Constitution Act, 2010 (Senate term limits)

An Act to amend the Constitution Act, 1867 (Senate term limits)

This bill was last introduced in the 40th Parliament, 3rd Session, which ended in March 2011.

Sponsor

Steven Fletcher  Conservative

Status

Second reading (House), as of Nov. 19, 2010
(This bill did not become law.)

Summary

This is from the published bill. The Library of Parliament often publishes better independent summaries.

This enactment alters the tenure of senators who are summoned after October 14, 2008.

Elsewhere

All sorts of information on this bill is available at LEGISinfo, an excellent resource from the Library of Parliament. You can also read the full text of the bill.

Constitution Act, 2010 (Senate term limits)Government Orders

April 29th, 2010 / 4:20 p.m.
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Regina—Lumsden—Lake Centre Saskatchewan

Conservative

Tom Lukiwski ConservativeParliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons

Mr. Speaker, it is certainly a pleasure to participate in this debate on Bill C-10, the Senate term limits bill.

Bill C-10 proposes a non-renewable term limit of eight years for senators. This proposal will be familiar to members as it is not the first time it has been considered by this House.

Bill C-10 would amend the Constitution using the amending procedures set out in section 44 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which authorizes Parliament to “--make laws amending the Constitution of Canada in relation to the executive government of Canada or the Senate and House of Commons”.

Opponents of this bill have argued that section 44 is not the appropriate amending formula to affect change of this kind. They have suggested that term limits would affect an “essential characteristic of the Senate and its ability to give independent sober second thought in the parliamentary process”. I wish to refute those objections today as there can be little doubt that this bill is constitutional.

During the last Parliament the constitutionality of term limits was studied by two separate Senate committees. The Special Senate Committee on Senate Reform concluded that Parliament could change the tenure of senators to an eight year term. In reaching the conclusion the special committee heard from some of Canada's most respected constitutional scholars, including Peter Hogg, Patrick Monahan and Stephen Scott. The opinion of these eminent legal experts was unanimous: the eight year term limit proposal is within Parliament's jurisdiction.

The bill was then approved by the Senate at second reading and referred to the legal and constitutional affairs committee. That committee ignored the aforementioned scholars and did not come to any definitive conclusion regarding the bill's constitutionality. Let us be clear. The committee did not conclude that the bill was unconstitutional. It simply said it was not sure.

To resolve the question the committee proposed to have the Supreme Court of Canada decide the matter. I believe that it is the responsibility of parliamentarians to use our best judgment on the constitutionality of proposed legislation and not hide behind the Supreme Court. That is why I wish to outline my rationale for concluding that the bill now before us is constitutional.

What is the relevant test for evaluating the constitutionality of the proposed term limits bill? On one hand, opponents argue that any change affecting the essential characteristics of the Senate cannot be enacted by Parliament acting alone. On the other hand, supporters maintain that only essential characteristics requiring more than Parliament's unilateral authority are those explicitly referred to in the 1982 Constitution Act namely, the powers of the Senate, the method of selecting senators, the residence qualification of senators, and the number of senators by which a province is represented in the Senate.

This debate essentially turns on a single question. Does the Supreme Court of Canada opinion in the upper house reference remain relevant today? Members may be familiar with that opinion.

In 1978 the Government of Canada referred a number of questions to the Supreme Court relating to the authority of Parliament to abolish or reform the Senate. A year later the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that it would be beyond the legislative authority of Parliament to abolish the Senate or to otherwise alter its fundamental features or essential characteristics. However, the court noted that by limiting tenure from life to 75 years of age, as Parliament had done in 1965, it “did not change the essential character of the Senate”.

I reference the Constitution Act, 1982. It provides for various formulae to amend the Constitution, including specific references to the Senate. While opponents of reform argue that these formulae override the Supreme Court's opinion, the court's opinion remains relevant for interpreting the various amending formulae.

Some maintain that the upper house reference remains a guide to understanding the scope of Parliament's power to make constitutional amendments with respect to the Senate. Others, including Canada's best constitutional lawyers, contend that the upper house reference was a guide for amending our Constitution only before patriation in 1982. Since 1982, the Constitution itself, not the Supreme Court, outlines the procedures for amendment.

For example, when Peter Hogg testified before the special Senate committee, he said:

It seems to me that the best interpretation of what happened in 1982 was that it overtook the ruling in the Upper House Reference. In other words, the 1982 amending procedures now say explicitly which changes to the Senate cannot be accomplished unilaterally by the Parliament of Canada;

This leaves other aspects, including tenure, within Parliament's jurisdiction.

In turn, when Patrick Monahan was before the same committee, he expressed the same view, that maintaining that patriation in 1982 “has superseded the Senate reference or indeed attempted to codify, to identify those matters that were found to be fundamental or essential...”. As for other matters, he went on to say, “The Parliament of Canada...may enact changes to the Senate, including the tenure of senators”.

Although this debate is of crucial importance to understanding our constitutional amendment procedures, it is not one that needs to be resolved in the context of our present debate. Not only does the bill before us today comply with the constitutional amending procedure authorizing Parliament to make certain amendments to the Senate, but it also proposes term limits of sufficient length to maintain the Senate's essential characteristics.

In other words, Bill C-10 passes both the Supreme Court test of 1979 by not affecting the Senate's essential characteristics and the Constitution Act of 1982 by not tackling any of the senatorial changes in section 42.

The proposal before us is for an eight-year term. Some have asked if this term is long enough to maintain the essential characteristics of the Senate. The simple answer is, yes. An eight-year term is within the range of terms for Senate chambers internationally and well within the range of terms contemplated by previous Senate reform proposals. Eight years is enough time to allow a new senator to acquire the necessary skills to maintain the Senate's role in providing an independent second sober thought in legislative review.

Hon. members may be familiar with the tenure of senators in the United States, which is six years. This is the same as the tenure for senators in Australia. Other upper houses have term limits as short as four years. France recently reduced its term from nine to six years. An eight-year term, which is what is being proposed in Bill C-10, would be among the longest worldwide.

Unless one is willing to suggest that the upper chambers of the United States, Australia and Europe are all ineffective due to limited terms, members must agree that eight years is long enough to maintain the essential characteristics of the Senate.

Another aspect of this bill that addresses concerns with maintaining the independence of the Senate is that the terms are non-renewable. Non-renewable terms assure Canadians that the senators will not have to curry favour with the government in order to preserve their seat.

The bill contains transitional provisions that will apply the eight-year term limit to all senators appointed after October 14, 2008. As with the rest of the bill, this transitional provision is on solid constitutional ground and can be enacted by Parliament alone pursuant to section 44 of the Constitution Act.

The bill before us today is a good one simply due to the fact that it would allow future Parliaments the opportunity to appoint, if necessary, senators for a limited term of eight years, which would certainly go far beyond the current status quo of 75 years of age. It would ensure, in my opinion, that senators being appointed in the future will bring a fresh set of eyes to all of the legislation coming through this chamber to the upper chamber.

I would also point out that, by the provisions contained in this bill of a non-renewable term limit, we would not have to worry about senators being reappointed time and time again. It would ensure that if Parliament changes, the Senate will change. I think that is in the best interest of all Canadians.

Constitution Act, 2010 (Senate term limits)Government Orders

April 29th, 2010 / 4:05 p.m.
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Conservative

Joe Preston Conservative Elgin—Middlesex—London, ON

Mr. Speaker, I will be splitting my time with the member for Regina—Lumsden—Lake Centre.

I am pleased to stand and debate Bill C-10, the Senate term limits bill. I will attempt to be a little less angry than the last member who spoke.

Bill C-10 proposes to amend the Constitution to establish term limits for senators. Specifically, the bill proposes that senators serve a single term of eight years.

Parliamentarians already had the opportunity to study the bill in some detail since it was first introduced in the last Parliament. In fact, two separate committees undertook studies of Bill S-4 which was similar to the bill before us today.

The call for change is certainly not new. Over the years there have been numerous proposals for term limits for senators and I believe there is now a general consensus that term limits are a good idea.

There remain a few skeptics. For example, concerns have been raised that term limits will somehow undermine the fundamental nature of the Senate, in particular, its capacity to provide sober second thought in the review of legislation. It is argued that an eight-year term is not long enough to allow senators to gain the experience to effectively carry out their functions in reviewing legislation. I would like to use my time today to address this concern.

I believe that if we look at previous proposals for term limits in the Senate and we examine the term limits in other jurisdictions, we can be confident that an eight-year term is more than sufficient for senators to exercise their constitutional responsibility.

Bill C-10 is far from being the first proposal to limit the tenure of senators. In fact, the only significant constitutional amendment relating to the Senate in our history was when Parliament amended the Constitution in 1965 to reduce the tenure of senators from that of life to a mandatory retirement age of 75.

However, the 1965 amendment still allows senators to serve as long as 45 years. That is why there have been so many proposals to implement additional limits on Senate tenure since 1965.

In 1980, the Senate legal and constitutional affairs committee proposed that senators serve fixed terms of 10 years which would be renewable for a further term of five years. In 1981, the Canada West Foundation recommended senators serve limited terms that would coincide with the life of two parliamentary terms. Similarly, the Alberta Select Special Committee on Upper House Reform recommended in 1985 that senators should serve the life of two provincial legislatures. In 1984, the Special Joint Committee on Senate Reform recommended that senators would serve non-renewable nine-year terms. In 1992, the Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada recommended that senators should serve terms of no more than six years.

The recommendations for Senate term limits over the past 30 years have ranged from six-year terms to ten-year terms. The authors of these reports, including some former and distinguished parliamentarians of different partisan persuasions believe a term ranging from six to ten years would be sufficient to maintain the Senate's ability to effectively scrutinize legislation.

An eight-year term limit proposed in Bill C-10 squarely falls within the range of the term limits that previously have been proposed for the Senate. Bill C-10 is not a radical or revolutionary proposition. It is consistent with other proposals for Senate reform that have been made over the years.

Let us contrast the eight-year term limit in Bill C-10 with the term limits of the upper houses in other jurisdictions.

Based on data compiled by the French Senate on 66 second chambers, the average term limit for members is 5.2 years.

In Australia, a country with similar characteristics to Canada, senators serve six-year terms.

Similarly, senators in the United States also serve six-year terms. I doubt anyone would consider an American senator in his or her fifth or sixth year of office to be unable to perform his or her legislative capacities effectively. As we all know, Barak Obama was elected President of the United States after less than four years in the United States Senate.

The proposal in Bill C-10 for an eight-year term limit for senators is well within the norm internationally. In fact, it is above the average term limit for upper houses in foreign jurisdictions.

Many members may point to the previous proposals by the British government for the members of the House of Lords to serve for the equivalent of three parliamentary terms, or 12 to 15 years. However, there are three considerations that should lessen the significance of the British proposal on Senate reform in Canada.

First, Britain is looking at lords reform at a different departure point than is the case in Canada. Currently, lords are appointed for life. In contrast, life appointments to the Senate were replaced here in 1965, with a mandatory retirement age of 75. Therefore, a move to 12 year to 15 year terms would be a much more significant change in the United Kingdom than it would be in the Canadian setting.

Second, while proposing 12 year to 15 year terms, the British government recognized that terms of this length would raise accountability concerns. To address this, the British government suggested that a recall mechanism may be appropriate for the House of Lords. In the 2008 white paper on lords reform, the British government stated:

Further consideration would need to be given to the accountability arrangements for members of a reformed second chamber, particularly in light of proposals that they serve long, single, fixed terms.The Cross-Party Group discussed the possibility of introducing recall ballots for elected members of a reformed second chamber, along the lines of those that exist in some states of the USA.

Unlike the 12 year to 15 year term, the eight-year term proposed by Bill C-10 does not create the same accountability concerns raised in the British white paper. Even if Britain were to create a 12 year to 15 year term limit, a term of that length would be the exception, not the rule. In short, I do not believe the British example to be a comparable model when evaluating the appropriate term limits for our Canadian Senate.

The proposed eight year term was studied extensively by two Senate committees during the last Parliament. The report of the Special Senate Committee on Senate Reform supported term limits, in principle, and validated the government's position that an eight year term limit would not undermine the essential characteristics of the Senate.

For example, the committee's report concluded:

While a variety of views were expressed about the desirable length of a senatorial term, virtually none of our witnesses dismissed the creation of a term limit per se and, indeed, most strongly supported it. These witnesses pointed out that limited terms would dispel the image, so harmful to the Senate, of “jobs for life”, and re-invigorate the Senate with a constant influx of fresh ideas. Most members of the Committee found these assertions to be persuasive.

The Committee also notes that, in previous deliberations on the Constitution of Canada, various committees of the Senate have unanimously favoured the creation of limited terms for service in the upper house of Canada’s Parliament. In the view of most Committee members, the arguments made in these reports remain sound.

Accordingly, following careful deliberation on the subject-matter of Bill S-4 and finding no reasonable grounds to withhold approval in principle, most Committee members endorse the underlying principle of the bill: that a defined limit to the terms of senators would be an improvement to Canada’s Senate

Previous recommendations for term limits ranged from 6 to 10 years. None have proposed term limits greater than 10 years. Yet, the Liberals have proposed a 15 year term limit.

Term limits for second chambers in other jurisdictions are, on average, 5.2 years, which is well below the 15 years proposed by the legal and constitutional affairs committee. Let us be clear. By proposing a 15 year term limit in committee, Liberal senators killed the term limits bill on a party line vote.

Furthermore, we should compare the 15 year term limit proposed by the committee with the actual tenure of senators. Since Confederation, the average term of a senator has been about 14 years. Since 1965, the average tenure of senators has been 9.25 years.

The 15 year term limit proposed by Liberal senators at the legal and constitutional affairs committee would not effect any meaningful change to the Canadian Senate. Rather, it would simply reinforce the status quo.

Before concluding, I would like to note that while the Canadian government believes that a 15 year term limit is too long, the government has expressed willingness to consider other points of view, within reason. For example, when he made the unprecedented appearance before the Special Senate Committee on Senate Reform, the Prime Minister stated:

A government can be flexible on accepting amendment to the details of Bill S-4 to adopt a six-year term or an eight- year term or a nine-year term. The key point is this: We are seeking limited, fixed terms of office, not decades based on antiquated criteria of age.

Nevertheless, I believe the eight year term limit proposed in Bill C-10 is reasonable. Eight years is sufficient time for senators to build up the necessary experience and expertise to perform their duties effectively. It is also consistent with previous Senate reform proposals and the term limits of second chambers internationally.

Bill C-10 would not alter the essential characteristics of our Senate. I encourage all members of this House to please support this initiative.

Constitution Act, 2010 (Senate term limits)Government Orders

April 29th, 2010 / 3:20 p.m.
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Bloc

Christiane Gagnon Bloc Québec, QC

Mr. Speaker, we are discussing Senate reform, which would see senators appointed for eight years. We have to ask ourselves the following question: should changes affecting the essential characteristics of the Senate be made unilaterally by Parliament or should they be part of the constitutional process involving Quebec and the provinces?

The Supreme Court of Canada has answered that question. In the late 1970s, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the capacity of Parliament, on its own, to amend constitutional provisions relating to the Senate. Its decision Re: Authority of Parliament in Relation to the Upper House [1980], 1 S.C.R. 54 establishes the principle that major changes, affecting the essential characteristics of the Senate, cannot be made unilaterally. As hon. members can see, the Supreme Court has ruled on this issue.

Any reform affecting the powers of the Senate, the method of selecting senators, the number of senators to which a province is entitled or the residency requirement of senators can only be made in consultation with the provinces and Quebec.

Let us see how certain political players have looked at this issue. In 2007, the former Quebec minister for Canadian intergovernmental affairs, Benoît Pelletier, not exactly a sovereignist, reiterated Quebec's traditional position as follows:

The Government of Quebec does not believe that this falls exclusively under federal jurisdiction. Given that the Senate is a crucial part of the Canadian federal compromise, it is clear to us that under the Constitution Act, 1982, and the Regional Veto Act, the Senate can be neither reformed nor abolished without Quebec's consent.

That is what a Liberal government member said about the issue in 2007. That same day, the National Assembly—every single MNA, including members of the Parti Québécois, the ADQ and the Liberals—unanimously passed the following motion:

That the National Assembly of Québec reaffirm to the Federal Government and to the Parliament of Canada that no modification to the Canadian Senate may be carried out without the consent of the Government of Québec and the National Assembly.

This is not just about consultation. I know that Canada's Conservative Prime Minister would like to have full control over the Senate and appoint senators for eight-year terms, but for that he needs to do more than just consult with Quebec and the provinces. He needs to obtain consent from the provinces, specifically from seven provinces representing more than 50% of Canada's population.

Traditionally and historically, Quebec's position on the Senate and possible Senate reform has been very clear. Since the unilateral patriation of the Constitution, successive Quebec governments have all agreed on one basic premise: they have made it very clear that there can be no Senate reform until Quebec's status has been settled.

In 1989, Mr. Bourassa, the former Quebec premier, said that he did not want to talk about Senate reform until the Meech Lake accord was signed.

In 1992, Gil Rémillard said that Quebec would not sign an agreement on Senate reform until it was satisfied with the results of negotiations on distinct society, power sharing and federal spending power. More recently, Quebec's Liberal government—a federalist government, I should point out—participated in the Special Committee on Senate Reform in 2007. It wrote the following in its May 31, 2007, submission:

The Government of Quebec is not opposed to modernizing the Senate. But if the aim is to alter the essential features of that institution, the only avenue is the initiation of a coordinated federal-provincial constitutional process that fully associates the constitutional players, one of them being Quebec, in the exercise of constituent authority.

The Government of Quebec, with the unanimous support of the National Assembly, therefore requests the withdrawal of Bill C-43 [a bill proposing an elected Senate]. It also requests the suspension of proceedings on Bill S-4...

Bill S-4 became Bill C-19 and then Bill C-10 on Senate term limits.

This is the fourth time the government has tried to bring a Senate reform bill before the House. The Liberal government spoke out against this for constitutional reasons.

And do not forget that on November 7, 2007, the National Assembly unanimously passed its motion. I think it is clear that if Ottawa wishes to reform the Senate, it must reopen the constitutional debate, sit down with Quebec and the provinces and negotiate with them in order to come to an agreement. It cannot act unilaterally. As I said before, the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled on this issue.

if it truly wants to recognize Quebec, the government must also make sure to take a second issue into account. We know only too well that the Conservative government does not want to recognize Quebec. If it recognized the Quebec nation, it would also recognize the various political figures that have spoke about this issue.

We also want Quebec's political weight in the House of Commons to be maintained. But the Conservative government wants to increase the number of seats by 30, including 20 in Ontario, which would reduce Quebec's political weight. We are told that we will always be guaranteed 75 members. But 75 out of 308 is not the same as 75 out of 338.

Furthermore, the entire population of Quebec opposes this. We are very surprised and very frustrated by the actions of this government, which finally decided to recognize the Quebec nation. That was a sham; it was nothing but empty rhetoric. It does not really mean anything at all. When this government can diminish Quebec's political weight and ignore Quebec's wishes to not reform the Senate for constitutional reasons, it will do so. This is nothing but smoke and mirrors.

If the government was serious about democratic legitimacy, it would ensure that Quebec maintained its current representation in the House of Commons, that is, 24.35% of the seats. If 30 more seats are added, Quebec's representation would drop to under 22%. It is crucial that Quebec be represented not only based on its demographic weight, but also based on its historical significance and its social, economic and cultural distinctiveness. That is why we want Quebec's political weight to be preserved, and do not want to be left with just 75 seats. It is also because of Quebec's historical significance and because the Conservative government recognized the Quebec nation. If it wants to show consistency, it must ensure that the Quebec nation's representation is proportionate to its historic, economic and cultural significance, proportionate to its weight and what it is.

Moreover, the Conservative government is contradicting itself. On the one hand, it claims that it wants to increase the legitimacy of institutions, but on the other hand, it is trying to muzzle Quebec by introducing bills that will reduce the political weight of the Quebec nation. Clearly, the supposed recognition, as I mentioned earlier, was nothing more than empty rhetoric, since the Conservatives are incapable of taking any concrete action that would suggest true recognition.

It must be said that since the creation of the Canadian confederation, Quebec’s weight has declined constantly. I would point out that Quebec had 36% of the seats in 1867; if this bill were adopted, that would fall to 22.4%.

The members of the National Assembly are also in favour of the principle of maintaining Quebec’s weight. On Thursday, April 22, all members of that body, federalist and sovereignist, voted unanimously in favour of a motion against decreasing Quebec’s weight. Similar measures were adopted when previous bills were introduced by this Conservative government, which was trying to dilute the weight of Quebec. As well, the Quebec people also reject this bill, which would diminish the weight of Quebec. In fact, an Angus Reid poll conducted on April 7 shows that 71% of the population of Quebec opposes Bill C-12, which seeks to diminish Quebec’s weight. Now, 71% is a lot of people.

So the consensus in Quebec is that it is important to maintain Quebec’s relative representation in this House. That includes all of the members of the National Assembly and the 49 members of this House, two thirds of the members for whom Quebeckers voted. We are elected representatives, and we have democratic, popular legitimacy. This government’s refusal to take Quebec’s demands into account is only the last in a long series of examples demonstrating that recognition of the Quebec nation means nothing to this government.

If it were truly serious when it talks about reforming the democratic legitimacy of institutions, the government would abolish the Senate and ensure that the weight of the Quebec nation, which has been officially recognized, is kept at 24.3%. In addition, as I said before, it would reform the democratic legitimacy of institutions by ensuring it has the support of seven provinces that together represent 50% of the Canadian population and acknowledging that a majority of Quebeckers oppose these issues.

The House resumed consideration of the motion that Bill C-10, An Act to amend the Constitution Act, 1867 (Senate term limits), be read the second time and referred to a committee.

Business of the HouseOral Questions

April 29th, 2010 / 3:05 p.m.
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Prince George—Peace River B.C.

Conservative

Jay Hill ConservativeLeader of the Government in the House of Commons

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the question from the hon. House leader of the official opposition as to the future business for the remainder of this week and up until Thursday of next week.

We will continue today with the debate at second reading of Bill C-10, Senate term limits. Following Bill C-10, I will call Bill C-12, democratic representation. I will continue with this lineup tomorrow.

Next week, we will call Bill C-4, Sébastien's law, Bill C-16, ending house arrest for property and other serious crimes by serious and violent offenders, and Bill C-13, fairness for military families. All of these bills are at second reading.

Tuesday, May 4, will be an allotted day. I am looking forward to the motion that my hon. colleague and his party will select for that opposition day. I note there are some nine allotted days in this parliamentary period, and obviously there are many important issues that the opposition has to choose from, including the east coast shellfish industry.

Constitution Act, 2010 (Senate Term Limits)Government Orders

April 29th, 2010 / 1:50 p.m.
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Bloc

Christiane Gagnon Bloc Québec, QC

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to address Bill C-10, which amends the Constitution Act of 1867 and limits Senate terms.

It is not the first time that the Conservatives introduce such legislation. This is the fourth time in four years that they are proposing a bill to reform the Senate by limiting to eight years the term for which senators would serve.

This is a new attempt by the Conservative government to somehow reform the Senate. That is totally ridiculous. It shows once again the Conservatives' bad faith when the time comes to obtain the consent of the provinces—in this case Quebec—regarding the Constitution Act of 1867.

The Bloc Québécois is in favour of abolishing the Senate. However, the path followed by the Conservative government ignores the negotiating process that must take place with the provinces and which requires the consent of seven provinces representing 50% of the Canadian population.

The government presents a number of arguments. It claims to want to strengthen the institutions' democratic legitimacy. At the same time, it has no scruples about continuing on a path of democratic illegitimacy for the Senate, by speeding up the appointment process with this new bill. We can therefore say that this legislation is useless, since the Conservatives are contradicting themselves. They claim that they want to increase the democratic legitimacy of this institution—which is said to be archaic—but appointed senators do not have any public legitimacy. Later on, I will refer to some polls that clearly show this to be the case.

Second, any reform of this archaic institution—and I emphasize the word “archaic”—cannot be achieved unilaterally, without the consent of Quebec and of the provinces that represent over 50% of the population, provided there are seven of them. Third, if this Conservative government were really serious about wanting to increase the institutions' democratic legitimacy, it would ensure that Quebec's weight in the House of Commons is maintained.

If I have time later on, I will explain how this government is going to change Quebec's democratic weight by adding 30 new ridings, including 20 or so in Ontario. But let us look at today's issue, namely Bill C-10, which would provide an eight year, non-renewable term for senators. That is why we are saying the Senate is archaic and, more importantly, why it lacks democratic legitimacy.

If this bill is passed, it will speed up senators' turnover and the appointment process, as current senators would retire and be replaced by others whose term would last eight years. Such a change would allow a recently elected prime minister to quickly harmonize the parties' representation in the Senate and in the House of Commons after a change of government, and thus take control of the Senate more rapidly.

We know the Conservative Prime Minister's propensity for getting his hands on information and controlling the various leaders in various key positions within the government, as well as within his own political party and in the media. We know how the Prime Minister likes to have control over everything. It is easy to imagine the current Conservative Prime Minister making his selection. This week, we saw the control he has in the House, not to mention the Senate, at least with respect to the Afghanistan documents.

Similarly, this bill would allow the Prime Minister to increase the cyclical domination of the Senate by one party. With the introduction of this bill, the Prime Minister is saying one thing—he said he would not reform the Senate—but is doing the opposite. This is not the first time this has been mentioned in the House.

The Prime Minister once promised transparency. What transparency do we have today? You might think that the Liberal Party was still in power. We are forced to track their every move, to ferret out the truth in dribs and drabs in order to get the information to the people and to see how the Prime Minister manages his own government.

Not bad coming from a Prime Minister who said, during his campaign, that he would not appoint any senators. That is what the current Conservative Prime Minister promised in his election campaign.

I believe that the Bloc Québécois' traditional position on the Senate is well known.

Given that I have just shown how archaic this institution is, its lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the people and the partisan way in which senators are appointed, the Bloc Québécois is in favour of abolishing this institution after holding negotiations. There must be constitutional negotiations with the provinces and Quebec in particular. If the government is planning on moving forward with this bill, it cannot continue to do so unilaterally, as it is preparing to do and as it wants to do.

Major reform or abolition of the Senate would require negotiated amendments to the Constitution as well as agreement from Quebec and the provinces. It would have to be decided if the general amending formula—agreement from seven provinces representing at least 50% of the population, the so-called 7/50 formula—or the formula requiring unanimous consent would be required. That remains to be seen.

I do not think that the Prime Minister has thought about that. He said that there would be consultations. It will take more than consultations; it requires agreement from seven provinces with at least 50% of Canada's population.

That said, it is most probable that unanimity from the provinces would be necessary in order to effect such a major change because it would affect matters, such as the office of the Governor General, specified in the unanimity procedure.

The Bloc's position in favour of abolishing the Senate following negotiations with Quebec and the provinces seems to be shared by the people of Quebec, as a March 2010 poll clearly shows:

The majority of Quebeckers do not see a value in the Senate as it is currently configured and a large percentage of them agree with abolishing it, according to an exclusive Canada-wide poll by Léger Marketing for QMI Agency.

The Minister of Canadian Heritage loves polls. A random national online poll of 1,510 adults showed that 35% of Canadians believe that the Senate can only be effective if senators are elected and not appointed. Furthermore, 25% of respondents believe that the Senate should be abolished and 12% are in favour of appointments based on gender and regional balance. As for Quebec respondents, 8% believe that the red chamber plays an important role and that the system for appointing senators does not work very well. Twenty-two per cent of Quebeckers would prefer to see senators elected and 43% want the Senate abolished. It is very clear. That is why we are saying that the Senate is not popular with the public.

Many participants, 20% in Quebec and 23% in the rest of Canada, chose not to respond because they did not understand the role of the Senate. This percentage increases to 31% for Canadians under 45. I think that these numbers speak for themselves. We can see there is no emotionally charged great debate on this bill. We see that here today. It just goes to show how archaic and irrelevant this institution is.

Senate reform can only be done with the agreement of Quebec and the provinces, and the Canadian Constitution is a federal constitution. I think that comes as no surprise to anyone.

Accordingly, there are reasons why changes affecting the essential characteristics of the Senate cannot be made unilaterally by Parliament and must instead be part of the constitutional process involving Quebec and the provinces.

I will conclude my speech after question period.

Constitution Act, 2010 (Senate Term Limits)Government Orders

April 29th, 2010 / 1:40 p.m.
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Bloc

Christian Ouellet Bloc Brome—Missisquoi, QC

Mr. Speaker, I appreciated the fact that my colleague from Vancouver Quadra wondered whether this would improve democracy. That is a very good question, and that is why I would ask her whether, now that the government has recognized the existence of the Quebec nation, but is refusing to act accordingly, she believes that Bill C-10 could lead to greater democracy and full recognition of Quebec as a nation.

She could perhaps talk about the famous peace march in Quebec. In her opinion, is this openness to the Quebec nation?

Constitution Act, 2010 (Senate Term Limits)Government Orders

April 29th, 2010 / 1:25 p.m.
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Liberal

Joyce Murray Liberal Vancouver Quadra, BC

“Only candidates elected by the people will be named to the upper house”, said the Prime Minister in 2004. “The upper house remains a dumping ground for the favoured cronies of the prime minister”, complained the current Prime Minister in 2004. “A Conservative government will not appoint to the Senate anyone who does not have a mandate from the people”, again from the Conservative Party.

Those are some of the claims that the Prime Minister has made, along with many other statements about the Senate that, unfortunately, have undermined the credibility of the Senate in the minds of the public.

What has the Prime Minister actually done, given those very clear assertions over many years that he would not be appointing senators and that there would not be partisan appointments? The Prime Minister appointed more senators in a single year than any prime minister in history. He appointed 27 senators. He is the Senate patronage king, and these have been some of the most blatant, partisan appointments in history.

We have seen well-connected party partisans throughout the Senate appointments, including fundraising chairs, national fundraising chairs, top strategists, Conservative staffers, Conservative communications advisers, failed candidates, Conservative-leaning journalists and so on. Essentially, we have an entire national election team for the Conservatives now on the Senate payroll. That is not even speaking to some of the questionable histories of senators, such as the one who is facing a sexual harassment complaint before a Human Rights Tribunal and who was president of an organization under investigation for financial impropriety.

How does this speak to the credibility of the Prime Minister's claims about improving democracy through his changes to the Senate? Not well, I would contend.

The objective claimed is to modernize democracy, which is a laudable objective.

I would like to talk a bit about some of the context that the government has on its record in terms of democracy. If we are to take improving democracy at face value, we would expect to see that as having been an objective with the government and the Prime Minister. I would contend that the facts do not suggest that is the case.

What about the fundamental underpinnings of democracy, such as openness, accountability and integrity? How has the Prime Minister fared?

In terms of openness, is the Prime Minister willing to hear from Canadians? I think a number of organizations would contest that willingness. In fact, organizations that disagree with the government are finding themselves punished. A member of one organization in civil society told me yesterday that there was a chill right across civil society because many organizations, such as the Canadian Council on Learning, KAIROS and Rights & Democracy, are seeing their funding cut for ideological reasons or because they are speaking up, which is what their organizations are designed to do.

In terms of openness, we have an Information Commissioner calling the government the most secretive in history. I have an example of that in a freedom of information request that I put forward around the disaster in a Canadian pavilion at the Olympics. I received two blanked out pages. Maybe that information was a state secret or a military secret but I do not think so.

In terms of openness, the government is preventing debate on critical issues by slipping key public policy changes into budget implementation bills, so that it does not have to debate on their merit. These are key issues, such as pay equity, the Canada Environmental Assessment Act and the protection of our environment. One must conclude that openness, that fundamental tenet of democracy, is not something that the government has promoted. In fact, it has seriously undermined it.

The same argument, unfortunately, needs to be made for accountability. The ruling by the Speaker the other day was an example. There are numerous other examples of accountability breaches by the Conservative government.

One of the key democratic mechanisms that we have as parliamentarians is the oversight officers of Parliament. The list of those oversight officers, or independent officers, whose job it is to ensure the integrity of government, who have been fired, sidelined, “resigned” early in their term or not reappointed, is very long. It includes the president of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Linda Keen; the environment commissioner, the president of the Law Commission of Canada, the head of the Canada Emission Reduction Incentives Agency, the Military Police Complaints Commissioner, the RCMP Public Complaints Commissioner; and the Federal Ombudsman for Victims of Crime.

The Liberal Party of Canada hosted a round table on that very issue during prorogation here in Ottawa. We heard from a range of constitutional experts and others as to the weakening of the fabric of democracy that takes place when the oversight officers are not able to speak their minds and are not able to speak the truth without fear of retribution. How does that illustrate the government's commitment to democracy? It actually illustrates the opposite.

I would remind all members of the words of Aristotle:

If liberty and equality, as is thought by some are chiefly to be found in democracy, they will be best attained when all persons alike share in the government to the utmost.

That is not what we have been seeing under the Conservative government. unfortunately.

This is relevant to Bill C-10 because there is a claim here that the government is trying to strengthen democracy.

The process by which Bill C-10 has come about is one that raises great questions. I will just provide a quick summary of the timeline.

Bill C-10 has several predecessors. In May 2006, Bill C-4 was introduced. It was recommended by the Senate to go to the Supreme Court of Canada on the constitutionality issues. The bill died when Parliament was prorogued in September 2007. This was followed by Bill C-19, which was tabled but never brought back for debate. It died in 2008 when an election was called just after the government passed a fixed election date law.

In May 2009, Bill S-7 came back to the House with the same eight year term limits. It was debated for three days only and then it died when the Prime Minister prorogued the House in January 2010 to avoid accountability with respect to questions on the Afghan detainee issue.

The bill has come back a fourth time as Bill C-10, with some minor modifications. One must question whether this is actually a serious attempt to improve democracy or whether it is posturing by the government. Whatever it might be, one must conclude that this process does not create confidence in the government's intentions with respect to this bill.

Let us look at the content of the bill itself. The Minister of State for Democratic Reform spoke to this issue briefly. A key legal issue to this is whether it is constitutional. The minister of state claims that there is a consensus that it is. The reading that I have done shows that the very serious question of constitutionality has not been resolved and unilateral action by Parliament to amend the Senate in this type of case should be referred to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The legal issue is around the upper house reference case of 1980 in which the Supreme Court of Canada decided that amendments affecting the essential characteristics or fundamental features of the Senate must have provincial involvement. Despite the amending procedures in the Constitution Act of 1982, this judgment continues to have relevance, according to many constitutional authorities.

Then the question is, does this bill affect the essential characteristics or fundamental features of the Senate. Of the two principles, one is experienced oversight, that is, both of legislation and complex societal issues, and two, independence. Let us consider how this bill might affect these essential characteristics.

I ask members to think back to eight years ago in their own lives and ask themselves whether they have mastered something to the point where they would be capable of sober, credible oversight for all Canadians on the issue. Eight years may seem like a long time, but it does not enable a person to provide the kind of input that our senators, whom I am very proud of, are able to provide. Aboriginal elders, for example, are the wisdom of their communities. Are they cut off after eight years as no longer being relevant? No.

Independence is clearly impacted by an eight-year term because in two terms a prime minister can turn over the entire membership of the Senate, which would clearly impact its independence. We could have a Senate consisting of one party or another. As Benjamin Franklin said, democracy must be something more than two wolves and a sheep voting on what to have for dinner. That seems to be what Mr. Harper is aiming for in the Senate with this bill.

Constitution Act, 2010 (Senate Term Limits)Government Orders

April 29th, 2010 / 1:15 p.m.
See context

Liberal

Joyce Murray Liberal Vancouver Quadra, BC

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to join the debate on Bill C-10, An Act to amend the Constitution Act, 1867 (Senate term limits). As the Minister of State for Democratic Reform has said, this limits the tenure of senators appointed after the bill becomes law to one non-renewable eight year term, preserves the existing retirement age of 75 for current senators, and allows a senator whose term has been interrupted to return to the Senate and complete his or her term.

It is a privilege to speak to this because the Senate is an essential component of Canada's constitutional democracy and of course it is of interest to all members both in the House and the Senate. We are here because we have a commitment to improving our country and improving the lives of the people through the democratic institutions of which we are privileged to be a part.

I would like to also say that this issue is of great interest to constituents of my riding in Vancouver Quadra. I have the privilege to represent an area with a highly educated public and the great institution of UBC, so there are many people who are lawyers, constitutional lawyers, professors of public policy, and professors of political science who have a great deal of interest in our democratic institutions.

One of the town halls I hosted that was the most popular was called the “town hall on prorogation and democracy” where Doctors Resnick and Young came and talked about prorogation and the negative impact on democracy that they believed that the government's use of prorogation has had.

The Liberal Party has a deep, and long interest and commitment in democracy, engaging people and having an openness where people of Canada can have their say and be part of our democratic process. Winston Churchill has been know to say that “--democracy is the worst form of government - except all the other forms that have been tried from time to time”. Plato has a different view. His is that “Democracy is a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequal alike”.

The Liberals have found over the last four years that it is the justice to the unequals that has been the most problematic under the current government and its undermining of democracy. But on a positive note, we just had a very good day for democracy recently. I want to refer to the minister of state's note that eight year term limits are needed to refresh and bring new ideas.

I would like to point out that I have a colleague from Scarborough—Rouge River who has been in this chamber for over 20 years and here is the result of his recent fresh new idea. It was a historic ruling by the Speaker that the Prime Minister was accountable to Parliament and not the other way around. The Speaker affirmed that Parliament has a fundamental and unlimited right to ask for Afghan records, that the Conservative Party appeared to be in breach of parliamentary privilege by failing to comply when opposition MPs, a majority in the House, voted to demand uncensored copies of the documents last September.

So we see that our democracy is alive and well; however, I think it should be an embarrassment for all the Conservative members that the opposition members had to go to so much trouble to have the basic tenets of democracy respected by the Prime Minister.

I want to talk about the important role the Senate plays in our democracy. It is an institution with a very proud history and an institution in which the members have done much good work over the years. For example, Senator Eggleton reporting on poverty, homelessness and housing, the work done by the standing committee; Senator Carstairs, the Senate report on Canada's aging population, very important work on understanding the demographics facing us and how to respond to them; Senator Fraser on children, the silent citizens; Hon. Mobina Jaffer and the Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights on issues such as Canada's human rights record and reports on equitable pay. The Senate serves a very important function.

The Liberals are committed to a Senate in which the members can make the maximum possible contribution to public life and the public good in Canada. The Liberals do support Senate reform but it needs to be Senate reform that constitutes sound public policy and respect for the institution. It needs to be a holistic and not a piecemeal approach. There needs to be consultation with the provinces and, above all, respect for the Constitution. Those are things we have not been seeing with the current government.

The Liberals will be sending the bill to committee where public consultation with the provinces, which the government has consistently failed to do, can finally take place.

With respect to Bill C-10, with the stated intention of enabling the Senate to better reflect the democratic values of Canadians, it is important to talk about the government's objective and its credibility with that objective, and to talk about the process that has been behind the bill coming forward. I will then say some words on the content of the bill as well.

The credibility of the government is essential in trusting the intentions of this legislation. For example, in a conflict zone, if an organization were to come forward with an idea for peace, one would want to know its record of promoting peace or perhaps of undermining peace in the past, and that would be germane to taking what it has to offer at face value.

We should listen for a moment to what the Prime Minister had to say about the Senate. In 1996, he said, “We do not support any Senate appointments. Stephen Harper will cease patronage appointments to the Senate. Only candidates--”.

Constitution Act, 2010 (Senate Term Limits)Government Orders

April 29th, 2010 / 1 p.m.
See context

Charleswood—St. James—Assiniboia Manitoba

Conservative

Steven Fletcher ConservativeMinister of State (Democratic Reform)

moved that Bill C-10, An Act to amend the Constitution Act, 1867 (Senate term limits), be read the second time and referred to a committee.

Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure to speak today and bring forward this historic piece of legislation. Bill C-10 deals with the Constitution Act and 2010 Senate term limits. Term limits are an important component of our government's broader objective of modernizing Canada's Senate. As the throne speech stated, “We are a country founded on democracy”. However, our democratic institutions were established in the 19th century and reflect the prevailing democratic standards of the time.

Canadians' views of democracy have evolved since 1867, and we must ensure that our institutions keep pace with those changes. An obvious example of democratic evolution is in our voting rights. Today, we take the principle of universal suffrage for granted, but that has not always been the case. At the time of Confederation, qualifications based on property and income prevented large segments of the population from voting. Women did not have complete voting rights until 1918, and only recently did we celebrate the 50th anniversary of a law that recognized the unconditional right of first nations to vote.

I use the example of voting rights to demonstrate how our democratic institutions and practices have evolved to reflect the modern principles of democracy. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the Senate, which still reflects antiquated principles of the 19th century. Over the past 143 years, there has been only one change to the Senate. In 1965, mandatory retirement at age 75 was introduced for senators. Prior to that, senators had been appointed for life. There have been no meaningful Senate reforms in our country's history, bar that one.

Canadians overwhelmingly believe that reform is overdue. According to a recent Angus Reid poll, 73% of Canadians want a new approach to the Senate. Our government made Senate reform a priority in the March 3, 2010, Speech from the Throne. It said:

Our shared values and experiences must be reflected in our national institutions, starting with Parliament.... Our Government...remains committed to Senate reform and will continue to pursue measures to make the upper chamber more democratic, effective and accountable.

That eloquent comment articulates why this reform is so important. Our government has been clear. Fundamental change is required to transform the Senate into a democratic and accountable institution. However, we recognize that there is insufficient support for fundamental constitutional change today. Instead, we are pursuing a practical, step-by-step approach to reform in areas where reform is possible within the federal jurisdiction. We hope this will ultimately build support for fundamental changes in the future.

Bill C-10 seeks to amend section 29 of the Constitution Act, 1867, to provide that new senators would be limited to a single term of eight years. This is an important first step to moving forward in fulfilling our commitment to Canadians to strengthen our democratic institutions. Limiting the tenure of senators is a modest but important step to making the Senate worthy of a 21st century democracy.

Our government hopes that parliamentarians will embrace this initiative and the overall reforms that are needed to modernize the Senate. In the past 30 years, there have been reports calling for major reform in the Senate. However, I am not aware of a single major study of the Senate that concluded that everything is fine and that no change is required.

Quite the contrary. While each study offered a unique alternative to Senate reform, the consensus is that the Senate suffers from a lack of credibility because its members do not have a democratic mandate from Canadians.

The undemocratic nature of the Senate is exacerbated by the fact that senators can remain in office for up to 45 years. That is right, 45 years. As the Prime Minister has pointed out on several occasions, the fact that unelected senators can keep their seats for such a lengthy period of time is at odds with the democratic ideals of Canadians.

It is not surprising that many studies have recommended limiting Senate terms. While the recommended lengths of term have varied, the general range appears to be between six and ten years.

Our government believes that a term limit of eight years strikes the right balance between ensuring that the essential character of the Senate remains intact and, at the same time, guaranteeing that renewal takes place. Fixed terms of eight years would provide senators with enough time to gain the necessary experience to carry out their important parliamentary functions while, at the same time, rejuvenating the Senate with new perspectives and ideas on a regular basis.

Our government believes that a renewed Senate would be a more effective Senate.

The vast majority of second chambers in other countries, both elected and appointed, have term limits. If Canada were to implement a Senate term of eight years, it would be the longest term of any country that currently has term limits in its second chamber.

I welcomed the recent comments of the Leader of the Opposition when he agreed that very lengthy terms are unacceptable and he favours term limits. While admitting that the Senate is “imperfect”, the Liberal leader stated he is “uncomfortable” with the idea of lengthy Senate terms. The Liberal leader has indicated he would support a 12-year limit for senators.

Let us reflect on that.

Clearly, the 15-year term recommended by the Liberal senators is too long. A 15-year term would not ensure that the Senate is refreshed with new ideas on a regular basis.

Whether a 12-year term would be sufficient is open to debate.

What is encouraging is the common belief that term limits are the right thing to do. I believe it is our duty as parliamentarians to listen to Canadians and move forward on this issue.

Now I would like to review other key aspects of the bill.

Bill C-10 makes specific reference to interrupted terms. An interrupted term could occur if a senator's seat became vacant by reason of resignation or disqualification, as set out in sections 30 and 31 of the Constitution Act, 1867, prior to the completion of an eight-year term.

The bill would provide that senators whose terms are interrupted may be summoned again to the Senate, but only for the remaining portion of their original eight-year term. For example, if a senator resigned from the Senate in order to be a candidate for the House of Commons, that senator could later be reappointed to the Senate, but only for the remaining portion of his or her term. This would eliminate any ambiguity about the length of term should such interruptions occur.

Unlike the previous version of the term limits bill, Bill C-10 contains a transitional provision, which would apply the eight-year term limit to all senators appointed after October 14, 2008. They would hold their seats for a period of eight years, once the bill received royal assent.

The transition clause demonstrates the commitment of our government and the commitment of our new senators to honour the principles of the Senate term limits once the legislation is passed. I would like to congratulate those newly appointed senators for putting the country's interests ahead of their own interests. That, I think, embodies the spirit of our Senate reform ideals.

The Senate term limits bill was first introduced in the spring of 2006. Members may recall that the Prime Minister became the first prime minister ever to appear before a Senate committee when he appeared before the Special Senate Committee on Senate Reform, which was created to study the content of that bill. The Prime Minister's appearance before the Senate committee illustrated the importance of Senate term limits for our government.

One of the important messages the Prime Minister delivered in his testimony was that our government was willing to be flexible with regard to potential improvements to the bill so long as any changes did not diminish the principles of the bill. That flexibility is evident in our response to the issue of the renewability of the terms.

As members will recall, in 2006 the bill was silent on the issue of renewability. That bill left open the possibility that a senator could receive a further eight year term if summoned again by the Governor General.

Some commentators expressed the concern that the possibility of a renewable term could compromise the independence of the Senate, since senators might adjust their behaviour in order to have their appointments renewed. The government has demonstrated its willingness to compromise by amending the bill to provide for non-renewable terms.

We are willing to listen and work together to ensure that the Senate is reformed in a respectful fashion. Our government's willingness to listen has also been demonstrated by preserving the retirement age of 75 years for all senators, whether appointed before or after this bill comes into effect. The amendment was recommended by the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee following the review of our previous bill.

Our government continues to be flexible in making improvements to the bill so long as its underlying principles remain intact.

I would like to conclude by briefly addressing the issue of the constitutionality of Bill C-10. There is no question that the bill is constitutional. Senate term limits can be enacted by Parliament pursuant to section 44 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

This fact was confirmed by the Special Senate Committee on Senate Reform, which concluded that the bill was constitutional and no reference to the Supreme Court was required. This finding has been supported by Canada's leading constitutional experts, including Peter Hogg, Patrick Monahan and Stephen Scott.

Despite the overwhelming evidence of the bill's constitutionality, the Senate defeated the bill by refusing to allow it to proceed to third reading unless it was first referred to the Supreme Court of Canada.

I trust that members of this House will judge the bill on its merits and not attempt to derail it with procedural tricks, frivolous or unsubstantiated charges about constitutionality.

Hon. members, it is time for parliamentarians to listen to Canadians and embrace reform of the Upper Chamber. Canadians understand the need for Senate reform. Every poll over the past two decades has confirmed that Canadians support Senate reform. Canadians particularly support limited terms for senators. Canadians recognize the importance of the Senate, but they do not believe it is fulfilling its full potential as a democratic institution.

Our government has listened to Canadians. We have made Senate reform one of our key democratic priorities. We can no longer tolerate an institution that has remained unchanged since Confederation and that is neither democratic nor accountable to the people of Canada.

A Senate based on 19th century norms cannot possibly meet the needs of a modern 21st century democracy. Our government is committed to the pursuit of practical and achievable reforms that will lay the basis for more fundamental reform in the future.

Bill C-10 is an important step forward in the reform of our institutions. I would encourage all members to embrace this important bill.

Senators who have been appointed since the 2008 election have demonstrated their commitment to Senate reform by agreeing to term limits, supporting legislation from the elected chamber, and supporting the overall reforms we are trying to institute in the Senate. These senators, as I said earlier, personify what it means to be in public office. They are putting the country's interests ahead of their own.

Together, I hope we can make Parliament more accountable to Canadians. Senate reform is a critical aspect of that. Canadians support Senate term limits and this government is moving forward with that reform. I look forward to all parties supporting this historic legislation to make for a better Canada and a better Parliament.

God keep our land glorious and free.

Business of the HouseOral Questions

April 22nd, 2010 / 3 p.m.
See context

Prince George—Peace River B.C.

Conservative

Jay Hill ConservativeLeader of the Government in the House of Commons

Mr. Speaker, as my hon. colleague has indicated, I know we have some visitors who we are looking forward to seeing in the chamber shortly, so I will keep this brief as well.

When we get to government orders, following the visit, I will call Bill C-4, Sébastien's law, which proposes to protect the public from violent young offenders. Following Bill C-4, we will call Bill C-13, fairness for military families.

We will continue with that business tomorrow.

Next week it would be my intention to begin second reading debate on Bill C-11, the balanced refugee reform act, Bill C-10, Senate term limits and Bill C-12, democratic representation.

Next Wednesday, April 28, shall be an allotted day.

As for the take note debate, that is under advisement.

Constitution Act, 2010 (Senate term limits)Routine Proceedings

March 29th, 2010 / 3 p.m.
See context

Charleswood—St. James—Assiniboia Manitoba

Conservative

Steven Fletcher ConservativeMinister of State (Democratic Reform)

moved for leave to introduce Bill C-10, An Act to amend the Constitution Act, 1867 (Senate term limits).

(Motions deemed adopted, bill read the first time and printed)