Bill C-51 (Historical)

Anti-terrorism Act, 2015

An Act to enact the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act and the Secure Air Travel Act, to amend the Criminal Code, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and to make related and consequential amendments to other Acts

Part 1 enacts the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, which authorizes Government of Canada institutions to disclose information to Government of Canada institutions that have jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada. It also makes related amendments to other Acts.
Part 2 enacts the Secure Air Travel Act in order to provide a new legislative framework for identifying and responding to persons who may engage in an act that poses a threat to transportation security or who may travel by air for the purpose of committing a terrorism offence. That Act authorizes the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to establish a list of such persons and to direct air carriers to take a specific action to prevent the commission of such acts. In addition, that Act establishes powers and prohibitions governing the collection, use and disclosure of information in support of its administration and enforcement. That Act includes an administrative recourse process for listed persons who have been denied transportation in accordance with a direction from the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and provides appeal procedures for persons affected by any decision or action taken under that Act. That Act also specifies punishment for contraventions of listed provisions and authorizes the Minister of Transport to conduct inspections and issue compliance orders. Finally, this Part makes consequential amendments to the Aeronautics Act and the Canada Evidence Act.
Part 3 amends the Criminal Code to, with respect to recognizances to keep the peace relating to a terrorist activity or a terrorism offence, extend their duration, provide for new thresholds, authorize a judge to impose sureties and require a judge to consider whether it is desirable to include in a recognizance conditions regarding passports and specified geographic areas. With respect to all recognizances to keep the peace, the amendments also allow hearings to be conducted by video conference and orders to be transferred to a judge in a territorial division other than the one in which the order was made and increase the maximum sentences for breach of those recognizances.
It further amends the Criminal Code to provide for an offence of knowingly advocating or promoting the commission of terrorism offences in general. It also provides a judge with the power to order the seizure of terrorist propaganda or, if the propaganda is in electronic form, to order the deletion of the propaganda from a computer system.
Finally, it amends the Criminal Code to provide for the increased protection of witnesses, in particular of persons who play a role in respect of proceedings involving security information or criminal intelligence information, and makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 4 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to permit the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to take, within and outside Canada, measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada, including measures that are authorized by the Federal Court. It authorizes the Federal Court to make an assistance order to give effect to a warrant issued under that Act. It also creates new reporting requirements for the Service and requires the Security Intelligence Review Committee to review the Service’s performance in taking measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada.
Part 5 amends Divisions 8 and 9 of Part 1 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to, among other things,
(a) define obligations related to the provision of information in proceedings under that Division 9;
(b) authorize the judge, on the request of the Minister, to exempt the Minister from providing the special advocate with certain relevant information that has not been filed with the Federal Court, if the judge is satisfied that the information does not enable the person named in a certificate to be reasonably informed of the case made by the Minister, and authorize the judge to ask the special advocate to make submissions with respect to the exemption; and
(c) allow the Minister to appeal, or to apply for judicial review of, any decision requiring the disclosure of information or other evidence if, in the Minister’s opinion, the disclosure would be injurious to national security or endanger the safety of any person.

[Micheal Vonn]

I appreciate the opportunity to comment.

If, as you've perceived, there's a disdain for Bill C-51 from our association, I would not want that in any way to translate to there being a disdain for national security. Indeed, we consider national security very seriously.

[Prof. Reg Whitaker]

Personally, I don't have a problem. The BCCLA may not agree with this, but I don't have a problem, in Bill C-51, where they actually expanded that somewhat, and the time, and also lowered the bar a bit. I don't have a particular problem with that because it in fact involves habeas corpus and legal representation at all stages, and so on, for the individuals. But I'm still puzzled by why it's never been used.

[Larry Miller, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Ms. Vonn and Mr. Whitaker, for being here.

It's pretty obvious, the disdain and dislike that both of you have for Bill C-51, but I stand by the comment that no legislation is perfect but no legislation is all bad, either. Even Bill C-22 was mentioned by a previous witness here, who made some criticism of it. That's fair enough.

What I'm trying to get my head around is that a number of so-called experts in the law enforcement field have made comments that if some parts of Bill C-51 had been in place prior to October 22, two years ago, Private Vincent and Corporal Cirillo might still be alive. Also, some of those same ones have stated that the would-be terrorist in Strathroy just a few months ago wouldn't have ended up being apprehended and stopped.

I see, Mr. Whitaker, that you shrugged your shoulders on that, as if it doesn't matter. If that's not the case, that's fine, but what I need to know is in your worlds, both of you, where and when should it not be that law enforcement powers have the right to infringe on an individual's rights if that individual has a distinct, deliberate plan to basically commit domestic terrorism or otherwise?

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Since the creation and the passing of Bill C-51 agreements, memoranda, have been exchanged between CSIS and the RCMP—two mandates, one vision 2.0—to enhance co-operation, and we've heard from experts who say that this co-operation is robust and it's healthy. We've also heard from some of your colleagues in the profession as well as in academia who say, as Mr. Whitaker did, that they accept that reduction measures are required in the current national security landscape.

[Micheal Vonn]

As I was alluding to, we have a situation with the Air India commission's recommendations that there should be a requirement that CSIS report the information it has. Bill C-51 ignores that recommendation, gives sweeping generalized powers of data collection, and then creates for CSIS a separate arm of disruption powers outside the regular law, and outside of any need to do anything other than vaguely co-operate with the RCMP.

[Prof. Reg Whitaker]

My preference certainly would be that the entire section of Bill C-51 that deals with threat reduction powers be eliminated in its entirety.

[Professor Reg Whitaker, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Victoria and Distinguished Research Professor (Emeritus), York University, As an Individual]

I would certainly like to add my voice to applauding the initiative of opening up national security to wider public participation as with these committee hearings. It's certainly a contrast to the way in which Bill C-51 was carried through the last Parliament. A better-educated public is crucial to democratic decision-making, as is the enhanced role of Parliament as we see put forward in Bill C-22.

However, public consultation can be diffuse and unfocused, while the key agencies of government have their own sharply focused agendas, which are relentlessly pressed on governments of any political stripe. I see already evidence in the green paper and in Bill C-22 of this process at work. The agencies are acting as a kind of heavy anchor pulling in one direction, while counter-pressures from outside are much weaker.

I'm not saying there's anything inherently nefarious in this kind of bureaucratic behaviour. I'm assuming that the bureaucrats are trying to do the job they're assigned to the best of their abilities, but on the issue of the powers that they are granted and the protections in terms of privilege and secrecy for their operations, there is a clear public interest in limiting the agencies' capacity to act without accountability to the public and to Parliament, and as well, in limiting the scope of their powers to conform to the rule of law.

The agencies certainly have legitimate concerns about reforms. I think there have been some unrealistic concepts of accountability and oversight that have been put out there, such as the idea that there should be oversight of ongoing operations in real time, whether by a parliamentary committee or whatever, which would be unworkable and undesirable. However, the provision of extraordinary and unreasonable powers, even though the agencies have no apparent intention of actually using them at this time but might prefer to keep them in the back drawer, as it were, just in case, should not be tolerated, nor should excessive limitations on external oversight review just to make the bureaucrats' lives a little easier.

In the interest of time, I want to focus my remarks on one section of Bill C-51, what I consider to be the very worst part of what I would say is a very bad piece of legislation, generally badly conceived, badly drafted, and potentially pernicious in effect. I'm referring to the threat reduction or disruption powers awarded CSIS and the special warrants CSIS might seek for judicial authorization to break the law and violate charter rights. I will also try to touch on the closely related issue of the secret intelligence public evidence problem.

What is wrong with CSIS threat reduction powers? Well, I think, everything, literally. As someone who has co-authored a history of the security service from its late 19th century origins to its present post-9/11 era, from the RCMP to its present incarnation as CSIS, I would say unequivocally that threat reduction in Bill C-51 is dangerous to civil liberties and the rule of law, certainly, but it also threatens to undermine security and effective counter-terrorist law enforcement.

CSIS is a security intelligence agency empowered to collect intelligence on threats to security and advise governments. The RCMP, of course, is the law enforcement agency on national security matters. The security service was taken away from the RCMP in 1984 after the McDonald commission for good reason: the illegal activities in the 1970s, mainly in Quebec against Quebec separatists but also against various left-wing organizations in the rest of the country.

Violations of laws without accountability, no clear lines between violent versus legitimate political groups, the question of control by elected governments, and so on, was precisely what the McDonald commission reacted against, and CSIS was created apart from the RCMP, with no law enforcement powers and a mandate spelling out what it was authorized to do and what it was not authorized to do. All those things flowed from McDonald and we're seeing it threatened with a return back to that era, that scandal-filled era again.

I'll just skip over some of the credits and try to focus on each of the problems with this.

First of all, the special warrants allow law-breaking and charter violations, short only of murder, torture, and rape, to be authorized by a judge. They are not surveillance warrants, which are in effect judicial certifications that these acts are within the law and abide by the charter. Instead, they ask judges to enable law-breaking and unconstitutional acts. This is a radical revision of the role of the judiciary from protectors of the law and constitution to enablers of violations. This is a shocking assault on the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, now turned into a tool of the executive. I expect most judges, if not all, would be quite appalled by this prospect.

The next point is that the warrant application is entirely secret, with no specified follow-up for the judge granting the warrant to determine if it has been carried out as promised, or what the results are. No reporting is required of warrants granted or turned down—no accountability of any kind.

The decision to seek a warrant—and this is an important point—is at the discretion of CSIS. If they decide that a disruption activity does not require a warrant, there appears to be no fallback accountability as to whether that decision is justified. That is unacceptable.

These threat reduction measures could involve detention, if you read this very carefully—not arrest but detention—and they could involve extraordinary rendition on the international stage. Of course, in the latter case, we could see the potential for somebody who is a Canadian perhaps being rendered to a country where torture is routinely practised.

All of these issues that I've been talking about are problems regarding the rule of law and the rights of citizens, and so on. However, it's also very important to realize that CSIS threat reduction efforts could impede rather than facilitate counterterrorism. This recreates the potential for conflict turf wars with the RCMP, as were tragically shown by the Air India commission. It opens up the possibility that CSIS, protecting its sources as a security and intelligence organization, could imperil convictions in court, and there's the distinct possibility that these activities could contaminate the evidentiary trail.

This brings us to the intelligence evidence conflict that the Air India commission addressed, in which the government did not take up any of the recommendations of the commission to deal with this problem. I can't go into this at any length, and certainly it's a topic best undertaken by lawyers, except to note that threat reduction or disruption activities can be useful, certainly. I'm not making the point that they should never be used. They can be very useful in counterterrorism, so long as they are undertaken with the goal always in mind of securing criminal convictions and putting dangerous terrorists behind bars.

The RCMP already does this, both in its criminal and national security investigations, if you look, for example, at the Toronto 18 case. CSIS does disruption as well, under pre-Bill C-51 law, and that's fine. I don't have any problem with that, so long as it does not interfere with the criminal law process and is rather supportive of the criminal law process.

A general point that I would like to make is that unlike the old Cold War era, the era of terrorism is one in which, given that the terrorist threat is against civilians, ordinary people, the priority must always be given to law enforcement and criminal convictions. CSIS has a role to play, but the notion that they have this role of slowly building a long-term picture of these networks like the old KGB in the Cold War has to be subordinated to law enforcement. The threat reduction powers and special warrants radically undermine this.

The last thing I want to say is that CSIS says it has not applied for any of these special warrants, and that presumably everything it has carried out, we can assume, has not required that kind of special warrant power, like the powers of preventive detention and investigative hearings in the 2001 Anti-terrorism Act, which were so controversial that time limits were put on them. They were actually allowed to lapse at one point and then were reinstituted by the former government, yet in all that process, they've never been used.

Are we seeing a repeat of the same kind of phenomenon?

In both cases, if they have never been used, why exactly are they needed? In the case of the threat reduction powers, perhaps CSIS had these foisted on them unwillingly by the government. In that case, then, we really ought to get rid of them. Or it may be another example of the unending pressure on governments to keep up powers that they might need “just in case”. That's a very bad case for keeping a bad law on the books to be potentially abused by less responsible people in the future.

[Micheal Vonn, Policy Director, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association]

Thank you for this invitation.

The BCCLA is on record as calling for the complete repeal of Bill C-51 and we have views on almost every aspect of the national security framework, which I would be very pleased to share with you. However, for the duration of my prepared remarks, I wish to make a substantive contribution to your deliberations on a topic that is receiving surprisingly little airtime given it's importance, and that is the new Security of Canada Information Sharing Act.

The unprecedented expansion of the surveillance powers in this act, along with the controversial new CSIS threat disruption powers, were the main points of opposition heard by the thousands of citizens who took to the streets to protest the introduction of Bill C-51. My discussion on the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act will focus on our new understanding of what is happening with the collection of datasets of personal information in the security intelligence realm.

If time permits, or perhaps during questions, I would be very pleased to unpack the ramifications of the act in further detail, including how it intersects with issues of profiling, but it is critical, in our view, that we first squarely set this discussion within the recent findings of unlawful data collection within the Five Eyes.

You will doubtless have seen today's headlines from the U.K. that the investigatory powers tribunal has ruled that British security agencies have secretly and unlawfully collected massive volumes of personal data in breach of article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and that this unlawful activity has been going on for years and years.

The illegal data holdings include bulk personal datasets, which might include medical and tax records, individual biographical details, commercial and financial details, communications, and travel data. The ruling confirms that for over a decade U.K. security services unlawfully concealed both the extent of their surveillance capacities and the fact that innocent people across the country had been spied upon. This is an eerie echo of what we here in Canada learned only a few weeks ago about our own comparable intelligence data holdings.

Granted, unlike the situation in the U.K., it was not front page news. The media coverage of SIRC's just-released annual report focused on the review of the new threat disruption powers, which is, by no means, a surprise. However, largely unexplored in the public discourse was the report of SIRC's first-ever examination into CSIS data acquisition programs, including bulk datasets, and that report was an extremely damning one, very much in keeping with the situation that was recently disclosed in the U.K.

SIRC advises that within CSIS's own data classifications there are two types of datasets. The first type they refer to as “referential”, which, on the argument that they are openly sourced and publicly available, CSIS says are not collected under the authority of section 12 of the CSIS Act and therefore have to meet no standard of collection. SIRC does not comment on the legal interpretation that underpins this theory of collection that is not collection.

The second type of dataset is the “unreferential” datasets, which CSIS does consider to be collected under the authority of the CSIS Act and must, therefore, meet the collection threshold of being strictly necessary. Despite its characteristic calm and measured tones, what SIRC has to report in this matter is extremely alarming. The bottom line is this. SIRC does not agree that all of the publicly available, openly sourced data is in fact publicly available and openly sourced, so there are definitely red flags in that category. Even more troubling, however, as regards the datasets that clearly fall under the requirement for strict necessity, “SIRC found no evidence to indicate that CSIS had appropriately considered the threshold as required in the CSIS Act.”

It found no evidence of appropriate consideration of the applicable legal standard to bulk data collection of Canadians' private information. It is simply impossible to read this as indicating anything other than contempt for the need to abide by the applicable laws in this arena. This is so serious a matter that SIRC called for the immediate halt to the acquisition of bulk datasets until there can be a system to confirm compliance with the law. This, then, is the situation, one completely unmoored from the legal requirements in the CSIS Act, to which we add the near free-for-all of the information sharing act's powers.

You will recall that the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act applies to national security concerns defined so broadly that the definition has never before been seen in Canadian law. It constitutes a bar so low that there is hardly anything that cannot be argued to be within its purview. It spans far beyond public safety into ordinary public life, encompassing everything from the administration of justice to the country's economic or financial well-being.

There's no need, under the legislation, for individualized suspicion as the basis for individual information sharing, and indeed no impediment to entire databases of personal information being disclosed on the grounds that they may be relevant to an institution's mandate to detect, identify, analyze, prevent, investigate, or disrupt an activity that undermines the security of Canada—again, as defined so broadly in the act as to encompass huge swaths of ordinary public life. It is difficult to imagine a database held by a federal agency that couldn't be argued for on such grounds. Perhaps it was thought that a possible mechanism to prevent the obvious threat of inappropriate data disclosure might be, by virtue of the CSIS Act, that CSIS would be unable to collect, retain, or use such vast categories of Canadians' private information because they would not fall under the legal standard that CSIS is to apply to its data holdings. However, we have just been told, in no uncertain terms, that those legal standards are being ignored. It is anyone's guess for how long that situation has existed. As I say, this is SIRC's first-ever review of these data holdings.

Further, we need to keep alive to the fact that there was never a compelling case for the legislation in the first place. In their recent response to the government's green paper, Professors Roach and Forcese cite a CSIS briefing note of 2014 that sets out some concerns about the lack of clarity with respect to information sharing for national security purposes. The briefing note did not call for the wholesale revisioning of information sharing to address this concern about clarity but rather suggested, “With appropriate direction and framework in place, significant improvements are possible to encourage information sharing for national security purposes, on the basis [of] existing legislative authorities.”

Instead of the careful and measured approach called for, legislation of monumental overbreadth was enacted, which compounded the lack of clarity and paved the way for a massive increase in already illegal data holdings by security intelligence. Ordinary citizens thus have every justification for concern that their personal information can be disclosed under the vast sweep of the act, which the Privacy Commissioner of Canada confirms is unprecedented. Meanwhile, the security benefits of this approach are, at best, entirely speculative and infinitely more likely to actually undermine rather than enhance effectiveness. The act is so far from hitting the mark of what is needful for national security that, as Roach and Forcese note, “The Act allows the government to share just about everything while it rejects the Air India commission’s recommendation that CSIS must share intelligence about terrorist offences, if not to the police than to someone who is in charge and who can take responsibility for the proper use of the information.”

It was ill advised when it was introduced, and it is even more so now that we have some insight into the shocking state of the current data holdings. The act should be repealed and replaced with the careful, measured approach that was called for in the first place to ensure that needed information sharing for national security purposes can occur within appropriate and meaningful protections for lawful Canadians' personal information. Thank you very much.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

I appreciate that. Like I said, I'll get off Bill C-22. There's a lot more to be said, but we'll have that opportunity when we study the bill.

You talked about the wider array of departments when it comes to the green paper and the review that needs to happen of the national security framework. There's a very specific story that comes to mind that's come out in the last couple of week of information sharing under Bill C-51 with consular affairs, for example, and the risk that runs of creating another situation like we saw with Maher Arar.

I'm just wondering, because you mentioned the foreign policy implications, if perhaps you could elaborate on that and some of the concerns there are even within Bill C-51 that the legal dispositions that exist here at home aren't the same as what happens abroad when information sharing happens.

[Larry Miller, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Back at the start, you mentioned C-51, and you mentioned shortly after that things that you thought were missing from the framework. One of the things that you talked about was the military forces, and you did mention the Afghan prisoners thing. I'd like you to expand a little more on that.

[Prof. Stuart Farson]

I'm afraid it will take me five minutes. I think this is probably the essence of my presentation.

Arguably in a democratic society two things should occur when governments want additional powers for national security agencies. First, they should make a case for why they are necessary. Second, where they take the balance in favour of security over individual rights and freedoms, they should ensure that it has a robust and effective oversight system in place that can also ensure accountability. Bill C-51 was perhaps the most contentious bill of the last Parliament because it fulfilled neither of these points.

Do you wish me to stop now?

[Professor Stuart Farson, Adjunct Professor, Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'd like to thank you and the committee for the opportunity to come here today. Given that every member of the committee comes from either Quebec or Ontario, coming to the other side of the country, in this case, is an important thing for you.

I'd like to commend the Liberal government on two points. First is for making public the mandate letters issued to ministers. Hopefully, the metrics they contain will help reinstate the singular importance of ministerial responsibility in our system of governance, and make it easier for Canadians and their Parliament to hold them to account.

Second is for issuing this green paper on national security to prompt a public discussion and debate on Canada's so-called national security framework. Regardless of how one views the breadth of the discussion that the government appears to have in mind, or the cynicism that many will hold over whether talk leads to action, such a dialogue deserves our support and is long overdue.

I'd like to tackle three points in my presentation. I hope, in a way, that they'll connect to the speakers that you will hear after I finish. The first is to talk about the breadth of what the government has termed our national security framework. The second point is how one goes about learning and this largely takes into consideration my own personal experience of how difficult it is to learn about this area of governance. Finally, to talk about something that this committee, and others in Parliament, will be doing on a regular basis, which is, how to make oversight work effectively.

By way of preparing for this meeting, I looked for, and did not find, guidance on what parameters this committee had in mind for a national security framework. Yes, there's a green paper, but perhaps and hopefully, the committee will look much more broadly than is the case with the green paper.

What is it that the committee will examine to form conclusions about the framework? Two things are perhaps obvious. One is that there are a whole range of issues in the green paper that need to be addressed. Many of them stem from Bill C-51 and if so, what reforms are needed?

I'm going leave these—what I call the nitty-gritty—to the rest of the witnesses that you're going to hear from. I want to touch on some of the things that are immediately, to my mind, missing from this national security framework.

From an academic point of view, at least, we've gone through calling this thing a whole range of names from communities to systems to networks. Now we're talking about a framework, so we really need to figure out what this thing is.

Missing, I think, from the discussion on independent review is the Military Police Complaints Commission. Arguably, its mandate was inadequate for pursuing whether Canadian troops knowingly committed war crimes when transferring prisoners to Afghan authorities. In addition to the adequacy of mandates, the experiences of the MPCC pose questions about the degree to which bodies are truly independent and have adequate resources.

I raise this because if you look at the RCMP complaints commission, this is a body that has changed—under the Conservative government, I should say—its mandate. It has a review process in addition to dealing with complaints. The MPCC doesn't have that sort of mandate at all. Perhaps it should.

The green paper also omits the historically important commission of inquiry, i.e., the McDonald commission, and it is to be recalled. The McDonald commission led to the establishment of CSIS, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, as an intelligence agency without a mandate to reduce threats. It's important to recognize that while commissions have a level of independence, they are still executive instruments where the government sets the terms of reference.

Why is this important? In the Arar inquiry, for example, Justice O'Connor could not be encouraged to consider how the various review bodies should relate to Parliament. I believe that this was a serious missed opportunity. Also, the executive, it should be noted, can close down commissions of inquiry when it chooses to do so. The example of the Somalia inquiry of the 1990s, which was also a national security issue, is a good example.

Now, to touch on what the green paper is and why I find it inadequate, I should say that I think we can agree that it is a product of the Department of Public Safety and the Department of Justice. Not surprisingly, the issues raised in it reflect those that are particularly of interest to their particular ministers. It focuses on the threat of terrorism, largely at the exclusion of other threats, how to respond to it, and the legal regime needed to confront it, while protecting the rights and freedoms of Canadians. It's not a bad thing. This is something that needs to be done, but it's not the entirety. Thus, it frames a particular notion, I would argue, of national security, and may in the process divert public attention from other threats, and particularly existential threats like climate change.

Arguably, a green paper produced by the national security adviser's unit within the Privy Council Office would look very different. It would be broader in concept, consider a wider array of departments and organizations—Global Affairs, Transport, Finance, and the Privy Council itself, particularly the intelligence assessment secretariat—reflect upon the activities they all perform, and detail the threats and the national interests they ponder. It would consider defence and foreign policy implications, and indicate concern about the effectiveness of organizations and the resources available.

Furthermore, it would likely cover the importance of intelligence analysis and the sharing of intelligence, not just within Canada, as I think this green paper does, but between Canada and foreign states. A review of these kinds of security intelligence organizations suggests that any such framework would likely reflect the following: structural and functional diversity among organizations; the existence of several policy and coordination centres; intelligence analysis being conducted within several organizations; national security law expanding and becoming more complex, particularly since 9/11 and because of technological innovation; and a rising level of public concern. I think it's not been since McDonald that we have seen a level of public concern about national security issues as we have today.

Finally, there is emergence of a diversified and, I would argue, uncoordinated review framework, something which I think this committee should pay particular attention to, and I'll come to later. Arguably, this suggests a greater focus on how policy is developed, who coordinates the various organizations of the framework, and how human resources are recruited, trained, developed, and retained.

I want to make a few observations about how you go about learning, because it took me several years, and I've been doing it I think since the early 1980s.

I want to touch on some of them, which I guess is informed by my own personal experience of having been on the other side of a committee in the 1990s when a special committee of Parliament reviewed the CSIS Act and the Security Offences Act. I was its director of research. The strengths and weakness of the process has led me, in my academic career, to pursue a number of what I think are key areas.

How does one go about learning about the framework or whatever you like to call it? Obviously commissions of inquiry need to be studied and the recommendations they have made pondered in detail. I don't think we do enough of that. We seem to finish off the commission and more often than not it disappears into history.

Secondly, I think working with independent review bodies is very important. At one point, SIRC, for example, used to hold conferences where there were discussions between academics and the review process. Obviously, going inside the institutions helps. Being a contractor is one that comes to mind. Working for Parliament is another, and I've indicated my experience. From my own experience, I know I went to Parliament in 1989 with a rather naive view that Parliament, or at least the parliamentarians on the committee, would have detailed knowledge of the CSIS Act. However, surprise, surprise, this was not the case. It was, over the course of the better part of a year, a tremendous learning experience for those MPs. Unfortunately, what was the case for many, or most of those MPs, was that only two of them survived the 1993 election, so that institutional memory was lost.

Working with non-governmental organizations such as the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces is another. It, for example, specializes in comparative security sector governance and reform, and it covers a broad array of countries.

Following, of course, the work of investigative journalists is another. Many of them have used the Access to Information Act to good effect. I would like to suggest to you from personal experience that there are enormous delays in this process. Anything I've asked for over the last few years automatically seems to get 120 days added onto the process. I would add that the complaints process isn't much better. In my view, there are not enough investigators, and the process, even when it's time sensitive, is far too long.

Finally, there's academia. There was an organization, the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies, that held multi-day conferences attracting considerable audiences from abroad. It now is a shadow of its former self. Its membership is dwindling and greying, like your witness today.

Maybe I should get on to what I really wanted to say about oversight, if I may.

[Michel Coulombe]

Well, it depends on what you talk about as mandate. We were able to fulfill our previous mandate, which was to investigate and advise government. What we couldn't do was reduce the threat. Threat reduction didn't have any impact on the mandate we had until Bill C-51, which was to advise government.

What was felt...and in fact if you go back to 2010, SIRC raised this issue. The whole issue of the service not being able to disrupt a threat was raised at a special Senate committee on terrorism. It had no impact on our previous mandate to advise government, but it had an impact in terms of being able to reduce the threat in the current environment, where it's fast paced, there is much more volume, technology, encryption, and we just talked about going dark. Therefore, it's an additional tool that we can use.

[Bernard Généreux, Conservative, Montmagny—L'Islet—Kamouraska—Rivière-du-Loup, QC]

Has the passage of Bill C-51 had an impact on the tools in your arsenal to conduct more in-depth investigations of certain individuals, either giving you more such tools or enhancing them?

[Nathaniel Erskine-Smith, Liberal, Beaches—East York, ON]

Okay.

Moving to Commissioner Paulson, with preventive arrest and the expansion of preventive arrest, you mentioned a lowering of the threshold. Is that lowering of the threshold necessary? Has this preventive arrest power been used since Bill C-51?