Bill C-19 (Historical)

An Act to amend the Criminal Code (investigative hearing and recognizance with conditions)

This enactment replaces sections 83.28 to 83.3 of the Criminal Code to provide for an investigative hearing to gather information for the purposes of an investigation of a terrorism offence and to provide for the imposition of a recognizance with conditions on a person to prevent them from carrying out a terrorist activity. It also provides for those sections to cease to have effect or for the possible extension of their operation.

Combating Terrorism Act

[Pierre Nantel, NDP, Longueuil—Pierre-Boucher, QC]

Mr. Speaker, Bill S-7 is the latest chapter in a long saga that began in the wake of September 11 and led to a number of legislative measures. Bill C-36, the Anti-terrorism Act passed in 2001, was the first salvo launched following the horrific events in New York which still strike fear in people today.

Obviously, the legislation was brought in not only to respond to this threat and to protect Canadians, but also to meet our international obligations, as dictated at high levels, to the UN.

Some of the provisions of the Anti-terrorism Act amended existing pieces of legislation such as the Criminal Code, the Access to Information Act and the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorism Financing Act.

Other more significant changes were brought in, notably unprecedented changes to Canadian law. Those who were serving in the House at the time of the 2001 attacks perhaps can attest to the fact that this legislation was passed hastily and without due consideration.

Facing the unknown and a climate of dread, Parliament responded in a strong-armed, reflexive manner. There is a reason therefore why these provisions, crafted in the urgency of the moment, were subject to sunset clauses.

These so-called sunset clauses ensured that the more controversial measures would simply be temporary. That was for the better. The provisions in question pertained to preventive arrest and investigative hearings.

Had the desire arose to extend the life of these provisions, had they been deemed useful or relevant or had it been acknowledged that they had prevented an otherwise inevitable catastrophe from occurring, there would have been an opportunity to maintain them and make them permanent.

To do so would have required a resolution by both Houses of Parliament. A resolution was in fact tabled and rejected. Parliamentarians in their wisdom found that there was no valid reason to extend the life of these provisions.

Both Houses did their homework as far as these measures were concerned. Each one examined the most sensitive provisions of the 2001 Anti-terrorism Act. In October 2006, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security reviewed the legislation, most notably the investigative hearings and recognizance with conditions provisions. The other place produced an aptly named report entitled “Fundamental Justice in Extraordinary Times”.

Despite this flurry of activity, these questionable, freedom-destroying and fortunately temporary provisions expired as originally scheduled in 2007.

Since then, several attempts have been made to resurrect this long-settled debate: Bill S-3 in 2008, Bill C-19 in 2009 and Bill C-17 in 2010.

Each time, the same conclusion has been reached: the state currently has all the tools it needs to combat terrorism.

There was no reason to bring in these measures, even in 2001, and there is no reason to re-introduce them today.

The measures being debated today are not harmless. Among other things, Bill S-7 would re-introduce into Canadian law the phenomenon of investigative hearings that allow a peace officer to apply to a provincial court judge for an order to compel individuals to appear before a judge if they are suspected of having information concerning future terrorist acts. The provision would compel the individual to attend hearings and to answer investigators’ questions.

Another important measure that is being brought hastily before the House is the recognizance with conditions provision which includes preventive detention. It would give a peace officer the authority to arrest an individual without a warrant if he believes such action is necessary to prevent a terrorist act. The individual in question is subsequently brought before a judge, as soon as feasible, according to the wording of the bill, and may be imposed certain conditions, or may even be committed to prison for a term not exceeding 12 months.

From a human rights standpoint, these provisions are very restrictive. One could also argue that they are cause for great concern and that careful consideration should be given to the balance that must be struck between the real advantage they provide in terms of public safety and the cost to citizens, which undeniably in this instance is restrictions on a person’s fundamental rights. Admittedly, at issue are the rights of the individuals primarily concerned, but ultimately the rights of all citizens are affected as well.

Dramatist Henry Becque wrote that freedom and health have much in common and that we only appreciate their value when they are lost to us.

I am greatly concerned about the timing of today’s debate, about the fact that the government has chosen to move it up in light of what has happened. As noted earlier, the 2001 Anti-terrorism Act was passed hastily and this is not how debates on national legislation should unfold.

Today it would seem that an attempt is being made to recreate the same climate of fear and panic in order to hastily push through a bill that has serious implications for people’s freedoms.

It goes without saying that the people in my riding, Longueuil—Pierre-Boucher, want to live in safety. However, they also believe very strongly in the rights that belong to every individual. Many of them are going to wonder whether this is the right time to be debating the measures in Bill S-7, when people are recovering from the horrific, cruel and gratuitous attacks that took place last week at the Boston marathon.

We do not need any added emotion for debating this bill. What we need is some distance, some reflection, and some calm and considered thought.

To me, there is nothing wise about the government precipitating this debate. I stress the word “wise”.

Is it really wise, the day after attacks like that, and with what we have in the news here in Canada, to be rewriting our laws and redefining our fundamental freedoms?

Perhaps it is the usual opportunism we see from this government, in its typical crudeness and poor taste.

We on this side firmly believe that this bill is contrary to the fundamental values of Canadians and the values on which our judicial system is built.

The unambiguous and unvarnished goal of these measures is to limit the civil liberties and fundamental rights of Canadians.

Those rights include basic elements of our judicial system that we take for granted: the right to remain silent, the right to a fair trial and the right to be considered innocent until proven guilty.

The principles of our law, whose origin lies in centuries-old customs and legal traditions, lay out individual rights that are unwavering.

While the draft we are presented with today includes a few sops that are supposed to reassure us, because they are in the form of additional protections, these proposals are very unconvincing overall.

We also oppose these measures simply on their track record: these methods are ineffective in principle.

Ultimately, we firmly believe the Criminal Code is an entirely satisfactory tool for investigating these suspicious people who engage in shady plans or whose goal is to threaten the public. Those are crimes and that is what the Criminal Code is intended for.

In fact, the provisions drawn up in 2001, which had a “sunset clause” that took effect in 2007, were never used. Those measures made people uncomfortable from the outset, in 2001, because they were inimical to liberty.

In 2010, a former director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Reid Morden, said, on the question of the two measures I referred to earlier:

...I confess I never thought that they should have been introduced in the first place...

He raised the idea that these provisions had slipped into the act almost by mistake.

...and that they slipped in, in the kind of scrambling around that the government did after 9/11...It seemed to me that it turned our judicial system somewhat on its head.

He then stressed that law enforcement agencies already have the powers they need to do their job. They do not need additional powers. He concluded by saying:

I guess l'm sorry to hear that the government has decided to reintroduce them.

It appears that these measures caused misgivings among the forces of law and order, who wisely decided not to use these powers in their investigations.

Can someone really explain why these measures would be useful today, when they were not useful in the months following September 11, and that even the people who could have enforced them did not want to?

Finally, when some rights are under threat, all rights are under threat. Under the provisions of this bill, there is not much to ensure that citizens or anyone will not be falsely accused in the future for activities that have nothing to do with terrorism. Some activities may be considered subversive or dissident—slippery words that can be applied to peaceful activities in a democratic context.

Those who defend fundamental human rights are speaking up from all sides, telling us that these measures are unnecessary and that the price to be paid will be paid in civil rights, which is not a fair exchange for the proposed benefits. These measures are unwanted and unnecessary.

We saw this a few years ago when threats of spectacular terrorist attacks were foiled. We saw it again yesterday, when the admirable public safety professionals arrested two suspects who, it appears, wanted to disrupt the lives of ordinary people and do them unimaginable harm.

At this moment in time when terrorism has become part of current events, it is essential that we resist. We must resist terrorism in order to protect ourselves, prepare ourselves and defend ourselves. We must make our trains, airports, public spaces and gathering places safe and secure.

It is also essential that we, as a society, as communities and individuals, refuse to be terrorized by terrorism, and refuse to be manipulated or to change our behaviour and lifestyles. That is precisely what we should not do.

We must not be terrified by terrorism. To stand up to terrorism is to ensure that democracy and individual liberties for everyone in our country are never threatened by such people and their violence.

Since I have only a few seconds left, I just wish to express my astonishment at the Liberal Party's inconsistency. In 2001, the Liberals adopted the sunset clauses, but today they are not proposing any amendments of the sort. I cannot explain that.

[Matthew Kellway, NDP, Beaches—East York, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to stand today in the House to speak against Bill S-7, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Canada Evidence Act and the Security of Information Act. The genealogy of Bill S-7 takes us back to Bill C-36, the Anti-terrorism Act, which was tabled by the Liberal government in 2001. The original intent of the Anti-terrorism Act was to provide the Canadian legislative response to the events of September 11, 2001, 9/11 as we now know it.

There is no question that day should not and indeed cannot be forgotten. The images of passenger planes flying into those iconic towers repeat themselves over and over again in news, television and film, and undoubtedly in the mind as the memories of the many who were personally impacted by that act of terror.

I note with sadness that my colleague from Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca and his partner have such memories to bear.

As these images repeat themselves, we witness the deaths of nearly 3,000 innocents, including 24 Canadians over and over again. That day we awoke to a new kind of threat and a new level of threat. Most importantly, we awoke to a new and profound sense of vulnerability, so we responded.

Several provisions of Bill C-36 became permanently enshrined in other legislation such as the Proceeds of Crime and Terrorist Financing Act, the Criminal Code and the Access to Information Act. However, several parts of the Anti-terrorism Act had sunset clauses expiring in February 2007. These provisions concerned investigative hearings and recognizance with conditions or preventive arrest provisions.

These measures were largely without precedence in Canadian law and for good reason. We believe that these provisions run contrary to fundamental principles, rights and liberties enshrined in Canadian law. The rights and liberties violated include the right to remain silent and the right not to be imprisoned without first having a fair trial. We believe that these are important restrictions on the authority of the state because in their absence there is not sufficient protection of an individual's freedom.

As per the terms of the Anti-terrorism Act, these provisions, in order to be extended, had to be adopted by way of resolution by both Houses of Parliament. However, the resolution was defeated soundly, 159:124 in this House, and these controversial provisions of the Anti-terrorism Act sunsetted.

We know that the efforts did not end there. Similar bills were proposed in 2008, 2009 and 2010 in the forms of Bill S-3, Bill C-19 and Bill C-17 respectively. It seems this is an annual, or almost annual rite. Now they are back.

Time has passed in the interim, a decade roughly since Bill C-36 was brought before the House, and time has been instructive. Since the passage of the Anti-terrorism Act, the recognizance with conditions or preventive arrest provision has never been used. The investigative hearing provision has been used once in the Air India case. Many consider that exercise to have had no positive effect, in fact quite the opposite.

Paul Copeland, a highly experienced and respected lawyer representing the Law Union of Ontario, speaking about this sole experience with the investigative hearing provision, said to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security in 2010 that the Law Union characterized this episode “as a fiasco, and I think that's an appropriate description”. He went on to say about all the provisions examined:

The provisions you are looking at here, in my submission, change the Canadian legal landscape.... They should not be passed, and in my view they are not needed. There are other provisions of the code that allow for various ways of dealing with these people.

This seems to be the nub of the issue. Without such extreme provisions, without changing the legal landscape of Canada, without breaching the rights and civil liberties of Canadian citizens, we have successfully protected the safety and security of Canada and Canadians from terrorist attack. These provisions have proven over the course of time to constitute an unnecessary and ineffective infringement.

As the former NDP justice critic said in the House in 2010:

When facing a crisis, we as political leaders feel that we have to do something even when all the evidence shows that the structures we have, the strength of our society, the strength of our laws, are enough to deal with it. We passed legislation in early 2002 to deal with terrorism when we panicked. We have learned in the last eight years that there was no need for that legislation.

The only thing to add to that summation is that in the past decade we have learned that we did not need this act.

The proof, as they say, is in the pudding. As Denis Barrette, spokesperson for the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group, noted before the standing committee on Bill C-17 in 2011:

Since 2007, police investigations have succeeded in dismantling terrorist conspiracies using neither one of the provisions we are talking about today.

He concluded:

We believe that Canadians will be better served and better protected under the usual provisions of the Criminal Code, rather than others that are completely unnecessary. Reliance on arbitrary powers and a lower standard of evidence can never replace good, effective police work. On the contrary, these powers open the door to a denial of justice and a greater probability that the reputation of innocent individuals...will be tarnished.

We have borne witness to that in this country.

While these provisions have proven to have no effect on the fight against terror, they have had a profound social impact on Canada and many Canadians. On the eve of 9/11 this year, I showed a film at my local review theatre, the Fox in the Beach. The film is called Change Your Name Ousama. It was produced and directed by local filmmaker Fuad Chowdhury and focuses on a community in my riding of Beaches—East York called Crescent Town. Crescent Town is a very densely populated and diverse community, which is largely made up of Bangladeshi Canadians, most of whom are Muslim.

The film is not a point of view film. It was made for television and screened at the Montreal film festival. It includes significant interview footage, for example, of the assistant director of CSIS. It also includes footage of our Prime Minister in a fairly recent CBC interview telling Canadians that the major threat to Canada is still Islamicism. The film also tells the story of what it feels like to be one of about a million Muslim Canadians living in a political climate where their religion has been held to be a threat to the security of their country.

It is noted in the film by a University of Toronto academic that governments, through their actions, have the power to create stigmas and to marginalize communities. Of this we need, in this place, to be very mindful and sensitive. This is where the film gets its title. It was the advice, amidst the political fallout of 9/11, of a Muslim leader of Crescent Town to members of his community, “Change your name Ousama. Shave your beard. Do not wear your kufi”. In essence, “change or disguise your identity”.

Motivated as they have been, bills such as that introduced in 2001 by the Liberals and its partial reprisal today in the form of Bill S-7 have had that impact. They have left so many across this country and in my riding feeling like they have something to apologize for, as if the onus rests on them to demonstrate somehow that they are not terrorists.

Herein lies a great tragedy. In Bill S-7, as with Bill C-36 before it, we have before us a bill that contradicts not just the legal heritage of this country but a fundamental social and political heritage that takes us back decades at least, a heritage of which we should be proud and protective. The heritage I speak of is the opportunity to maintain and exercise one's culture and religion in Canada freely and still be and feel fully Canadian. This social and political heritage is one that has made us a great place, a place where so many around the world long to come to live.

Disposition of Abolition of Early Parole Act

[Alexandra Mendes, Liberal, Brossard—La Prairie, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to participate in the debate on the motion to prevent debate on the content and substance of Bill C-59. I find it rather odd that the Bloc has supported the government's attempt to stifle any attempt at debate on the substance of this bill.

No one in the House can accuse the Liberals of not supporting the idea of eliminating parole eligibility after one-sixth of the sentence is served for economic crimes. Two years ago, my colleague from Bourassa, our candidate in Saint-Bruno—Saint-Hubert and our member for Lac-Saint-Louis participated in a press conference with several of Earl Jones' victims to call on the government to quickly bring forward a bill to eliminate parole eligibility after one-sixth of the sentence is served, especially for criminals who commit major fraud and have multiple victims.

No one can accuse the Liberals of not supporting that idea. I think it is really dishonest of the government to make that kind of accusation when it knows very well what the Liberals' position is. This was pointed out by my colleague from Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine.

Now I would like to talk about the debate and the fact that the Conservatives and the Bloc members want to limit the scope of the debate. Just seven months ago the members of the Bloc rose in the House to criticize the government for doing the exact same thing it is doing now with Bill C-59. The government moved a motion to block debate.

Last June, the member for Saint-Maurice—Champlain rose in the House to criticize the government for moving a motion to block debate on the Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act. The Bloc member for Hochelaga also rose to oppose a government motion to block debate on Bill C-9, the Jobs and Economic Growth Act, by imposing time allocation.

We are opposed to this time allocation motion because we believe that Bill C-59 addresses a very important issue. Furthermore, for two years now, the Liberals have been calling on the government to eliminate parole eligibility after one-sixth of the sentence is served for economic crimes like those committed by Earl Jones, Vincent Lacroix and others.

I think it is a shame that some would have people believe that the Liberals do not want to protect victims. That is simply not true. When the government introduced Bill C-21 on economic crimes and it was referred to committee, the Liberal justice critic proposed an amendment to the bill to eliminate eligibility for parole after one-sixth of the sentence in cases of economic crime. The Conservatives and the Bloc defeated the motion.

Every MP is entitled to his or her opinion on bills that we are called on to debate in the House. It is a fundamental aspect of the democratic process. The operative word here is “debate”, and the collusion between the Conservatives and the Bloc is preventing us from acting as responsible parliamentarians.

We would like to hear from experts. We want to know how this bill will truly address a gap in the law, how it will do justice to victims, how this bill will improve the chances of rehabilitation for those who once lost control of their lives.

Perhaps we should indeed eliminate parole after one-sixth of a sentence for offenders who have committed serious economic crimes and left a number of victims.

However, for non-violent criminal acts that are not fraud, we believe that evidence has shown that parole after one-sixth of a sentence has been very effective and that the rate of recidivism is much lower.

We will never know what the experts might have said since this closure motion eliminates any chance to consult experts. With this government so eager to control everything, it has become somewhat of a tradition to just pass a bill without any idea of the facts that might call it into question.

The Liberals are against this closure motion. It is not justified, and we regret that the Bloc has decided to join the Conservatives to limit the debate on this bill. As far as the substance of the bill is concerned, in the past and still today, no one could accuse the Liberals of not showing their support for eliminating parole after one-sixth of the sentence for economic crimes.

In order to illustrate the government's intellectual dishonesty, I would like to present a chronology of the Conservatives' failures in their so-called fight against crime.

I am referring here to the various bills that have died on the order paper for all sorts of reasons or that have remained in the House or at committee indefinitely.

Here they are. Bill C-15, An Act to amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and to make related and consequential amendments to other Acts, died on the order paper when Parliament was prorogued; Bill C-19, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (investigative hearing and recognizance with conditions), died on the order paper before the House had a chance to vote on it; Bill C-26, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (auto theft and trafficking in property obtained by crime), also died on the order paper. It is certainly not the opposition that forced the government to prorogue Parliament.

Bill C-31, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act and the Identification of Criminals Act and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, died on the order paper, and Bill C-36, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, on the faint hope clause, died on the order paper before being brought back this session. One committee meeting was held on Bill C-46, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Competition Act and the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, before it died on the order paper. Bill C-52, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sentencing for fraud), which is related to Bill C-59, the bill we are dealing with today, died on the order paper when Parliament was prorogued. Bill C-58, An Act respecting the mandatory reporting of Internet child pornography by persons who provide an Internet service, died on the order paper. The prorogation of Parliament killed many bills.

Among the bills introduced by the Minister of Public Safety was Bill C-34, the Protecting Victims From Sex Offenders Act, which also died on the order paper. The bill to deter terrorism and to amend the State Immunity Act died on the order paper. Bill C-43, An Act to amend the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and the Criminal Code, died on the order paper. Bill C-47, An Act regulating telecommunications facilities to support investigations, died on the order paper. Bill C-53, An Act to amend the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (accelerated parole review) and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, died on the order paper. Bill C-60, An Act to implement the Framework Agreement on Integrated Cross-Border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America, died on the order paper.

To date, no meetings have been held to discuss Bill C-16, An Act to amend the Criminal Code. Bill C-17, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (investigative hearing and recognizance with conditions), was given first reading 51 days after Parliament was prorogued, and the committee still has not met to discuss that bill.

Bill C-21, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sentencing for fraud), was fast-tracked at committee in just one meeting and still has not reached second reading. Bill C-22, An Act respecting the mandatory reporting of Internet child pornography by persons who provide an Internet service, was given first reading 64 days after Parliament was prorogued, and the government delayed it for 26 days at report stage because of the debate on the short title.

Bill C-48, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make consequential amendments to the National Defence Act, was given first reading 89 days after Parliament was prorogued, and we are still waiting for the next step. Bill C-50, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (interception of private communications and related warrants and orders), was given first reading after 94 days, and we are still waiting. First reading of An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Competition Act and the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act took place 243 days after Parliament was prorogued. Bill C-53, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (mega-trials), was given first reading and nothing more.

Bill C-54, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sexual offences against children) only made it to first reading. Bill C-5, An Act to amend the International Transfer of Offenders Act was introduced at first reading by the Minister of Public Safety 15 days after prorogation. Two committee meetings were held and nothing has happened since. As for Bill C-23B, An Act to amend the Criminal Records Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, we are still waiting. After a few meetings on the subject, the minister was supposed to come back with amendments that he felt were necessary in order to make the bill more comprehensive and definitely more respectful. Bill C-39, An Act to amend the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts was introduced for first reading 104 days after prorogation and we still have not met in committee to discuss it. Bill C-49, An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Balanced Refugee Reform Act and the Marine Transportation Security Act was introduced for first reading 232 days after prorogation and there it remains. Bill C-52, An Act regulating telecommunications facilities to support investigations was also introduced for first reading 243 days after prorogation and we are waiting for the next step. The Senate introduced Bill S-7, An Act to deter terrorism and to amend the State Immunity Act for first reading 49 days after prorogation and we are still waiting for the next step. Bill S-10, An Act to amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and to make related and consequential amendments to other Acts was introduced for first reading in the Senate 60 days after prorogation. Bill S-13, An Act to implement the Framework Agreement on Integrated Cross-Border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America was introduced for first reading 237 days after prorogation.

I am pointing this out to prove that it is not the opposition parties that are slowing the process down. For all sorts of unknown reasons, the government introduces these bill and then goes no further with them.

To conclude, I would like to question the justification for Bill C-59 and the fact that the Conservatives and the Bloc felt this was urgent enough to warrant this closure motion, which is an affront to parliamentary dialogue.

Combating Terrorism Act

[Shelly Glover, Conservative, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to contribute to the debate on Bill C-17. This key piece of anti-terrorism legislation seeks to re-enact, but with more safeguards, the provisions having to do with investigative hearing and recognizance with conditions, which we lost because of a sunset clause in March 2007.

The powers set out in the bill attempt to fill a gap in our national security law. Effectively they focus much of their attention on the prevention of a terrorist offence.

I think all members of the House can agree that unlike some other forms of criminality a terrorist who is able to carry out an offence is attempting to injure and kill large numbers of people, making prevention an even more crucial policy goal.

This point, that there is a qualitative difference between terrorism offences and other regular forms of criminal activity, has been made by a number of terrorism experts. In this regard the members of the House may wish to recall the testimony of Lord Carlile of Berriew, the United Kingdom's independent reviewer of its anti-terrorism legislation, before the House of Commons subcommittee that reviewed the anti-terrorism act in November 2005. Lord Carlile was asked whether there was really any difference between investigating terrorism and investigating organized crime. She replied:

If I can I'll just characterize one important difference between terrorist crime and normal organized crime, or what police in Northern Ireland call ODCs, or ordinary decent criminals, in a distinction that they make. With organized crime, it is often possible for the police investigating that crime to leave arrest until very late. Indeed, for example, there was a huge robbery at London Heathrow Airport a couple of years ago—I was involved in the case for a time professionally—in which they allowed the robbery to take place, and they arrested the robbers whilst they were committing the robbery, with the result that in the end most of them pleaded guilty. You can't run that risk with terrorism.

To summarize this relatively short bill, the proposed investigative hearing provisions would create a mechanism for questioning persons before a judge about a past or future terrorist offence. The proposed provision for recognizance with conditions would allow a judge to impose reasonable conditions on a person in order to prevent the commission of a terrorist activity.

Surprisingly, some have maintained that the provisions are not necessary. Various reasons have been advanced in this regard. I would like to use my time to address some of these arguments, as I think it is important to have an informed debate on these matters.

Some say that since the provisions have never been used they must not be a truly necessary law enforcement tool. I cannot disagree more.

This view is based exclusively on hindsight and not on foresight. In the policing world, which I know very well as a member of the Winnipeg Police Service on a leave of absence, foresight is crucial, as is pro-activity. One could just as logically claim that because to date one's house has not burned down or one has never before become seriously ill that there is no need ever to buy fire or life insurance. Given the existence of an ongoing terrorist threat, reliance on past experience alone is an insufficient guarantor of the future security of Canadians.

Another view advanced has been that the recognizance-with-conditions provision is unnecessary because other Criminal Code provisions could be used instead. This view fails to appreciate the purpose of the recognizance-with-conditions provision. This tool is designed to disrupt the planning of terrorist activity at a very early stage. I will give an example. Suppose the police receive intelligence that a foreign head of state visiting Canada will be the target of a terrorist attack. They may therefore have reasonable grounds to believe that a terrorist act will be committed, but they may not have reasonable grounds to believe that a particular person will be the one to carry out the attack, which is the standard required under our existing arrest laws.

As a result, the person could not be arrested for conspiracy or under subsection 495.(1) of the Criminal Code. Similarly paragraph 810.01(1) would not apply, because it is targeted, in part, at those who it is reasonably feared will engage in a terrorist activity.

Bill C-17 seeks to fill this gap by authorizing a peace officer to lay an information before a judge if he or she believes on reasonable grounds that a terrorist activity will be carried out and suspects on reasonable grounds that the imposition of a recognizance with conditions on a person, with the arrest of the person, is necessary to prevent the carrying out of a terrorist act.

Some have also put forward the position that Bill C-17 infringes upon human rights. In rebutting this view, let me begin with the investigative hearing provisions.

In the debates on this bill's predecessor, former Bill C-19, the argument was made that this hearing was an infringement on the right to silence. The answer to this argument was authoritatively given by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2004 in a case called “Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code”, which arose in the context of the Air India prosecution.

The majority of the court rejected the appellant's argument that the investigative hearing violated an individual's absolute right to silence and the right against self-incrimination, noting in part the specific and robust protections governing use and derivative use immunity found in the original legislation. Indeed, the court noted:

Derivative use immunity is provided for in s. 83.28(10)(b). Indeed, the protection in para. (b) goes beyond the requirements in the jurisprudence, and provides absolute derivative use immunity, such that evidence derived from the evidence provided at the judicial investigative hearing may not be presented in evidence against the witness in another prosecution even if the Crown is able to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that it would have inevitably discovered the same evidence through alternative means.

We all need to keep in mind when thinking about possible adverse ramifications of the recognizance with conditions that they have a built-in legal filter. They can only be imposed when two criteria are met: A peace officer must believe on reasonable grounds that a terrorist activity will be committed, and must suspect on reasonable grounds that the imposition of the recognizance is necessary to prevent the carrying out of the terrorist activity.

Moreover, the second criterion is not one of mere suspicion, it is one of reasonable grounds to suspect. In other words, this is a higher bar. This means more than a mere hunch. In this regard, I would note that the concept of reasonable suspicion is not unknown in Canadian criminal law.

By analogy, I note that the Supreme Court approved the standard of reasonable suspicion in the context of the common law police power of investigative detention, the police power to briefly detain a person where the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect the person has committed a crime. In this regard, I refer hon. members who are interested to the case of Regina v. Mann.

Therefore, I think it is fair to say that this will not be applied to a broad range of people in this country. With regard to the view that these powers can unfairly label a person a terrorist without the opportunity to clear oneself, I would call attention to the well-established and often-used peace bonds or recognizance powers in the Criminal Code. In particular, a peace bond could be imposed to prevent a person from inflicting injury on or committing a sexual offence against a young person. These, too, have implications for the defendants who are subject to them, but no one would argue that because of this these provisions should not exist.

Like these existing provisions, the proposed recognizance with conditions is carefully tailored to achieve an overarching critical objective, namely the prevention of a terrorist activity, an objective that I know all members support.

Another criticism of this bill, in its previous incarnation as Bill C-19, was made by the hon. NDP member for St. John's East. It went as far as, in effect, something like this:

When a bill allows for imprisonment for up to 12 months or strict recognizance conditions on individuals who have not been charged with any crime, it is contrary to the core values of our justice system.

I disagree, and I am going to prove that point immediately. I would point out that this accusation of fundamental unfairness cannot only be made of the recognizance with conditions provision found in this bill, it can also be equally made of all the peace bond provisions of the Criminal Code.

Please allow me to set out for consideration and reflection by the hon. members the following peace bond provisions that contain this very same power to order up to 12 months' imprisonment where a person refuses to enter into recognizance.

The first is a recognizance where a person fears on reasonable grounds that another person will cause serious injury to him or her or to his or her spouse or common-law partner or child, or will damage his or her property, under paragraph 810(3)(b) of the Code. Other examples are a recognizance where a person feels on reasonable grounds that another person will commit a terrorism offence or a criminal organization offence, under subsection 810.01(4); a recognizance where a person feels on reasonable grounds that another person will commit one of various sexual offences in respect of a person under 16 years of age, found under subsection 810.1(3.1); or a recognizance where a person feels on reasonable grounds that another person will commit a serious personal injury offence, which is found under subsection 810.2(4).

In all these instances, if a person refuses to enter into a recognizance, the power to order up to 12 months imprisonment exists. My point is that the punishment provision for refusing to enter into a recognizance is not unique to the recognizance with conditions provision found in Bill C-17. It is standard for all peace bond provisions in the Code. It is therefore a good reason to ensure that there is a means whereby a person's refusal to enter into a peace bond has consequences.

Indeed, I would point out that the recognizance with conditions provision found in Bill C-17 is, in one important respect, more limited in scope than some other peace bond provision found in the Code.

Hon. members may recall that where there is a reasonable fear that another person may commit a sexual offence against a person under 16 years of age or that another person may commit a serious personal injury offence, the recognizance can actually be extended from 12 months to two years if the person has been previously convicted of a similar offence. In contrast, in Bill C-17 the maximum period of time that a recognizance can be enforced is in fact 12 months.

Changing gears a little bit, I want to discuss briefly some of the policy decisions that went into the development of the bill. Members may recall that the House of Commons subcommittee interim report on the Anti-terrorism Act, the legislation that originally contained both of these schemes, recommended limiting the investigative hearing power to the investigation of imminent terrorism offences.

The government has, for good reason, decided not to go this route. If this limit were imposed, it would exclude the possibility of holding an investigative hearing in respect of past terrorism offences. For example, if this recommendation were to be accepted and if a terrorist group committed an offence and planned a subsequent offence, or offences, in the investigative hearing no questions could be asked about the offence already committed, even though such questioning could yield information that would be essential to the prevention of the planned subsequent offences. It is clear that this decision makes good policy sense and serves to better protect Canadians.

Another criticism that may be raised is that the bill does not totally reflect the judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada with regard to the investigative hearing provisions. As hon. members may recall, the Supreme Court of Canada in 2004 rendered two decisions with regard to the investigative hearing. In one case, the Supreme Court held that the investigative hearing should presumptively be an open hearing, albeit this is a presumption that could be rebutted, depending on the facts of the case; and in the other, which I have already referred to, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the investigative hearing.

However, as part of its latter judgment, the Supreme Court extended the protection of use and derivative use immunity beyond the criminal proceeding context to cover extradition and deportation hearings.

In my view, it is unnecessary for Bill C-17 to explicitly propose an amendment to extend the use of derivative use provision to extradition and deportation hearings or to include a provision about the presumption of openness in such cases. It is obvious to me that, if enacted, Bill C-17 will be interpreted in light of the Supreme Court's conclusion on these issues.

I have attempted to address some of the objections to the bill that have been raised in previous discussions. I hope that some of the reasons I have articulated will have resonated with my colleagues in this place and that they begin to view these provisions as minimally intrusive and ones that do not present a threat to the Canadian values but actually protect them.

I want to reiterate that we have heard from police officers as well on this issue. I myself was a police officer when the sunset clause took away these powers, and I am here to say that I represent many police officers across this country who believe this is essential to prevent any kind of terrorism attacks in the future.

I would urge all hon. members in the House to please support Bill C-17 and in doing so contribute once again to the safety and security of all Canadians.

[Rob Nicholson, Conservative, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada]

moved that Bill C-17, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (investigative hearing and recognizance with conditions), be read the second time and referred to a committee.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to rise and speak at second reading to the combating terrorism act, Bill C-17.

In that regard, I have to thank the hon. government House leader for putting justice legislation first on the list. I know that is in accord with his own thoughts and priorities. I just want to tell him how much I appreciate that this is the first bill before Parliament in this session and thank him.

I am pleased to lead off the debate on a vital piece of the government's national security legislative agenda: Bill C-17. This bill, with which many members are familiar, seeks to reinstate, with additional safeguards, the investigative hearing and recognizance with conditions provisions that sunsetted in March 2007.

This government has put national security and, in particular, anti-terrorism at the forefront of its agenda.

In the March 3, 2010, Speech from the Throne, the government committed to taking steps to safeguard Canada's national security, maintaining Canada as a peaceful and prosperous country and one of the safest places in the world in which to live. This is our goal. The proposals in this bill represent one significant step in the right direction.

There is somewhat of a history in this place on these powers. These provisions were first introduced in the Anti-terrorism Act in December 2001 and were subject to a sunset clause. Members will recall that the ATA also contained a mandatory parliamentary review component, which led to two separate reviews: one by a Senate special committee and, in this place, by two subcommittees, the last being the Public Safety and National Security Subcommittee.

As the committees were winding down their review of the ATA, including the investigative hearing and the recognizance with conditions powers, the sunset date on these provisions was fast approaching. As a result, the government introduced a resolution in the House of Commons that proposed to extend these provisions for three years. Unfortunately, the powers were not extended by a vote of 159 to 124 and the provisions, therefore, expired on March 1, 2007.

It is important to recognize that the reports published by the parliamentary committees that reviewed the ATA were generally supportive of the powers contained in Bill C-17 and called for their extension.

Since that time, attempts have been made by this government to reinstate these important tools.

First, Bill S-3 was introduced in the Senate in the 39th Parliament and contained additional safeguards and technical changes to respond to the recommendations of the committees reviewing the ATA.

The Senate passed Bill S-3 on March 6, 2008, with a few amendments, but it died on the order paper when the election of 2008 was called.

More recently, in the last session of Parliament, this government again made efforts at bringing this important piece of legislation back to life, through Bill C-19. Bill C-19 contained the amendments made by the Senate to the former bill.

In summary, these were making mandatory a review of these provisions by a parliamentary committee within five years; deleting some words in the recognizance with conditions provisions to track charter jurisprudence; and making a technical amendment for consistency.

These changes are also now found in Bill C-17. I want to make that very clear. They are all there in this piece of legislation.

With that short history, let me turn to an explanation how the investigative hearing and the recognizance with conditions provisions of this bill would operate.

What will become very clear, as I described these proposals, is that they would achieve the appropriate balance between the respect for human rights without compromising effectiveness and utility.

First, with the investigative hearing provisions, the courts would be empowered to question, as witnesses, those persons who are reasonably believed to have information about a past or future terrorism offence.

The key here is that the person required to attend an investigative hearing is treated as a witness, not someone who is accused of a crime. It is important to note that witnesses could be questioned under this scheme without the commencement of any prosecution.

Earlier, I noted the balance between human rights and security. In this regard, the investigative hearing provision would be equipped with numerous safeguards for witnesses in accordance with the charter of rights and the Canadian Bill of Rights. I would like to set out a few of these safeguards so that all hon. members can get a sense of the careful attention which our government pays to issues of this type.

First, the attorney general must consent before the investigative hearing can be initiated.

Second, an independent judge must agree that an investigative hearing is warranted, finding in particular that it is believed on reasonable grounds that a terrorism offence has been, or will be committed, the information concerning the offence or the location of a suspect is likely to be obtained as a result of the order, and in all cases, reasonable attempts have been made to obtain the information by other means. Previously, this safeguard only applied to future terrorism offences and not past ones.

Third, section 707 of the Criminal Code, which sets out the maximum period of time in relation to which an arrested witnesses can be detained at a criminal trial, would apply to a person arrested to attend an investigative hearing. This is a new safeguard that is added to Bill C-17, something that was not in the original legislation.

Fourth, the person named in the investigative hearing would have the right to retain and instruct counsel at any stage of the proceeding.

Finally, there is a robust prohibition against the state using the information or evidence derived from the information against the person.

It is important for all members of this place to know that in 2004 the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the investigative hearing was constitutional having regard to the safeguards that existed at that time in a case called “Re: Application under Criminal Code s. 83.28”.

Therefore, I think all members would agree that the safeguards set out in Bill C-17 in relation to the investigative hearing are robust, effective and reasonable.

Now let me return to the recognizance with conditions provisions of the bill. The recognizance with conditions proposal would permit the court to impose on a person such reasonable conditions as the court considers necessary to prevent terrorist activity. This would prove to be a vital tool in efforts at keeping Canadians safe. As I set out in the various components of the recognizance with conditions scheme, I would ask hon. members to take note of the numerous safeguards contained within the proposal.

Under the proposed bill, before a peace officer is able to make an application to a judge for a recognizance order, again the consent of the attorney general would have to be obtained. A peace officer could lay an information before a provincial court judge if the peace officer believed on reasonable grounds that a terrorist activity would be carried out and suspected on reasonable grounds that the imposition of a recognizance with conditions on a person or the arrest of the person would be necessary to prevent the carrying out of the terrorist activity. This would be the legal test to be met in order to obtain the judicial order to compel a person to attend before a judge.

Under this proposal judges would be able to compel a person to attend before them for a hearing to determine if a recognizance would be imposed. Now the bill proposes a very limited power to arrest without warrants, the purpose of which is to bring a person before a judge so that the judge can exercise his or her power of judicially supervised release.

This power can only be exercised in two situations as follows: first, is where a peace officer has the grounds for laying an information before a judge, but by reason of exigent circumstances it would be impractical to lay an information and the peace officer suspects on reasonable grounds that the detention of the person is necessary in order to prevent a terrorist activity.

The second is where and information has already been laid as a summons issued by a judge and the peace officer suspects on reasonable grounds that the detention of the purpose is necessary in order to prevent a terrorist activity.

For example, suppose that a peace officer has the requisite grounds to lay an information before a judge. However,he or she also learns that the terrorist suspects are planning an imminent terrorist attack and the person is about to deliver material that could be useful in making, for instance, an explosive device. In such an example, the peace officer could reasonably suspect that it is necessary to detain the person and bring him or her before the judge in order to prevent the delivery of the material and therefore the carrying out of the terrorist activity.

The bill sets out that in cases where the person has been arrested without a warrant under the recognizance with conditions provisions, that person cannot be detained for more than 72 hours. In the end, if in the opinion the recognizance is not warranted the person will of course be released.

It is important to note that if a person refuses to enter into a recognizance when ordered by the court, the judge can order the person's detention for up to 12 months. This is a significant power but I am sure one that is understandable in the circumstances given the seriousness of the harm that could be caused by the commission of a terrorist offence. Moreover, it is a power found in other peace bond provisions of the Criminal Code.

For both the investigative hearing and the recognizance with conditions powers, the bill would require annual reporting on the use of these provisions. While annual reporting requirements existed in the original legislation, this is an important change that is found in Bill C-17. In response to a recommendation from the Senate committee that reviewed the ATA, the bill proposes that both theAttorney General of Canada and the Minister of Public Safety provide their opinions, supported by reasons, as to whether the operations of these provisions should be extended. This is an open, transparent and sound reporting mechanism that is being proposed.

One of the benefits of having extensive reviews and debates already to have taken place on these provisions is that one is able to anticipate questions or concerns that may be expressed. I will not attempt to address some of those issues.

Some may take the position that these provisions are not necessary since they have been rarely used when they were in force if at all. However, this argument is premised on the view that since these powers were not used in the past that they will not be needed in the future. In the face of continuing terrorist attacks around the world, this logic is, to say the least, questionable. Neither I nor do I suspect the members of the House have the power to predict the future. Therefore it is imperative that we as a country have the mechanisms necessary to respond to a terrorist threat and that we give our law enforcement proper tools to do so. This is what Canadians rightfully expect.

It is certainly true that when these powers were previously in force for five years, to our knowledge the investigative hearing power was invoked only once and never in fact held. On that occasion, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the investigative hearing scheme and found it to be constitutional. To my knowledge, the recognizance provision was not used at all.

I suggest that this is clear proof, not that these powers are not needed, but rather that Canadian law enforcement is prepared to exercise restraints when it comes to using these powerful tools.

I would like to restate that the recognizance provisions cannot be imposed solely on the ground of reasonable suspicion. The bill would require that the police officer believes on reasonable grounds that a terrorist activity will be carried out and that he or she suspects on reasonable grounds that the imposition of a recognizance with conditions is necessary to prevent a terrorist activity. This is a significant threshold and not one based on mere suspicion.

Some have argued that the Criminal Code already contains similar provisions that could be used for terrorism related offences, such as Section 495(1)(a) and Section 810.01, and that accordingly these provisions are unnecessary. Section 495(1)(a) in part allows a police officer to arrest without a warrant a person reasonably believed to have committed an indictable offence or about to commit an indictable offence. What this argument fails to realize is that the arrest powers in that section apply to a much smaller class of persons than those who would be covered under this bill.

Similarly, the peace bond provisions that I talked about earlier target only potential perpetrators of offences themselves, the actual person doing it. Provided the criteria or the recognizance with conditions are met, this bill would apply more broadly to persons who could not be arrested for terrorism offences in order to disrupt the planning of terrorism. I think all members of the House would agree that this is a class of persons who must, in order to save lives, be subject to a form of judicially supervised release.

We all know that terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Since the attacks on the United States in September 2001, the world has witnessed numerous acts of terrorism but, more important, as the recent guilty pleas and convictions in terrorism cases in our country have shown us, Canada is not immune to the threat of terrorism.

We as a government and as parliamentarians have a responsibility to protect our citizens. In doing so, we must provide our law enforcement agencies with the necessary tools to achieve that objective. It is equally our responsibility to do so in a balanced way with due regard for human rights. That was our goal with this reform and I believe that we have achieved it.

The investigative hearing and the recognizance with conditions powers are necessary, effective and reasonable. I call upon all parties to work together to make Canada a safer place to live, work and thrive.

Business of the House

[Jay Hill, Conservative, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, today we will continue with Bill C-57, Canada-Jordan Free Trade Act.

If we were to complete that, I would intend to call Bill C-23, Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act. I would point out to my colleagues that this bill has already received more than 30 hours of debate in the House and yet the NDP and the Bloc continue to delay the proceedings and hold up this agreement that would create new business opportunities for Canadians from coast to coast.

As I indicated this morning, tomorrow will be an allotted day.

Next week we will once again focus on our justice agenda beginning with the report and third reading stage of Bill C-36, An Act to amend the Criminal Code followed by Bill C-31, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act and the Identification of Criminals Act and to make a consequential amendment to another Act. Then we will have Bill C-54, Protecting Canadians by Ending Sentence Discounts for Multiple Murders Act; Bill C-55, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the response to the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in R. v. Shoker act; Bill C-19, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (investigative hearing and recognizance with conditions); Bill C-53, Protecting Canadians by Ending Early Release for Criminals Act and finally, Bill C-35, Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act. All of these bills are at second reading.

On the issue of a NAFO debate, I would remind the hon. House leader for the Liberal Party that is what opposition days are for.

[Jay Hill, Conservative, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, in relation to what day the House will be doing its annual tributes to the sacrifices of our veterans and those in the Canadian Forces currently serving, that will be under negotiation. I suspect that is something that will be discussed among all House leaders in the days ahead. We will decide, obviously, collectively and co-operatively on the appropriate time to make that important tribute.

In regard to our ongoing justice program, obviously we are going to continue along, as we have last week and this week, for the remainder of the week with our justice legislation. I would note that since my last statement, we introduced Bill C-53, Protecting Canadians by Ending Early Release for Criminals Act, and Bill C-54, Protecting Canadians by Ending Sentence Discounts for Multiple Murders Act. Both of those additional bills are a key part of our ongoing efforts to reform the justice system in our country.

We sent to committee this week Bill C-42, Ending Conditional Sentences for Property and other Serious Crimes Act; Bill C-52, Retribution on Behalf of Victims of White Collar Crime Act; Bill C-46, Investigative Powers for the 21st Century Act; and Bill C-47, Technical Assistance for Law Enforcement in the 21st Century Act.

By the day's end, we hope to conclude debate on Bill C-43, Strengthening Canada's Corrections System Act. If we do that, I intend to call Bill C-31, the modernizing criminal procedure bill, and Bill C-19, the anti-terrorism bill.

Tomorrow we will continue with yet another justice bill, Bill C-35, Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, followed by the remainder of the justice bills that I noted if they have not been completed.

Next week I intend to call Bill C-50, the employment insurance for long tenured workers' bill, which is at report stage, having had it returned from committee.

Following Bill C-50, we will call for debate the report and third reading stage of Bill C-27, Electronic Commerce Protection Act, and second reading of Bill C-44, An Act to amend the Canada Post Corporation Act,

Finally, Wednesday, November 4, will be an allotted day.

Technical Assistance for Law Enforcement in the 21st Century Act

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member is right. This should have been dealt with years ago. It should have been allowed to pass in 2005, instead of the Conservatives causing an election then. It should have been allowed to pass when the member for Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine had introduced it in the previous session of Parliament before the Prime Minister killed it by going to the Governor General. It should have been introduced at the first opportunity in this session of Parliament.

Instead, as I mentioned, it was introduced right before the summer and then sat languishing on the order paper. However, that is not unusual. The reality is that many of the government's justice and crime bills languished on the order paper for years. We all remember Bill C-19, which dealt with investigative hearings. We were told that we were unpatriotic because we asked questions about it and that it had to be passed instantly. Suddenly, however, it sat on the order paper for two years and the Conservatives forgot all about it.

Why do they bring back these bills? I think the answer to that question rests with their recent troubles. When they get hit with a scandal and are dealing with a problem with cheque scandals and ministers embattled with various questions of impropriety, their first reaction is to drag back whatever justice bills have been languishing on the order paper as a channel changer.

That is the truth of the government's agenda on crime. It uses crime as a political weapon and as safe harbour. If other things are not going well, it retrenches to crime and talks about crime to try to change the channel.

Business of the House

[Jay Hill, Conservative, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, I will proceed in the same order in which my colleague presented his questions.

We will continue today with our government's justice program because this is a justice week. We will be starting with our latest edition, Bill C-52, the retribution on behalf of victims of white collar crime bill.

That bill will be followed by Bill C-42,, the conditional sentencing legislation; Bill C-46, the investigative powers legislation; Bill C-47, the technical assistance for law enforcement legislation; Bill C-43, legislation to strengthen Canada's corrections system; Bill C-31, modernizing criminal procedure legislation; and Bill C-19, the anti-terrorism act.

All of these bills are still at second reading, but members can see from the long list that we do have many pieces of legislation to debate and hopefully move through the legislative process.

We will continue with these law and order bills tomorrow and next week when we return from the weekend. As is the normal practice, we will give consideration to any bills that are reported back from committee as well.

On the issue of an allotted day, Wednesday, October 28 shall be the next allotted day.

We will then resume consideration of the government's judges legislation on Thursday following that opposition day.

As my hon. colleague from across the way mentioned, speaking of our justice agenda, I should add that I was extremely pleased to see that despite the Liberals' best efforts to try to gut the bill, it was passed in the other place. For those who are not aware, there were 30 Liberal senators in the other place at the time when they were voting on those amendments. All of them voted for the amendments that would have gutted that legislation. Fortunately, the Conservatives in the other place were sufficient in number to defeat those amendments and actually pass Bill C-25, the truth in sentencing legislation. It actually received royal assent earlier today.

I would like to thank my hon. colleagues, the Conservative senators, for all the good work they did in pushing that bill forward and for all the good work they are doing in pushing forward other legislation.

The House dealt with Bill S-4, the legislation to crack down on identity theft. It was passed and received royal assent as well today.

Opposition Motion--Business of the House

[Jay Hill, Conservative, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to speak to the opposition day motion moved by the hon. member for Wascana, the Liberal House leader.

The motion recognizes the role of the House in ensuring government accountability. As we know, that is the primary function of Parliament in our Westminster system.

More specifically, the motion at hand calls for three things: first, that the Standing Orders of the House be changed with respect to the scheduling of allotted days this fall; second, that the House calendar be altered to accommodate the G20 meetings in September; and third, that the government table an additional report on the implementation of the 2009 budget.

I will touch on these three points very briefly, as it is the government's intention to support the motion. I will devote the remainder of my remarks to a more general discourse on the successful functioning of Parliament and my experiences of this past session.

The opposition day motion provides for a change to the rules of Parliament with regard to how the government may allocate opposition days this fall. Since coming to office in 2006, as a general rule our government has always tried to evenly distribute the opposition days in the parliamentary calendar. In certain circumstances we recognize that legislative priorities can force a deviation from this practice. However, we do support the idea of amending the Standing Orders to ensure that this usual practice becomes a rule.

The second provision of today's opposition day motion provides for a change to the House calendar for the fall of 2009. Under this provision the House would open a week earlier than currently scheduled and it would then adjourn for the week of September 21. This will enable the government to focus on the G20 meetings in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania on September 24 and 25.

The G20 is the chief forum for the world leaders, as a group, to address issues resulting from the global economic crisis, and Canada has played an active and important role in these discussions. At the fall G20 meetings, the Prime Minister and other world leaders will discuss progress in promoting economic recovery and they will consider new ways to address global economic and financial challenges.

I think we can all agree that there is no more pressing issue before Parliament than dealing with the global economic downturn, which has caused personal hardship and job loss around the world. Unfortunately, as we all know, Canada has not been immune.

Our legislative program of this past session has reflected that the economy is the number one issue for Canadians. As such, I am pleased to support a motion that permits the Government of Canada to give its undivided attention to the critical economic discussions that will be taking place at the G20 summit in September.

The third provision of today's opposition motion requests that the government table an additional report on the implementation of the 2009 budget. In the face of global economic uncertainty, this government presented a budget in January with a comprehensive economic action plan to stimulate economic growth, restore confidence and support Canadians and their families during this global recession.

This economic recovery program is unprecedented in our history, and it is working. Canada was the last group of seven country to enter recession and the International Monetary Fund expects that we will have the strongest recovery coming out of it.

The government has also taken unprecedented steps in reporting on our economic action plan. We tabled an initial budget report in March. A week ago we tabled a second budget report, which outlines how 80% of the measures in our economic action plan are already being implemented. This government welcomes the opportunity provided by today's opposition day motion to table a third budget report in September. In fact, we committed to such a report in our budget presentation earlier this past winter.

The Minister of Finance announced at the time that he would be tabling an economic report in the fall. This being the case, I commend the official opposition for echoing the government's pre-existing intention and commitment to provide quarterly reports on the economy in and through the House to all Canadians. As we debate this today, I think it is important to remember that the government was already committed to providing that report in September.

As all members in the House know, the last few weeks have not been easy in this place. In fact they have not been easy on Canadians from coast to coast to coast. During this time of economic challenge, Canadians did not want to hear about the possibility of an election. Canadians want us to continue to work to achieve results for them. They know we cannot afford an election, which would put Canada's economic recovery at risk, halt stimulus investment across the country and limit our ability to continue to implement our economic action plan for Canadians.

By avoiding an election, we have enabled the government to continue its course of doing everything possible to turn this global recession around on our own soil. The cooperation we have seen emerge over this week, spearheaded by our Prime Minister, has not only avoided a costly and unwanted election but has clearly demonstrated to Canadians that their Parliament can work for them.

Despite the partisan political drama played out during the daily 45 minutes of question period, Canadians may be surprised to know just how cooperative and productive this past session of Parliament has been. Since January, our government has worked with all opposition parties to advance many important bills that will help Canadian families. We have moved forward on our electoral commitments, and I am pleased that much more has been done.

Since January, the government has introduced a total of 54 bills. By the time the Senate adjourns for the summer next week, I expect we will have royal assent on 26 of those bills, including such important legislative initiatives as Bill C-33, which will restore war veterans' allowances to allied veterans and their families; Bill C-29, to guarantee an estimated $1 billion in loans over the next five years to Canadian farm families and co-operatives; Bill C-3, to promote the economic development of Canada's north; Bill C-28, to increase the governance capacity of first nations in Canada; and Bill C-14, a critically important justice bill to fight the scourge of organized crime.

Although much work has been accomplished, a good number of bills that continue to be priorities of our government remain on the order paper, including Bill C-6, to enact Canada's consumer product safety act to help protect the health and safety of all Canadians; Bill C-8, to provide first nations women on reserve with the same rights and protections enjoyed by all other Canadians; and Bill C-23, to open new doors for trade between Canada and Colombia.

Furthermore, our government has continued to demonstrate an unwavering commitment to fighting crime and violence in this country. Our justice minister, the hon. member for Niagara Falls, has been unrelenting in his determination to hold criminals accountable and protect victims and law-abiding Canadian citizens.

Over a dozen justice related bills have been introduced since the beginning of this parliamentary session, which include Bill C-15, Bill C-26 and Bill S-4, to help fight crimes related to criminal organizations, such as drug-related offences, identity theft and auto theft; Bill C-25, which will return truth in sentencing and eliminate the two for one credit; Bill C-36, which will repeal the faint hope clause, and Bill C-19, the new anti-terrorism bill.

Unfortunately none of these bills have completed the legislative process during this session of Parliament. Again, due to the leadership of our Prime Minister, thankfully our country will not be plunged into an election and these bills will remain on the order paper. We hope to pass them into law in the fall.

I look forward to continuing the spirit of cooperation in this place in September to accomplish this unfinished business for all Canadians. Five of these bills have already passed one chamber of Parliament and they are before the second House for consideration. On behalf of vulnerable Canadians in particular, we have to keep moving to get the job done on this important legislation.

In closing, I am pleased that the government has been able to develop today's opposition day motion in cooperation with the official opposition. This House of Commons should more often focus on what all of us have in common rather than what divides us. While I would have liked to have seen some debate on some of our newer bills that we have just introduced and passed more of our justice and safety bills, this parliamentary sitting is winding down in the age-old Canadian tradition of compromise.

We all know that this place is about debate, trade-offs, negotiations and compromise. This is how Parliament works. This is how our very country was born, has grown and continues to develop and flourish.

As I have already indicated, the government will be supporting today's motion. I again salute our Prime Minister for his leadership in staving off an election, which I think would be dreaded by the vast majority of Canadians.

Mr. Speaker, I wish you, and all colleagues in this House, a very happy summer.

Business of the House

[Jay Hill, Conservative, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to be able to respond to not just the regular Thursday question about the business of the House for the next week, but indeed to respond to all the questions from my colleague across the way.

In the order that we will dealing with it, today we are debating a motion from the New Democratic Party, which has its supply day today.

Tomorrow we will continue, and hopefully conclude, the third reading stage of Bill C-6, product safety, followed by Bill C-36, the faint hope bill. The backup bill tomorrow will be Bill C-19, the anti-terrorism bill.

Monday, June 15 and Friday, June 19, 2009 shall be allotted days.

On Monday, we will be introducing a bill regarding the Maa-nulth First Nations agreement. It is my intention, provided that I have an agreement from all the other parties, to call and complete that bill on Tuesday. On behalf of that first nation, I express my appreciation to all hon. members and all the parties in the House.

Next week, I will also call Bill C-26, auto theft, for report and third reading. My hope is that we will get that down the hall to get it dealt with at the Senate.

In addition to Bill C-26, we will also consider Bill C-36, the faint hope bill; Bill C-37, National Capital Act; Bill C-38, Nahanni; and Bill C-31, modernizing criminal procedure. All of these bills, as we know, are at second reading.

I am hoping that Bill S-4, identity theft, can be sent over from the Senate expeditiously. If and when it arrives, I will be seeking the cooperation of the opposition to try to expedite that bill in our Chamber.

I might add that despite the assurance of the hon. opposition House leader last week, after we had passed Bill C-33 at all stages, the bill that will extend benefits to allied veterans and their families, I expected the Senate to quickly follow suit. Although sad, it is true that time is running out for some of these veterans and their families. They are waiting to receive these benefits. This bill is not controversial, but the delay of this bill by Liberal senators will become controversial very quickly.

Last week I also mentioned Bill C-29 in my Thursday reply, which the hon. member for Wascana mentioned a minute ago. That is the agricultural loans bill, which will guarantee an estimated $1 billion in loans over the next five years to Canadian farm families and cooperatives. Today the Liberal senators did not grant leave to even consider the bill, let alone agree to adopt it.

Another week has come and gone. I am not sure how the member for Wascana intends to return to farm families in Saskatchewan and explain why his senators in the other place are delaying the passage of Bill C-29.

Criminal Code

[Brian Murphy, Liberal, Moncton—Riverview—Dieppe, NB]

We do not have time to talk about the death penalty and the inappropriateness of the government's action, but I do have time to say that Bill C-19 adopts suggestions made by Liberals in the Senate, by Liberals here and by opposition parties, that suggest, for instance, there should be a right to retain and instruct counsel in these secret hearings, which was absent before.

It is very important, I will not say softened, but they made it more fair, that a judge must recognize that the disclosure and the investigation must be complete and that investigators, namely the police authorities, must exhaust all other methods before they get into preventative detentions and investigative hearings. They must go through the wringer, so to speak, before they trample on individual rights. That would guarantee, hopefully, the collective right of security.

[Brian Murphy, Liberal, Moncton—Riverview—Dieppe, NB]

Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to speak to the bill. I have the objective to cover a number of topics that I think might give us the full picture.

Too often in the House, we talk about specific legislation. We call it “C-19” or C-whatever. We talk about clauses in bills. We talk about the black letter law and the fine lines. All too often, it must be lost on the Canadian citizenry, stakeholders such as law enforcement officials and attorneys general, et cetera, and all of us that there is a wider context and broader scope.

Today, we are essentially discussing aspects in the Criminal Code of Canada. I have said a number of times that a great way to get Conservatives on our side is to say that one of the best things they ever did as a party was to have a bright Maritimer, a former prime minister and minister of justice, Sir John Thompson. In 1892, when he was the minister of justice, he collated and wrote the Criminal Code of Canada, many years after we became a country. The hon. member from Scarborough has said it maybe it was one of the last goods things they did. That is probably unfair, but it history will judge.

The point is we live with the Criminal Code. The fact it was enacted it in 1892 and has never really had a wholesale revision of it means that we keep adding things to it. We keep adding layers to the Criminal Code. One of the layers we enacted in the wake of 9/11, the terrorist attacks on North America and our security and sovereignty as it was felt then, was section 83.1, a separate section on terrorism. It became law on January 17, 2002.

This was the context where we said that we would take 24 pages of the code and dedicate it to anti-terrorism tactics and legislation. It is a good place to start, because I have mostly been hearing a bit of a repetition from the Conservative side of the fine points about anti-terrorism legislation and how we have to shore this up because we kind of lost the boat in 2007. We have to clean this up and stop the leaks. It is only two subsections, which is a very small part of the 30 pages.

There has not been a wholesome discussion of what we did in 2002 in reaction to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. However, what I have heard all day from members of the opposition is the supposition that the Criminal Code takes care of all criminal activities and that there should not really be a special circumstance for acts of terrorism, that other parts of the code protect individual liberties. Criminals are people accused of crimes. They say that these should be good enough and that we should not have a special section on terrorism.

There is a lot written about how we reacted as a country and as Parliament to the acts of 9/11. There may be a thought after the passage of time that we overreacted with respect to the intrusion upon individual liberties and rights as defined in the charter. That will be a judgment of history. I do not think events are written into history in three, five or ten years. As they say, history is often written by the winners, but history is also often written when the winners and losers are long gone. The judgment of history will decide whether there were overreactions in North America or the western world with respect to 9/11.

However, when we look at the context of section 83.1, we can see that it is written fairly broadly and fairly comprehensively to take international situations into account. I do not think it can be said that the whole of section 83.1 was an overreaction that went too far. I have yet to hear the opposition parties say that the section 83.1 should be thrown out. I take it as an admission that the other opposition parties feel section 83.1 is worth keeping.

I think of my friends in the Bloc, particularly my friend from Hochelaga, who rail against certain sections of 83.1, in particular the recognizance preventive detention sections, which are the crux of the debate today. It is very curious that at the justice committee, he was the very member who brought forward the motion to suggest we should list organized crime organizations as outlawed associations and further our work in battling crime. It is a sure analogy because that is the very thing we did in section 83.1. By cabinet decision, by Governor-in-Council, there can be a scheduled list of terrorist groups, which then is made to apply to this part of the Criminal Code.

The member from the Bloc, who was extremely eloquent in defending his position, undercuts himself when he says that we should do this domestically in the Criminal Code, buttress section 467.1, which is the organized crime part of the code, with a legislated listing or organized crime associations, just like we did in 2002 with terrorist organizations.

I am a little concerned that opposition members are perhaps overreacting to legislation, the bulk of which heretofore they have not objected to.

I have a word on organized crimes. It is not an advertisement for the upcoming justice committee hearings, but it is worth noting that we spend 26 pages in the Criminal Code on terrorism and we spend 4 pages on organized crime. Currently we are trying to move organized crime into the terrorism section 83.1 by perhaps naming organizations and buttressing that section. If we are talking about organized crime, we can go to section 467.1 and say that this is what Parliament intended in dealing with this specific problem.

There is great recognition in the House that there is a specific problem when it comes to organized crime. Unlike what my friends in the other opposition parties are saying, it is not all found elsewhere in the Criminal Code. We are not talking about simple assault or murders. We are talking about murders, assaults and harm done by criminal organizations.

It is easier for us to understand that because we know about criminal organizations, drugs and crime. We see it every day. We see there are not enough prosecutions to keep up with the crimes. It is in front of us and it is in front of our constituents. It is open, it is notorious and it is there to see. Therefore, we see the need for that.

In the months after 9/11 we saw the need for section 83.01. As I say, I do not think there has been a backtracking on the need for a separate section on anti-terrorism legislation.

Like all reviews of legislation and like all needs for legislation, from time to time it is important to look back and see whether we overstepped. I am not saying that this would be part of the debate today, but an act of terrorism is defined in section 83.01, as many of those definitions are defined by universal declarations. I will not go through them all. They have been well pounded out by international organizations, declarations and conventions. They are all there. The definitions are clear. However, they are also for acts or omissions in or outside of Canada.

It was groundbreaking for this part of the code to take into account acts or omissions that took place offshore. It was very vital for us to treat terrorist offences differently in that way so we could have extraterritorial jurisdiction. However, it goes on to say that these acts are committed in whole or in part for political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause.

I know a number of lawyers who have been involved with some very high profile cases, including none other than the member for Mount Royal. They have suggested that the phrase, which precurses the debate of the sections we are getting into, may be a bit wide.

If we think about it, in organized crime we do not get into the ideological, political or religious reasons why organized criminal organizations open up chop shops or grow marijuana for the currency in the drug trade, corrupting our youth with respect to illicit drugs. We do not much care about that. We care about the fact that they are organized, they have targeted groups and they harm people by various crimes that would otherwise be in the code.

It is similar with respect to terrorism. We might say that ideological purpose drives a person to be a suicide bomber, and I understand that, but in this day and age, in our country of pluralistic values, the word religious hits a button, which I think is objectionable. The fact that it does not exist in the patriot act would tell us that the Americans bill of rights will not countenance it.

If we had to gauge reactions to 9/11, probably the American response was a little more reactive than ours. Again, history will judge that. I say that as a precursor because I know the influence for a lot of this legislation may be British in origin.

The British Parliament in its legislation, as it does not have a code, has been reactive to terrorism for a lot longer. It has some of the best crack units in anti-terrorism and some of the best intelligence gathering because of its longer experience with terrorist activities, which, in the main, were caused with the “problems” in Northern Ireland. Again that went back to the thought many years ago that this was only a religious problem. That is something at which we might want to looked.

Remember we are talking about the last three or four pages. With respect to the bill itself, the first 20 or so pages talk about the special powers that might be given to judges and prosecutors to amass evidence and property. As section 83.03 says, providing or making available property or services for terrorist purposes is an offence. There is the whole section of establishing the list.

There is the admission of foreign information obtained in confidence, which would not necessarily apply to a domestic crime. This is why section 83.1 is needed. There is the freezing of property, which again is a special element of the anti-terrorist campaign to get rid of parts of the Criminal Code. There is immunity from disclosure. There are audit powers that are necessary for the incursions into terrorist organizations. There are restraint and forfeiture of property applications that fill this part of the section. There are forfeiture provisions unaffected and participation in an activity and terrorist group, which are the collateral named or delineated offences.

There are a number of activities of harbouring and concealing terrorists, the instructing to carry out a terrorist activity if the individual is not the actual person involved, before we get to the debate about investigative hearings and the arrest warrant for detention in aid of that.

The Canadian public should know, and parliamentarians should keep reminding themselves, that we have no intention of getting rid of section 83.1, the whole terrorist part II.1. Not a speaker rose and said we should get rid of that.

The so-called sunset provision would maybe let the public feel or some people think that we have not had a lot of incidents, that maybe we do not need this heavy-handed tool, therefore the whole Anti-terrorist Act regime in this part of the code will go out. It is not part of the debate today.

We are talking about two provisions of the legislative agenda and whether they should be returned to the code and looked at on an annual basis, as the amended act says, and reviewed. Also it should be looked at within the view of terminating it within five years, another sunset provision.

The investigative hearings, in particular, have been tested by the Supreme Court of Canada. That is another thing I did not hear much about in the debate today. In the 2004 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, Bagri, sections 7 and 11(d) of the charter were declared not to have been violated by these sections of the code.

This is now 2009. Five years ago, and two years after the enactment, those sections have been declared, without further challenge in five years, to have been compliant with the charter. We are now debating whether they should go back in. One reason is there have been improvements to the deleted or the sunsetted provisions by virtue of the work of the House and the other House.

Bill C-19, replaces, in the two section I want to talk about, the pith of the debate, sections 83.28 and 83.3 of the Criminal Code. These call for an investigative hearing to gather information for the purposes of an investigation of a terrorist offence and to provide for the imposition of a recognizance with conditions on a person to prevent him or her from carrying out a terrorist activity.

This act that has been brought in also provides that these sections cease to have effect for the possible extension of the operation.

All parties in this House take the protection of rights very seriously. On the other hand, there is a collective right in favour of protecting national security. There is the collective right of Canadians in every province and territory to feel that we have secured our boundaries, that we are going to act preventively, hopefully, and at least reactively, to measures that are undertaken by terrorist groups to destroy our country. I have to think that is a primordial national value shared by all parties.

Obviously the question in the debate today is the question of balance. How much infringement on individual rights will be tolerated for the protection of the collective right in favour of national security?

What is encouraging about this bill, as opposed to the last time we debated whether these two provisions should sunset or not, is that the government has incorporated safeguards proposed by the Senate and the special House committee that studied these matters in Bill C-19.

We feel that this bill deserves to be sent to committee to be studied in an overall wholesome and holistic way to determine whether those safeguards do indeed satisfy the right balance. Let us face it: none of us who spoke today are qualified to be witnesses on the topic. We are the elected members who express, as best we can and in the best fashion we can, what we think are the wishes of the Canadian people and in particular the people in our ridings.

At a hearing at committee, we would expect to hear experts in the field on this very important question of the balance between individual rights and the collective right of national security. The bill should be sent to committee because it has addressed previous concerns and it has incorporated proposed amendments set forth by the Senate members of the committee who studied it.

Again, this is not an advertisement. Let us be clear: the Senate committee studying this bill did a good job. They made a thorough review of the legislation and they proffered some suggestions that were followed by the Conservative government. It is about time that the government and all members in this place say that the Senate did a good job. There are some very capable people in the Senate, who brought forth some very important procedural protections and the tweaking of the two provisions to make it palatable, in my view, on the balance of rights.

The investigative hearings provisions in the Criminal Code allow authorities to compel the testimony of an individual without the right to decline to answer those questions. The intent would be to call in those who are on the periphery of the alleged plot, as it may be in terrorist circumstances, who may have vital information, rather than the core suspects. It is information gathering.

The second aspect of these two provisions is the preventive arrest provision, which in the Criminal Code allows the police to arrest and hold an individual, in some cases without warrant, provided they have reasonable grounds.

I think these amendments are very reasonable. They follow on Bill S-3.

In conclusion, I might add that the stakeholders in support include the Canadian Jewish Congress, which told the Senate committee that studied these provisions:

We believed in 2001, and continue to believe today, in the importance of granting expanded powers to the security services through recognizance with conditions and investigative hearings for the careful monitoring of individuals and groups that are suspect and the amassing of relevant information well in advance.

I want to speak briefly about the Harkat decision. I would like to discuss it in terms of the questioning that I may receive. The Harkat case is a jumble of the misapplication of the law as it is. It does not stand for the proposition that the law as it is or as it is about to be amended through this process is bad. It is throwing the baby out with the bathwater to use Harkat and the various decisions of Justice Noël for an argument that we should not enact proper legislation respecting the balance between individual liberties, the rights of individuals and the collective need for security.

[Réal Ménard, Bloc, Hochelaga, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise in this debate on Bill C-19, whose purpose is to re-introduce two provisions that the House did not want to approve when we dealt with them back in 2007.

I remember the debate we had in 2002. I was in the House then, having been elected a few years previously. If I remember correctly, Minister McLellan was responsible for public safety at the time and there was a legislative committee on which the Bloc Québécois was represented by the hon. member for Saint-Jean. It was not the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security or the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights that dealt with these proposals. I remember the situation very well. It was just after the attacks of September 11, 2001. There was a kind of psychosis in the air and all countries felt the need to be much more vigilant about terrorism. This widespread psychosis made us realize just how vulnerable we were as a society.

I can remember reading documents and going to conferences where we were told about the new phenomenon of terrorism. It was mass terrorism, in which innocent civilians were attacked. We had seen examples on subways and in airports. The terrorists were pursuing ideological ends. These were not various groups confronting one another but people trying to find ways to destabilize and terrorize civilian populations. We were trying to find methods—and very legitimately so, I can easily understand it—to avert these threats.

It was a time when the American congress had quickly passed the Patriot Act. I think the United Kingdom passed some legislation too, as well as France. Canada did not want to be left out and passed an act.

It would be a mistake for the members to allow themselves to be guided by reasoning that is fundamentally flawed. The provisions proposed here give the impression the government wants to find people to convict. It wants to force people before judges without having to meet a certain burden of proof, and that is clearly unreasonable. They argued at the time there was an emergency. I am very proud that the Bloc Québécois never yielded to this psychosis. There was also a very strong feeling of sympathy for the Americans. Prime Minister Chrétien went to walk around Ground Zero, along with all the party leaders.

We obviously have a special relationship with the United States. In speaking of it, former President Kennedy said geography made us neighbours and history, friends. There really is a symbiotic relationship between Canada and the United States. Whether it is the border, the American dream or trade flows, we are integrated in ways that can sometimes be very harmful. It is not my intention, though, to talk about that now.

I am proud that the Bloc Québécois managed to resist voting for these provisions, which are not the right approach given our objectives. When members do not agree with these provisions—one of them more than the other, if I understood correctly, especially when it comes to preventive detention in section 83.3—that does not mean we are less concerned about terrorism, we are not vigilant, we do not think we should anticipate terrorist acts, or we think there is no such thing as terrorism.

It was even explained to me that, in the world right now, there is an alarming proliferation of terrorist groups and that the most threatening terrorism, the most active, should I say, is that guided by considerations that are often ideological based on religious practices. That said, we are parliamentarians, democrats. We do not lose sight of the balance that must be struck in Parliament between rights, and of course, the end, in this case, is to protect the public. In 2002, it did not seem to us that this balance was reached and that the means being proposed to us were likely to achieve this end. Through my colleague, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, who sat on the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, we are renewing our position and concerns of 2002, when we considered the provisions put before us then.

Why did we have concerns? Because, for a parliamentarian, the end can never justify the means. We can never take shortcuts with warrants, assessment of the evidence or detention, even if we are talking of 24 hours. We can never take shortcuts, because to do so in this matter, there will be no more limits and there would be a loss of vigilance that is beneath the office we hold.

People here lived through the 1970 crisis. I was a little too young, but I am well aware, having heard the oral history, of the extent to which 1970 was a blot on our collective history of individual rights. Freedoms were suspended and because of that excesses were committed against poets, women singers, people who were moved by freedom, who believed in a certain ideology but represented no threat to society.

In the Bloc Québécois, we are not prepared to give our support to this type of democratic shortcut, even less so when we consider the history of these provisions, a short history, I grant you. Investigative hearings are mechanisms by which a provincial court or superior court justice of the peace can be asked to compel a citizen to testify and answer questions. While certain mechanisms may prevent it from being prejudicial for later testimony, the potential for compelling someone on the basis of suspicions remains. These investigative hearings, while they are more clearly defined, still represent a threat to procedural balance and democracy. I will come back to this.

Investigative hearings, like preventive arrest and detention, exist in provisions but have never been used. That is rather surprising. I heard the government members telling us earlier that these are tools needed by the various law enforcement agencies. It is contradictory, not to say paradoxical, and perhaps even inconsistent to suggest that tools are vital to law enforcement agencies, when they have never been used. Could we take into consideration the fact that the reason we have never used them is that there are alternative means in law, provided in the Criminal Code, which the law enforcement agencies can use?

We all understand that when terrorism is involved, somewhat like when organized crime is involved, these are not things that come about through spontaneous generation. They are things that call for lengthy investigations and a huge amount of resources. The Bloc Québécois does not dispute that intelligence is needed or that wiretap warrants are required. I was also in this House when wiretap warrants were extended. Not only may those warrants be necessary, but there may also be surveillance operations.

Terrorism and the networks that make it possible are things that depend on organizations. It is reasonable for a state to be able to use all means available to it to try to anticipate what is going to happen. Not only is it reasonable, it is also our duty. Society would not feel safe without the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the RCMP and all of the organizations that are responsible for intelligence. I agree, and I understand, that the state must have agencies that will keep an eye on these various networks and will use wiretaps, surveillance, undercover operations and counter-espionage, and all lawful means available to its leaders, to anticipate, foresee and engage in extremely vigilant monitoring of these people’s behaviour.

Let us consider the question of preventive detention. Obviously there is a considerable risk of abuse and stigma. In our legal system, the first consideration is fairness. If the state, with its prerogative powers, uses coercion against individuals and intrudes into their private lives, it is reasonable for there to be something to offset this, that being the knowledge that the individuals will have evidence against them that will lead to a conviction. In order for them to know and understand that evidence, and be able to prepare their defence, they must know what they are charged with and they must be arrested in accordance with the procedure set out in the Criminal Code.

In the case of preventive detention, that balance is upset somewhat. If I understand correctly, in the case of preventive detention, individuals may be arrested based on grounds or suspicions. Suspicions, in legal terms, are much less sound considerations. When there are reasons to think that individuals will commit terrorist acts, we generally have information we can use to assess the situation. There are various provisions. Why not use the conspiracy provision? If I remember correctly, it is in section 467 of the Criminal Code. Why not use the conspiracy provisions?

If we want to force someone to behave in a certain way and enter into a recognizance to keep the peace, why not use section 810? There is a big difference between clause 83.3 in the proposed legislation and section 810. They both have the same objective, namely to avoid something and ensure that someone enters into a recognizance to keep the peace. Under section 810, however, the person is summoned before a justice of the peace but not arrested. That is the first very important distinction.

The justice can require him to sign a peace bond, and he is arrested only if he refuses. If I remember correctly, the person can only be arrested for 12 months, although I think that might have increased to 24 months, at least in the case of section 810.

Those are provisions, therefore, that can be used by the various people responsible for enforcing the law. Unfortunately, clause 83.3 goes much further than that. A person can be held for 24 hours. The justice can also impose conditions for keeping the peace, there is no doubt about it. There will also be a stigma attached to the person involved because he was brought before a justice of the peace and associated with things that lead one to think he was involved in terrorism.

Being stigmatized in this way can have repercussions on a person’s job. If his employer hears about it, his reputation could be tarnished in the organization he works for. His employer may well question his allegiance as an employee and even his contract.

If an employer finds out that one of his employees has been associated with terrorism, even if only suspected of it, he could very well lose confidence in him. This is understandable but very detrimental, especially as it is based not on a charge, or solid proof, or a trial conducted under the established rules but simply on a process that takes someone to a peace officer who sends him before a justice of the peace, all on the basis of suspicions.

Once someone has been associated with terrorism, even if only suspected of it, there are repercussions not only on his job but also on his mobility, for example if he wants to travel by plane or any other means.

In thinking about our objective, neither Canada nor Quebec is safe from terrorist incidents. We understand that. But why ask parliamentarians to take shortcuts with our democracy when there are no assurances that these shortcuts will ever be used by law-enforcement agencies? In fact, until there is proof to the contrary, they certainly have not been used so far.

In connection with the prevention of acts of terrorism, section 495 of the Criminal Code provides that a peace officer may arrest without warrant a person whom he believes on reasonable grounds is about to commit a criminal act. As we can see, the provisions are already in place.

I must say with no ill will, because I am totally incapable of it, that I am surprised by the attitude of our colleagues in the official opposition. The Liberals supported the charters and just society of Pierre Elliott Trudeau, and I thought they always responded positively to the call to end practices that might be considered highly discretionary and of concern in terms of individual rights. I do not understand that the official opposition is today supporting the government. If my calculations are right, that means that Bill C-19 will likely be passed. Even if the Bloc and the NDP oppose it, we can realistically expect it to pass.

That is shameful, especially since the leader of the Liberal Party, when I was a law student, was recognized as an authority in individual rights. How can he today drop his guard and allow his party to support a bill that is extremely worrisome in terms of individual rights and the potential abuses it may lead to?

My time is up. I appeal for Bill C-19 not to be passed.

[Gord Brown, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I am very happy to address hon. members in the House on the importance of the powers contained in Bill C-19.

The bill seeks to re-enact the investigative hearing and recognizance with conditions provisions that were originally part of the Anti-terrorism Act, but ceased to be in effect as of March 1, 2007 when they were sunsetted.

The bill contains changes to the original provisions that are designed to respond to many of the recommendations that were made by two parliamentary committees that reviewed the Anti-terrorism Act. I would also like to note that I chaired the subcommittee of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security which reviewed the Anti-terrorism Act. The subcommittee made a number of recommendations in the interim report that was tabled on October 23, 2006. The recommendations of the majority of the subcommittee included that both provisions be extended for five years to the end of the 15th sitting day of Parliament after December 31, 2011. It also recommended that there be further parliamentary review before there be any further extension, and that the investigative hearing provision be limited to occasions where a peace officer has reason to believe that there was imminent peril that a terrorist offence would be committed.

I want to speak to the investigative hearing and the recognizance with conditions provisions and also the things that the committee actually dealt with in the report of October 2006, as well as the Senate committee report that was tabled in February 2007. Additionally, the bill contains the amendments that were made last year by the Senate when it reviewed the predecessor to this bill, Bill S-3.

The result is that this bill would create enhanced human rights safeguards and would expand upon annual reporting requirements. Bill C-19 is the same as former Bill S-3 as amended by the Senate in March 2008, with one principal exception. That exception is the additional change made to subsection 83.28(12), which I will explain later. Bill S-3, subsequently died on the order paper due to the fall 2008 election. This bill picks up where Bill S-3 left off.

The investigative hearing and the recognizance with conditions provisions were designed to assist law enforcement agencies and strengthen their ability to prevent acts of terrorism. First I am going to talk about investigative hearings. It seems that I already spoke about this in the House when I spoke to Bill S-3 in the 39th Parliament, but these are very important tools for law enforcement agencies to ensure that we are protected against terrorist attacks.

The investigative hearing provision would allow the courts to compel a witness who may have information about a terrorism offence to testify and provide information about the offence. The process relating to this provision works as follows. With the prior consent of the attorney general, a peace officer investigating a terrorism offence that has been or will be committed, may apply to a judge for an order requiring a person who is believed to have information concerning the terrorism offence to appear before the judge to answer questions and/or produce something.

If the judge believes there are reasonable grounds that a terrorism offence will be committed in the future, if the person has direct and material information and reasonable attempts have been made by other means to obtain the information, the judge may make an order for the gathering of information. It is important to note that this investigative hearing provision and the process was found to be constitutional by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2004. The reason this provision was found to be constitutional lies in the safeguards that are intimately attached to the exercise of this power. I will note these safeguards.

First, only a judge of a provincial court or of a superior court of a criminal jurisdiction can issue the order to hold an investigative hearing.

Second, before an application for the investigative hearing order can be made, the Attorney General of Canada, or the attorney general or solicitor general of the province needs to consent to making the application for the order.

Third, the person ordered to attend at the investigative hearing has the right to retain and instruct counsel at any stage of the proceedings.

Fourth, any incriminating evidence given by the person at the investigative hearing cannot be used against him or her in a further criminal proceeding, except for prosecution for perjury and giving contradictory evidence. This prohibition also applies to derivative evidence, that is, evidence found or derived from the evidence initially gathered in the context of the investigative hearing.

Fifth, the Supreme Court of Canada has also ruled that through the use of this provision, there is a constitutional exemption against self-incrimination that precludes testimonial compulsion where the predominant purposes of the proposed hearing is to obtain evidence for the prosecution of the person. In other words, a person cannot be brought before a judge and be compelled to provide evidence if the predominant purpose is to gather evidence against that person to lay charges against him or her.

Sixth, the Attorney General of Canada and the attorney general of the provinces were and continue to be required to report annually on the use of the investigative hearing provisions.

Finally, it has been noted that the Supreme Court of Canada held that the protection against self-incrimination at investigative hearings, carried out in the context of criminal investigations, also extended to deportation and extradition matters.

There are a number of new things in Bill C-19. There are new human rights safeguards that are not found in the original legislation. For example, new to the provisions is the requirement that in all cases, a judge to whom an application for an information gathering order is made must be satisfied that reasonable attempts have been made to obtain the information by other means. The previous legislation required this when investigating possible future terrorism offences, but not past terrorism offences, and only in relation to reasonable attempts to obtain the information from the person subject to the investigative hearing, as opposed to third parties more generally.

Another change alluded to earlier which is proposed for the first time in this bill would be made to subsection 83.28(12). It would clarify that the judicial power to order things into custody on an investigative hearing is discretionary rather than mandatory. This change would align this provision with the Supreme Court decision and application under section 83.28 of the Criminal Code, which held that a judge at an investigative hearing has considerable discretionary power to the effect that the word “shall” in the provision would be changed to “may”.

Additionally, subsection 83.29(4), not found in the original legislation, would clarify that the witness detention provisions of section 707 of the Criminal Code apply to investigative hearings. As a result, witnesses at the investigative hearing would enjoy the same procedural safeguards with respect to detention that applied to witnesses in criminal prosecution.

I would also like to speak about the recognizance with conditions provision. This provision would give the court the power to issue an order requiring a person to enter into an undertaking whereby he or she accepts to respect certain conditions imposed upon him or her to prevent the carrying out of terrorist activity. The purpose of the provision is to create a mechanism that would allow the authorities to disrupt the preparatory phase of terrorist activity rather than after the fact.

The provision is not designed to detain a person, but rather to release the person under judicially authorized supervision. The process by which the recognizance with conditions operates is as follows:

With the prior consent of the Attorney General, a peace officer who reasonably believes that a terrorist activity will be carried out and who also reasonably suspects that the imposition of recognizance with conditions or the arrest of a person is necessary to prevent the carrying out of a terrorist activity may lay an information before a provincial court judge. That judge may then cause that person to appear before him or her or any other provincial court judge. In very limited circumstances, the peace officer may arrest that person without a warrant in order to bring him or her before the judge.

In any event, a person will be brought before a judge within 24 hours, or as soon as possible, if a judge is not available within this time period. If the person is detained to protect the public or to ensure his or her attendance at a subsequent hearing, the matter may be adjourned for a maximum of 48 hours. Thus, generally speaking, the person can only be detained for up to 72 hours.

If the judge determines that there is no need for the person to enter into a recognizance, the person will be released. If the court determines that the person should enter into a recognizance, the person will be bound to keep the peace and respect other specified reasonable conditions for a period not exceeding 12 months, and only if the person refuses to enter into such a recognizance can the judge order that he or she may be detained for up to 12 months.

As in the case of the investigative hearing, the recognizance with conditions is also subject to numerous safeguards. The consent of the Attorney General of Canada or the attorney general or solicitor general of the province, of course, is required. The peace officer could also lay information before a judge if he believes there is reasonable grounds that the activity could be carried out. The judge receiving the information would have a residual discretion not to issue process, for example, where information is unfounded.

Continuing on, these two provisions that were sunsetted back in 2007 were important tools that were used or can be used to help keep Canadians safe as we ensure that we do not suffer from terrorist attacks. These are things that Canadians do fear, and they do want to ensure that law enforcement has the tools required to ensure that Canadians remain safe.

There was the attack, of course, in the U.K. back on July 7, 2005.

There was the case just a few years ago here in Canada where there were some Canadians arrested on the threat of the potential for a terrorist attack.

So we must remain vigilant. Canadians expect that.

The committee I chaired back in the 39th Parliament that reviewed this act spent a great deal of time. I spoke a little earlier about what the committee brought forward in recommendations to the House that very much mirrored the recommendations that were brought forward in the Senate.

In 2007, after the committee released its interim report back in the fall of 2006, with just a few months to go before the sunsetted provisions were set to sunset, where the majority of the committee had brought this forward, it turned out that when we were running out of days in order to maintain these two sunsetted conditions, the Liberal Party withdrew their support, or at least the members of the committee who had supported the extension of these sunsetted provisions withdrew their support.

We brought back Bill S-3 in the 39th Parliament. We had the fall election in 2008, and that bill died on the order paper.

Bill C-19 seeks to deal with bringing back those two provisions that we know can be used in the arsenal to continue to keep Canadians safe, to fight against terrorism.

Part of this as well is that it would continue to be reviewed on an ongoing basis. That was one of the recommendations that came forward in the 39th Parliament out of the subcommittee, that we do in fact ensure that these provisions continue to be reviewed. They are quite strict. These are important tools. They do need to be reviewed, because we do not know the implications. These are extraordinary measures.

At this time I do not see any compelling reason we should not seek to reinstate these provisions and have them in the toolbox that we and law enforcement can to use to ensure that Canadians remain safe.

I urge all hon. members to support this legislation. Let us get it to committee and move it forward.