of the Centre de recherche sur les interactions hôte-parasite and I hold a Canada Research Chair in infection and immunity. I have more than 25 years' experience in microbiology research.

My interest in Bill C-11comes initially from the classification of micro-organisms in the previous version of this bill, Bill C-54. In it, the parasite that I work with, the Leishmania parasite, was classified in group 3, a glaring error. It mobilized the research community that works with the Leishmania parasite, because of the potentially disastrous consequences that this could have on our research work. Regrettably, there had been no consultation with the researchers involved on the reclassification of this micro-organism, and a number of others. It seems that it was done in quite an arbitrary way. Of course, I cannot make that assumption, but it seemed to be so.

A number of corrections were made to the classification of micro-organisms and toxins in Bill C-11. But problems remain, as Dr. Hynes has indicated. Let me give some examples. Viral strains, such as VSV, are classified at level 3, whereas several strains are modified for the laboratory and used with animal models to understand how they cause infection. Mycobacterium bovis, the BCG vaccine strain, is classified in level 3 in this bill, yet one third to one half of the world's population has received the BCG vaccine. This vaccine is currently used to treat certain cancers, such as bladder cancer. Imagine doctors having to go to a level 3 facility to treat their bladder cancer patients with BCG injections. It would be absolutely ridiculous. Escherichia coli was also mentioned.

I would also like to mention toxins briefly. People seem to be very afraid of toxins. But a toxin called botulinum is used to treat wrinkles and some spasms; the common name is Botox. In humans, it is not really very dangerous. Another interesting thing about bacterial toxins in research is that molecules of microbial origin target molecules in our cells in very specific ways. So these toxins become essential tools in studying how a cell works. In cancer, in neurology and in immunology, for example, toxins are frequently used to block cell functions. If toxins became impossible to obtain, or extremely difficult to keep, a good deal of research in those areas would have to be abandoned, or would become very difficult.

As for basic research, that is, the kind of research in microbiology and the fight against disease that a number of my colleagues do, and I include myself, we know that it is essential if knowledge is to move forward. It allows us to understand the interactions between microbes and their hosts, including humans, the pathogenic processes and the immune responses that humans generate against these micro-organisms. Knowledge like that is essential in order to develop vaccines, treatments, diagnostic tests, and so on.

The current version of this bill can potentially have negative consequences. What consequences can over-restrictive legislation have on microbiology research? It could mean reducing or abandoning research on some micro-organisms because of the administrative complexities and the lack of adequate infrastructure. For example, if a researcher in an institution is working with a level 1 organism that is now classed as level 2, he no longer has the required infrastructure, which is very expensive. Is he going to continue his research? Where is he going to get the money to upgrade his facility? The same happens with pathogens that move from level 2 to level 3.

Costs go up for the research institutions and for the researchers who are funded by the Canadian Institutes for Health Research, for example.

Who is going to pay for the oversight mechanisms, the permit applications, the administration? It is all very well to impose constraints, though they seem excessive to me, but who is going to pay for them so that the research does not suffer? Let us not forget that most research in health and microbiology in Canada is funded by the federal government. If this bill is passed in its present form, there will be less return for each grant dollar.

It was said earlier that research requires the free exchange of information, knowledge and reagents. By “reagent“, I mean exchanging microbial strains, and I am not alone. if the rules are too strict, it can interfere with researchers' ability to exchange and obtain the reagents they need to pursue their research. How are we going to address those questions? The bill does not really make it clear. Ultimately, it is the fight against infectious diseases that may be affected by this bill because of the influence it has on the potential for research in Canada.

I would also like to talk about the negative impacts of overly restrictive legislation on the training of highly qualified people. By that, I mean the students in our universities and colleges. As director of the doctoral program in virology and immunology at my institution, and as a professor who teaches microbial pathogenesis, this concerns me greatly. It is crucial to ensure that the next generation of microbiologists in Canada is properly trained. That is done by having them work with micro-organisms.

These highly qualified people will be needed in order to staff our hospitals. These are the diagnosticians, the people who take samples, and so on. They are in research institutions, private or governmental. They are in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. In the food industry, they are in quality control departments; we have heard plenty about contamination problems in that industry. People have to be familiar with micro-organisms. So we have to train people so that, for example, they go into government laboratories or into teaching.

In Quebec, we train laboratory technicians at college level. They have to learn how to recognize and work with micro-organisms. A good microbiologist can tell the strain of a microbe by smelling it. He can see the shape of a colony in a Petri dish. If we do not give them the ability to do that, or if it is too difficult to have practical courses in schools, universities and colleges, it is going to be very difficult to train the next generation of microbiologists.

We must make sure that the legislation does not prevent students and trainees from getting into research laboratories, or prevent them from learning by working with micro-organisms. You do not become an auto mechanic without ever rooting around inside an engine or a transmission. It is the same in microbiology. You have to be able to play with these micro-organisms in order to really get to know them.

The greatest dangers from infectious disease that Canadians are exposed to are likely to be in contaminated water and food, which are, in fact, often used to justify this bill. Think of Walkerton, think of the listeria crisis, and so on. You can also go to a restaurant, eat something suspect and get food poisoning, but a bill like this is not going to prevent that. The problems there are negligence, inadequate maintenance, poor practices in hygiene or cooking. Nosocomial infections, the ones you get in hospital, are associated with hygiene problems, as are outbreaks of C. difficile. We tackle epidemics such as flu, SARS and legionellosis with appropriate public health measures that allow us to limit and isolate the outbreaks. Canadians will not become safer overnight, or be in less danger from infectious diseases, because of restrictive legislation.

In my opinion, this bill cannot be used to pretend that it is preventing this kind of everyday hazard. I will end by saying that the vast majority of microbiological research in Canada requires micro-organisms in containment levels 1 and 2.

Because they pose a very low risk and because it is unlikely that they would be used for bioterrorism, micro-organisms in schedule 2 must, in my opinion, be removed from Bill C-11.

Thank you for your attention.

[Theresa Tam, Director General, Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response, Infectious Disease and Emergency Preparedness Branch, Public Health Agency of Canada]

Thank you.

Madam Chair and members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before the Standing Committee on Health today to discuss Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins..

My colleagues have been introduced.

We have an opportunity at this committee today to discuss the key elements of this bill, which seeks to provide protections to safeguard Canadians against the health and safety risks posed by the most dangerous human pathogens and toxins. Let me first discuss the current system.

Currently, approximately 3,500 laboratories that import human pathogens or toxins are regulated under the human pathogens importation regulations. These laboratories must also comply with the laboratory biosafety guidelines, which are widely accepted as Canada's national biosafety standard.

Even though these guidelines are in place, additional legislation and regulations are required to reinforce safe laboratory practices and establish consistency. The bill seeks to do this by ensuring that all laboratories in Canada, whether federal, provincial, or private, whether or not they import pathogens, are adhering to the laboratory biosafety guidelines.

The need to enhance biosafety in Canada's labs by preventing an accidental release of these agents is one of the two primary focuses of Bill C-11. The other is the desire to safeguard Canadians from the risk of an intentional release of a dangerous agent, such as anthrax, by someone who is trying to harm Canadians.

Ensuring that persons who have access to the most dangerous human pathogens or toxins are properly security screened can ultimately reduce the risk of an intentional release of a pathogen and enhance the biosecurity standard in Canada.

The intention of the bill is to try to balance biosafety and biosecurity requirements with the need to advance science, innovation, and research. The intention of this bill is not to restrict research and development but rather to introduce a risk-based approach to the management of human pathogens so they are handled safely and accounted for across Canada.

In this vein, the program and regulatory framework around this legislation is intended to be less stringent for those individuals who are handling less dangerous pathogens and toxins and more stringent on those handling the more dangerous pathogens and toxins. For example, there is no intention of security-screening individuals working with risk group 2 human pathogens, such as salmonella, under this act.

Because of the risk posed by dangerous human pathogens and toxins, Bill C-11 relies primarily on the criminal law jurisdiction of Parliament. In this regard, Bill C-11 includes a range of prohibitions, inspection powers, and security-screening requirements designed to address the health and safety of Canadians.

The program and regulatory framework to be developed under Bill C-11 will include requirements for licensing, inventories, biological safety officers, information gathering, and the transferring of human pathogens and toxins. The legislation has been drafted with care to ensure the bill fully respects the rights and freedoms of Canadians entrenched in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Public Health Agency of Canada has already conducted four rounds of information sessions with stakeholders.

In September 2007 a proposed legislative framework was discussed with the academic, research, and diagnostic communities as well as private industry across Canada. As well, discussions about the proposed legislation took place with the chief medical officers of health from the provinces and territories in October 2007.

Following the tabling last year of the previous version of this legislation, Bill C-54, the Public Health Agency held more information sessions with stakeholders, including the laboratory community across Canada, to gauge some reactions to the new legislation. Most sessions were open to all who wanted to attend and took place in Halifax, Quebec City, Montreal, Toronto, Saskatoon, Calgary, and Vancouver.

Stakeholders expressed agreement with the general need to enhance federal oversight of human pathogens and toxins, although they did raise some technical and operational issues regarding how the entire program would be implemented. Based on the feedback we have received from stakeholders, the Public Health Agency has developed an initial program and regulatory framework that outlines what the regulations under the bill could potentially look like.

With regards to the financial impacts of Bill C-11 on laboratories across Canada, although we cannot anticipate for certain what the costs will be until the full suite of regulations have been developed, we anticipate that there should be little impact on laboratories that are already in compliance with the laboratory biosafety guidelines.

In addition, avoiding unnecessary financial burdens on laboratories is a priority. For this reason, to help laboratories adjust to the new requirements, it's envisaged that the act will be implemented in three phases to allow time for stakeholders to adjust to new requirements without unduly interfering with research activities, with a view to minimizing any potential costs.

A concern was raised at second reading about potential privatization. The policy intent of this bill is not to privatize public laboratories. The Public Health Agency of Canada will conduct in-depth and meaningful consultations with stakeholders across the country to discuss the program and regulatory framework. These consultations will include the matters that stakeholders identified to us, such as inventories, licensing, and security screening. This will help balance the needs for biosafety and security on the one hand and the interests of ongoing and innovative science and research on the other.

Madam Chair, Bill C-11 is required to safeguard the health and well-being of Canadians. The bill will finally enable Canada to eliminate the biosafety and biosecurity gap that has been filled by most of its G8 partners. As we learned during consultations and information sessions, most stakeholders recognize the need to move ahead with expanded federal oversight of human pathogens and toxins. We look forward to the committee's inquiries regarding this important piece of legislation.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Joy Smith]

That is carried. Thank you very much.

Pursuant to the order of reference of Monday, February 23, 2009, Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins, from the Public Health Agency of Canada we have Theresa Tam, who is the director general, centre for emergency preparedness and response, infectious disease and emergency preparedness branch. Welcome to our committee. We have James Gilbert, director general of the strategic policy directorate. Welcome also. We have Jane Allain, general counsel for legal services. Welcome. Of course, everyone is familiar with Dr. Frank Plummer, scientific director general of the National Microbiology Laboratory.

In front of us today we have some of the best minds in our country, and we're very happy and pleased that you could come to join us again.

We will have presentations of seven minutes, or do you want to go right into the questioning?

We will start with Theresa Tam. That's a 10-minute presentation, Ms. Tam. Then we'll go on to our next witness. Thank you.

The House resumed consideration of the motion that Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

Human Pathogens and Toxins Act

[Paul Szabo, Liberal, Mississauga South, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I would like the member to know that we are debating Bill C-11, important legislation that would provide information to Canadians. It would enable us to track human pathogens, such as anthrax, salmonella and influenza. However, the speeches that have been given today by the opposition members have to do with concerns about accountability, transparency and openness.

During my speech, I gave some examples of where we have not had the transparency and openness that Canadians deserve. It is a part of the foundation of democracy. If the member does not agree with what I had to say, I accept that because he has the right to do that, but if his only reaction to a speech that demonstrates clearly that the government has not been accountable to the people of Canada and if his only concern is what somebody did in the province of Ontario when we are talking about an important bill on human pathogens, it tells me more about the member than it does about me.

It is important for us to understand that transparency, openness and accountability are fundamental to the foundations of democracy. The opposition has raised certain considerations. We are prepared to support the objectives of the bill but we do have concerns about the mechanisms in which the transparency, openness and accountability will be delivered given the abysmal track record of the current government.

[Paul Szabo, Liberal, Mississauga South, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to participate in the debate on Bill C-11, an act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins.

There is a number of pieces of legislation of a same or similar nature in which I have had some involvement. The discussion that has just taken place in House is with respect to the need for openness and transparency as key issues.

Let me briefly look at some of the basics of the bill.

First, Bill C-11 proposes a mandatory licensing system for the federal government to track what human pathogens exist, those being anthrax, salmonella and influenza, for example, where they are and who possesses them in Canada. It also proposes to provide enhanced inspection powers to inspectors to help ensure compliance with laboratory biosafety guidelines and to ensure that the legislation is applied properly and consistently across Canada.

That is a very succinct but important statement on behalf of the Government of Canada. This is a very important bill for us to have.

As the previous speaker had indicated, in a response to the question that I posed to her, there have been questions of openness and transparency with regard to the reporting of important information to the public.

In terms of the key messages, I think all members in the House are committed to improving the safety and health of Canadians. I have often said that the measure of success of a country is not so much an economic measure as it is a measure of the health and well-being of its people.

When there are circumstances where the health and well-being of people is being impacted by matters beyond their control, such as the importation or storage of such things as anthrax or salmonella or influenza, it is relevant.

We support the measures that have been proposed to improve the safety and security of Canadian laboratories for all Canadians. We want to review the legislation at committee to ensure that it is accountable, transparent and as effective as possible.

The purpose of the act, as I indicated, is to establish the safety and security regime to protect the health and safety of the public against the risks posed by human pathogens and toxins. The bill does establish that legislative framework that extends beyond the present importation and storage regime for pathogens and toxins.

The current regime requires that all labs that import human pathogens or toxins adhere to the requirements, but that these existing guidelines are not mandatory for laboratories that acquire human pathogens and toxins from domestic sources. This is a problem.

Even though they are applied widely on a voluntary basis as an industry standard, voluntary guidelines are not good enough when it comes to the health and safety of Canadians.

The bill also requires that all Canadian labs that possess human pathogens or toxins, regardless of where they were acquired, adhere to these guidelines. Bill C-11 specifically includes a number of provisions which will help to achieve these objectives.

It requires laboratories carrying out activities with risk groups two, three or four human pathogens or select toxins have to register with the Public Health Agency of Canada Office of Laboratory Security. It also subject licensees with risk group three and four pathogens and possibly select toxins to stricter operating regulations.

It requires an importation permit to import the human pathogen or toxin. It requires a transfer permit to send and receive any human pathogen or toxin between laboratories within Canada that are not part of the same facility. It also requires the authorization from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada to export agents on the export control list. It also requires licensees, as a part of their annual or biannual update of inventories, to notify the PHAC of the nature of the disposal of human pathogens and toxins.

These changes are meant to bring Canada in to line with more stringent regulations, which are in place in the United States and in the U.K., for example. It also gives substantial regulatory powers to the minister and inspectors. It will be necessary to further study these powers to ensure the transparency, effectiveness and accountability. This leads me to my specific contribution to the debate, which is with regard to the accountability aspect as well as the regulatory powers.

I have had the opportunity to be a member of the scrutiny of regulations committee, the standing joint committee of the House of Commons and Senate, for a number of years, and was its chair for a couple of years. What struck me was the regulatory guidelines and requirements, as laid out in certain pieces of legislation, tended to push the envelope with regard to a concern about what is called backdoor legislation. Backdoor legislation refers to providing undertakings or responsibilities in the regulations where that authority is not enabled by the legislation itself. It means putting something into the legislation that is not even part of the bill itself, simply covered under, “The minister may make regulations from time to time”.

When the regulations are required by a bill, the bill in the end will not show that it comes into force on receiving royal assent, but will be at a date specified by order-in-council, which is by cabinet. The reason for that is so the regulations necessary and called for under the legislation can be properly drafted, reviewed and gazetted et cetera prior to their enforcement.

There is some concern when we get to matters like this. We have seen far too many examples of where regulations have not been prepared on a timely basis. It represents a reluctance by the government to have legislation come into force. It may just simply be, here is a bill that will do all these wonderful things and it will be the law in Canada when the regulations are done.

Time and time again there have been delays in the implementation of legislation simply because regulations have not been done, and I can give an example.

One was the reproductive technologies act that I was involved with through the health committee. This dealt with the whole question of embryonic stem cell research and the establishment of a committee that would review the application of researchers to do research involving embryonic stem cells.

At that time, the officials told us in committee that the regulations required to make this happen would take something like two years, yet the government said that we needed it, that it was pursuant to a royal commission report on the reproductive technologies. It was urgent and had some very significant recommendations, but much of the legislation from years gone by is still not in place. One of the reasons for that was we put into the legislation that the minister was required to submit the proposed regulations to the committee for its comments. The minister of the day refused to give the committee the authority to amend or to reject regulations. They were simply there for review and comment.

With regard to that legislation, and it is years now after the royal commission report, which was about 15 years ago, we now have a situation where regulations pursuant to that legislation, which was passed at all stages in this place and in the other place, still are not the law in Canada. In fact, the committee to establish it has not been established and all the regulations related to the research permissions or authorizations are not in place.

Notwithstanding that Parliament as a whole, along with the Senate, passed urgent legislation, the law has not been totally put into force because regulations have not been promulgated, which totally frustrates the responsibilities of Parliament to do its job. I hope to have an opportunity to follow up with the new health minister on what the minister is doing in this regard.

However, that is a good example of a situation where legislation has gone through all stages, with two or three months of comprehensive committee hearings, and it is still not fully in force primarily due to regulations and the fact that the government has not even come forward with them.

It is not a matter of whether the regulations were a problem. As the members well know, when we deal with legislation in this place we do not get to see the regulations. We do not get to see those fine-tuning items that give us an idea of the scope or the intent of the legislation. There is a fine line at which a regulation will go beyond what was enabled in the legislation.

The Standing Joint Committee on Scrutiny of Regulations is there to review these things as they occur but after the fact to determine whether the regulations have been properly enabled within the legislation.

I raise that because it leads to the whole question of whether we have backdoor legislation where regulations are trying to do things that were not enabled in the legislation and whether the proviso that there be regulations made, which the government chooses not to make, could delay or even stop legislation that goes through the entire parliamentary process from ever becoming law in Canada.

How can Canadians keep ahead of the curve when they do not know whether legislation that is passed in Parliament will become law. We have far too many examples. It goes to the true question of accountability and transparency.

One of the first things the current government did was bring in the Federal Accountability Act. It puffed its chest and said that it would be accountable. When I first looked at it I thought that people should understand what the expectation was from accountability. I was looking at some of this material on the weekend and I came up with a definition that I challenge the government to follow. The definition of accountability is to explain and justify one's actions or decisions in a clear, concise and truthful manner. To synthesize this down, it means to be honest and give the straight story. I want to understand and I want to understand why the government took that decision.

If a government promises to do something and it does not do it, accountability demands that it explains and justifies that decision. Sometimes we make decisions to do things but circumstances change and it is important to back off and rethink the decisions. There is no point in going forward with something that changes because there is new information. However, when I think of some of the examples, such as promising not to tax income trusts but imposing a 31.5% tax one year later, really did not do much for the government, which boasted that it was helping seniors by introducing things like pension income splitting when it knew that over 85% of seniors would not benefit from it simply because they were in the lowest tax bracket, did not have eligible pensions or were seniors who had no one to split with.

When we take it to that extent, when the government claims that it represents 100% of a group and then does something for a group that only 14% or 15% actually can benefit from, that is not being accountable.

I have many examples of that and I hope to get a chance to talk about them at some other opportunity.

On February 22, CP had an article dealing with access to information requests. It is relevant because the concerns that have been raised by the opposition with respect to this bill have to do with transparency, accountability and openness. According to the Canwest news service, since January 2008 the Department of Foreign Affairs has prevented the release of more than 160,000 pages of government records on everything from the mission in Afghanistan, to new free trade deals with NATO, to material being left at the home of the girlfriend of the former minister of foreign affairs. It goes even further.

The Access to Information Commissioner has said that the government has demonstrated a systemic problem of inhibiting the intent of the Access to Information Act by having most of the releases vetted by the Prime Minister's Office or the Privy Council Office. This is contrary to the spirit and the intent of the law.

With respect to one of the releases, the government asked for a four month extension but once the four month extension expired the government said that even though it had the documents they were not really relevant to what was asked for so it had nothing to give. The Privy Council Office, on the other hand, turned around and said that it could not give the information because it was secret and could not be given out.

When Mr. Marleau, the Access to Information Commissioner, says that there are systemic problems in the government and that the worst offenders of the spirit and intent of the Access to Information Act are the Prime Minister's Office and the Privy Council Office, one can understand why the opposition is concerned about accountability, transparency and openness. An officer of Parliament, appointed by this Parliament, has said that it is the Prime Minister's own office that is the biggest problem in ensuring that Canadians do not get the information to which they are entitled.

Access to information, openness and transparency are foundations of our democracy. The Prime Minister, by denying the workability of the Access to Information Act, is taking away the opportunity for Canadians to experience what they can get under a truly democratic system. Canadians have the right to know.

If the government is not going to support the Access to Information Act and its intent and its principles, then now is the time for it to say so. If it wants to back away from the Federal Accountability Act now is the time to say so.

In these challenging times for Canadians, now is the time for the government to put the interests of the people ahead of its own partisan interests. The government has spent all of its time campaigning, not governing, and the country needs the government to govern. The government must be accountable. This litany of unaccountability must stop now in the best interests of the people of Canada.

[Yasmin Ratansi, Liberal, Don Valley East, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleagues for giving me the opportunity to speak to Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins. Although technical in nature, this bill is very necessary and important federal legislation. It is a public safety issue as much as it is a public health bill. Bill C-11 proposes a mandatory licensing system for the federal government to track the human pathogens that exist, such as anthrax, salmonella and influenza.

While many Canadians do not consider the flu to be a national threat, we need only remind ourselves of the 1918 flu pandemic, commonly referred to as the Spanish flu, that spread to nearly every part of the world, including the Arctic and remote Pacific islands. The Spanish flu did not claim simply those normally at risk, such as the elderly, infants and the infirm; in fact, it claimed the lives of normal, healthy adults, mostly because it tricked strong immune systems into a catastrophic overreaction. It is estimated that anywhere from 20 million to 100 million people were killed worldwide, roughly double the number of people killed during World War I. Indeed, many of those who survived the horror of trench warfare ironically succumbed to this deadly strain of influenza A, a form of bird flu.

Modern science has made it possible to recreate influenza A and other pathogens. That is why it is necessary to implement government controls to track who is in possession of them in Canada.

Many residents of Toronto remember the social and economic impact of the SARS outbreak in 2003. Severe acute respiratory syndrome is believed to have originated in China, but within weeks it had been reported in 37 countries around the world, including Canada. It resulted in 800 deaths, 44 of which were in Toronto. This virus tested international containment efforts and changed the way Canada deals with pandemic threats.

Many of the staff on Parliament Hill recall the extraordinary measures that were taken in 2001 following the anthrax attacks, when letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to several media outlets and the offices of two U.S. senators. This attack killed five people and infected 17 others. Anthrax is one of the oldest recorded diseases of grazing animals and is even believed to be the sixth plague mentioned in the book of Exodus. One can see I read religious books. It occurs in nature, but it also has been harnessed as a weapon of war. Sheep and cattle are especially vulnerable to anthrax spores because they are soil-borne and are inhaled or ingested while the animals graze. For the people who did not know about it, I am giving a lesson in agriculture.

Anthrax spores were harnessed as bioweapons in both world wars. Thousands died in Manchuria in the 1930s when anthrax was tested on prisoners of war. It was stored as a weapon of mass destruction in the arsenals of the former Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States until 1971. However, the 2001 anthrax attacks were classified as weaponized or weapons-grade strains of the spores. While that should have made it easier to identify the attacker, it was not until August 2008, seven years later, that the FBI identified the culprit as a scientist who worked at a government biodefence lab.

That is why it is absolutely necessary that Canada and the federal government modernize the capability of tracking human pathogens and toxins. This legislation, Bill C-11, will give inspectors enhanced powers to ensure that the laboratory biosafety guidelines, called LBG, are followed properly. That is why the official opposition supports sending this bill to committee for an in-depth study.

Bill C-11 will require laboratories handling deadly toxins to register with the Public Health Agency of Canada's Office of Laboratory Security. Bill C-11 will require an import permit to bring a human pathogen or toxin into Canada. It will require a permit to transfer a pathogen or toxin between laboratories in Canada. Bill C-11 will require laboratories to notify the Public Health Agency when registered pathogens or toxins are disposed of. All in all, the bill will bring Canada in line with the more stringent regulations in the United States and the United Kingdom.

As has been eloquently stated by my colleague from Etobicoke North, it is in the best interest of all countries, including Canada, to support initiatives to control infectious diseases. The world is now an island. There is free flow of traffic, human beings, goods, services and food. As such, all countries should be alert and develop strategies to minimize the risks from infectious diseases. As I mentioned before, we have seen examples of the avian flu, SARS, et cetera.

Microbiological agents and toxins can and do impact global health. As I mentioned before, in 2003 SARS killed 800 people. Biosafety is essential if we are to mitigate the deadly effects of infectious diseases. The World Health Organization urges countries to: one, promote biosafety practices for the safe handling, containment and transport of microbiological agents and toxins; two, to review the safety of laboratories and their existing protocols; three, to develop programs that enhance compliance of laboratories; and four, to encourage the development of biological safety training.

Thousands of infectious samples are shipped daily around the world for clinical trials, disease investigations, surveillance, et cetera. Animal and human specimens need to be transported efficiently, legally, safely, and on a timely basis. Shippers must be aware of regulatory requirements, personnel must undertake appropriate training, and specimens must be packed to protect transporters from risk of infection.

Best practices regarding the transport of microbiological agents and toxins must be used to protect the environment and human health. Perhaps more support is needed to prevent the introduction and spread of communicable diseases from other countries and among other provinces.

It is therefore imperative that laboratories have strict facility safeguards, microbiological practices and safety equipment that protect laboratory workers, the environment and the public from exposure to infectious microorganisms and toxins that are stored in the laboratory.

Responsible laboratory practices will help prevent intentional release, loss, misuse, theft, or unauthorized access of biological material and will contribute to preserving important scientific work for future generations.

To conclude, this is not a partisan matter. This is about the health and safety of Canadians. That is why my Liberal colleagues and I are proud to support the bill. Bill C-11 is a great improvement over Bill C-54. Infectious diseases know no boundaries. Pathogens are not restricted to one's own airspace. As such, we should do everything to increase biosafety.

Since the bill requires licensing and the provinces and territories are responsible for licensing, it is important to have a further study and review of this legislation. As well, we must ensure that there is transparency, effectiveness and accountability at the ministerial level as well as at the level of inspectors. We need to build trust so that Canadians and the world can be assured that they will be safe and secure when it comes to activities involving pathogens and toxins.

[Luc Malo, Bloc, Verchères—Les Patriotes, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like first to express my deep appreciation to my colleague from Hochelaga on his eloquent address.

As he explained so well, the hon. member for Hochelaga has a wealth of parliamentary experience. I was listening so hard during his speech that I could not check the schedules to find out what the security level is for the pathogens that cause mononucleosis. If he so desires—because this topic seems especially close to his heart—I could delve into this a bit more deeply.

My question is for him because the hon. member for Hochelaga is the justice critic for the Bloc Québécois.

Bill C-11, as written, institutes penalties for persons or institutions that are negligent, fail to take precautions or intentionally release pathogens into the environment. I would like to know if he, as our justice critic, knows whether the Criminal Code already deals with intentional attacks on public safety, such as terrorism, or unintentional acts, such as criminal negligence?

[Réal Ménard, Bloc, Hochelaga, QC]

Mr. Speaker, it is not difficult to imagine how pleased I am to speak to Bill C-11. I thank my party whip's office for providing me with this wonderful opportunity.

This bill may seem technical on the surface. But when we examine it a little more closely, we see that it is a technical bill through and through.

Nevertheless, in spite of its technical nature, this bill is important because it deals with pathogens, those micro-organisms that can carry infection and disease, that can cause devastation and that can transmit viruses and sources of infection. This bill is about pathogens, toxins, laboratories and research. It is also about our desire to ensure that research facilities are safe and secure without adversely affecting research activities carried out throughout Canada.

When it comes to health—my colleagues know this—we can always question if this is a federal jurisdiction. I would like to remind members that when the 33 Fathers of Confederation met, in what was called a constituent assembly, they divided the powers.

Naturally when we examine the facts, we know very well that when we ask which authority has the constitutional power—known as a head of jurisdiction in constitutional law—to intervene in a particular area, we must read sections 91 and 92. We note that health may well be an area of greater concern to the provinces because it deals with providing care to the population and it concerns the operation of health establishments.

In all modern societies, many resources are allocated to the operating budget of the various departments because health is a concern of all citizens. I am pleased to remind members that, from 1995 to 1997, the government refused to make investments in health. There were campaigns throughout Canada and a federal-provincial conference including all health ministers of all political stripes. The Bloc Québécois took out ads in the papers calling on the federal government to assume its responsibilities and to make significant investments through its health transfers. The Bloc was obviously speaking on behalf of the National Assembly of Quebec.

I am not trying to suggest that the federal government has no responsibility for health. For example, we know that the federal government has fiduciary responsibility for aboriginal people. In addition, if I am not mistaken, more than half the federal health department's programming has to do with aboriginal people. The federal government obviously has a role to play in patents, and that responsibility is shared by the Department of Health and the Department of Industry.

I have wondered about the whole issue of patents. Are they in consumers' interests? How do we strike a balance? There needs to be a public policy of investment to promote research. Ten years can easily go by from the time a molecule is isolated to the time a drug is available to consumers. That is an investment cycle involving several million dollars. There needs to be a balance between consumers' interests and policies that promote research, because there are major investments involved.

The federal government has a role to play with regard to aboriginal people, patents and epidemics. Perhaps we need to look at this bill in that light.

This bill says that guidelines exist for pathogens that may be viruses or major sources of infection. The idea is to create a stricter system of regulations for pathogens and toxins.

I read in the bill we received and the research notes prepared by my party that there are thousands of labs in Canada that may not fully comply with policies that are not as strict as what is proposed in the bill.

From now on, we will need a licence or permit to conduct what are being called controlled activities. People in labs will need a licence to possess, handle, use, produce, store, authorize access to, transfer, import, export, release, abandon or dispose of human pathogens or toxins.

We could ask if such a system is necessary. I believe that my colleague, the member for Verchères—Les Patriotes, mentioned that the Bloc Québécois is not opposed to the bill, but we would like to know a bit more about the repercussions. For example, what will this mean for the research institutions? What will this mean for the laboratories?

One of the great advances for humanity in recent years is that we do not simply talk about old age anymore, we now talk about very old age. As a human society, if we are prudent, if we do not drink too much, if we do not smoke, if we do a bit of physical activity, if we go to the gym regularly and if we pay attention to what we call health determinants, chances are good that we will live to be 100 or more. That is what we mean by very old age. We have met centenarians in our ridings. I could ask my colleagues how many of them have, in their activities as a member, met people older than 95 or 100. There are more and more of them. In Canada, it is said that there are more than 100,000 centenarians. I have no doubt, Mr. Speaker, when I look at you and see how healthy you are, that you will be a centenarian yourself, and I wish that for you.

We live in a society in which there are more and more centenarians, in which people are living much longer and in better health, and this is thanks to research. It means we are able to control certain diseases that used to be crippling, and not all that long ago. Remember, just a few years or a few decades ago, mononucleosis was a fatal disease. Today, there are some differences, depending on the strain in question, but people do not die from mononucleosis. It has been called the kissing disease. Of course, I do not wish to get too autobiographical about it.

That said, I think my point is clear. More and more of our fellow citizens are living longer and longer thanks to research, and this research may require the use of pathogens that must obviously be isolated in conditions where this is no contamination, understandably. As an aside—and I am sure you know this, Mr. Speaker—I have 16 years of service in this House and I have had various responsibilities within the Bloc Québécois caucus. My first role was as our research and development critic.

I recall Lucien Bouchard, a great leader whom I respect and regard very highly, inviting me to a meeting in his office. I had been elected in October 1993. At the time, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien had recalled the House for January. We did not sit in November and December because Prime Minister Chrétien had to attend various international meetings with NATO.

When Mr. Bouchard appointed his shadow cabinet, he gave me a very important responsibility: research and development. I told Mr. Bouchard that I was flattered. During the 1993 campaign, we were very concerned, as a political party, about the fact that there had been a lot of public investment in the national capital region, where several public laboratories were—and still are—located, and very little investment on the Outaouais side. There was a lot of investment in the national capital region, but even though research was being done, compared to the numbers for the Outaouais, there was a huge disparity.

The Bloc Québécois wants to make sure that this bill's worthy objectives result in all laboratories complying with human pathogen handling standards. We have been told that several thousand labs in Canada do not follow Health Canada's biosafety guidelines. The government wants to make the guidelines more coercive by introducing a licensing system. It wants to ensure that organizations conducting research will not be penalized. The bill's schedule differentiates between pathogens that can be very harmful to public safety and those that are less dangerous. We see that different classes of licences will be issued.

The Bloc Québécois would like to know what this means for research. I was a member of the Standing Committee on Health when we studied the bill to create the Canadian Institutes of Health Research. In the 1990s, John Manley was the minister responsible for that file: as minister of industry, he was responsible for research and development. The OECD had released a report that lambasted Canada for investing so little in research and development. The bill was introduced.

The Bloc Québécois had a number of concerns. We wanted to ensure that various funding organizations, such as the Medical Research Council of Canada, would continue to support us. In good years, Quebec received nearly 30% of the funding. We wanted to be sure that, under the new Canadian Institutes of Health Research, we would hold on to our share of research contracts.

The Canadian Institutes of Health Research is a network of virtual institutes across Canada. Some of these institutes are concerned with population health, while others focus on cancer, aboriginal people, mental health and so on. The institutes are connected to each other in a structure that can produce interesting outcomes. Certainly, within these publicly funded research labs, research involving pathogens is being conducted. If the bill is passed, what will that mean? That is one question the Bloc Québécois has.

We also have questions about fines. As I said, we are told that biosafety guidelines already exist. In Canada—and I feel it is my duty to share these figures in the interest of full disclosure—there are 7,500 labs, nearly 4,000 of which allegedly do not comply with the guidelines. In addition, 5,500 labs, including 1,100 in Quebec, reportedly import pathogens. This comes as no surprise, considering how vibrant the research sector is in Quebec. There are apparently 24 labs in Quebec and 150 in Canada that are working with group 3 and 4 pathogens and are subject to these guidelines.

This bill tries to impose a system of offences that opens the door to criminal proceedings. We must always be extremely careful when it comes to imposing fines.

I used to sit on the Standing Committee on Health. That was a great time in my life. I was the health critic for at least five years. I focused on research and development. I was a bit surprised when Mr. Bouchard told me he was giving me the research and development file, because I was someone who had trouble plugging in a VCR. But I learned about it, I took an interest in it, and I understood its importance. I then became the immigration critic. Immigration is an extremely important issue, and as I am a member from Montreal, it was an issue in my own community. After that, I was the health critic for five years. Today, I am the justice critic. I have led an interesting life, when you sum it all up.

I would remind the House that when I was the health critic we examined the issue of new reproductive technologies. I was very disappointed to learn something about the regulations for new reproductive technologies. We know that one in five couples in Canada is infertile. Therefore, it is important that the issues of surrogate mothers, gamete conservation and donations be covered by regulations. I am very surprised to see that the regulations we have been expecting for at least two years have not yet been submitted to the Standing Committee on Health. I hope that the Minister of Health will remedy this situation because we worked very hard in committee.

The Government of Quebec went to court to challenge certain legislative provisions with respect to new reproductive technologies, known as assisted reproduction, because some of the legislation's provisions meddled in provincial jurisdiction. Quebec already has its own support system for infertile couples.

Why am I mentioning this? To make a link with the offences established by the bill. Failure to obtain a permit would result in a hefty fine of $250,000 for a first offence and increasing fines for subsequent offences.

It is not clear to me—nor does the bill provide clarification—how this system of fines will be administered. Will there be an inspection system? How will licences be issued? How will laboratories be monitored? And how will inspectors carry out annual inspections of the 5,000 or so laboratories that are deemed not to be compliant with the guidelines? And what will that mean?

It is a complex bill that may have a noble goal, taking precautions against possible transmission, but certain aspects of it are troubling. I know that the members of the Standing Committee on Health would like to ensure that this bill, before obtaining royal assent, has been the subject of proper consultation. Have universities and hospitals been consulted? Have large research and development associations been consulted? And the pharmaceutical industry, in terms of both generic and brand name drugs, has it been consulted? If we looked a little more closely, we would find that the consultations have been rather superficial.

I am being told that my time is running out, which is too bad because I have many more things to say about a bill as gripping as this one, but I will finish with three things. First, the Bloc Québécois will work very hard in the Standing Committee on Health to make sure that we have a thorough understanding of this bill.

Second, we hope that the principal stakeholders will appear before the Standing Committee on Health. Finally, we will judge the bill according to its merit.

[Derek Lee, Liberal, Scarborough—Rouge River, ON]

Mr. Speaker, we are debating Bill C-11 today, which is an act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins.

The schedules to the bill list these pathogens and toxins. It is really quite a who's who of all the biological bad guys out there and it is pretty scary for a layman to read. I had two esteemed colleagues from my Liberal Party up, who are both doctors and probably pretty comfortable with the words, but there is aflatoxin, anthrax, cholera, diphtheria and dozens of ugly sounding toxins and pathogens.

Any layperson who looks at that would say that we need this legislation, and it is a consensus in the House that we need this legislation. There was a bill in the prior Parliament that did not make it through as it was a short Parliament. My party supports the bill in principle and, if adopted by the House, hopefully it will go to committee.

However, I must point out some issues that I do have with the bill. One issue that I raised previously is an issue that I will raise again, and if nobody moves amendments to this bill, I probably will. The issue concerns the granting by this House of powers to the administration, not just to the government but to persons in the government. In this particular case, they are referred to in the bill as inspectors. It has to do with this whole concept of the House giving power in a statute to the government to make regulations and enforce provisions of the act that are regulatory, in addition to the statutory provisions.

In modern government, we all accept that we need to do that. The real trick is in how we do it, how Parliament does it and whether or not Parliament will scrutinize, review and oversee the regulatory work and the enforcement that happens after the powers are delegated.

It is okay for Parliament to pass a law that says a citizen shall not do X. That is not a delegation. That is a creation of an offence and authorities enforce those offences. However, when Parliament passes a law that gives the authority to a minister or the governor in council to make a regulation, to create some kind of a regulatory offence, that is a delegation. When we do that in Parliament we should take steps to ensure that the enforcement and execution of those powers happen within the law. Parliament has created a method for doing that.

I will address this bill through a lens of our civil liberties, our freedoms. I have always tried to do that as a member of Parliament and I will do it here. I am not doing it just to be critical of the bill. I am doing it to better assure the rights and freedoms of Canadians under this particular legislation.

Sections in the bill would give substantial regulatory powers to the minister and to inspectors. When we are dealing with these human pathogens and toxins, one could expect that we would do that. There is no way we would send the minister or a member of Parliament over to some illegal laboratory to pick up some anthrax. This is done through hard-working, honest and dedicated public servants who need the authority to do that hard work.

I now want to look at the legislation to see how we are asking them to do this. I would refer the House to subclause 41(1), which reads:

Subject to section 42, an inspector may, for the purpose of verifying compliance or preventing non-compliance with this Act...enter at any reasonable time any place or conveyance [such as a motor vehicle or a bus] in which the inspector believes on reasonable grounds that an activity to which this Act or the regulations apply is conducted...

Not just for the purpose of preventing a breech of the act but for the purpose of ensuring compliance, the inspector may enter any place, any reasonable time. We pretty much just give to an inspector the right to do something that not even a policeman could do without a warrant or specific statutory authorization. There had better be a real good reason for this, to give all this power to a particular individual.

We are dealing with some difficult chemicals here, some pathogens and toxins, but here are some of the things that inspectors could do. They can examine the place. They can require the person in the place to do things. They can seize and detain, open and examine, direct the owner or the person having possession, care or control, to do certain things, to move certain things. They can examine and make copies, require any person in the place to do the same, and the list goes on.

These are significant powers. We should keep in mind the basis on which the inspector enters the premises. It is for the purpose, low threshold only, of verifying compliance. That would mean on a bad day, “I think I will go check these guys because I feel like it”. It could be that. I am not saying that it would be, but what if that is the case? “I will go into this place to check it because I want to verify compliance. I do not like the way they park their cars in the parking lot”, or maybe, “I do not like the owner”. This is the power that the act now gives, not by regulation, but by statute, right up front, to an inspector.

Subclause 41(6) says, “No person shall knowingly obstruct or hinder...an inspector who is carrying out their functions”. No person shall obstruct or hinder. That sounds reasonable, but let me tell the House that there are occasions where, from time to time, this restriction on hindering is abused. I am not making it up because I represent constituents whom I think have been criminally assaulted by government officials in the Canada Border Service Agency.

My constituents, a family, father, wife, two teenage boys, 14 and 16, came back to Canada at Windsor. They had made some purchases in the U.S.A. and low-balled the amount of money, they underestimated the amount they spent, so they were invited to go to secondary for inspection. It was all pretty reasonable stuff. I have been sent to secondary for inspection. People there are a little bit officious, but they are just doing their job: “Stand up. Move over there. Do this. Do that. Do not talk”. Okay, they checked my car. I did not tell them I was an MP.

Anyway, this family came across. The inspectors in that case were border services officers, that is, immigration officials, food inspectors, customs officials, tax collectors. They ended up breaking the arm of my constituent. They broke his arm. They put both the teenage boys in handcuffs and dragged them into the office along with the wife. When all was settled, they charged my constituents with obstruction. These guys behaved like bikers. They beat up this family and then they charged them with obstruction. Here we have a section which authorizes that Canadians be charged with obstructing or hindering an inspector.

I happen to be a lawyer. I went to Windsor with these people to defend them in court against this charge of obstruction. It was wrong and the charges were dismissed.

Four people were summoned by Her Majesty to come to court that day, to tell the truth, and say what happened. One CBSA official showed up and did not rise in court when the case was called. Those individuals did not even appear to a summons. That was lawlessness. There is no appeal mechanism for that agency. There is an informal one in the minister's office, but there is no oversight.

These are tax collectors, food inspectors, immigration officers, who are running around arresting people, beating them up, but do not show up in court to prosecute a case, so the case was dismissed. It was kind of a happy ending after the man's arm was broken and he missed work. I did inform the minister about this and the minister said not much could be done. Maybe there should be a lawsuit. These are just regular people who do not have a lot of money to start lawsuits to get justice.

The obstruction charge is contained in Bill C-11 and I am very nervous about that.

Clause 42 also has provisions about entering a dwelling house. We crossed this bridge before in the House. Someone cannot go into a dwelling house without a warrant and the bill makes provision for that, happily.

I see a problem with subclause 42(3) which deals with the warrant and going into a dwelling house. It says that the inspector may not use force unless it is specifically authorized. The problem is that the use of force issue is too vague in the statute. It is not clear what extent of force is being referred to. If I have a warrant to enter a dwelling house, do I have the ability to turn the doorknob if that requires the use of force? Do I have the ability to break a window? Do I have the ability to lift the latch?

A warrant to enter a dwelling house, as I understand it now, allows the reasonable use of force. I have a question with respect to this. If an inspector shows up with a warrant and breaks down the door but the owner of the house does not know what is going on and tells the inspector he cannot come in, is that obstruction? Based on the case I described with the CBSA, I can bet my boots that is obstruction.

On the other hand, it might be a good day if the inspector is in a good mood and apologizes for breaking the window but explains that he has to check for pathogens and toxins. Maybe everything would work out.

I am looking at this from the perspective of a citizen. The wording about use of force in that section is, in my view, too vague. It has to be fixed in some way, otherwise there would be a legal issue and by the time the case was litigated and sorted out by the Supreme Court half a million dollars would be spent. I am suggesting that the committee to which the bill would be referred sort that out.

Clause 40 says that when the minister delegates these authorities he or she may restrict the powers of the inspector. That is the wrong way to put it. I think the inspector should only have those powers that the minister delegates to him or her. The minister should not have the whole raft of powers under the statute which he or she could then pull back under authorization because I do not think the minister would ever do it.

There are no criteria for the minister. There is no framework for the minister to act. There is no framework under which the minister could say, “I think I am only going to give you powers 1 to 5 and you do not get powers 6 to 10”. There would be an automatic predisposition on the part of the minister and the public service simply to give all of the powers to the inspector without restriction.

Why would anyone take the time to restrict the powers given to the inspector? Why handicap the inspector? The statute already gives the inspector powers. This is a mistake. The minister should decide which specific powers should be in the hands of the inspector. Then we know clearly what the inspector can and cannot do. The minister knows, government knows and Parliament knows. This way it is an open book.

Clause 40 is a problem and I hope the committee will deal with that. If the committee does not, I am going to do it here in the House. I am giving notice right now.

Last is regulatory activity. Canada has a fairly good regulatory process. It allows the delegation of authorities from Parliament to the government or ministers and sometimes to agencies. I will not read clauses 67 and 68 of the bill, but they provide for the delegation of regulatory powers.

In Canada's system now, normally a statutory instrument or regulation is pre-published before it is enacted, there is consultation, then it is adopted by the cabinet or the minister, it is published in the Canada Gazette, and then it is reviewed by the Standing Joint Committee for Scrutiny of Regulations in the House. It is reviewed for compliance with the law, the originating statute, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the criteria adopted by the House. This way we make sure that regulations passed are legal and fair. That has worked fairly well for the last 30 or 40 years.

However, clause 68 of this bill exempts some of the statutory instruments and regulations from the Statutory Instruments Act. It takes it right out. It says these regulations are not statutory instruments. For the layman that may be kind of a foggy term and some may ask what it means.

In some cases in this bill it only means that the regulation is not pre-published and consulted, that it simply is made, and there may be good public policy reasons for doing that. In an emergency, three months cannot be taken to consult. Dealing with risks to human health, sometimes action has to be taken quickly. We do that and authorize regulations to be made without the need to pre-publish and study, et cetera. However, there are a couple of components that are worrying to me and should be to the House.

First, the bill specifically authorizes incorporation by reference. That means an adoption of a rule that somebody else made. Maybe it is a rule made by the European Union or Brazil or Japan or wherever. That is incorporation by reference. Not only that but it allows what is called ambulatory incorporation by reference, which means whenever Brazil changes its rule, our rule changes. We have to get a handle on that because that is a pure delegation of regulation-making by us to them.

Second is the exemption from the Statutory Instruments Act. We cannot do that. We must allow Parliament to continue reviewing it. We must specifically authorize Parliament to review these instruments under sections 19 and 19.1 of the Statutory Instruments Act. Those amendments should all be made to this bill.

[Larry Miller, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate my colleague's concerns about Bill C-11.

During her speech, she mentioned what happened in Walkerton a number of years ago, which was a terrible tragedy. Walkerton, while not in my riding, used to be part of it. It is just on the edge of Bruce county.

The one thing I and the people of Walkerton do not need to hear is the implication by members of the opposition or anybody else that it was a breakdown in the system. The clear truth of what happened in Walkerton was that two employees did not do their jobs.

The government is bringing forth Bill C-11 to improve the health and safety of Canadians. It was the same thing on the listeriosis outbreak not too long ago, although the government over the last two years hired 200 more inspectors for CFIA. Those are the kinds of things the government has done.

Does the hon. member support improving the health and the risks for health problems in Bill C-11?

[Judy Wasylycia-Leis, NDP, Winnipeg North, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased we have the opportunity today to speak to Bill C-11, important legislation that deals with human pathogens and toxins. One thing that needs to be said at the outset of this debate is that nowhere is it more important to have a proactive government using all the tools available through the public sector than when it comes to human pathogens and toxins.

We start from the basic premise that the legislation, at face value, looks good. It is long overdue. It is part of a package of antiquated legislation that needs to be updated and brought into the 21st century. However, there also needs to be a new kind of thinking on the part of government, the kind of thinking that appears contrary to the ideological predilections of the Conservative government.

I want to start by putting on the table the overriding concern for Canadians. When it comes to the safety and well-being of Canadians, there can be no shortcuts. There can be no privatization, no offloading and no passive regulatory scheme.

This area demands a proactive government, a strong public sector component and laboratories that are within and only within the public sector, not privatized, no public-private partnerships, no deals with the private sector, no commercialization.

First and foremost, this is about safety. Canadians know a lot about exposure to dangerous pathogens and toxins, and they are worried. They are worried because they have not seen from the government the kind of action that is necessary to guarantee their safety and security at times of crisis.

The record of the Conservatives, and the Liberals before them, is atrocious. Neither party has understood the role of government in this area. The dismantling of our health protection system started under the Liberals and has continued to this day under the Conservatives.

Under the Liberals, we lost laboratories in the federal public service. We lost laboratories that tested for dangerous pathogens. We lost laboratories that looked at interactions between drugs and foods. There were outcries from scientists who felt their scientific judgment had been pushed aside in the name of expediency.

In the past the Liberal government took away the resources and means by which one could actively oversee a system pertaining to human safety, whether we talk about drugs, foods, pathogens, toxins, organs, blood, just name it. Let us not forget the Krever Commission and the whole blood scandal. Let us remember the lessons of our history and ensure that history does not repeat itself when it comes to something as fundamental as human health and safety.

The path set out by the Liberals has been continued by the Conservatives. Did we see a replenishment of inspectors when it came to problems in our food safety systems? Did we see a well coordinated, thoughtful, profound response when it came to something as devastating as listeriosis, which resulted in 20 deaths in our country? No. We saw once more the kind of scattergun approach that the Liberals brought to this chamber. We saw a passive government response that said it would let the industry regulate itself. We saw confusion everywhere, with no central coordination or authority to oversee this entire area.

We have lost something fundamental that has to be regained, that the Conservative government has to recommit to, if we are going to get anywhere with something as profound as protecting people from dangerous pathogens and toxins.

I want to start with some basic principles. This legislation says it will broaden the mandatory application of the laboratory biosafety guidelines from just imported pathogens to include domestic sources as well. It will supposedly ensure that the government has a complete inventory of where potentially dangerous pathogens exist and that sites are licensed appropriately. It says it will parallel the treatment of pathogens in many other industrialized countries, because we are far behind the rest of the world on these issues, and that it will bring the malevolent use of these organisms under the criminal code regime and provide for the inspection of work sites and penalties for misuse.

That sounds good. It sounds progressive and along the lines of what Canadians have been asking for on other issues pertaining to drugs and foods for some time.

It would appear that this bill will make Canadians safer, or will at least make them feel safer. That comes after dealing with Walkerton, SARS, listeriosis, and what have become regular announcements of food contamination and recalls. Just remember that E. coli, salmonella, and listeriosis have all now become household names across this country. There are no exceptions across communities in this country.

In Winnipeg, as my colleague from Winnipeg Centre mentioned earlier, we have a level 4 lab. We are very proud of that fact. We are proud of the record of achievement of that laboratory, but we know that it takes a certain ideological perspective to ensure that the public safety is guaranteed whenever such a facility is established in a community. It takes a perspective that says that government's job is to protect people from any dangerous spills or seepage or accident pertaining to pathogens and toxins. It says that the workers in that lab must be safe, that the people in the community must be safe, and that whenever such dangerous pathogens are transported, people everywhere must be safe.

But there was a bit of a problem back in 1999 with that lab. The Liberals were in power. There was a leak, and 2,000 litres of lab effluent were dumped into the public sewage system. That was on June 23, 1999.

It took a community to stand up and demand its rights for government to take action. The Liberals were then in power, and the Government of Canada decided to keep things relatively quiet, to keep it a secret, to not be fully transparent. Health Canada did not publicize the spill. News of it came through media reports.

Naturally the community was very upset. I and my colleague, the member for Winnipeg Centre, decided to work with the community to make sure that their voices were heard and that lessons were learned from this incident. In fact, shortly after that spill we launched a community lab safety task force, hosted a round table of experts and activists, and met with many people in the community on this issue.

It paid off. Eventually the government announced a community liaison committee to improve communications, and other measures were taken as a result of this incident.

However, it took the community to speak up about it. There was no full disclosure, and that should never happen.

That is why I started this debate by saying there must some basic principles in place in order for this legislation to mean anything and to work.

At the top of the list is the principle that there must be full transparency and accountability to the public. There can be no secrets. There has to be full disclosure when accidents happen or mistakes are made. The public has to be kept informed every step of the way.

I know that the Conservatives are not naturally inclined to do that, despite all their protestations when they were in opposition and their promises during the last election to be accountable and transparent. We have seen almost no evidence of that. They break their word, they change their minds, and they refuse to disclose when the public needs to be told of an important public policy development. I do not need to go into the long list of issues on that front. We could talk about appointments to the Senate or about breaking their own law on fixed election dates. The list goes on and on. There are all kinds of issues related to the Conservatives' promises of transparency and accountability.

However, that kind of action on the part of the Conservatives cannot be allowed to continue, especially when it comes to something as important as human pathogens and toxins. We are talking about life-and-death situations. There is no room for that kind of culture of secrecy and arrogance to be continued for one second in this country today, especially on this critical issue.

The first issue, then, is public accountability and full transparency.

Second, there has to be coordination. The right hand of government has to know what the left hand is doing. There has to be some semblance of a coordinated system within government to deal with the issues pertaining to human pathogens and toxins, partly because of the public health issue at stake here, but also because of the threat of bioterrorism.

We all have questions today pertaining to the legislation. Is the government any more prepared today than it was last fall with respect to the listeriosis crisis? Is it any more prepared today than when we had the SARS crisis? Is it any more prepared today than when we learned the tragic news of September 11? Do we have a coordinated, centralized shop within government that oversees this area?

I do not think so. I am having a hard time finding it. I know the public safety department is sometimes responsible. Health Canada is sometimes responsible. There are pots of money here and pots of money there. There is a little bit of shifting here and there between government departments, but who is in charge? Where does the buck stop? Which minister is absolutely responsible?

This is a very legitimate concern in the light of a couple of recent developments. In September 2008 the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence found our response capabilities lacking. The Senate committee found that the federal government will not even tell local front-line responders where it stashes its emergency medical supplies. It will not tell them where they are located.

It is interesting that when those who are responsible for delivering emergency services at the local level in Medicine Hat stumbled on a federal supply, the federal government, rather than using the opportunity to build coordination and efficiency, took the supplies and hid them somewhere else. Does that make sense? Is that responsible, accountable, fully transparent government action in the midst of a very serious situation? It certainly does not bode well for future crises that are likely to occur in this country.

Canadians are especially concerned about the government's ability and capacity to protect them from a non-terrorist threat.

I talked about listeriosis earlier. Let me go back to that for a moment because it is our most recent example of what happens when we do not really have a government in charge that knows what it is doing and puts the needs of Canadians first. We only have to refer to the Canadian Medical Association's article in the midst of that crisis to give full meaning to this point.

The Canadian Medical Association Journal actually stated on October 21, 2008, that “...the most visible figures in the recent recall of affected foods have not been public health officials but rather the head of Maple Leaf Foods and the minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada”.

Where was the Prime Minister? Where was the Minister of Health? Where was the coordinated response to something as tragic as listeriosis? Why was it left to the private sector to explain the situation? Is it not the job of government to put in place regulations and standards and laws and programs that the private sector must adhere to? Is it not the fundamental role of government to set the stage and to put in place the framework by which those who operate in the private sector are guided? How was it possible that through consecutive Liberal and Conservative governments we just let this system deteriorate to the point that nobody was in charge, the private sector was regulating itself, inspection capacity was greatly reduced, and standards based on a series of recommendations on paper were not on site? Were there regular surprise visits to meat plants, food stores, retailers, manufacturers, and producers?

No. Rather, there was simply a risk management model that said there might be a problem, that we were going to let business live up to these standards, that we were not going to inspect them regularly to make sure that they were, and that when it happened, we were going to duck and run.

There is the lesson. That is why this legislation is so important today and why we need more than simply the words of this bill before us. We need a whole government plan. We need to know that this government finally gets it and understands that we have to have a precautionary model when it comes to pathogens and toxins, just as we have to have a precautionary do-no-harm model when it comes to protecting people from dangerous drugs and problematic foods. There is no other way around it.

I do not see that here. I do not see the government coming forward with a plan about how it is going to coordinate any government plan in this regard and how it is going to put in the resources necessary to make sure we actually have that kind of proactive do-no-harm model in place.

It is not risk management. It is not saying, “Well, this is out there in the market. These pathogens or toxins exist, and we are going to protect as much as possible”, but in fact, “We are going to warn people, and if something happens, then we're going to take action. We'll wait until someone dies or gets sick before we take action.”

Has that not been the way of the Conservatives, and the Liberals before them, on all these issues? I think so. I heard someone say no. I think it has been the way, and that has to change.

I know my time is almost up. There is much more to say in terms of this issue, but I want to end by saying that the framework we expect to be in place in dealing with this legislation must include transparency and accountability. It must emphasize public ownership and public sector involvement, and not privatization or P3s. This model must be based on the precautionary principle, the do-no-harm model, and not on risk management. Finally, it must ensure that all Canadians are involved and fully informed and participative in any schemes or programs that address threats to people's food security, threats in terms of bioterrorism and threats in terms of human pathogens and toxins.

[Luc Malo, Bloc, Verchères—Les Patriotes, QC]

Mr. Speaker, this morning, my colleagues spoke to Bill C-11, an act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins. Now it is my turn. The summary of the bill reads as follows:

This enactment creates measures to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins and all activities associated with them. It establishes a comprehensive legislative regime that extends beyond the present importation regime. It requires every person conducting activities involving human pathogens or toxins to take all reasonable measures to protect the health and safety of the public.

As my colleagues said, it is important to keep Canadians safe. It is every Parliament's duty to ensure the safety of Canadians within the scope of its constitutional powers. As we have seen, the proposed legislation would require all persons conducting these activities to comply with a number of guidelines. It would ensure consistency by obliging all labs to adhere to laboratory biosafety guidelines developed by the Public Health Agency of Canada. Licences must be obtained for controlled activities, such as possessing, handling, using, producing, storing, permitting authorized access to, transferring, importing, exporting, releasing or otherwise abandoning, or disposing of a human pathogen or toxin.

The federal government claims that it is entitled to introduce this bill because of its jurisdiction over criminal law. However, at this point, I have to wonder whether the government should really have made this bill a priority. As we know, since the guidelines were introduced over 15 years ago, there have been no incidents in Canada, regardless of whether labs have been following those guidelines.

Also on the order paper is a bill the government introduced in January, Bill C-6, formerly Bill C-52, on the safety of consumer products. The government has known at least since November 2006 that there are problems in this area. The Auditor General said so. Since the summer of 2007, there have been several major recalls, including a recall of toys containing lead. It would have been better if this bill were before the House now, seeing as how there have been no pathogen problems to date under the existing acts and regulations.

We know that the highest risk groups are groups 3 and 4. I would remind this House that the human pathogens in these groups pose a high risk to the health of individuals and a low or high risk to public health. Twenty-four labs in Quebec and 150 in Canada fully meet the guidelines for groups 3 and 4. In addition, the backgrounder on Bill C-54, which is the number this bill had in the last Parliament, states that “The risk to Canadians posed by the presence of human pathogens and toxins in labs is low.”

This is still a very important issue. However, this bill, in its current form, must not be allowed to stop or impede lab work, which is crucial to determining the causes of diseases and advancing science through research. In committee, it will be very important to look at this aspect of the bill in depth and to meet with a wide range of specialists working in this field to make sure that they will be able to do this work once this bill has been passed, especially with regard to risk group 2, which poses a lower risk to the health of individuals and public health. Of course, these labs include hospital and university labs where very important research is under way.

I would like to raise another point before I go on to the topic of university research. I am just wondering whether the Criminal Code already covers intentional threats to public safety, such as terrorist acts, and unintentional threats, such as criminal negligence. To my way of thinking, these threats to public health or public safety are already covered by legislation passed here.

I would like to start with the issue that, in the current version of the bill could, in our opinion, pose a number of problems. That issue is research conducted in our universities. The parliamentary secretary told us earlier that the government had held a number of consultations. And at a meeting with officials from the Public Health Agency of Canada, we were told that a number of consultations had been held. However, despite these consultations, researchers still have a number of important questions, especially regarding who will pay the costs of complying with the new requirements. This concern is mentioned in the Public Health Agency of Canada notes, but was not addressed by the parliamentary secretary in his earlier remarks.

We know that university research is already underfunded, yet today, as we prepare to refer this bill to committee, we do not know if assistance will be made available to institutions to help them comply with the new guidelines or if labs will be left to cover all the costs themselves.

Has the government actually conducted studies to determine the impact this new legislation would have on university courses, on how our hospitals operate and on the research industry in Quebec and Canada?

This question is extremely relevant because, as I said earlier, I have not yet received an answer. I understand the government's desire to impose a new guideline so that no products are released that could pose a risk to public health, but as for the operations of laboratories, I have yet to receive an answer.

I simply have one question. Does the government want us as parliamentarians to pass legislation that I think is incomplete, in the sense that it does not address all the concerns raised by the community? It is asking us for carte blanche, in a way, and asking us to trust it and wait until later. It seems to be saying that it will communicate with the various stakeholders and labs again, that it will ensure that the regulatory framework will meet their expectations and not pose a problem for their operations. If that is in fact what the government and the department intend to do, why then, from the first draft, from the time this bill was introduced for first reading, has this bill not included provisions to address the concerns justifiably raised by the community?

Once again, the government decided to introduce a bill in this House without assessing the direct impact it will have on the community. If it had done so in a responsible manner, this version of the bill would already include provisions to address the concerns raised by the academic community. We would have already heard the government's response regarding its assessment of the impact of Bill C-11 on university education.

The bill also proposes a number of fines. I understand that when a bill is introduced that will affect the Criminal Code, for example, fines must be imposed. However, what the government wants to do is impose fines on universities and hospitals, when everyone knows very well—and I said so a little earlier in my speech—that there is an abysmal lack of funding for those two kinds of institutions where research is done.

The bill also establishes penalties and fines for anyone who shows wanton or reckless disregard concerning pathogens and toxins. The bill also establishes financial penalties and imprisonment for anyone who intentionally releases pathogens.

I am wondering, as are my Bloc Québécois colleagues, about the need for these new prison sentences given that they are already contained in existing legislation. Are measures put in place by this bill with respect to breach of duty, wanton or reckless breach of duty and intentional release not already in the Criminal Code and the Canadian Environmental Protection Act? And are measures prohibiting intentional misuse of pathogens not included in the Anti-Terrorism Act? These are the questions to ask when the bill is before the Standing Committee on Health.

I am pleased that my colleagues from the Conservative and Liberal parties have agreed to hear important witnesses who, on a daily basis, will have to work under and adapt to this new legislation to establish new standards for storing and handling human pathogens and toxins.

Before concluding my remarks, I would like to go back to two or three other aspects that are more directly related to the bill. Clause 39, for example, states:

The Minister may, without the consent of the person to whom the information relates, disclose personal information and confidential business information obtained under this Act to a person from whom the Minister seeks advice, to a department or agency of the government of Canada or a province, to a foreign government or to an international organization—

For all intents and purposes, although those receiving this confidential information are required to maintain confidentiality—as stated later in the clause—I find it rather strange that consent is not required. It should be understood that the person may not be consulted or, at the very least, notified that information will be disclosed. This could be discussed with the minister and his officials in order to clarify this aspect of the bill, which could be problematic if, in fact, confidential information is disclosed without notifying the individuals or institutions concerned.

I would also like to talk about another issue that relates a bit more directly to the bill. Clause 67 states that the minister may make an interim order involving a product in the case of problems with enforcement of the legislation. The minister would then make an interim order effective immediately. The clause also states that the two houses of Parliament need not be informed for up to 15 days.

Should an emergency occur that requires immediate action on the part of the minister, this House should be informed much sooner than that. Perhaps the parliamentary secretary or even the minister would like to touch on that. When it comes to incidents involving public health and safety, all members of the public, as well as all parliamentarians, should be informed and given the opportunity to debate the issues without delay. To me, that means within hours or, at most, a few days. Fifteen days is far too long. Indeed, it would be odd for Parliament not to be informed of a situation endangering public health within 15 days.

In conclusion, I want to emphasize the importance of ensuring public safety. We must also ensure that our universities and hospitals can carry on doing their research, and that the government provides more support for research.

[Carolyn Bennett, Liberal, St. Paul's, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure today to speak to Bill C-11, an act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins. The Liberal Party supports improving Canadians' health and safety. We support measures that improve the safety and security of laboratories in Canada for all Canadians. We will scrutinize this bill in committee to ensure that it is as accountable, transparent and useful as possible.

It is important that we establish a legislative framework that extends beyond the present importation and storage regime for pathogens and toxins, especially for things such as anthrax, salmonella and influenza. The current regime is inadequate and not up to the standard of other international regulations. It only requires that all labs that import human pathogens and toxins adhere to the laboratory biosafety guidelines, the LBGs, but these existing guidelines are not mandatory for labs that acquire human pathogens and toxins from domestic sources even though they are applied widely on a voluntary basis as an industry standard. This voluntary approach is no longer good enough. We need to bring Canada into the modern world that actually deals with the biosecurity reality we now face.

The bill would require laboratories carrying out activities with risk groups 2, 3 or 4 human pathogens or select toxins to register with the Public Health Agency of Canada's Office of Laboratory Security. It would subject the licensees with a risk of group 3 and 4 pathogens and possibly select toxins to stricter operating regulations and it would require a permit to import a human pathogen or toxin. As well, as was raised by the hon. member from Winnipeg, the bill would require transfer permits to send and receive any human pathogen or toxin between laboratories within Canada that are not part of the same facility.

It would also require licensees, as part of their annual or biannual update of inventory, to notify the Public Health Agency of Canada of the nature of the disposal of human pathogens and toxins. These changes would bring Canada into line with more stringent regulations in the United States and the United Kingdom.

Although there is a need for the minister to have the ability to improve the safety and security of Canada's laboratories, the powers given to the minister in the bill are very serious. We believe that putting in place the kind of scientific advice that would be important to the minister should be as transparent as possible. I am in favour of there being an advisory committee to give transparent advice to the minister, so it is clear that scientists make scientific judgments and politicians make political judgments.

The Liberal caucus will support this bill at second reading because it modernizes and improves the laboratory licensing system and improves the overall health and safety of Canadians. However, since provinces and territories are responsible for licensing, we will have to further study and listen to the representatives from the provinces and territories at committee to make sure that those jurisdictions are comfortable with this collaborative approach.

I want to thank the minister and her department for the excellent briefing they gave us this morning on the bill. I was relieved to hear that the $36 million that will be required to implement the bill is already in the fiscal framework and that the bill will protect the health and safety of Canadians by closing the significant gap in Canada's national security framework.

The current regime is inadequate. As we have said, there has been this legislative gap about knowing where these dangerous human pathogens or toxins exist and how they are transferred. It is hugely important as we go forward that there be a comprehensive framework that the rest of the world understands exists in Canada, which is now seen to be a weak link in dealing with human pathogens and toxins through the various controlled activities.

I am very comfortable with the different levels of penalties. Obviously, in this dangerous world, the idea of releasing, abandoning or disposing on purpose a human pathogen or toxin must face the highest possible criminal offence.

It is important that these new criminal aspects include duty of care, the complete prohibition of controlled activities with certain human pathogens, such as the smallpox virus, as well as prohibition of controlled activities with a human pathogen or toxin without a licence.

I am happy that the regulatory framework will be enhanced in terms of the specific licensing requirements, inventory requirements, security screening requirements, and the outlining of the duties and qualifications of the new biological safety officers.

I am happy that since the bill was last presented, there have been changes to it in terms of the schedules; the transferring and the inspection powers now explain that inspection must be on reasonable grounds; and there is now the ability to move conveyances.

I am pleased that the stakeholder consultation was done properly. No real opposition was expressed, although some issues were raised around the implementation. The need for balance, the technical issues and the cost of complying with the new requirements for the individual smaller labs seem to have been taken into consideration and there is a commitment for continued consultation with the stakeholders.

The basic approach of the bill makes colossal sense. On royal assent, in phase one, the prohibitions, the duty of care, and the offences in the registry will come into force. I am happy that in phase two the development of the regulatory framework will again involve extensive consultation with the stakeholders. Phase three will bring into force the rest of the requirements.

I am very pleased with the collaboration and cooperation of the department on this bill. I look forward to studying this bill in detail at committee.

[Judy Wasylycia-Leis, NDP, Winnipeg North, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the remarks made by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health and his description of Bill C-11. I agree with him that this is a very important issue and we have learned a lot based on some very traumatic episodes in our history over the last little while.

My concern is that all of these great plans will come to nought if in fact the government does not have an underlying framework that respects the question of government supported or sponsored initiatives, whether it be in terms of emergency services or laboratories.

My question to the parliamentary secretary is quite simple. Could he give the House assurances that the government, unlike in other areas, has absolutely no intention of privatizing our public laboratories?

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health]

Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure to have this opportunity at second reading to address the important issues of the safety and security of human pathogens and toxins. That is a primary reason behind Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins.

I want to begin by explaining what a pathogen is. A human pathogen is a micro-organism capable of causing disease or death in humans. Examples include: salmonella bacteria, the agent of anthrax, listeria bacteria and the Ebola virus. The need to enhance biosafety in Canada's laboratories and prevent an inadvertent release of these agents is one of the two primary focuses of Bill C-11.

The need to safeguard Canadians from the risk of an intentional release of these dangerous agents constitutes the second primary focus of the proposed human pathogens and toxins act. As we know, the world changed after September 11, 2001. The events of that day highlighted the need for greater vigilance on our part. This was emphasized in the month that followed when an anthrax attack in the United States resulted in 22 identified cases and five deaths.

The cost of a bioterror attack is high, both in terms of lives lost, lives affected and economic consequences. It is the responsibility of government, of this Parliament, to put in place the necessary measures to minimize the likelihood of such an event.

There are approximately 3,500 laboratories that import human pathogens into Canada. These laboratories are regulated under the existing human pathogens importation regulations which have been in force since 1994. They must also comply with our laboratory biosafety guidelines which are widely accepted as Canada's national biosafety standard.

Unfortunately, these regulations and associated laboratory biosafety guidelines are only mandatory for facilities that import human pathogens. They are not mandatory for the additional 4,000 laboratories that do not import, but which acquire human pathogens within Canada.

While labs working with these pathogens do so in a safe manner and widely apply these guidelines on a voluntary basis, we need legislation and regulations in place to reinforce these safe practices, and establish consistency by ensuring all labs in Canada, whether federal, provincial or private, are adhering to these guidelines.

Canada faces some serious risks as a result of this legislative and regulatory gap. These include risks to the safety of persons working in and around laboratories and risks to our national security. There is always the potential for accidental release of human pathogens or toxins.

As I have said, about 4,000 laboratories in Canada use domestically acquired human pathogens and toxins. The fact that these laboratories are subject only to a voluntary biosafety regime is not acceptable, especially since similar laboratories that import human pathogens operate under a mandatory biosafety regime.

It is time to level the playing field in Canada so that all persons working with these agents, and especially all laboratories, are required to operate under the same rules and to comply with the same national biosafety guidelines.

To this end the new human pathogens and toxins act is designed to ensure that unless exempted, no person may carry on activities with these dangerous substances without a licence and without complying with the laboratory biosafety guidelines.

Beyond accidental release, Canada also faces the risk of a deliberate release of a human pathogen or toxin. This is not a pleasant scenario but one which we must consider fully in order to protect Canadians. To address this risk the new legislation includes a provision for a new national system of security screening for persons handling the most dangerous of these agents. Other than for individuals working in federal government laboratories, there is no such system in place in Canada at this moment.

It is important that the government take reasonable precautions to ensure that while not interfering with research, people handling the most dangerous human pathogens and toxins in Canada have received appropriate security screening. At the same time, the government will seek to ensure that there is a minimal paper burden on those handling less dangerous human pathogens and toxins.

The new legislation will address both biosafety and biosecurity risks through a range of mechanisms including: new criminal prohibitions, offences, and penalties; expanded inspection and enforcement; a new authority to make regulations; and new security screening requirements for persons having access to the most dangerous human pathogens and toxins.

This proposal would render Canada more consistent with its international partners and allies, including the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, which have all passed new security legislation. It is time that Canada joined them.

This new legislation is needed now. It is required to safeguard the health and well-being of Canadians, especially those persons working in laboratories. It is also required to demonstrate to the Canadian public, and to our international partners, that the Government of Canada is taking very seriously the issue of national security related to dangerous human pathogens and toxins.

The proposed legislation represents a made in Canada approach that would emphasizes safety and strong security linkages. The urgency in moving ahead with expanded federal oversight over human pathogens and toxins has been widely recognized. We have discussed this proposal with our provincial and territorial public health colleagues and with the diverse laboratory community in Canada, including academia and the private sector. They have agreed with the need to move ahead and they have shown a keen interest in further discussions concerning details about licensing, inventories, security screening, and how they will be included in future discussions.

We will continue to engage our stakeholders as Bill C-11 moves through the parliamentary process.

As well, we will commence in-depth consultations with stakeholders across the country on the program and regulatory framework. These consultations will help us ensure that we have correctly balanced the needs of biosafety and biosecurity, on the one hand, and the interests of ongoing science and research, on the other. In proposing this legislation, we are building on our existing importation program.

It is important that we turn our attention to applying existing biosafety and biosecurity controls equally to all persons carrying on activities with these dangerous agents across Canada. For this reason, I call on my colleagues in this House to support Bill C-11. I am looking forward to questions.

[Gary Lunn, Conservative, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

moved that Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

Business of the House

[Jay Hill, Conservative, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, I welcome those questions from the opposition House leader.

In a few moments we will be voting on the second reading stage of Bill C-10, the budget implementation act. Also, the House will approve supplementary estimates (B).

I would like to take this time to thank all members for their cooperation in accelerating the consideration and approval of supplementary estimates (B) including and especially my cabinet colleagues who responded with little notice to invitations from the various committees to study these estimates.

After the votes, we will continue with the debate on Bill C-4, not-for-profit legislation; followed by Bill C-9, transportation of dangerous goods; Bill C-5, Indian oil and gas; Bill C-11, an act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins; and Bill C-3, Arctic waters. All these bills are at second reading.

Next week is a constituency week when the House will be adjourned.

As the House is also aware President Barack Obama will be visiting Canada next week. Since the House will not be sitting, I would like to take this opportunity, on behalf of all members of the House, to welcome the President to Canada. We hope he has a productive and enjoyable visit here in our nation's capital.

When the House returns from the break, we will continue with the list of business I mentioned earlier and in addition to these bills Tuesday, February 24 and Thursday, February 26 will be designated as opposition days.

Human Pathogens and Toxins Act

[Leona Aglukkaq, Conservative, Nunavut, NU]

moved for leave to introduce Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins.

(Motions deemed adopted, bill read the first time and printed)