Electronic Commerce Protection Act

An Act to promote the efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian economy by regulating certain activities that discourage reliance on electronic means of carrying out commercial activities, and to amend the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission Act, the Competition Act, the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act and the Telecommunications Act

This bill was last introduced in the 40th Parliament, 2nd Session, which ended in December 2009.

Sponsor

Tony Clement  Conservative

Status

In committee (Senate), as of Dec. 15, 2009
(This bill did not become law.)

Summary

This is from the published bill. The Library of Parliament often publishes better independent summaries.

This enactment establishes a regulatory framework to promote the efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian economy by regulating certain activities that discourage reliance on electronic means of carrying out commercial activities.
It enacts the Electronic Commerce Protection Act, which prohibits the sending of commercial electronic messages without the prior consent of the recipient and provides rules governing the sending of those types of messages, including a mechanism for the withdrawal of consent. It also prohibits other practices that discourage reliance on electronic means of carrying out commercial activities, such as those relating to the alteration of data transmissions and the unauthorized installation of computer programs. In addition, that Act provides for the imposition of administrative monetary penalties by the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, after taking into account specified factors. It also provides for a private right of action that enables a person affected by an act or omission that constitutes a contravention under that Act to obtain an amount equal to the actual amount of the loss or damage suffered, or expenses incurred, and statutory damages for the contravention.
This enactment amends the Competition Act to prohibit false or misleading commercial representations made electronically.
It also amends the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act to prohibit the collection of personal information by means of unauthorized access to computer systems, and the unauthorized compiling of lists of electronic addresses.
Finally, it makes related amendments to the Competition Act, the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission Act and the Telecommunications Act.

Elsewhere

All sorts of information on this bill is available at LEGISinfo, an excellent resource from the Library of Parliament. You can also read the full text of the bill.

September 28th, 2009 / 5:15 p.m.
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Kim Alexander-Cook Vice-Chair, Marketing Practices Committee, Competition Law Section, Canadian Bar Association

Thank you.

In addition to the concerns raised by Mr. Fraser, we have two concerns that relate specifically to the way in which Bill C-27 proposes to amend the Competition Act.

The first concern is, in essence, a concern about a single word, or at least a single phrase. It's only a single phrase, but we think you will agree that it's a very important one.

At clause 71 of the bill, added to the Competition Act is a new proposed section that provides for a criminal false and misleading representation offence that applies specifically to electronic messages. There's already a general false and misleading advertising provision in the Competition Act. This provides a very specific one.

This new proposed section would specifically prohibit sending an electronic message knowingly and recklessly with one or more of the following three features: either misleading or false header information, that is sender or subject matter information; content within the message that is false or misleading; or locator information that's false or misleading.

Our concern is that only in respect of one of those features is the important phrase “in a material respect” included. In all other prohibitions for false and misleading representations in the Competition Act, there is a qualifier.

The false or misleading representation has to be in a material respect. There is an important reason for that. We all make mistakes, and in fact, many people in business make what are actually false representations but which ought not to be pursued for false or misleading representations under the Competition Act. I can give you a very simple example.

Last week I sat on an expert panel at a conference where we considered environmental product marketing claims, including the following claim: “Save the planet, use our biodegradable shampoo”. We talked at length about this claim. One of the issues that were not raised was that “save the planet”, although it's obviously false in respect of the shampoo, was problematic under the Competition Act. It's considered playful puffery or hyperbole. Is it false? Yes, you're not going to save the planet by using this shampoo. Is it actionable under the Competition Act as a criminal or civilly reviewable offence? Not under the general provision. Would it be if it were included in the header of an e-mail? Under Bill C-27, arguably it would be. That's our first issue.

The second issue concerns the proposed lowering of the threshold that must be met under the Competition Act for a temporary order to be issued by a court in respect of any allegedly reviewable conduct under the act. That includes not just misleading advertising, but it includes tied selling, exclusive dealing, and a number of other pieces of conduct that businesses may or may not be engaged in.

Bill C-27, perhaps unaware to many on the committee, makes a fundamental change to the standard that must be observed by a judge in deciding whether to issue a temporary order to stop a representation from being made. It will not only apply to electronic message representations, but it will apply in respect of all of the conduct under the Competition Act to which it currently speaks. This is an over-breadth that, in our view, defies any real rational connection to this legislation.

Thanks very much.

September 28th, 2009 / 5:10 p.m.
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David Fraser Chair, Privacy and Access Law Section, Canadian Bar Association

Thank you very much.

As a preface to all of our comments, we'd like to emphasize for the benefit of the committee that we agree wholeheartedly with the intent of the legislation. I think there's general consensus that spam wastes time, energy, and significant resources, is a source of fraud, and makes it difficult for legitimate business to be conducted online. Notwithstanding that, we do have some serious concerns about Bill C-27 and exactly how it's implemented. I'll briefly delve into each of them, but we will of course be available for questions.

First of all, we think the legislation is a little too broad. What it does is take all commercial electronic messages and outlaw them subject to some hard-to-manage exceptions that are simply based on explicit consent, which can be altered significantly in regulations; personal or family relationships, which also are defined in the regulations that we haven't seen; and implied consent, which doesn't quite accord with what you would think implied consent means--it means simply an existing business relationship.

We're also concerned that the legislation itself is inconsistent with related regimes and other statutes that it actually seeks to amend. “Existing business relationship” is a concept that's entrenched in the national “do not call” list, but it's treated differently for the purposes of this statute. “Commercial activity” is also a term that is central to the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act but is defined differently in this statute for purposes that aren't necessarily clear on their face as to why one needs to have different definitions of the same term.

Consent, which is obviously a concept that's central to the privacy provisions in PIPEDA and is central to this piece of legislation, is radically different from one to the other. We think this presents problems because many of the businesses that are going to have to deal with compliance with the Electronic Commerce Protection Act, PIPEDA, and the Competition Act are the same people who are going to be using the exact same terms, but for very different purposes or with different meanings, which makes it difficult to manage.

Otherwise, the statute is also a bit hard to follow, and we're concerned that too much of it has actually been left to the regulations. This is a statute of general application. It's going to apply to pretty well every business and it's designed to be for the benefit of every single consumer. In our view, businesses should be able to pick up the statute and have a very strong understanding of exactly what it is they have to do and what it is they can't do. Likewise, consumers should have the ability to pick up the statute and understand what their rights are and what their remedies are.

It's our feeling that too many important provisions are being left to the regulations, which may be sensible in the sense that this is a rapidly moving area. There are some central concepts that could be and should be entrenched in the statute, with regulations being left to deal with issues that come up and to deal with loopholes that might not have been foreseen.

We're also concerned that the statute may in fact actually, on its face, violate the charter, simply based on a violation of the freedom of expression provisions contained in paragraph 2(b) of the charter for anything that regulates communication that conveys expression. You may not think that most of the spam that arrives in your inbox actually conveys meaning, but the courts would find otherwise. In order to be justified, it has to meet a strict test under section 1 of the charter, the most important provision of which is that it has to be minimally impairing, so it has to be very finely tuned legislation.

We're concerned that the way it's drafted so broadly may mean that it actually might not survive a charter challenge. While we agree wholeheartedly with the intent of the legislation, we don't want to be back here in a couple of years because it has been struck down as being unconstitutional. In our view, it needs to be fine-tuned in that regard.

A number of fixes could be proposed, which we'd be happy to talk about at greater length. The most important one would be not to limit implied consent. I think you've probably heard this from others. Consent is a concept that we've been dealing with under privacy legislation for quite some time. People have a pretty good idea of it. You've been dealing with it in the medical context as well. A reasonableness standard can be put in place.

Before I run out of time--and I apologize for being a bit long-winded--I'm going to hand it over to my colleague Mr. Alexander-Cook.

September 28th, 2009 / 4:40 p.m.
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Conservative

Stephen Woodworth Conservative Kitchener Centre, ON

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

This afternoon I heard the Privacy Commissioner reiterate something I found in a May 28, 2009, statement she made, to the effect that one in six Canadians have experienced some form of identity theft. That same report also indicated that over 90% of Canadians are concerned about identity theft.

I know this bill is substantially the same as Bill C-27 from the last session.

I've seen reports from PhoneBusters that in 2007 $6 million was lost to identity theft, and up until October 31, 2008, $8 million was lost. I've seen reports that Canadian banks and credit companies estimate that we lost $2 billion per annum. There are 1.7 million victims. So I was really pleased to hear comments from the Liberal member, Mr. LeBlanc, and also from the Bloc member, Monsieur Ménard, to the effect they think we need to pass this bill quickly.

I think Canadians can be glad that we have a government that has taken this problem seriously. It is a crime of the 21st century, it's been said, and I'm glad we have a justice minister who has taken it seriously.

Thank you to all of the witnesses.

I'm grateful for your attendance today. In particular, I admire Mr. MacRury as a good example of a prosecutor who knows that in law there is not a defence side or a prosecution side, but only justice, because some of the recommendations in the CBA report are what I would otherwise think of as defence recommendations.

I would like to focus in particular on the recommendation made on page 3 of the brief.

I will start with a question for Mr. MacRury about what is called de minimus behaviour in his brief, which is very close to the legal concept we have in our common law courts of de minimis. I am thinking that a lawyers' organization like the CBA would not likely toss out a term that is so similar, unless it might be intending to refer to the same thing; but I'm not sure, and I would like to know, to begin with, if in that recommendation you are talking about what a lawyer in the common law system would refer to as de minimis conduct in a criminal case.

September 28th, 2009 / 4:30 p.m.
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Bloc

Robert Vincent Bloc Shefford, QC

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

And thank you for being here today.

From the start, we have been talking about consent and bulk email, but we are also talking about businesses. Indeed, you all have a business or you work for a business. We want to pass Bill C-27, which covers Quebec and Canada, and targets the mass distribution of email and spam.

But what about the other countries where these messages can originate? What kind of competition does that mean for you, since they are not regulated? Here, it will be regulated, but not abroad.

You raise the following problem: others will be allowed to distribute email in bulk, but not you. How could we adjust things in a suitable manner, so that we could obtain consent without sending out a mass email to 14 million people? We want to make it law and stop this. Consumers' inboxes are being flooded with spam. There are four or five companies here today, but there are many more all over Canada. We need to follow some kind of logic.

First, I would like to hear your thoughts on that and what your idea of business consent would be. What would you consider a reasonable distribution of email that would allow you to stay in business?

September 28th, 2009 / 4 p.m.
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Bloc

Robert Bouchard Bloc Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, QC

Mr. Brun, unless I'm mistaken, you see two types of clients to whom emails may be sent. There are emails between businesses—that is one of your categories—and then emails sent by a business to consumers.

Would you like to see these two categories of clients expressly set out in Bill C-27?

September 28th, 2009 / 3:55 p.m.
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Bloc

Robert Bouchard Bloc Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, QC

... yes, for the implementation of Bill C-27. You referred to a one-year transition period before its implementation.

September 28th, 2009 / 3:55 p.m.
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Bloc

Robert Bouchard Bloc Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, QC

Thank you very much for your testimony. What you have come to tell us this afternoon will help to improve Bill C-27.

My first question is for Mr. Morency, from the Mouvement des caisses Desjardins.

You talked about an implementation delay of one year, and among other things, you said that consultations should be held. I would like to hear more about this from you.

Who should we consult and who should do the consulting in order to arrive at a time period that would seem fair and equitable to you?

September 28th, 2009 / 3:50 p.m.
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Liberal

Marc Garneau Liberal Westmount—Ville-Marie, QC

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all I want to thank all of the witnesses who came to submit their views to us today on this bill, which, in order to be well drafted, practically requires the wisdom of Solomon.

On the one hand, of course, we want to get rid of spam as it is very harmful, as everyone agrees, but on the other hand, we don't want to prohibit legitimate electronic commerce communication. For a bill to make good sense, I think that two different philosophical approaches can be adopted. In one case, we impose all sorts of restrictions, but in the final analysis, these may be excessive and this could hinder electronic commerce. Consequently, those who use electronic means to do business are forced to prove that some important exceptions have been forgotten.

On the other hand, we can choose a much more open approach, with few restrictions, and then realize over time that a great deal of spam is still getting through and that the bill has to be applied in a much stricter manner. In short, this isn't easy.

Today, I have the impression that you have found arguments to prove that the bill should be amended because it will interfere with commerce and legitimate communication on the Internet. That is clearly what your presentation led me to conclude.

I would like to put a question to Mr. Morency or to another representative of the Desjardins Group.

You took issue with clause 2 in particular. You mentioned that Bill C-27 affected electronic commerce and needed to be readjusted. I understood your arguments.

Do you have any concrete suggestions to make to us in order to bring about this balance and allow you to continue to do your work in a legitimate fashion?

September 28th, 2009 / 3:45 p.m.
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President and Chief Executive Officer, Investment Funds Institute of Canada

Joanne De Laurentiis

We believe the anti-spam provisions are too broad as they relate to business-to-business communications. Where a business makes its e-mail address public and the address is not accompanied by a statement that commercial messages are not welcome, Bill C-27 should treat this as implied consent by the business.

Electronic communications have evolved to be a convenient, quick, and cost-effective way to communicate employment opportunities. One way our members grow is by recruiting new financial advisers through electronic communications. We propose that clause 6 be amended to include an exemption for electronic communication that has as its sole purpose information regarding legitimate employment opportunities.

IFIC supports the proposed penalties. The maximum penalty for a violation is $1 million in the case of an individual and $10 million in the case of any other persons. For violations of clauses 7 and 8, where prohibited actions have the potential to result in large-scale system damage or fraud, these are at the right level.

In the case of clause 6, we believe the penalties are excessive and out of scale to the potential harm caused by a breach. The penalties for contravening clause 6 should be different from the penalties applicable to a contravention of clauses 7 and 8. Within clause 6, we would also propose much smaller deterrent penalties for those businesses that are simply using electronic means as a supplement to their business efforts and where individual violations are not harmful.

IFIC supports the right of public action for violations of clauses 7 and 8 where prohibited actions have the potential to result in large-scale system damage or fraud, but for clause 6, the right of public action seems unnecessary, excessive, and potentially open to abuse. We propose that the right to a public action be limited to violations under clauses 7 and 8.

As noted earlier, the investment industry has rules in place governing communications with the public. The Mutual Fund Dealers Association and the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada require that all sales communications from their members to the public must first be approved by an officer of the member company. We believe these requirements, together with the provisions of Bill C-27, provide the necessary protection to the public on matters of content as well as the need for sanctions. Accordingly, we recommend an exemption to clause 6 for industries where existing regulatory structures are in place.

We all recognize that technology has changed the way we interact, both on a personal and a business level. Whereas in the past we would have met friends and made new personal or business contacts through dinners, meetings, and other gatherings, today we are doing it through technology. Cyberspace has redefined how we communicate and interact.

Our concerns about the overly broad application of this legislation could be corrected by very simple amendments, primarily in clauses 6 and 10, to provide exemptions and safe harbours for referral business, ongoing fiduciary relationships, business-to-business communications, employment opportunities, and established social networking relationships, together with a refinement of the penalties and private right of action to target the actual wrongdoing in cyberspace.

Thank you for listening. We look forward to your questions.

September 28th, 2009 / 3:40 p.m.
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Paul Vaillancourt Independant Financial Advisor, Investment Funds Institute of Canada

Bonjour. My name is Paul Vaillancourt.

The proposed clause 6 prohibits one-to-one e-mails of specifically directed marketing communications, which are not by their nature intrusive in the lives of recipients and do not create economic harm. My clients are my best sources of new business. A financial adviser like me regularly sends e-mails as a follow-up to a referral from an existing client to a friend or a family member who is looking for a financial adviser. In fact, such referrals are crucial to my business.

E-mails are an efficient means of contacting potential new customers based on referrals without being a nuisance to the recipient. In years past, we used the postal service to follow up on referrals. E-mail has replaced the old technology of writing letters, but it is essentially the same thing. In addition to being less expensive, less intrusive, and more environmentally friendly, it is an accepted, indeed an expected, form of introduction. Individuals are able to access the information at their convenience and have complete control to respond or not.

Clause 6 should be limited to those who target individuals or entities through mass e-mails, where there is no reasonable identifiable relationship between the recipient and the sender. Where the recipient has been referred to the sender, there should be a specific exemption allowing the sender to contact the referred individual or entity. Regulations pursuant to this legislation could be developed to prevent abuse of this exemption and to ensure there was indeed a referral.

Subsection 10(4) of Bill C-27 defines “existing business relationship”. That definition may be sufficient for relationships based only on contract dates or specific sales operations, but it is ill-suited to a consultant service relationship where the consultant has a fiduciary responsibility to contact and inform his client. This type of relationship should be viewed differently.

In many cases, our relationship with the client is linked to an investment made by the client that is followed by none of the operations targeted in subsection 10(4). Consequently, we recommend that in the case of persons who have a fiduciary relationship with the client, the 18-month period targeting subsequent communications begin when the professional relationship or the consultancy relationship ends.

Canadians are world leaders in the use of social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, clubs, and associations. The proposed legislation does not contemplate the popularity and widespread use of these social networking groups or the fact that these groups already effectively govern the boundaries of the communications. The definition of “existing non-business relationship” in subclause 10(6) should be expanded to include members of established electronic social networks to better reflect this emerging reality.

September 28th, 2009 / 3:40 p.m.
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Joanne De Laurentiis President and Chief Executive Officer, Investment Funds Institute of Canada

Thank you, Mr. Chair. We appreciate the opportunity to speak with you today.

My name is Joanne De Laurentiis. I'm president and CEO of the Investment Funds Institute of Canada. I'm joined by Paul Vaillancourt, who is an independent financial consultant who runs his own successful business here in Ottawa. We will share our comments this afternoon.

The Investment Funds Institute of Canada is the national association of the Canadian investment funds industry. Like Paul, individuals representing our members work in almost every town and city across Canada. IFIC's mutual fund manager members manage over $560 billion in mutual fund assets, and 70% of these assets are held in retirement saving vehicles and are helping Canadians build their wealth.

We believe the clauses in Bill C-27 that combat and punish illegal and harmful activities and that damage the trust surrounding electronic commerce are necessary. We support the recommendations in clauses 7 and 8 regarding the prohibition of the altering of transmission data and the unauthorized installation of computer programs on another's computer. We also support the proposed amendments to the Competition Act to prohibit misleading commercial e-mails and amendments to PIPEDA regarding the use of e-mails collected through selected computer programs.

We are here to encourage you to better balance the protection of individuals and businesses from unwanted e-mails while still allowing responsible communications by legitimate businesses to their potential clients and customers. We think this can be accomplished with several simple amendments.

September 28th, 2009 / 3:35 p.m.
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Peter Goldthorpe General Director, Marketplace Regulations Issues, Canadian Life and Health Insurance Association Inc.

Thank you, Frank.

Mr. Chair, the stated purpose of the bill is to regulate the commercial conduct that discourages the use of electronic means to carry out commercial activities. Everyone, I think, agrees that this is an important objective, so it is equally important that we avoid restrictions that would have the effect of discouraging or making impossible exactly what the bill seeks to protect.

Our contention is that within an opt-in framework contemplated by Bill C-27, greater flexibility can and in fact should be provided as it relates to the means of obtaining consent. As we noted in our written comments that were circulated earlier in the summer, the proposed restrictions threaten to undermine the viability of commercial communication by electronic means. The problem is that in a great many instances people will simply not use one medium to give consent to communicate in another medium.

In the life and health insurance industry, and I think more generally in the financial services industry, many contacts are developed through referrals. By and large, the referral process is an informal process, and that sets up an important disconnect. The person being referred may be quite happy to be contacted by e-mail, but it is extremely unlikely that many will be willing to take the time and effort to write out express consent or take the initiative to contact an adviser.

We appreciate that there is a concern that e-mails intended to obtain consent could be misused. But it is important to keep in mind that e-mails following up on a referral need to clearly identify the person who is sending them. Our suggestion is that e-mails to obtain consent be permitted if they clearly state the purpose and do nothing else to promote the sender's services or products.

It's important to keep in mind that an e-mail that's doing this must clearly identify the sender who is using the e-mail for these purposes. So if there is any misconduct, if they're deviating from any of the restrictions you care to put in place, their identification is all over the e-mail. This fact should be more than enough to discourage misuse.

Mr. Chair, the use of electronic communication has important economic and environmental advantages. It would be unfortunate if the restrictions in Bill C-27 had the effect of forcing businesses to rely on more costly and less environmentally friendly ways of communicating with prospective customers. An important step in avoiding this outcome is to permit e-mails intended to obtain consent.

The industry greatly appreciates this opportunity to contribute to the committee's review of Bill C-27. I would like to thank you for your attention. We'd be happy to answer any questions you might have.

September 28th, 2009 / 3:35 p.m.
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Frank Zinatelli Vice-President, Legal Services and Associate General Counsel, Canadian Life and Health Insurance Association Inc.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I would like to thank the committee very much for giving us this opportunity to contribute to your review of Bill C-27, the Electronic Commerce Protection Act.

My name is Frank Zinatelli, and I am vice-president of legal services and associate general counsel of the Canadian Life and Health Insurance Association. I am accompanied today by my colleague Peter Goldthorpe, who is the CLHIA's director of marketplace regulations issues. We welcome this opportunity to make constructive contributions to the committee as you seek to develop your report to Parliament on this important bill.

By way of background, the Canadian Life and Health Insurance Association represents life and health insurance companies accounting for 99% of the life and health insurance in force across Canada. The industry protects 26 million Canadians and some 20 million people internationally.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, we would like to make a few introductory comments.

In August, we submitted written comments to the committee. Several of the matters were technical in nature and involved providing greater clarity and certainty to the language of the bill. We trust that these are relatively free of controversy and will be addressed by the committee.

This afternoon we would like to focus our remarks on a broader issue. The issue is the proposed restrictions on obtaining consent by electronic means, and my colleague Peter Goldthorpe will now address this.

September 28th, 2009 / 3:30 p.m.
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Yves Morency Vice-President, Government Relations, Mouvement des caisses Desjardins

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good afternoon, members of the committee. The Desjardins Group thanks you for giving it this opportunity to share its views on bill C-27 with you today.

First of all, allow me to briefly introduce the organization we represent. Desjardins Group is ranked 26th among the 50 most reliable financial institutions in the world, according to the list entitled “World's 50 Safest Banks 2009”. With total assets of approximately $160 billion, it is the largest cooperative financial group in Canada and the 9th largest in the world. Supported by its network of caisses in Quebec and Ontario, as well as the contributions of its subsidiaries, several of which are active across Canada, it offers a complete line of financial products and services to its 5.8 million individual and business members and clients.

Desjardins Group is also a hub of expertise in wealth management, life and health insurance, property and casualty insurance, services for businesses large and small, securities, asset management, venture capital and cutting-edge technology, all within an integrated service model that is one of a kind in Canada.

It must be noted that Desjardins Group has been concerned for quite some time about the problems caused by spam proliferation. The bill is without a doubt an initiative that targets more reliable, safe and secure electronic commerce. However, Desjardins Group believes that some of the bill's provisions will do more to restrict legitimate electronic commerce than to dispel the efforts of ill-intentioned users of this technology.

Bill C-27 needs to be adjusted in such a way as to slow down the proliferation of spam while allowing for the development of electronic commerce and the competitiveness of the Canadian economy. As regards consent, section 2 of the bill is excessively limiting and poses a threat to legitimate electronic commerce. Under the bill, it would be prohibited to send an electronic message requesting consent to receive commercial electronic messages. Desjardins Group believes that it is unrealistic to think that Canadians will give express consent to receive commercial electronic messages on their own initiative. Being far too restrictive, the prohibition of electronic messages requesting consent should be stricken from the bill.

As well, the bill should recognize that certain commercial practices do not constitute unsolicited commercial electronic messages. For example, a company should be able to solicit a client if it has first received a referral. It should be able to do the same if it holds an individual's email address as part of a prior business relationship, where the individual has not withdrawn his or her consent for solicitation purposes, or when a potential client contacts a company to obtain information and does not withdraw his or her consent. Electronic communications following referrals are common practice, they are legitimate and appreciated by clients. As such, the recognition of implied consent should be added to the bill with the possibility of such consent being regulated thereafter.

Another major source of concern not only for Desjardins Group, but for all Canadian companies are the clauses related to the Do Not Call List. We understand that the government does not plan to implement those clauses at this time, but their mere presence within the bill is worrisome. In this respect, it is important to remember that those subject to the act and their partners in government worked for three years on establishing effective regulations for this tool and significant financial and labour resources have gone into achieving compliance. It is therefore quite astonishing that the longevity of the Do Not Call List could be jeopardized just one year after coming into effect. Given these considerations, Desjardins Group recommends that a detailed study and public consultations be carried out before making any modifications to the DNCL.

In conclusion, in Desjardins Group's view, the current text of the EPCA will threaten legitimate electronic commerce.

Quite honestly, the bill seems more geared to protecting service provider bandwidth than electronic commerce itself. With this in mind, we believe that it is essential for certain parameters to be readjusted and for more flexibility to be added to the ECPA in order for it to achieve its intended objectives without discouraging growth in the Canadian economy.

Thank you for your attention.

My colleagues and I would be happy to answer your questions.

September 28th, 2009 / 3:30 p.m.
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Conservative

The Chair Conservative Michael Chong

Good afternoon to members of the committee. I hope you all had good weeks in your constituency.

Welcome to the 34th meeting of the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology. We are meeting today pursuant to the order of reference of Friday, May 8, 2009, to study C-27, An Act to promote the efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian economy by regulating certain activities that discourage reliance on electronic means of carrying out commercial activities, and to amend the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission Act, the Competition Act, the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act and the Telecommunications Act.

Welcome to our three groups of witnesses on our first panel, which will meet until 5 p.m. We have Mr. Yves Morency, vice-president, government relations; Mr. Bernard Brun, senior counsel, commerce and technology, Desjardins sécurité financière; and Yvan-Pierre Grimard, government relations adviser. All three are with Mouvement des caisses Desjardins.

We also have with us today Mr. Frank Zinatelli, vice-president of legal services and associate general counsel; and Mr. Peter Goldthorpe, general director of marketplace regulations issues. Both are with the Canadian Life and Health Insurance Association Inc.

Finally, in our third group of witnesses on our first panel we have Ms. Joanne De Laurentiis, president and chief executive officer; and Mr. Paul Vaillancourt, independent financial adviser. They are with the Independent Funds Institute of Canada.

Welcome to all three groups. We will begin with the Mouvement des caisses Desjardins and an opening statement of five minutes.