Bill C-51 (Historical)

Anti-terrorism Act, 2015

An Act to enact the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act and the Secure Air Travel Act, to amend the Criminal Code, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and to make related and consequential amendments to other Acts

Part 1 enacts the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, which authorizes Government of Canada institutions to disclose information to Government of Canada institutions that have jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada. It also makes related amendments to other Acts.
Part 2 enacts the Secure Air Travel Act in order to provide a new legislative framework for identifying and responding to persons who may engage in an act that poses a threat to transportation security or who may travel by air for the purpose of committing a terrorism offence. That Act authorizes the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to establish a list of such persons and to direct air carriers to take a specific action to prevent the commission of such acts. In addition, that Act establishes powers and prohibitions governing the collection, use and disclosure of information in support of its administration and enforcement. That Act includes an administrative recourse process for listed persons who have been denied transportation in accordance with a direction from the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and provides appeal procedures for persons affected by any decision or action taken under that Act. That Act also specifies punishment for contraventions of listed provisions and authorizes the Minister of Transport to conduct inspections and issue compliance orders. Finally, this Part makes consequential amendments to the Aeronautics Act and the Canada Evidence Act.
Part 3 amends the Criminal Code to, with respect to recognizances to keep the peace relating to a terrorist activity or a terrorism offence, extend their duration, provide for new thresholds, authorize a judge to impose sureties and require a judge to consider whether it is desirable to include in a recognizance conditions regarding passports and specified geographic areas. With respect to all recognizances to keep the peace, the amendments also allow hearings to be conducted by video conference and orders to be transferred to a judge in a territorial division other than the one in which the order was made and increase the maximum sentences for breach of those recognizances.
It further amends the Criminal Code to provide for an offence of knowingly advocating or promoting the commission of terrorism offences in general. It also provides a judge with the power to order the seizure of terrorist propaganda or, if the propaganda is in electronic form, to order the deletion of the propaganda from a computer system.
Finally, it amends the Criminal Code to provide for the increased protection of witnesses, in particular of persons who play a role in respect of proceedings involving security information or criminal intelligence information, and makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 4 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to permit the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to take, within and outside Canada, measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada, including measures that are authorized by the Federal Court. It authorizes the Federal Court to make an assistance order to give effect to a warrant issued under that Act. It also creates new reporting requirements for the Service and requires the Security Intelligence Review Committee to review the Service’s performance in taking measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada.
Part 5 amends Divisions 8 and 9 of Part 1 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to, among other things,
(a) define obligations related to the provision of information in proceedings under that Division 9;
(b) authorize the judge, on the request of the Minister, to exempt the Minister from providing the special advocate with certain relevant information that has not been filed with the Federal Court, if the judge is satisfied that the information does not enable the person named in a certificate to be reasonably informed of the case made by the Minister, and authorize the judge to ask the special advocate to make submissions with respect to the exemption; and
(c) allow the Minister to appeal, or to apply for judicial review of, any decision requiring the disclosure of information or other evidence if, in the Minister’s opinion, the disclosure would be injurious to national security or endanger the safety of any person.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act

[Ali Ehsassi, Liberal, Willowdale, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is an honour to once again rise in the House to discuss Bill C-22, an act to establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain acts.

We on this side of the House pride ourselves in avoiding easy absolutes and rejecting simple binaries and false dichotomies. The question before us today is not, as some would have us believe, whether we need to prioritize our security on the one hand, or our cherished values on the other hand. Rather, the question before us is quite simple: Is our national security regime working effectively and in a manner that is consistent with Canadian law and values?

Simultaneously balancing these twin objectives, keeping Canadians safe while also respecting and safeguarding our rights and freedoms, are among the most fundamental duties that a government can perform. However, currently that duty does not contain an element of committee oversight, a glaring weakness which puts Canada at odds with accepted international best practices. To that end, in this legislation, we are confident that we have developed a model for robust and comprehensive parliamentary reviews, one that will help build the trust of Canadians in our national security and intelligence activities.

The establishment of the national security and intelligence committee represents the realization of a key 2015 campaign promise. However, I want to stress that it is by no means the only action we are taking to strengthen Canada's national security framework.

First and foremost, we recognize that when it comes to an issue that is fundamental to who we are as a country, it is important that the will of Canadians is reflected as much as possible. As a result, our government has engaged in an unprecedented series of consultations with experts, stakeholders, parliamentarians of all parties, and individual Canadians on issues of national security and civil liberties. These consultations remain ongoing, and as such ensure that our approach to national security remains rooted in meaningful conversation and dialogue.

Second, our government remains committed to addressing the more problematic elements of Bill C-51, as introduced by the former government. Specifically, and largely as a result of the aforementioned public consultations, we remain committed to amending Bill C-51 so as to better protect the right to advocate and protest, and to better define rules regarding terrorist propaganda.

Third, the ever-evolving nature of security threats, as well as the clear need to remain vigilant in defending civil liberties, require that any national security framework not be set in stone. As such, our government has committed to mandating statutory review of national security legislation.

Fourth, our government remains committed to fighting violent extremism in all forms. The recent rise in domestic hate speech and hate crimes, for example, has served as a poignant reminder of the need for vigilance and community outreach to combat domestic violence. The goal here is to coordinate the efforts being undertaken at multiple levels to further enhance our capacity to prevent radicalization and violence, and ultimately make Canada a global leader in this field.

Bill C-22 fits within this pattern of strengthening and modernizing our national security laws and policies. As members have already heard, this bill would establish the national security and intelligence committee, a body comprised of parliamentarians from across parties, to scrutinize all of the national security and intelligence operations of the Government of Canada. Given that there are more than 20 departments and agencies within the Government of Canada that carry out national security-related functions, it cannot be overstated how important this initiative actually is.

The current system of security oversight, such as it currently exists, remains highly fragmented, with non-partisan review bodies, judicial oversight, and ministerial discretion all playing vital oversight roles. While these existing mechanisms will remain independent, untouched, and in place, the creation of a permanent committee will allow for a more comprehensive and reactive security oversight framework. As such, the committee's mandate will be necessarily wide ranging. It will look at not only the legislative, regulatory, administrative, and financial aspects of national security and intelligence, but also the operations and activities that departments and agencies of the federal government undertake in the name of national security.

To carry out this vital role, committee members would be given broad access to classified information with appropriate safeguards and exceptions, as well as leeway to examine matters they deem worthy of examination. Importantly, Bill C-22 would allow the committee to analyze and study laws, policies, and operations in real time, increasing the discipline, responsiveness, and accountability of our security framework. With the establishment of this committee, we would close what has amounted to an important accountability gap, one that has existed in Canada for far too long. It would also allow Canada to at long last count itself among its Five Eyes partners and other western countries that have long had parliamentary review of national security and intelligence activities. Clearly, this represents an extraordinary responsibility, and as a result would require checks and balances. I believe that the safeguards embedded in Bill C-22 strike this balance.

Furthermore, I believe that an already strong piece of legislation has been generally strengthened by the exemplary work done at the committee stage. It is important to reiterate that the government has accepted the vast majority of amendments put forward by the public safety committee. In particular, members will recall that the second reading version of the bill said that the new committee could not have access to information about ongoing defence intelligence activities, privileged information under the Investment Canada Act, and certain information collected by the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada. The public safety committee, wisely in my opinion, recommended amendments giving the new committee access to this information. The bill is stronger as a result, and I would like to thank the committee members and expert witnesses for all their hard work.

I also believe that this legislation has been strengthened by the additional report stage amendments introduced by the government House leader. In particular, by further amending clause 14 of the bill, the government has reinstalled important safeguards designed to protect vulnerable intelligence sources and reduce the risk of political interference in security operations. Finally, the restoration of clause 16 of Bill C-22 would realign Canada's security framework with similar provisions in place among our Five Eyes allies.

Let me end my remarks by getting back to where I started. It is vital that this esteemed institution has a clearer view into the national security and intelligence functions of the federal government. By establishing the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians, we would finally open that window, and we would do it responsibly. This initiative would serve Canadians and our democracy well. I therefore call on all members for their support tonight.

Report Stage

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Madam Speaker, normally I would say that I am pleased to rise in the House to take part in the debate on Bill C-22, a bill that the NDP supported at second reading. However, under the circumstances, with the rejection of most of the changes that were made in committee, contrary to what the minister claims, and only one hour after the adoption of a time allocation motion, I am far from pleased to take part in the debate on this matter.

Bill C-22 is important, especially for the Liberals, considering it is central to the intellectual backflips they have been doing for three years now to justify their support for Bill C-51, passed in the last Parliament under the Stephen Harper government. The Liberal government has been in power for almost a year and a half now and we have barely completed this stage. It is worth mentioning, even if this is an issue for another debate on another day, that there is still no legislative measure on the table to right the wrongs created by Bill C-51 regarding rights and freedoms.

That said, this is still a very important matter. Since Bill C-51 was passed and, I would venture to say, even before, many commissions of inquiry have been formed after various incidents in connection with the work of national security agencies. There is one very clear finding: Canadians have lost a great deal of confidence in our national security agencies. This issue obviously affects our rights and freedoms, as well as our privacy, given the rapid advances in technology. However, this is also a matter of national security because, after all, if the public has no confidence in its agencies, it is difficult for them to do their work effectively and appropriately.

In principle, Bill C-22 is a good first step, and I can say that the minister is right about that. It is something that we should have had for a very long time. That said, very serious problems with the bill were raised in committee. A number of amendments would have gone a long way—even though they would not have made the bill perfect—to at least allowing parliamentarians to do their work better and to start off on the right foot.

We can see that, and we have often heard the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons come back to one point. They say that this is new for Canada, that other countries have had more time to learn, and that we have to give ourselves some time. We are already some way ahead compared to other countries, but there is a problem. For example, look at how the chair of the committee is elected. In Great Britain, the committee chair is not only elected, but he is also an opposition member. As justification for not electing the committee chair, we are told that, in Great Britain, the committee has existed for a number of years now and that they decided to make changes only after a certain period of learning and becoming used to it. Here, clearly, as we have just heard, the minister is relying on a legislative review that will take place in five years.

However, why not apply now what we learned from our allies? Why relearn the lessons of the past? I have a theory, without wanting to spread conspiracy theories. When this nice job, which comes with a salary on top of an MP's salary, is announced a year in advance, it is difficult for the Prime Minister to break his promise to the Liberal member who had the good fortune to secure this great position. Therefore, I would say that this is why we were not listening to the opposition amendments or the testimony of the chair of the British committee who offered this extremely important point for the credibility of the committee. All the technical issues on the form could be addressed, but credibility is also very important, to get back to the point I made at the outset, which is the public trust in our national security agencies.

It is not just me saying this. I want to come back to the column in The Globe and Mail, co-written by professors Wesley Wark, Kent Roach and Craig Forcese, professors the minister likes to quote to talk about the importance of this first step that has been completed. In speaking of the amendments passed in committee, they said:

Should the government choose to force a return to the restrictive original bill, it risks potentially undermining a new and historic Parliamentary ability that it has enthusiastically championed. Failure to reach agreement with Parliament

—not the Liberal caucus, but Parliament—

on this issue also imperils non-partisan support for future national-security reforms and changes to other elements of the review system for national security.

When we hear that and with the majority of the amendments having been thrown out and a time allocation motion having been thrown in to boot, it is difficult to see a path forward that would allow the committee to have that credibility and non-partisan environment it so desperately needs. The committee needs that not only to do its work, but also--as I said, and it is worth repeating--in order to gain the public's trust so the public can begin trusting the work that is being done by the national security agencies. This is a key element, and the government is clearly failing on that front.

I want to come back to the two examples I mentioned in the questions I have asked the government since the debate began this morning, specifically regarding the time allocation motion and the bill itself. The issue of ongoing investigations has often been raised. That is one of the restrictions we tried to lift through our amendments.

Indeed, the two most striking examples of investigations into human rights violations that are worthy of examination by a body such as the one this bill proposes are the Air India inquiry and the Afghan detainees investigation.

These are still open investigations, so technically, they are still ongoing. Under this bill, however, the committee of parliamentarians will not have the authority or the power to gather intelligence or conduct investigations. Thus, various pieces of information revealed in the media recently and many questions raised in the House for many years now could never have been raised. That is problematic, because it undermines the committee's mandate.

Once again, this brings us to the public's confidence in the committee and its work, and by extension, in the work of our national security agencies. That is the theme of my speech, as members will soon see.

When the government talks about some of the other issues that we raised in committee, it is important to note that for us, one point that has been clear is the restriction on access to information and the obvious solution is to limit it to cabinet confidence. With respect to everything else, we have to trust these parliamentarians, and the minister alluded to that issue. These parliamentarians will be sworn to secrecy and could potentially face jail time if any of this information is leaked.

The government's approach seems to be one of not trusting the parliamentarians who will sit on this committee and who will literally never be able to talk about any national security issues in the public space. When the government House leader or the Minister of Public Safety stand and tell us not to worry because the committee can use the bully pulpit if ever it feels it is unable to do its work behind closed doors, that is just not true. It is critical for Canadians to understand that.

Moreover, we talk about compromise and the importance of this being a non-partisan process. We hear the government say, “Well, the NDP proposed 13 amendments. The Liberals proposed 16. The Bloc proposed nine. The Green Party proposed two. We adopted two of those amendments so we are in the clear and everything is all right.” It is critical that the government look at the broader picture and the public trust.

I move, seconded by the member for Jonquière:

That Motion No. 3 be amended by deleting paragraph (a).

Bill C-22--Time Allocation Motion

[Marjolaine Boutin-Sweet, NDP, Hochelaga, QC]

Madam Speaker, first I hear that there had been no impasse in committee. Then I learn the all of the committee's recommendations were rejected. The report was not accepted as my colleague said.

The Liberals promised during the election campaign that they would lessen the negative effects of Bill C-51. They had also promised more transparency. However, in addition to gutting the bill, they are imposing time allocation. They are trying to sweep everything under the rug and make the issue disappear as quickly as possible. Twice, the people were let down. We call that a double whammy. It is very disappointing to Canadians.

How can Canadians trust a government that breaks so many promises? It is no surprise that people are so cynical about politicians.

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Madam Speaker, I join with my colleague from the Conservative Party, the official opposition, in registering serious concern about the government's actions today.

The experts we have talked to on security and intelligence issues are frustrated by the fact that these amendments, done at the last moment at report stage, weaken the oversight that is available. That we would proceed with only government support for such a critical initiative on national security and intelligence is a matter that should disappoint all Canadians. This is the government's sole response to the controversial Bill C-51, which the Liberal government, while in opposition, supported. They agree that these amendments would weaken the job parliamentarians would be asked to do.

Why is the government not willing to allow time for all parties to try to seek consensus on this bill? My colleagues and I are standing ready to work with the hon. House leader and with these experts. Why is the government refusing to work with us?

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act

[Adam Vaughan, Liberal, Spadina—Fort York, ON]

Mr. Speaker, this is not the first time that I have faced this line of questioning from the New Democrats, so I have a prepared answer for this.

First of all, Bill C-51 did a few things right. The modification to the no-fly list to prevent people from getting on airplanes, as opposed to simply stopping hijacking situations, was a very important transition that needed to be understood. We no longer had a no-fly list that dealt with what might happen on an airplane, but what might happen when the airplane landed and people deployed into other countries. We should not be exporting fighters into foreign wars where national interests and national security are quite clearly at stake. We need to manage that differently, and that is what some of the changes in Bill C-51 did.

There were a number of small changes like that. Expanding preventative detention by a number of days was prudent in light of the complexity of the way that attacks were materializing. It required a different thinking and approach to how we use preventative detention. That is not unlike the way in which some Criminal Code provisions in this country already operate. It simply was extended to areas of terrorism and national security. Those were some of the fine points that we found needed to be strengthened as we started to embark upon changes to Bill C-51. We thought they were quite clearly important.

This is the third time that this Parliament has tried to deal with civilian oversight of our security agencies. The NDP has never once supported civilian oversight when it has been on the floor for a vote.

My question to the NDP is this. How do you protect democracy without civilian oversight? Why has that party historically voted against every single proposition put forward by this party in this House when the opportunity has arisen? Why will the New Democrats not strengthen it incrementally? Why do they leave it in the hands of experts instead of the public, where it should be if we are to have true civilian oversight?

[Pierre-Luc Dusseault, NDP, Sherbrooke, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his contribution to the debate.

Bill C-22 is meant to be a direct response to Bill C-51. In fact, when we were debating Bill C-51, my Liberal colleagues often brought up this issue. They said that we needed to ensure some kind of parliamentary oversight of Canada's intelligence organizations. However, they went ahead and supported Bill C-51 anyway, even though the Conservative bill included no such measures.

Why did the Liberals support that bill in the first place, and why did they trust the Conservatives or the next government to fix the part of the legislation that deals with parliamentary oversight?

[Adam Vaughan, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Families]

Mr. Speaker, it is an honour to be able to speak to this extraordinarily important piece of legislation. Before I reference parts of the bill, I would like to provide a bit of background as to where my perspective emanates from. I was a member of Toronto City Council on the Police Services Board, and in particular on the Police Services Board during the G20 summit when elected officials were presented with information that they could not share with their constituents, despite the fact that they were on the board precisely because they represented constituents. It was a very trying period to provide oversight to an important police body and an important security operation. They had no capacity to talk to those in charge of the operation because it was nestled in the Ontario Provincial Police at the time, not at the City of Toronto as many think it was. At the same time they could not relate back to their constituents the steps they were taking to protect their civil rights and make sure that their rights to political protest as well as access even to their homes were going to be guaranteed.

Therefore, civilian oversight is at the heart of any democracy and is at the heart of any responsible approach to public safety, let alone intelligence and security measures that we are now embarking upon, which when Parliament was conceived were not really perceived as being part of the responsibility of Parliament but rather the executive branch and others in society. As Parliament has evolved over the last few centuries, we have been evolving the practice of stronger and stronger civilian oversight, in particular around public accountability for the way in which our police and security agencies operate. We have also developed, expanded, and layered our security and our police bodies as we have taken on more and more complex matters. Society has changed and we have become more cognizant of the realities that we have to encounter. As a result, there is not a single police operation that Parliament oversees but rather close to 17, 18, or 19. We could even include border security now in that, which we need to explore as dynamics change in an ever-evolving world.

Into this mix, we have had over the last decade, even the last 20 years I would argue, significant powers invested into our security agencies. What has not kept pace is an oversight body that is as complex and as far reaching as those agencies now are. When the RCMP was originally looked at as a security force way back when, 100-plus years ago, there was no need to think of it as a spy agency dealing with foreign interventions coming into this country. It was a completely different colonial period of time when it was conceived.

CSIS flew straight out of the inadequacies both in the regulation and the oversight of the RCMP, when that was discovered in the 1970s. When CSIS was established, a whole new chapter of security agencies was brought to bear in terms of the way in which this country and this Parliament prosecuted public safety. However, the rules and regulations that were brought in for CSIS were not applied to other elements of the government. We get into electronic surveillance, intelligence sharing with our allies, and the complexities that technology has brought to this issue. It is clear that it is time for a revisit as to how we provide civilian oversight, as I said the corner of democracy, to make sure that we are protecting both people's public safety and their private safety as well as their civil liberties and society's civil liberties. That is the challenge that we are trying to address with the bill in front of us.

Over the last decade in particular, the powers invested in our security agencies have been strengthened, but the powers of oversight have not. What this Bill C-22 seeks to do is strengthen those oversights. One of the most important components of this bill is that the committee would be struck in a way that it would report directly to Parliament. I know the opposition has talked about it going through the executive branch because the Privy Council Office and the Prime Minister's Office, in particular, have the ability to screen it to make sure that the reports that have been tabled in public do not compromise public safety. That is a prudent measure, it is not a political measure. It is a measure that has been put in place in particular to keep sensitive information away from public eyes, not to stop the work of the committee or the advice that the committee would give Parliament as it relates to public safety. That is a critical distinction to make. All redactions and all screenings would have to be justified in writing both to the committee and to Parliament and would have to be understood as such, as being filters that do not preclude activity or preclude areas of examination but rather make sure that the reporting of those activities is done in the safest way possible to protect our public safety environment.

The other thing that is critically important here is there has been criticism that it would not be a parliamentary committee but rather a committee of parliamentarians. The language there might sound very familiar, just a set of words reordered, but a committee of parliamentarians means that it would include the Senate.

Again, I think this is a critical piece of evolution. It would allow us to sit down with both chambers, both of which have carriage of public safety in this country, to make sure that real information and sensitive information are delivered in real time to both bodies, so that both bodies can make quick decisions when quick decisions are needed. What we know from the ever-evolving situation globally and internally in this country is that quick decisions are part of what of what we have to accommodate as we move through accountability practices in this country.

The other issue which I think is critically important is that the government would not have a majority on this committee. Let that be said again. It would be a committee of parliamentarians where government would not have a majority. This means that the activities, the advice, the description, and the publication of what is being done is constituted by a majority of parliamentarians who are outside of government, let alone outside of the executive branch. In other words, if the belief of some members of Parliaments is that civil liberties or public safety in the areas of inquiry are being frustrated by the government, they would have the ability, as a majority committee, to make a committee report to that effect and bring public pressure. That is the best form of accountability to bring to bear on the activities of this committee.

The other thing which I think is critically important to understand, as well, is that currently there are silos in which the different security agencies operate, and with the accountability officers for those different security agencies, all 17 to 19, depending on one's view of the configuration of the list, that is not shared in real time. The information among those organizations is shared in real time, but the accountability is not conducted in a coordinated, overreaching, and overarching method. What this committee would achieve is to bring that together under one accountability model. It would measure the relationships between these two organizations, or several different organizations, and make sure that the information that is being shared, the practices that are being pursued, the behaviour of these agencies, are consistent across all of government as we move to protect both civil liberties and the public's right to public safety.

These issues allow us to broaden the access of parliamentarians to security, and sensitive information and sensitive operations. Instead of just being housed inside the executive branch now, it is housed inside the Parliament of Canada. That, again, is a critically important development. It is one that fulfills our mandate and our promise to the electorate that sent us here to make sure that we strengthen, broaden, and engage all of Parliament as we try to make sure that public safety in this country is done with the most accurate, up-to-date, and effective civilian oversight possible. That is a principle that this party will not step back on.

I would like to also reference a couple of other components of the bill which I think are critically important. The notion that this is somehow not fulfilling our mandate, I think is just wrong. In fact, if we listen to the experts who were critical of the previous government's approaches to public safety, what we hear is that they are in accordance with us.

Craig Forcese said, “this will be a stronger body than the UK and Australian equivalents. [It will be] a dramatic change for Canadian national security accountability. [It's] a good bill.” He gives it a high pass.

The criticism of Bill C-51 largely emanated from this individual, and now the support is coming from this individual. Clearly, we have moved the yardsticks.

I am going to leave members with one last thought. I think this is a critical thought, as well.

There is a notion somehow, and I certainly saw it in Bill C-51 when I was here in the previous term, that governments can land on public safety issues or civil rights issues perfectly, every time that they present legislation. That is a fallacy. In fact, I would say that is an arrogance.

Public safety and civil rights in particular are iterative processes. We move forward carefully. We move forward prudently. We expand rights. We protect rights simultaneously as best we can. However, we never get it right. Circumstances change. The behaviour of institutions changes. Individual officers within these organizations behave in particular ways.

It is a constant moving target that we are trying to deal with here, both the need to protect Canada's public safety and the need to protect charter rights. This process, as we establish this committee, I can guarantee members will evolve over time. It must evolve over time, because the circumstances we are dealing with are evolving over time. To do it in a way that is responsible is to do it in a way that is open and parliamentary and accountable to this body, and not to the executive branch.

That is exactly what this legislation would achieve. It would allow us to make significant steps forward at this time. I assure members that as long as I am sitting in this House, the conversation around good legislation, strong ideas, and intelligent criticism that emerges around how we balance the complexities of the security environment which we live in, how we make sure that civil liberties are protected as we protect public safety, needs to be sustained.

I take the ideas that frame that endeavour and that work of this Parliament very seriously. I think members have seen over the last couple of days that when strong ideas and intelligent criticism are presented on the floor of this Parliament, all parliamentarians have the ability to say, “That's a good idea. Let's support that, and let's move that into law and move that forward to protect Canadians or develop Canadians rights.”

That is what this bill would do. It is in the spirit of that kind of thinking, that kind of discipline around public safety and civil rights. That is the hallmark of the Liberal Party and this government. I am proud to support this bill because it continues that reputation.

[Pam Goldsmith-Jones, Liberal, West Vancouver—Sunshine Coast—Sea to Sky Country, BC]

Mr. Speaker, on the contrary, I was elected in October 2015. I was not part of the former deliberations or government. I can assure the member opposite and all members of the House that Bill C-51 caused a grave amount of concern with respect to excessive use of powers that really belong to members of Parliament and Canadians. I am very pleased to support Bill C-22 today.

[Pierre-Luc Dusseault, NDP, Sherbrooke, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I have a very simple question for my colleague, who seemed to be quite worried about Bill C-51 that passed in the previous Parliament.

She talked about some serious concerns regarding the excessive powers given to this country's security agencies; at the time, however, her party did not share those concerns. Instead, it voted in favour of Bill C-51—enthusiastically, I might add.

How can she reconcile her comments today to the effect that serious concerns remain about excessive powers with the fact that her party voted in favour of Bill C-51 at the time?

[Pam Goldsmith-Jones, Liberal, West Vancouver—Sunshine Coast—Sea to Sky Country, BC]

Mr. Speaker, as the member knows, this whole process is much more than a campaign commitment. This process is about engaging parliamentarians and the country in order to address what was broadly perceived as excessive use of power under Bill C-51. Bill C-22 takes a significant step forward by providing that kind of oversight. Our country was in the minority really, one of the only countries in the G20 not to provide this kind of oversight. I believe we will see a much more robust, engaged assessment as we move forward, because it is intended to say that we are open and transparent about providing and balancing our freedoms with our security and safety.

[Pam Goldsmith-Jones, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of International Trade]

Mr. Speaker, I rise to address the House with respect to the second reading of Bill C-22 establishing the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians.

Bill C-22 is about rebuilding trust with Canadians. It is about providing assurance that our national security and intelligence communities' activities are being conducted responsibly. Parliamentarians can and should play a major role in reviewing these activities. To that effect, our government made a commitment to an approach that protects our rights and freedoms and provides for the security of Canadians.

For many, Bill C-51 was cause for grave concern. Today, as our consultation analysis and improved legislation comes forward, it is a pleasure to demonstrate that we are being proactive and fair in our commitment to protecting Canada's national security and Canadians' rights and freedoms.

Democracy and freedom should never be taken for granted. Upholding democracy and freedom requires constant vigilance. Bill C-22 is a significant step forward. It stands against excessive powers of the state, something that I and many in the House believe in strongly.

Bill C-22 would provide a well-designed and sensible framework for the government to share highly classified information with selected members of Parliament from various parties, as well as senators, so that national security and intelligence activities in Canada would be subject to their scrutiny.

It is my pleasure to continue debate on this important bill that would help to protect both Canada's national security and Canadians' rights and freedoms. The amendments proposed by the government would strengthen the bill. The bill and an amendment brought forward by the committee would enable the national security and intelligence committee to review any federal department or agency, and now, because of a recent amendment, any crown corporation that performs national security or intelligence activities. This could be the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, the Communications Security Establishment, the Canada Border Services Agency, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, for example.

The national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians would have a government-wide mandate that would set it apart from other oversight bodies established to review a specific agency, such as the Security Intelligence Review Committee, the commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment, or the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP.

To ensure transparency, the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians would provide an annual report of its findings and recommendations to Parliament. It would also issue special reports at any time it considered it necessary. Because these reports would be available to the public, they would need to be submitted to the prime minister before tabling to ensure that they did not contain any classified information. However, I wish to emphasize the fact that the prime minister would not have any power to change the committee's findings and recommendations.

Bill C-22 would also enable the committee to provide classified reports to ministers at its own discretion. To ensure transparency about its reviews, the committee would be required to include a summary of these special reports in its annual report.

While it is vital to involve more parliamentarians in examining how federal agencies carry out their national security responsibilities, there must be some boundaries to ensure that ministers remain fully responsible and accountable for the activity of their departments.

Every department and agency of the security and intelligence community reports to a minister. That minister is ultimately responsible for the conduct of these departments and agencies. The minister is accountable to Parliament, and Canadians, for ensuring that the organization under her or his charge carries out its duties to keep Canadians safe while respecting our fundamental rights and freedoms. A minister may need to stop a review of a security or intelligence operation or may have to withhold sensitive operational information if the minister believes the review or the disclosure of the information could be harmful to national security.

I believe that such checks and balances are appropriate when we consider, for example, that the integrity of an active operation could be at stake. This is the reason our government has put forward amendments relating to access to information. Under the amendments proposed, ministers would not be able to use their power arbitrarily when it came to disclosing or not disclosing the information. Any request to withhold information would have to be explained to the committee, and if the committee was not happy with a minister's decision, it could report back to Parliament. The committee would have a legitimate platform to challenge a minister in public, in Parliament, before all Canadians.

Thanks to Bill C-22, the committee of parliamentarians would be able to hold the government to account. It would play a key role in ensuring that ministers took the necessary actions to address problems and fix deficiencies. It is clear that the bill would give the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians significant powers. It would also back it up with the necessary support through the creation of a secretariat.

It is also very important to stress the fact that the proposed national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians' mandate and powers could only be changed through amendments to the legislation, that is to say, only through the will of Parliament. Nevertheless, the proposed legislation includes an obligation for a review of all of its provisions and operations after five years to make sure it is meeting its objective.

Bill C-22 demonstrates how the government is setting the bar higher when it comes to transparency and accountability concerning national security. Canadians can be confident that Parliament can and will hold the government to account.

[Pierre Nantel, NDP, Longueuil—Saint-Hubert, QC]

Mr. Speaker, this is an extremely sensitive topic. Bill C-51 came up a lot during the election campaign. People talked about a great darkness, as my colleague opposite said. However, the Liberals supported Bill C-51, saying they would figure it all out later on, and that member was part of the team in charge in another capacity then.

Canadians have not forgotten. They remember. They remember that Bill C-51 was outrageous, regardless of what my colleagues over here think, and that the Liberals said they would figure it all out. The PMO has some nerve thinking it can appoint the committee chair.

Would my colleague care to comment on that? It makes no sense.

[Kelly McCauley, Conservative, Edmonton West, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise today to speak to Bill C-22, an act to establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain acts, or, as I call it, another piece of bad legislation to cover for a campaign promise the Liberals made without really thinking it through.

There are some points I want to address in discussing this bill, as I mentioned: using bad legislation to cover for bad campaign promises, the problem with creating legislation that relies on putting blind trust in the government, a redundancy of some of the legislation, and what stakeholders are saying about the bill.

We start with a campaign talking point that turned out to be a poorly phrased policy platform: how to reconcile the Prime Minister's support of Bill C-51 when he was a third party leader and his current compulsion to oppose everything the previous government did. My colleague from Parry Sound—Muskoka said it perfectly when he said, “the devil is not only in the details; the devil is in the fundamental misappropriation of the bill to promise something to the electorate and then not deliver.”

Today's legislation is just another in a string of poor attempts to cover up politically popular, but operationally difficult, campaign promises. This bill gives broad discretion over intelligence and national security discussions to the government, with “strong” oversight from the PMO, but not from Parliament. MPs are told to just trust the Liberals and they will figure it all out later. We know from their actions, though, they cannot be so easily trusted. They find ways to bend, break, and skirt the rules.

Therefore, we use the mechanisms within the House to hold the government to account and make sure that Canadians are aware of what the Liberal government is up to. Bill C-22 creates a committee with broad oversight, heavy Liberal influence, and public disclosure solely at the discretion of the PMO. It is a system designed to operate on blind trust in the government of the day, but we know that a strong and secure democratic system of government will ensure our security and liberty no matter who is in charge. Bill C-22, demanding that Canadians blindly trust the Liberals, does not accomplish this.

With their already lengthy track record of abuse of privileges, ethical lapses, and skirting responsibility for their mistakes, as well as their general contempt for the opposition when it opposes flawed legislation, I just cannot trust the government to act in the best interests of Canadians. Bill C-22 simply does not provide reasonable, meaningful mechanisms for parliamentary oversight.

Let us look at the track record of this bill. The special committee is appointed by, and reports to, the PMO. It should, instead, be appointed by, and report to, Parliament. The Prime Minister campaigned on a reduced role for the PMO, but his actions do not follow his words. Similarly, the Prime Minister, independent of any discussion with the other parties, appointed the committee chair in January before the legislation was even created. He refused to consult with the opposition parties, despite the public willingness of my party and the NDP to discuss this important committee. We were at the table, willing and ready to talk, but they stood us up.

The purpose of this committee is not to encourage and ensure transparency for the security agencies that are already as transparent as they can be while still protecting Canada and Canada's interests, rather it is a knee-jerk policy decision to shore up public support the Liberals lost when they voted in favour of Bill C-51 previously. Bill C-22 is a roundabout way for the Prime Minister's Office to direct the way our national security agencies function, effectively politicizing institutions that should always operate at arm's length from political sources. If the bill achieved some balance between oversight for parliamentarians and effective oversight for the committee while enhancing our national security, perhaps Conservatives could support it, but the bill, as it is, is purposeless.

Oversight agencies, including the Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner, Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP, the RCMP External Review Committee, National Defence and Canadian Forces ombudsman, and the Security Intelligence Review Committee are already mandated to provide oversight for each department or agency. This includes providing annual reports to Parliament.

Let us look at the membership process of the committee. Subclause 4(2) of the bill states:

The Committee is to consist of not more than two members who are members of the Senate and not more than seven members who are members of the House of Commons. Not more than four Committee members who are members of the House of Commons may be members of the government party.

There are two members of the Senate, seven members of this House, and not more than four government members, so we could easily be looking at four parliamentary secretaries from the government, notably members who are accountable first to their cabinet ministers, two so-called independent senators, and three members of the opposition.

I have heard government members state that they only get up to, but not necessarily, four members. Let us be honest here. No one expects the government to appoint a majority made up of opposition members and Conservative senators.

We have seen all too often that the Prime Minister and his office truly believe that their unilateral decisions are the best courses of action for Canadians. They dictate the issues of the day and the alleged solutions to those issues.

The government House leader has offered amendments so that subclause 4(2) would instead read: “The Committee is to consist of not more than three members who are members of the Senate and not more than eight members who are members of the House of Commons. Not more than five committee members who are members of the House of Commons may be members of the government party”.

Even with this, we could have five government members, three so-called independent senators, and three opposition members. We would still be faced with a Liberal majority on the committee that could unilaterally direct our intelligence and security agencies.

We always talk about how important it is to consult with the relevant stakeholders on legislation, so I will read what a couple of stakeholders are saying about Bill C-22. Here is a spoiler alert. It is not praise.

The Canadian Civil Liberties Association said:

we are concerned by the government’s power to halt a Committee investigation, or refuse to provide information, when it is deemed “injurious to national security.” While we recognize that the utmost secrecy is sometimes required, this is particularly worrisome because these decisions are final, and are not subject to judicial review or any other dispute resolution process. Also concerning is the prime minister’s power to redact Committee reports (without any evidence that redactions were made), as well as the numerous categories of information the committee cannot access. Furthermore, it should be the Committee members themselves—not the prime minister—that chooses the Committee chair.

The Civil Liberties Association seems to broadly agree with our concerns, that Bill C-22 would leave most of the discretionary decisions and oversight resolution mechanisms to the Prime Minister.

I am really not sure how the government can genuinely argue that it is increasing oversight by increasing the discretionary power of the PMO to censor information that claims to be injurious to national security but may actually just be injurious to the Liberal government.

The government seems to hide things it does not like. Just two weeks ago, members of the House debated a motion calling on the government to release the finance department's redacted data on a federal carbon tax. The information was unfavourable to the government, so it refused to disclose the information and voted it down.

The government has muzzled more than 100 public servants for life on the purchase of the politically motivated, sole-sourced Super Hornet purchase. We have heard testimony in committee that the government did not even bother to make these muzzled public servants aware of their rights under the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act, but it sure went out of its way to muzzle them for life.

The Canadian Bar Association, which I understand might be versed on the impacts of laws, waded in on Bill C-22 by saying:

While we have made suggestions and expressed concerns about various aspects of the Bill, our concerns about section 16 of the Bill are greater by several orders of magnitude. That section would provide broad discretion for Ministers and departments to refuse to provide information on vague national security grounds and on the basis of the expansive definition of ‘special operational information’ in the Security of Information Act.

Just recently, in the government operations and estimates committee, we heard how the government is making extensive use of national security exemptions to skirt rules on the procurement of such items as jackets for Syrian refugees, under the guise of national security, yet we are supposed to trust that government ministers are not going to opt out of the disclosure regime under Bill C-22 when they see fit.

However, it is okay, just trust that the Liberal government will always act in everyone's best interest, and shame on us for again questioning its so-called commitment to act openly and honestly.

I do not like legislation that relies solely on trusting the government to act properly. We have seen too many examples of the government hiding from responsibility for political gain, and this legislation will only make that easier, without tangibly increasing Canada's national security oversight.

As such, I cannot in good conscience support the bill.

[Lloyd Longfield, Liberal, Guelph, ON]

Mr. Speaker, yes, we do have a system of government that involves input from committees. Committees, such as the public safety committee, are able to have experts and hear testimony so the members can debate among themselves and come up with some recommendations that come forward to the government. Not all recommendations are adopted, but they are all taken into consideration. I know that some of the hon. committee members from the NDP had some of their suggestions come forward, which was unusual when compared with what the previous government was doing. Bill C-51 came through with no amendments, no amendments required, no amendments taken. In this case, we did have a very good discussion at committee. The discussion came forward to the government. The government makes its recommendations, which then go to the upper House and then come back for debate in Parliament, which is what we are doing right now.

I think the process is working. Not all committee members will get their amendments through, but it adds value to our conversation and in fact to our parliamentary democracy.

[Lloyd Longfield, Liberal, Guelph, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure today to rise in support of Bill C-22. This bill would create a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians. First, I would like to thank the members of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security for its hard work on this file, and for what I understand was a great discussion at committee level.

Our government is committed to protecting both the national security of Canadians as well as Canadians' rights and freedoms. By establishing the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians, this government is fulfilling the promise that we made to Canadians in 2015. The role of the committee will be to ensure that the national security framework is working effectively to keep Canadians safe, and that the rights and freedoms of Canadians are also safeguarded.

It was 17 months ago that Canadians elected this government to produce real change in Canadian society. Bill C-22 is part of our plan to address the deficit of public trust between Canadians and the intelligence agencies that protect them. Restoring public trust will be no easy task. What it requires is a return to the basics of public service. We do not need to look hard to find these foundational principles. They are enshrined in our Constitution, now 150 years old. The phrase, “peace, order, and good government” has come to symbolize Canadian constitutional principles. These words hold truth today and are in fact fundamental to the mandate of this new committee.

Peace is a universally recognized Canadian value. This committee would have a hand in overseeing our military and intelligence agencies. Canadians have empowered their security agencies with the tools they need to keep Canada safe and to maintain public peace and security, yet there must be measures in place to ensure that these tools are not abused. This is why the committee will have a broad government-wide mandate, in fact, broader than other partners in the Five Eyes. This will allow the committee members to review any national security matter in all government departments and agencies, and, if security allows, present their findings to the House. Assuring citizens that their privacy is respected is a challenge that persists for democracies around the world. This next step would help to provide the transparency that Canadians overwhelmingly voted for in 2015.

“Order”, the second foundational virtue of our Constitution, is a crucial element to the bill. Every democracy struggles to strike the appropriate balance between collective security and individual liberty. MPs and senators on the committee will have access to classified information and a robust mandate to review and to complete the scope of our national security framework throughout the federal government. All of our Five Eyes allies have similar committees, and the broad scope of this committee's mandate will make it a stronger body, as I mentioned earlier.

Here too, the government has struck a reasonable balance between peace and order. MPs and senators on the committee will have access to classified information, as well as the mandate to review the complete scope of Canada's national security framework.

However, there are provisions in the bill that limit access to certain information, such as ongoing military operations, cabinet confidences, and information related to ongoing law enforcement investigations. This balance ensures the security of classified information and the operational effectiveness of the DND, CSIS, and the RCMP, while also providing MPs and senators with adequate oversight to properly protect our Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

“Good government” is the final value reflected in this phrase. It is best embodied when we here and those in the upper house collaborate for the good of our country. With government amendments, the committee will be comprised of up to 11 members, eight from the House of Commons and three from the Senate. Up to five members of Parliament will be from the governing party.

This bill is an essential part of our national security strategy, which includes specific measures outlined in our platform, as well as consultations, so that Canadians can have their say about what other measures are needed.

Restoring public trust in Canada's security institutions is of critical importance. This is by no means the only measure the government will take to rebuild the public's confidence. The hon. Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness is currently reviewing Bill C-51, to make much-needed reforms.

There are many lessons that history has to teach. Perhaps the most important is the government's role in society. Government is an instrument for good, where people can come together and work toward common goals. As MPs, we cannot forget this simple truth. We are tasked with protecting the rights of the people we serve, as well as future generations. We must not become complacent and rely upon false comfort and assumptions. Constant vigilance by Canada's leaders to maintain these freedoms is included in the review recommendations of this bill.

This past summer, the former president of the United States, Mr. Obama, addressed this House and emphasized the truth of this. He quoted the late prime minister Pierre Trudeau when he said, “A country, after all, is not something you build as the pharaohs built the pyramids, and then leave standing to defy eternity. A country is something that is built every day”.

If we are to keep building Canada as a monument to the world, we must take these words to heart.

To conclude, I urge my fellow MPs to support Bill C-22. The bill is a thorough and comprehensive piece of legislation. It would equip MPs with the resources they need to responsibly exercise their due diligence. I urge my colleagues to support the bill as a common-sense move to promote government accountability.

I welcome any questions from my colleagues.