CCGG recognizes that Bill C-25 currently reflects changes to the CBCA where there's a perceived consensus among the comments received during the previous round of consultations. However, CCGG has identified the following three additional corporate governance issues that require further consideration. CCGG does not believe Bill C-25 should be held up, however, while these additional issues are considered.
First, the CBCA should facilitate the ability of shareholders to nominate directors. Current methods by which shareholders nominate director candidates are quite simply not effective. As a result, director nominees are almost always chosen by the incumbent board or company management.
Further, in our experience, companies very seldom seek input from shareholders when selecting board nominees. Canada is becoming a laggard in this area of governance. In the United States, for example, 39% of the S&P 500 companies have adopted a meaningful method for shareholders to nominate director candidates. We also understand that direct shareholder input into the director nomination process exists in many other countries around the world.
Second, the CBCA should require an advisory “say on pay” vote by means of an ordinary resolution at each annual meeting of shareholders. The area of such advisory votes is one in which Canada is an international outlier. Periodic say on pay votes are mandatory in the United States, Australia, and such western European countries as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and others.
Third, the CBCA should as a general rule require that the board chair be independent of management. The board chair plays a key role in leading or coordinating the other directors, both during and outside of meetings, in support of the board's obligation to supervise the senior executive team's performance. When the board chair is not independent of management, it results in a serious conflict of interest and obscures the lines of accountability. For example, the oversight of the senior executive team, in particular of the CEO, is one of the board's key responsibilities. A combined board chair and CEO would thus be responsible for leading the body that oversees himself or herself.
Finally, in addition to the three specific issues I've just mentioned, CCGG recommends the creation of a standing external stakeholder advisory body to advise the federal government on corporate governance issues. It's been addressed many times over the past few weeks before this committee that the CBCA has not been substantially amended since 2001, and only twice in the past 40 years. If consensus is what drives this process forward, then we respectfully submit that there is consensus for more regular follow-up.
A standing stakeholder advisory body in corporate governance would support a regular review process. The advisory body could be populated with key government stakeholders and professionals to provide periodic reports on ways to improve the regulatory environment for CBCA public companies as well as federal public financial institutions. Further, such a body could provide helpful feedback regarding the matter in which the provisions in Bill C-25 related to diversity are being interpreted and adopted by public companies.
In closing, we thank you for the opportunity to testify before this committee. Catherine and I would be happy to respond to any questions.