Bill C-10 (Historical)

Constitution Act, 2010 (Senate term limits)

An Act to amend the Constitution Act, 1867 (Senate term limits)

This enactment alters the tenure of senators who are summoned after October 14, 2008.

Constitution Act, 2010 (Senate term limits)

[David Christopherson, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Mr. Speaker, the member mentioned a referendum. Let me start at the top. We do not have a problem with a referendum for certain things. We supported it for the Charlottetown accord. The difference is that the Reform Party wanted to have referendums on pretty much everything. It pretty much wanted to replace this place and do everything by referendum. We do not agree with that. We do not believe that is the best way to run a mature democracy.

I asked for an example and the member gave me one. I accept that. I would point out two things. One, there is always two sides to every argument. I do not know whether there was another senator leading another group that was arguing the point or was this all just motherhood? I do not want to put it down, but I would raise the question, did they enter into the full political fray and take on both pro and con, or was it just facilitating an argument?

The last thing I want to say is that I asked if there were any public meetings. I have been in public life for almost 25 years in all three orders of government. It took all that time before I heard about even one senatorial meeting. What about the rest of them and what about the rest of the time?

[Joe Preston, Conservative, Elgin—Middlesex—London, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I will be splitting my time with the member for Regina—Lumsden—Lake Centre.

I am pleased to stand and debate Bill C-10, the Senate term limits bill. I will attempt to be a little less angry than the last member who spoke.

Bill C-10 proposes to amend the Constitution to establish term limits for senators. Specifically, the bill proposes that senators serve a single term of eight years.

Parliamentarians already had the opportunity to study the bill in some detail since it was first introduced in the last Parliament. In fact, two separate committees undertook studies of Bill S-4 which was similar to the bill before us today.

The call for change is certainly not new. Over the years there have been numerous proposals for term limits for senators and I believe there is now a general consensus that term limits are a good idea.

There remain a few skeptics. For example, concerns have been raised that term limits will somehow undermine the fundamental nature of the Senate, in particular, its capacity to provide sober second thought in the review of legislation. It is argued that an eight-year term is not long enough to allow senators to gain the experience to effectively carry out their functions in reviewing legislation. I would like to use my time today to address this concern.

I believe that if we look at previous proposals for term limits in the Senate and we examine the term limits in other jurisdictions, we can be confident that an eight-year term is more than sufficient for senators to exercise their constitutional responsibility.

Bill C-10 is far from being the first proposal to limit the tenure of senators. In fact, the only significant constitutional amendment relating to the Senate in our history was when Parliament amended the Constitution in 1965 to reduce the tenure of senators from that of life to a mandatory retirement age of 75.

However, the 1965 amendment still allows senators to serve as long as 45 years. That is why there have been so many proposals to implement additional limits on Senate tenure since 1965.

In 1980, the Senate legal and constitutional affairs committee proposed that senators serve fixed terms of 10 years which would be renewable for a further term of five years. In 1981, the Canada West Foundation recommended senators serve limited terms that would coincide with the life of two parliamentary terms. Similarly, the Alberta Select Special Committee on Upper House Reform recommended in 1985 that senators should serve the life of two provincial legislatures. In 1984, the Special Joint Committee on Senate Reform recommended that senators would serve non-renewable nine-year terms. In 1992, the Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada recommended that senators should serve terms of no more than six years.

The recommendations for Senate term limits over the past 30 years have ranged from six-year terms to ten-year terms. The authors of these reports, including some former and distinguished parliamentarians of different partisan persuasions believe a term ranging from six to ten years would be sufficient to maintain the Senate's ability to effectively scrutinize legislation.

An eight-year term limit proposed in Bill C-10 squarely falls within the range of the term limits that previously have been proposed for the Senate. Bill C-10 is not a radical or revolutionary proposition. It is consistent with other proposals for Senate reform that have been made over the years.

Let us contrast the eight-year term limit in Bill C-10 with the term limits of the upper houses in other jurisdictions.

Based on data compiled by the French Senate on 66 second chambers, the average term limit for members is 5.2 years.

In Australia, a country with similar characteristics to Canada, senators serve six-year terms.

Similarly, senators in the United States also serve six-year terms. I doubt anyone would consider an American senator in his or her fifth or sixth year of office to be unable to perform his or her legislative capacities effectively. As we all know, Barak Obama was elected President of the United States after less than four years in the United States Senate.

The proposal in Bill C-10 for an eight-year term limit for senators is well within the norm internationally. In fact, it is above the average term limit for upper houses in foreign jurisdictions.

Many members may point to the previous proposals by the British government for the members of the House of Lords to serve for the equivalent of three parliamentary terms, or 12 to 15 years. However, there are three considerations that should lessen the significance of the British proposal on Senate reform in Canada.

First, Britain is looking at lords reform at a different departure point than is the case in Canada. Currently, lords are appointed for life. In contrast, life appointments to the Senate were replaced here in 1965, with a mandatory retirement age of 75. Therefore, a move to 12 year to 15 year terms would be a much more significant change in the United Kingdom than it would be in the Canadian setting.

Second, while proposing 12 year to 15 year terms, the British government recognized that terms of this length would raise accountability concerns. To address this, the British government suggested that a recall mechanism may be appropriate for the House of Lords. In the 2008 white paper on lords reform, the British government stated:

Further consideration would need to be given to the accountability arrangements for members of a reformed second chamber, particularly in light of proposals that they serve long, single, fixed terms.The Cross-Party Group discussed the possibility of introducing recall ballots for elected members of a reformed second chamber, along the lines of those that exist in some states of the USA.

Unlike the 12 year to 15 year term, the eight-year term proposed by Bill C-10 does not create the same accountability concerns raised in the British white paper. Even if Britain were to create a 12 year to 15 year term limit, a term of that length would be the exception, not the rule. In short, I do not believe the British example to be a comparable model when evaluating the appropriate term limits for our Canadian Senate.

The proposed eight year term was studied extensively by two Senate committees during the last Parliament. The report of the Special Senate Committee on Senate Reform supported term limits, in principle, and validated the government's position that an eight year term limit would not undermine the essential characteristics of the Senate.

For example, the committee's report concluded:

While a variety of views were expressed about the desirable length of a senatorial term, virtually none of our witnesses dismissed the creation of a term limit per se and, indeed, most strongly supported it. These witnesses pointed out that limited terms would dispel the image, so harmful to the Senate, of “jobs for life”, and re-invigorate the Senate with a constant influx of fresh ideas. Most members of the Committee found these assertions to be persuasive.

The Committee also notes that, in previous deliberations on the Constitution of Canada, various committees of the Senate have unanimously favoured the creation of limited terms for service in the upper house of Canada’s Parliament. In the view of most Committee members, the arguments made in these reports remain sound.

Accordingly, following careful deliberation on the subject-matter of Bill S-4 and finding no reasonable grounds to withhold approval in principle, most Committee members endorse the underlying principle of the bill: that a defined limit to the terms of senators would be an improvement to Canada’s Senate

Previous recommendations for term limits ranged from 6 to 10 years. None have proposed term limits greater than 10 years. Yet, the Liberals have proposed a 15 year term limit.

Term limits for second chambers in other jurisdictions are, on average, 5.2 years, which is well below the 15 years proposed by the legal and constitutional affairs committee. Let us be clear. By proposing a 15 year term limit in committee, Liberal senators killed the term limits bill on a party line vote.

Furthermore, we should compare the 15 year term limit proposed by the committee with the actual tenure of senators. Since Confederation, the average term of a senator has been about 14 years. Since 1965, the average tenure of senators has been 9.25 years.

The 15 year term limit proposed by Liberal senators at the legal and constitutional affairs committee would not effect any meaningful change to the Canadian Senate. Rather, it would simply reinforce the status quo.

Before concluding, I would like to note that while the Canadian government believes that a 15 year term limit is too long, the government has expressed willingness to consider other points of view, within reason. For example, when he made the unprecedented appearance before the Special Senate Committee on Senate Reform, the Prime Minister stated:

A government can be flexible on accepting amendment to the details of Bill S-4 to adopt a six-year term or an eight- year term or a nine-year term. The key point is this: We are seeking limited, fixed terms of office, not decades based on antiquated criteria of age.

Nevertheless, I believe the eight year term limit proposed in Bill C-10 is reasonable. Eight years is sufficient time for senators to build up the necessary experience and expertise to perform their duties effectively. It is also consistent with previous Senate reform proposals and the term limits of second chambers internationally.

Bill C-10 would not alter the essential characteristics of our Senate. I encourage all members of this House to please support this initiative.

[Shawn Murphy, Liberal, Charlottetown, PE]

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the member across for his comments. The last part of his speech dealt with a term, and I just want to get his opinion on this point. This is a point that has been raised before. The concept is to have two legislative bodies. A bicameral system is one that we certainly will continue in Canada, regardless of whether we invoke term limits.

However, with an eight year term, does the member not think that we could get into a very unpleasant situation where 100% of the senators would be appointed by one prime minister? I will give an example to the member. The last Liberal government came into power in 1993. By the year 2001, following the draft legislation, 100% of those senators would have been not only from that party but appointed by that one individual. I do not think it would create a deliberative body, so I would look for, and again this will be discussed at committee, perhaps a better mechanism.

I would appreciate member's comments.

[Joe Preston, Conservative, Elgin—Middlesex—London, ON]

Mr. Speaker, the member's remarks are very relevant. We are talking about term limits for senators. We have talked, through other debate here today, about how much experience a senator can gain over an eight year period of time.

In my speech I talked about the President of the United States who spent less than his six year term in the U.S. Senate before he became President. So we can certainly remove the thoughts of experience building. People come here with altruistic reasons and life experiences will help them become senators.

To the member's point of appointing new senators after an eight year term and the government of the day perhaps even over time making a full turnover in the Senate, I certainly find it refreshing that our Senate would turn over that often and bring in individuals with new, fresh ideas. That would be very refreshing to Canadians.

[Steven Fletcher, Conservative, Minister of State (Democratic Reform)]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the member for his kind reflections on how to improve our democratic institutions. The eight year term in context with our Senatorial Selection Act will empower people to select the nominees for the Senate. I wonder if that would address the previous member's concerns. I also wonder if the member could reflect on the integrity of newly appointed senators as they are putting their country's interests ahead of their own self-interest by agreeing to the term limits upon royal assent.

[Joe Preston, Conservative, Elgin—Middlesex—London, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the minister for bringing the bill forward and for his good question on it today. The true answer is that it is a series of Senate reforms. If we take it in isolation, I suppose we could always poke little holes in it.

We are here today talking about the change to Senate term limits. I recognize that the minister has also put forward another piece of legislation that gives the provinces the ability, if they choose, to hold provincial-wide elections for Senate candidates. So that certainly would address the previous question of would they all be appointed.

Yes, I would expect that the Prime Minister would need to appoint the people who are successful in those provincial elections by putting people into the upper chamber. We have very few examples of it now. There is a senator from Alberta who was chosen by the people, but we need senators who really want to come here for altruistic reasons and for really good fresh reasons to try to help Canada be a better country.

[Tom Lukiwski, Conservative, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, it is certainly a pleasure to participate in this debate on Bill C-10, the Senate term limits bill.

Bill C-10 proposes a non-renewable term limit of eight years for senators. This proposal will be familiar to members as it is not the first time it has been considered by this House.

Bill C-10 would amend the Constitution using the amending procedures set out in section 44 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which authorizes Parliament to “--make laws amending the Constitution of Canada in relation to the executive government of Canada or the Senate and House of Commons”.

Opponents of this bill have argued that section 44 is not the appropriate amending formula to affect change of this kind. They have suggested that term limits would affect an “essential characteristic of the Senate and its ability to give independent sober second thought in the parliamentary process”. I wish to refute those objections today as there can be little doubt that this bill is constitutional.

During the last Parliament the constitutionality of term limits was studied by two separate Senate committees. The Special Senate Committee on Senate Reform concluded that Parliament could change the tenure of senators to an eight year term. In reaching the conclusion the special committee heard from some of Canada's most respected constitutional scholars, including Peter Hogg, Patrick Monahan and Stephen Scott. The opinion of these eminent legal experts was unanimous: the eight year term limit proposal is within Parliament's jurisdiction.

The bill was then approved by the Senate at second reading and referred to the legal and constitutional affairs committee. That committee ignored the aforementioned scholars and did not come to any definitive conclusion regarding the bill's constitutionality. Let us be clear. The committee did not conclude that the bill was unconstitutional. It simply said it was not sure.

To resolve the question the committee proposed to have the Supreme Court of Canada decide the matter. I believe that it is the responsibility of parliamentarians to use our best judgment on the constitutionality of proposed legislation and not hide behind the Supreme Court. That is why I wish to outline my rationale for concluding that the bill now before us is constitutional.

What is the relevant test for evaluating the constitutionality of the proposed term limits bill? On one hand, opponents argue that any change affecting the essential characteristics of the Senate cannot be enacted by Parliament acting alone. On the other hand, supporters maintain that only essential characteristics requiring more than Parliament's unilateral authority are those explicitly referred to in the 1982 Constitution Act namely, the powers of the Senate, the method of selecting senators, the residence qualification of senators, and the number of senators by which a province is represented in the Senate.

This debate essentially turns on a single question. Does the Supreme Court of Canada opinion in the upper house reference remain relevant today? Members may be familiar with that opinion.

In 1978 the Government of Canada referred a number of questions to the Supreme Court relating to the authority of Parliament to abolish or reform the Senate. A year later the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that it would be beyond the legislative authority of Parliament to abolish the Senate or to otherwise alter its fundamental features or essential characteristics. However, the court noted that by limiting tenure from life to 75 years of age, as Parliament had done in 1965, it “did not change the essential character of the Senate”.

I reference the Constitution Act, 1982. It provides for various formulae to amend the Constitution, including specific references to the Senate. While opponents of reform argue that these formulae override the Supreme Court's opinion, the court's opinion remains relevant for interpreting the various amending formulae.

Some maintain that the upper house reference remains a guide to understanding the scope of Parliament's power to make constitutional amendments with respect to the Senate. Others, including Canada's best constitutional lawyers, contend that the upper house reference was a guide for amending our Constitution only before patriation in 1982. Since 1982, the Constitution itself, not the Supreme Court, outlines the procedures for amendment.

For example, when Peter Hogg testified before the special Senate committee, he said:

It seems to me that the best interpretation of what happened in 1982 was that it overtook the ruling in the Upper House Reference. In other words, the 1982 amending procedures now say explicitly which changes to the Senate cannot be accomplished unilaterally by the Parliament of Canada;

This leaves other aspects, including tenure, within Parliament's jurisdiction.

In turn, when Patrick Monahan was before the same committee, he expressed the same view, that maintaining that patriation in 1982 “has superseded the Senate reference or indeed attempted to codify, to identify those matters that were found to be fundamental or essential...”. As for other matters, he went on to say, “The Parliament of Canada...may enact changes to the Senate, including the tenure of senators”.

Although this debate is of crucial importance to understanding our constitutional amendment procedures, it is not one that needs to be resolved in the context of our present debate. Not only does the bill before us today comply with the constitutional amending procedure authorizing Parliament to make certain amendments to the Senate, but it also proposes term limits of sufficient length to maintain the Senate's essential characteristics.

In other words, Bill C-10 passes both the Supreme Court test of 1979 by not affecting the Senate's essential characteristics and the Constitution Act of 1982 by not tackling any of the senatorial changes in section 42.

The proposal before us is for an eight-year term. Some have asked if this term is long enough to maintain the essential characteristics of the Senate. The simple answer is, yes. An eight-year term is within the range of terms for Senate chambers internationally and well within the range of terms contemplated by previous Senate reform proposals. Eight years is enough time to allow a new senator to acquire the necessary skills to maintain the Senate's role in providing an independent second sober thought in legislative review.

Hon. members may be familiar with the tenure of senators in the United States, which is six years. This is the same as the tenure for senators in Australia. Other upper houses have term limits as short as four years. France recently reduced its term from nine to six years. An eight-year term, which is what is being proposed in Bill C-10, would be among the longest worldwide.

Unless one is willing to suggest that the upper chambers of the United States, Australia and Europe are all ineffective due to limited terms, members must agree that eight years is long enough to maintain the essential characteristics of the Senate.

Another aspect of this bill that addresses concerns with maintaining the independence of the Senate is that the terms are non-renewable. Non-renewable terms assure Canadians that the senators will not have to curry favour with the government in order to preserve their seat.

The bill contains transitional provisions that will apply the eight-year term limit to all senators appointed after October 14, 2008. As with the rest of the bill, this transitional provision is on solid constitutional ground and can be enacted by Parliament alone pursuant to section 44 of the Constitution Act.

The bill before us today is a good one simply due to the fact that it would allow future Parliaments the opportunity to appoint, if necessary, senators for a limited term of eight years, which would certainly go far beyond the current status quo of 75 years of age. It would ensure, in my opinion, that senators being appointed in the future will bring a fresh set of eyes to all of the legislation coming through this chamber to the upper chamber.

I would also point out that, by the provisions contained in this bill of a non-renewable term limit, we would not have to worry about senators being reappointed time and time again. It would ensure that if Parliament changes, the Senate will change. I think that is in the best interest of all Canadians.

[Guy André, Bloc, Berthier—Maskinongé, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I listened to the speech by the Conservative member. A survey conducted in Quebec a few months ago indicated that only 8% of Quebeckers believe in the role of the Senate, that 22% would prefer an elected Senate, and that 43% would simply abolish the Senate.

During the election campaign, the Conservatives proposed real reform of the Senate. However, with this bill, it is evident that they have not consulted Quebec and the provinces about this reform, and have not questioned the very basis for the Senate.

I would like the Conservative member to explain to us how the will of Canadians is respected when the provinces and Quebec—where 43% of Quebeckers want the Senate to be abolished—have not been consulted.

[Tom Lukiwski, Conservative, Regina—Lumsden—Lake Centre, SK]

Mr. Speaker, one of the reasons that Canadians in various regions of this country would like to see the Senate abolished is because of the abysmal record of senators in the past.

As we all know, senators have been appointed, in effect, almost for life. At one point in time, senators were appointed until they were 100 years of age. It was only recently changed to 75 years of age. However, because of the partisan nature of many of these appointments, we saw that many Canadians became disillusioned with the Senate as an institution, which is why we are taking steps to reform the Senate

I believe eight-year terms would ensure not only integrity, but it would ensure that senators not become complacent, and the non-renewable provision would ensure that the senators who are appointed to the Senate are there for a limited amount of time, ensuring they will absolutely be working in the best interests of Canadians.

With respect to the member's question about consultations, we are planning, through future democratic reform initiatives, that provinces will be consulted on the nature of the senators they elect. They will be providing their wish to the Government of Canada and the Prime Minister will then take their wishes into consideration when appointing senators in the future.

[Dennis Bevington, NDP, Western Arctic, NT]

Mr. Speaker, on the question of the nature of the Senate and how it affects the decisions that we are making here today, I think the examples that have been used are a bit inappropriate. The U.S. Senate, of course, is an elected body. Perhaps the model that we should look to by which to judge the bill is the House of Lords, where appointed gentry for hundreds of years have held those positions for a very long time.

I come from a party that does not believe in the institution of the Senate. It does not believe that it has usefulness left in Canada. Certainly, to try to compare this institution today to an elected body like the U.S. Senate where senators hold very important positions in the democratic process there, is completely wrong. There is no comparison between those two bodies in their function and, ultimately, even if this Senate was elected, in its purpose to Canadians.

[Tom Lukiwski, Conservative, Regina—Lumsden—Lake Centre, SK]

Mr. Speaker, I am actually very heartened to see members of the NDP engaging in this debate since, as the member opposite stated, they do not believe in the Senate to begin with. I also find it passing strange that they would actually try to make suggestions on how to improve the upper chamber when they do not want to see an upper chamber in existence.

With respect to the member's comments about unfair comparisons to the U.S. because the U.S. has a system of electing senators, I am not sure if the member heard me but I will repeat what I said for his benefit. One of our further initiatives on democratic reform is on the method by which senators are appointed to the upper chamber.

We plan to introduce legislation that would allow people in individual provinces to cast their opinion on who they would like to see provincially appointed to the Senate. In effect, there is a way that we could say that senators will be elected by the members of the regions that will ensure integrity from the members' perspective to the Senate itself.

[The Acting Speaker, Conservative, Barry Devolin]

It is my duty pursuant to Standing Order 38 to inform the House that the questions to be raised tonight at the time of adjournment are as follows: the hon. member for St. John's South—Mount Pearl, Government Advertising; the hon. member for St. John's East, Hibernia Project.

Resuming debate, the hon. member for Charlottetown.

[Shawn Murphy, Liberal, Charlottetown, PE]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise today and participate in this debate.

This is an issue that is complicated. The whole issue of Senate reform has been discussed on many occasions since Confederation in 1867, but it is an issue that I am glad to see brought before the House and it is an issue that should be debated by Canadians. I congratulate the minister for introducing it.

I want to say at the outset that when the bill comes to a vote, I will be supporting it so that it will go to committee even though I have some very serious concerns with the whole issue of tenure, which I will get into.

I understand the gist of the legislation. We have a situation now, and it has happened, where technically a person can be appointed at the young age of 35 and can serve 40 years in the Senate. It does raise certain concerns of accountability and legitimacy. It is an issue that we should debate and perhaps correct, if it is possible constitutionally, which I believe it is. However, there is a need for discussion and, of course, it will then need to go to the Senate.

It is a good issue to have before the House but, as I indicated, I do not think there is any institution as complicated, complex and perhaps misunderstood as the Senate of Canada. The debate about the Senate cannot start today. It has to start back in 1864, at the time of the meetings when the discussion started to form this country. The original meeting was held in Charlottetown when the British colonies of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island came together to discuss the possibility of forming a Maritime union because of their small size and other concerns, such as defence, et cetera.

Upper Canada and Lower Canada, now Ontario and Quebec, more or less invited themselves to this meeting to discuss the whole concept of a larger union and they were included to form the Dominion of Canada.

According to the historical annals, there was a lot of partying and drinking at this meeting. They did not form an agreement but they very much agreed to continue the discussions. The discussions did continue in a meeting in Quebec City and as are result of those two meetings, the country was formed in 1867. I should point out that Prince Edward Island, at that time, opted not to join the Federation.

Again, if we look at the debates, the Atlantic provinces, although they were smaller, were probably more mature because they had been settled earlier. To a certain extent, they did have a legislature. Responsible government came first to the colony of Nova Scotia. It had its own governors and its own legislature. There was a considerable degree of reluctance to get into this new union. They also had their own political issues back in their colonies because lot of time certain factions were against any kind of a larger union with Upper Canada and Lower Canada. A lot of times people did not appreciate what was going on or what the political climate was in that far off land.

Again, as we all know, the agreement was culminated and the country was formed, to its great credit, for which we are forever grateful. In the early 1900s the country expanded and in 1949 in the province of Newfoundland joined Confederation.

The point I am making is that during those discussions chips were put on the table, there were a lot of negotiations and discussions, if we read the debates of the delegates from the colonies, and one of the concerns of the smaller colonies was to be swallowed up by the larger colony of Ontario.

One of the concerns, of course, was the protection of minorities. We are not talking about the minorities as we view the concept in the House today. There was only one minority and that was French Catholic males. At that time the females and the aboriginals did not have a franchise and were not considered, or I did not see them considered too much in the debates.

The point I am making is that one of the significant chips that was put on the table, and the chip that got the country, was the Senate. The way they constructed the Senate was that each region would have 24. The Atlantic region would have 24. Quebec would have 24; that was what brought them on board. Ontario would have 24, and of course that expanded as the west was brought into the federation in subsequent years. That balanced the regions and it was also there to protect the minorities.

These are considerations we all should bear in mind. We should all bear in mind the chips that were put on the table during these very important discussions back in 1864, 1865 and 1866, concluding in 1867. In other words, the bottom line was that if we did not have the Senate, we would not have got the country.

I point to that for contextual purposes. I do not think there is any reason why this House should not discuss the possible reform of the Senate, but as the minister would know, it is a very difficult process because of the constitutional framework that was adopted then and that was changed subsequently but not a lot, not in any major amendment to the Senate. The way the senators are appointed, their capacities and the regions they represent require the consent of at least seven provinces, representing in excess of 50% of the population of Canada.

As every politician who has ever been elected in Canada knows, that is a very difficult and murky process. We got into that in Meech Lake. We got into that in Charlottetown. We all know how difficult that process is and I believe most politicians, if questioned, would say they really do not want to go there.

However the point I do want to make is that it is unfortunate that there was not a larger consultative process. The provinces, in this case and in this discussion, are the successors to the colonies. The Senate was put there for a purpose, with certain specific capacities to protect and enhance the interests of the colonies, especially the smaller colonies, and of course the minorities, which have expanded beyond that concept of the French Catholic male.

It is unfortunate that we did not have a more consultative process. We are having situations where certain larger provinces have publicly stated that this bill should not go forward. That is unfortunate, but I still think the debate should continue. There is a larger constitutional issue and many constitutional scholars have given opinions. By my reading, certainly the preponderance of the opinion seems to be that this legislation can proceed without the consent of the provinces. However, the previous member who spoke was talking about appointments made at the request of the provinces. We are into some constitutional problems there. It is a slippery slope, and there have really been very few substantial amendments made to the Senate since Confederation.

One issue I do have, which has been talked about by the previous two speakers and which can continue before the committee, is the whole issue of tenure. The previous two speakers compared it to other countries where they have a bicameral system with two political institutions, a lower house and a Senate. One speaker said the average tenure was 5.2 years and talked about the American and Australian experiences, but again these are all elected bodies.

Even if this legislation were passed tomorrow, we are going to continue with an appointed body. I am very troubled with the possibility that after eight years, we have a legislative and deliberative body that comprises 104 members, each and every one of whom are appointed by one individual. I would think they would be very compliant. I am not so sure they would be an institution of sober second thought and I am not so sure what purpose they would really serve.

If we go back to the previous Liberal government that was elected in 1993, by the year 2001 all 104 senators would have been appointed by one individual, resulting in no opposition in committees. I am not clear how that would serve the interests of democracy in the long run.

I do not have any specific suggestions, although I think it should be a longer term and there should be staggering. However, I believe there certainly has to be some debate on creating a viable opposition because I have seen with my own eyes what happens when a democracy is overtaken by one party. We have seen it more in provincial legislatures than in the federal ones and it is my opinion that democracy suffers in the long run. It may be a happy day when a government wins all the seats, but in the long run it is the people who suffer and democracy suffers too.

The legislative bodies that operate in the House of Commons, the Senate and the provincial legislatures work best with an effective, informed and hard-working opposition. That is a real question, but again it should not in any way stop the debate from continuing.

This matter has been before the House previously and there have been some slight changes based upon the debates. It is good that the matter is being brought before the House again, but there are a lot of other issues, which I will raise briefly.

There are democratic reforms that are extremely troubling and probably more important than this issue, one of which is the issue that has been before the House over the last six months about documents. There seems to be a movement to create a new concept in Canada that I would classify as executive or prime minister or government immunity. Instead of the traditional role that Parliament, the House of Commons and committees have delegated to them, the powers to send for persons, papers and records, if we accept the logic that is being put forward, the persons, papers and records that would be sent to the committees would be determined by the executive. Whatever is in the public interest would be determined by the opinion of the executive or cabinet.

That is a very unholy trend. I am pleased the Chair ruled that is not the case in this country. I agree with that ruling and hopefully we will move on with that. I am dealing with the very same thing in the public accounts committee, which did not raise a national security issue. It was dealing with another issue that had the very same response from the government. That particular case dealt with some tapes that are not that important to anything. We met with a lot of resistance but we finally got them.

First of all, members are probably not going to believe this, but the government would not provide them because the committee did not follow the Access to Information Act. When that was explained, the government said it would not give them to the committee because that violated the Privacy Act. We finally got them, but we can see the trend that is developing. I wish the Minister of State for Democratic Reform would get engaged in that issue because it is so important to democracy in this country.

It is good that this debate is taking place. I will be supporting this legislation. I have some concerns. The two biggest concerns deal with the consultation process and tenure, which is a major concern. We have to work on some mechanism to allow the institution to operate efficiently, effectively and in the best interests of all Canadians.

[Steven Fletcher, Conservative, Minister of State (Democratic Reform)]

Mr. Speaker, a lot of the hon. member's comments were thoughtful and in a historical context. Of course, what we are here to talk about today is the eight-year non-renewable term.

My question to the member is quite simple. We know the constraints of the Constitution. We know that Canadians are demanding a more accountable institution. Will the member agree that a term limit that is non-renewable is critical? Is it the perfect solution? There are probably no perfect solutions, but is it better than what we have now? The answer is yes. I think that is what most Canadians would say.

Would the hon. member agree that non-renewable term limits are better than what we have at present?

[Shawn Murphy, Liberal, Charlottetown, PE]

Mr. Speaker, it would depend on how we solve that issue. I really feel strongly that this concept of a non-renewable eight-year term would not work. I gave the example that after eight years the Prime Minister would have appointed all 104 members. There would be no opposition. They would go to a committee and it would be all one party.

Not only that, but there is another very important point I want to raise. I have noticed over the years that the members of the same party who were appointed by a previous leader are less compliant. I believe that the Conservative members who were appointed by Mr. Mulroney are less compliant than the ones appointed by the present Prime Minister, and I have seen that in both political parties.

We would have a situation where a democratic institution, a House, comprised 104 members from one party, all appointed by one individual. I am troubled with that. I do not think it would work. We have to work on other solutions. I am sure there are experts out there who would give us all kinds of ideas, but that particular solution would not work for democracy and it would not work for Canadians.