Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act

An Act to implement the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and Ukraine

This bill was last introduced in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session, which ended in September 2019.

Sponsor

Status

This bill has received Royal Assent and is now law.

Summary

This is from the published bill. The Library of Parliament often publishes better independent summaries.

This enactment implements the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and Ukraine, done at Kyiv on July 11, 2016.
The general provisions of the enactment set out rules of interpretation and specify that no recourse may be taken on the basis of sections 9 to 15 or any order made under those sections, or on the basis of the provisions of the Agreement, without the consent of the Attorney General of Canada.
Part 1 approves the Agreement, provides for the payment by Canada of its share of the expenditures associated with the operation of the institutional and administrative aspects of the Agreement, and gives the Governor in Council the power to make orders in accordance with the Agreement.
Part 2 amends certain Acts to bring them into conformity with Canada’s obligations under the Agreement.
Part 3 contains coordinating amendments and the coming into force provision.

Elsewhere

All sorts of information on this bill is available at LEGISinfo, an excellent resource from the Library of Parliament. You can also read the full text of the bill.

Votes

Feb. 14, 2017 Passed That the Bill be now read a third time and do pass.
Dec. 13, 2016 Passed That the Bill be now read a second time and referred to the Standing Committee on International Trade.

Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement Implementation ActGovernment Orders

December 13th, 2016 / 11:35 a.m.
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NDP

Tracey Ramsey NDP Essex, ON

Madam Speaker, I share the concerns of the member for Saanich—Gulf Islands on the provisions in trade agreements. We are the most sued country in the world under chapter 11 in NAFTA. The experience has not been good for us when investors have been able to sue our country.

Initially in NAFTA, when we engaged in it, it was because of concerns about corrupt court systems in Mexico. It has not been Mexican corrupt court systems that have hurt us; it has been international corporations that have sued our government when we have attempted to legislate on behalf of all Canadians.

Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement Implementation ActGovernment Orders

December 13th, 2016 / 11:35 a.m.
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LaSalle—Émard—Verdun Québec

Liberal

David Lametti LiberalParliamentary Secretary to the Minister of International Trade

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to have a chance to speak to Bill C-31 before us today. The bill calls on the government to take all necessary legislative steps to ratify the Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement, something I encourage all of us to support.

Moving forward with the ratification of the Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement will help to further strengthen Canada's support for Ukraine as it works toward securing its future as a stable democratic and prosperous country.

Since the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine in November 2013, Canada has been at the forefront of the international community's support for Ukraine. As part of Canada's response to Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and its ongoing support of the insurgency in eastern Ukraine, the Government of Canada has imposed nearly 300 sanctions, in coordination with international partners, against Russian and Ukrainian individuals and entities. It also has committed more than $750 million in assistance to Ukraine, including $400 million in low-interest loans to help Ukraine stabilize its economy and more than $245 million in bilateral development assistance.

The Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement complements the objectives of Canada's assistance to Ukraine: to expand opportunity to Ukrainian citizens and to contribute to a higher standard of living. This benefits Canada in terms of both promoting stability for an important ally and building a stronger market into which Canada can sell its goods.

Canada-Ukraine trade relations have been relatively modest to date, with two-way merchandise trade totalling $278 million in 2015. Canadian exports that same year totalled $210 million, while imports from Ukraine reached $68 million. There is room to grow.

Ukraine's economy has significant potential and offers diverse commercial opportunities for Canadian business, given its strategic location between Europe and Central Asia, its solid industrial base, its abundant natural resources, in particular in the agricultural and energy sectors, and its well-educated population.

The Canada-Ukraine FTA will enable our companies to take greater advantage of these opportunities with new market access and by creating more predictable conditions. That is why the legislation before us today is so important.

Let me elaborate on that. An important aspect of the agreement is the opening of new markets for Canadian goods. When the Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement enters into force, it will eliminate tariffs on about 86% of current Canadian exports to Ukraine. That means that Canadian exporters will see an immediate benefit from this agreement. The balance of Ukraine's tariff reductions and eliminations will be phased out over a period of up to seven years.

At that point, the agreement will have basically eliminated all tariffs on the goods that are currently being exchanged between Canada and Ukraine. The agreement will also create more favourable conditions for exporters through important non-tariff measures. For example, the agreement includes provisions that will ensure that market access gains are not undermined by unjustified trade barriers.

This agreement includes trade facilitation measures to reduce red tape at the border, and protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, which will allow Canadian IP rights holders to do business in the Ukrainian market with increased confidence. As part of the agreement, Canada and Ukraine both commit to not levy customs duties or other charges on digital products that are transmitted electronically.

I will now talk about how this agreement will result in real benefits for Canadian businesses. In particular, the Canada-Ukrainian free trade agreement will create opportunities for important sectors of the Canadian economy, including industrial products, fish and seafood products, and agriculture and agri-food products.

From 2011 to 2015, Canada's industrial exports to Ukraine averaged approximately $123 million a year.

However, those exports are currently subject to tariffs of up to 25%. On the day the agreement comes into force, virtually all of those tariffs will be eliminated. This is good news because it will make our industrial exports to Ukraine more competitive and help our exports grow. Iron, steel, industrial machinery, and plastics are some of the products that will benefit from the agreement.

Canada's fish and seafood industry also has a lot to gain from preferential market access under the Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement. Canada is one of the top exporters of fish and seafood to Ukraine, with average annual exports of $31 million between 2011 and 2015. Canada is the largest exporter of frozen shrimp and cold-water shrimp to Ukraine and is one of its main suppliers of frozen hake. As in other sectors, these products are subject to tariffs of up to 20%. Once the Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement eliminates tariffs for this sector, Canadian fish and seafood products will be much more competitive.

Canada's agriculture and agri-food sector will also benefit from the Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement. Between 2011 and 2015, Canada exported an average of $18 million worth of agriculture and agrifood products to Ukraine per year. However, those exports are subject to tariffs of up to 30%.

Once the agreement comes into force, it will eliminate the majority of those tariffs. Virtually all of the rest will be eliminated over a seven-year period. The main Canadian agricultural products that will benefit from duty-free access are beef, pulse crops, grains, canola oil, processed foods, and animal feed. Greater market access for Canadian pork exports was of particular interest during the negotiations, and one of the first things the government did to meet people's expectations was obtain duty-free access for fresh and chilled pork.

As far as the export of frozen pork and pork products is concerned, Canada will enjoy a duty-free tariff rate quota that exceeds current exports by a large margin. These tariff outcomes put Canada's pork industry on equal footing with the European Union, a key competitor in this sector. This agreement will also give Canadian companies a leg-up on competitors in all the other countries that have not concluded a free trade agreement with Ukraine.

Those are just a few of the benefits of this agreement. Our government has said from day one that trade and open markets are essential for ensuring Canada's economic prosperity. Canada is a trading nation. We know that with increased trade come more well-paying jobs.

Our government also wants to work on growing a more inclusive economy to ensure that the trade benefits are distributed better. We must ensure that the increased trade and investment strengthens the middle class. We must also ensure that the trade benefits do not come at the expense of environmental protection, labour rights, and the rights of governments to make rules in the public interest.

Our government is committed to making trade progressive, as we have demonstrated with the comprehensive economic and trade agreement with the European Union, and we continue to demonstrate with this agreement. The Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement integrates a number of key progressive trade components to ensure that economic gains are not achieved at the expense of the values and priorities that are important to Canadians.

The labour-related commitments made in the agreement require both countries to enforce their laws in this area, and those laws must be in line with the International Labour Organization's 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. This includes strengthening the freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, the elimination of child labour and forced labour, and the elimination of discrimination in the workplace.

The agreement also includes occupational health and safety protections, acceptable minimum employment standards, and non-discrimination provisions to protect migrant workers.

The commitments made in this agreement also emphasize the importance of co-operation on labour issues and include mechanisms to monitor compliance with labour-related commitments, as well as a dispute settlement mechanism that can result in monetary penalties. These are the most comprehensive labour-related commitments ever negotiated by Ukraine.

The Canada-Ukraine FTA also includes a chapter on the environment that involves substantive and binding commitments. The agreement's environmental chapter contains commitments to maintain high levels of environmental protection as we intensify our trade relationship. Importantly, both Canada and Ukraine commit to not lowering their levels of protection in order to attract trade or investment.

This agreement's environment chapter reflects Canadian values that trade liberalization and environmental protection should be mutually supportive. To support these obligations and ensure that they are respected, the environment chapter includes a distinct dispute resolution mechanism with recourse to an independent panel of experts. Canada and Ukraine also agreed to work together to implement the panel's recommendations.

In addition, the agreement contains commitments ensuring the transparency of the parties' domestic administrations including the prompt publication of legislative, regulatory, procedural, and administrative rulings.

Furthermore, the agreement contains a robust state-to-state dispute settlement mechanism that includes a binding, compulsory panel procedure. This dispute settlement mechanism reinforces Canada's commitment to transparency.

The Canada-Ukraine FTA also includes a number of commitments on anti-corruption. For instance, it obliges the parties to adopt, maintain, and enforce anti-corruption legislation and related measures, in particular to adopt or maintain measures to establish acts of bribery and corruption involving public officials as criminal offences. It also obliges Canada and Ukraine to ensure that they have jurisdiction over these criminal offences. These obligations are also supported by a dispute settlement mechanism involving an independent panel if parties are not able to resolve an issue related to these anti-corruption commitments.

Furthermore, the Canada-Ukraine FTA contains provisions ensuring the ability of the governments to regulate in the public interest, including specific provisions that preserve the right to protect national security; human, animal, or plant life or health; as well as the right to pursue cultural objectives.

Finally, trade-related co-operation is another important element of the Canada-Ukraine FTA, which will indeed facilitate co-operation between Canada and Ukraine, with the objective of maximizing the benefits from the agreement and contributing to sustainable development, for example, through capacity-building, joint activities in research, and the transfer of technological skills and practice.

Canada's strong friendship and partnership with Ukraine has very deep roots, stretching back 125 years to the arrival of the first Ukrainian immigrants to Canada, the first of successive waves of immigrants who would leave lasting and indelible impressions on the fabric of our Canadian society, economy, and political landscape.

Today, there are more than 1.2 million Canadians with Ukrainian heritage, including a number in this House, making the Ukrainian community one of Canada's largest ethnic communities and an important source of information and support in the political, security, and commercial spheres for both Canada and Ukraine. Such deep ties are important for many reasons. Strong trade relationships depend on strong people-to-people relationships.

Our government believes that these uncertain economic times call for more global partnerships, not less. Moving forward with the timely ratification of the Canada-Ukraine FTA will establish a more stable trading environment that will be beneficial for both Canada and Ukraine, strengthening our bilateral relations, supporting Canada's foreign policy objectives, and enhancing commercial opportunities that can contribute to sustainable economic development.

I therefore urge all hon. members to support Bill C-31 to help us to accomplish that and a great deal more.

Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement Implementation ActGovernment Orders

December 13th, 2016 / 11:50 a.m.
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NDP

Sheila Malcolmson NDP Nanaimo—Ladysmith, BC

Madam Speaker, while I have the floor I want to thank the cafeteria staff for feeding us perogies at lunch today, which was very appropriate given the deal we are debating.

I want to thank the parliamentary secretary to the Minister of International Trade for bringing forward a trade deal to this House that the New Democrats are happy to support. It removes tariffs from steel to seafood, and aids exports, and adds Canadian jobs, without any of the downside of the other trade deals the government has been supporting, which give more rights to foreign investors to challenge disputes in the new investor court in the EU, for example, and undermine our environmental and social regulations.

Both the parliamentary secretary and the trade minister on the Liberal side have talked a lot about progressive trade deals. I would like to learn more, because we have had two very different types of trade deals in the House, one the New Democrats support and one we do not. Can the parliamentary secretary tell us more about his view of what constitutes a progressive trade deal and how this one fits with that?

Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement Implementation ActGovernment Orders

December 13th, 2016 / 11:50 a.m.
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Liberal

David Lametti Liberal LaSalle—Émard—Verdun, QC

Madam Speaker, as members on that side of the House know, I will go to no lengths to make the NDP happy on trade deals.

Progressive trade deals are meant to reinforce social values that we share, such as protecting the environment, advancing labour standards, and advancing standards of transparency, and enshrining the right to regulate.

Trade deals are not all the same. They have different political and social goals that can be attained in any given situation, depending on whether they are multilateral or bilateral. Hence, every trade deal is different. Accordingly, we on this side of the House feel that CETA and CUFTA are progressive trade deals for a variety of different reasons. We believe they advance these various goals in different ways, to different degrees, but always within the realm of the possible.

Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement Implementation ActGovernment Orders

December 13th, 2016 / 11:55 a.m.
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Green

Elizabeth May Green Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC

Madam Speaker, I too will be supporting Bill C-31. It is interesting that the bill does not contain the investor-state provisions. I do not know why there is the assumption that investor-state provisions have to go into every trade deal. The hon. parliamentary secretary and I have discussed this before.

I would like some clarification. Were there any substantial changes, or any changes at all, made between this Canada-Ukraine agreement, for which I understand negotiations were concluded under the Harper administration in 2015, and the version that was signed by our current hon. Minister of International Trade earlier this summer?

Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement Implementation ActGovernment Orders

December 13th, 2016 / 11:55 a.m.
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Liberal

David Lametti Liberal LaSalle—Émard—Verdun, QC

Madam Speaker, I thank the hon. member for her work on these files.

The investor-state dispute resolution mechanism is not in this treaty but exists in a prior foreign investment promotion and protection agreement, FIPA, that we had signed with Ukraine. It contains the standard ISDS mechanism that is well known. I do not start from the presumption that everyone who participates in ISDS is in some way a crook, or something like that; rather, it is meant to provide for more efficient resolution of disputes, which in most cases involve issues akin to the expropriation of private property. Therefore, it is not a question of people getting additional rights, but a different way of regulating rights that most of us in this House recognize exist.

To finish the last part of the member's question, it is my understanding that there were no substantial changes made to the treaty as negotiated.

Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement Implementation ActGovernment Orders

December 13th, 2016 / 11:55 a.m.
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NDP

Anne Minh-Thu Quach NDP Salaberry—Suroît, QC

Madam Speaker, I am very pleased to say that this treaty has been demonstrably and thoroughly analyzed by all parties in the House, including the NDP, and that our party can show that there are free trade agreements that it can support, such as those that help Canadian workers and the Canadian economy and ensure respect for human rights and democracy abroad—in Ukraine in this case. There are some bilateral treaties that are simpler, such as the one with Ukraine, that we can support.

The parliamentary secretary compared the treaty with Ukraine with CETA, and said that the Liberals were being very transparent. However, the process was quite different for both. The government did not allow some witnesses to present their briefings to the committee that studied CETA. That shows a lack of transparency. There were supposed to be 21 days between the tabling of the agreement and the tabling of the bill in the House. However, that was not the case for CETA, but it was for the Ukraine agreement.

The transparency around these two agreements was altogether different, and I hope that the Liberal member can acknowledge that.

Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement Implementation ActGovernment Orders

December 13th, 2016 / 11:55 a.m.
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Liberal

David Lametti Liberal LaSalle—Émard—Verdun, QC

Madam Speaker, I thank my honourable colleague for her question.

I would like to point out that the CETA text has existed since 2014. The parliamentary process was followed by the former government during the 41st Parliament. Therefore, generally speaking, the agreement was studied.

The NDP is exaggerating when it says that there is a double standard. Both treaties were duly studied by committees, as they should be.

Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement Implementation ActGovernment Orders

December 13th, 2016 / 11:55 a.m.
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NDP

Pierre-Luc Dusseault NDP Sherbrooke, QC

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for his speech.

Could my colleague elaborate on the geopolitical impact that the signing, ratification, and implementation of the free trade agreement with Ukraine would have on that part of the world?

Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement Implementation ActGovernment Orders

December 13th, 2016 / noon
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Liberal

David Lametti Liberal LaSalle—Émard—Verdun, QC

Madam Speaker, I thank my hon. colleague for his excellent question.

It is important to note that, by helping Ukrainians develop their economy and reduce their dependence on other countries, namely Russia, we are helping Ukraine become a truly independent country.

By strengthening bilateral economic relations between our two countries, we can also create a more positive structure and space that will promote other types of political relationships and political stability in the region.

Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement Implementation ActGovernment Orders

December 13th, 2016 / noon
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Conservative

Garnett Genuis Conservative Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB

Madam Speaker, I am going to raise this issue in my speech, but I would like to ask the parliamentary secretary's perspective in terms of the issue of ongoing co-operation with Ukraine. Obviously, this trade deal is something we support, and it reflects very much our values as well as our economic interests. However, there has been, in some important areas of co-operation, some pullback from the government in terms of that co-operation less on the economic and more on the military side.

I would ask the member's perspective on his government's decision to stop providing satellite imagery to the Ukrainian armed forces. This was something that Canada did through RADARSAT-2 under the previous government, which was stopped in May of this year. I certainly agree with the importance of collaborating with Ukraine on multiple fronts. Does the member agree that the government should at least look at restoring that vital support to the Ukrainian armed forces?

Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement Implementation ActGovernment Orders

December 13th, 2016 / noon
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Liberal

David Lametti Liberal LaSalle—Émard—Verdun, QC

Madam Speaker, relationships, whether they be military, economic, or political, evolve. We continue, as we will, under this trade agreement as under our political engagements, and continue to evaluate our relationship with Ukraine and every aspect of that relationship.

We will make decisions in a variety of specific cases, as we have done with satellite imagery, as we are doing in the economic realm, and in other places, to do what is in the best interests of Canada first and foremost, but also in the best interests of helping Ukraine to build itself as a country.

Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement Implementation ActGovernment Orders

December 13th, 2016 / noon
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Conservative

Garnett Genuis Conservative Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB

Madam Speaker, it is a pleasure for me to rise to join this exciting and important debate about ratifying the Canada-Ukraine free trade deal. This is an agreement and legislation that all parties in the House support, at least the three major parties. We are grateful for that and the statement it makes about Canada's co-operation with Ukraine.

I want to share a bit of the history of the Canada-Ukraine co-operation and talk specifically about some issues in Ukraine. Then I will also make a plea to the government to consider doing more when it comes to this co-operation. I think there is some pulling back in terms of this important relationship that has happened under the current government, not so much on the economic front but on other fronts. I want to draw the attention of members to that issue and again ask members of Parliament and the government to do more, because we are, indeed, talking about a relationship that is critically important for both countries.

I had the honour of visiting Ukraine in August of this year. I stayed in a hotel that overlooks Independence Square. I was there when this young nation marked its 25th anniversary and it was such a powerful experience for me. Canada is coming up to its 150th anniversary, an important milestone for our country, but we experience our founding moments as a matter of history and not so much a matter of immediate personal experience. They are part of our collective memory, but not part of any of our individual memories. Even so, our founding did not come out of occupation.

Being in Ukraine for this 25th anniversary was so powerful on multiple levels. The history of the occupation of all of Ukraine is very immediate. Most Ukrainians will remember what it was like to live under Soviet occupation, but Ukraine is also a country that is currently being occupied by Russia and Russian-backed entities. There is no doubt that there is a great deal of sorrow about the ongoing challenges and the occupation, but there is also a great pride in Ukraine about what this young nation has been able to accomplish.

Ukraine has been compared to the mythological creature, the phoenix, that dies and is continually dramatically reborn. This is the story of Ukraine, entirely irrepressible and continually reborn in the midst of a very harsh environment geopolitically in terms of the neighbour it has to deal with. The current incarnation of the Ukrainian state has, indeed, accomplished so much in a short time, so much since its founding 25 years ago and since the Euromaidan movement, which started about three years ago.

Eastern Europe, like many parts of the world, is a place where the shifting sands or, in this case, we might say the shifting snows, of empire have left a multicultural and multi-ethnic reality that makes the definition of ethnic borders quite difficult. This is sort of true of Canada as well, although we generally think of our multiculturalism here as being voluntary. Much, though not all, of our diversity is the product of immigration and accommodation as opposed to conquest. However, Ukraine emerged only recently from occupation, an occupation that included genocide, which was followed, in turn, by the sending of ethnic Russians into communities that had previously been inhabited by Ukrainians.

Therefore, as we think about Ukrainian identity and the reality of the Ukrainian state, it might be worth suggesting and understanding that, though quite diverse, Ukraine has found itself in a place of what we might call involuntary diversity. During the occupation, people were sent there and this was a situation that the Ukrainian state, upon coming into existence, found itself in. That history, obviously, has made certain cultural ties between Ukraine and Russia inevitable.

Because of this, we hear some political narrative from people with an interest in propelling this narrative about division, the claim that Ukraine is divided between east and west, between Ukrainian and Russian speakers, and along ethnic and religious lines. However, what I found when I was in Ukraine in August, what I observed and what I was told, is that Ukraine is a diverse but also a deeply united country, indeed, united in its intention to resist foreign aggression, a country that, in the midst of a history of involuntary diversity, is choosing to build a shared civic nationalism, with shared values and shared cultural touchstones as well.

It is within this context, and other members have already referred to this, that we hear about an interest in the Canadian model of unity around common values in spite of differences.

I mentioned my hotel room, when I was in Ukraine, overlooked Independence Square, which was the centre of a movement that started about three years ago, called the Euromaidan movement, where protestors bravely resisted a corrupt Russian-backed autocrat Viktor Yanukovych and successfully forced him from power.

As we have a discussion today about a trade deal with Ukraine, it is worth reminding ourselves that the spark that set off that conflict, initially, was actually a discussion about trade. The then government of Ukraine decided not to pursue closer economic integration with Europe, despite previous commitments to do that.

As we think about that, and we think about the debate we are having today, it is a good reminder that trade association, in this context, is not principally about the economy. It was, for Ukraine, about independence and identity. The initial decision to not proceed with this agreement would have left Ukraine in a position of serious economic vulnerability and, therefore, geopolitical dependence on Russia.

The Russian regime, the Putin regime, did not want Ukraine to be able to develop trading relationships that affirm and deepen its independent western and European identity; hence, the pressure that was put on Yanukovych. This was a key pivot point associated with a discussion about trade.

Because of the bravery of protesters who risked and, in some cases, gave their lives, Ukraine positioned itself to start a stronger future as a more independent, more European, more western-looking nation. It was a brave and proud moment for Ukrainian nationals.

Russian propaganda, then and since, tries to dismiss Ukrainian nationalism, in general, and the Euromaidan movement, in particular, as being about narrowly xenophobic and ethnic nationalism, even anti-Semitism and white supremacy; but the reality could not be further from the truth.

In fact, these messages are particularly ironic when we identify Russian support for far right movements in Europe. The Russian regime and its enablers and useful idiots in the west peddle an exclusive colonialist vision of nationalism that suggests they have a right to seek to control affairs in countries that they have historically bullied or occupied, their so-called sphere of influence.

No sovereign state has a right to bully another on the basis of cultural ties or historic claims to so-called sphere of influence. There is no moral or legal justification for such bullying, and there never has been.

However, while the Russian state peddles narrow and ethnocentric nationalism, the Ukrainian nationalism that spawned the Euromaidan move is open, pluralistic, and democratic, and it has strengthened Ukraine and it continues to strengthen Ukraine.

When I was there, I spoke with young Ukrainians who participated in the Euromaidan movement, of all varied ethnic and religious backgrounds. I met with Jewish leaders, one of whom led a Jewish brigade in the Maidan. I met Muslim Crimean Tatar leaders who have inspired their fellow Ukrainians by showing as great a pride in their predominantly Christian country as anyone else.

We have an opportunity tonight in the vote to recognize the genocide they have faced and to do something very important for this community.

We have Muslim Ukrainians, ethnic Tatar Ukrainians, Jewish Ukrainians, Russian-speaking Ukrainians, Polish Ukrainians, Catholic Ukrainians, Orthodox Ukrainians, Ukrainian Ukrainians. They are all Ukrainians, united by culture, to some extent, but, more important, by common Ukrainian values of independence and democracy.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine sought to capitalize on a moment of weakness but, in fact, it united Ukrainians more than ever in a commitment to share civic nationalism, and to the western and European values that spawned Euromaidan in the first place.

Ukraine's success was never inevitable, but her people have shown, and continue to show, inspiring and inspired courage.

Trade with Ukraine is economically useful, but it is also a moral and strategic imperative. We must use our own significant and unique cultural ties with Ukraine to ensure that this brave nation is never again as vulnerable to the bullying of Russia as it once was. Its independence requires economic ties with nations that will respect that independence and, indeed, that share its values.

We share cultural ties with Ukraine, but also we have a common approach to nationalism, a love of country rooted in shared civic values, not in ethnic exclusiveness or a desire to dominate someone else.

While I am pleased to see a certain consensus in the House around the need to have a strong relationship with Ukraine and to support Ukraine, we need to do more and better when it comes to standing up for Ukraine. I want to identify three specific areas where the government can do a better job when it comes to standing by our important partner.

The first thing we can do is to do more for domestic human rights issues inside Russia. Why would I say that in the context of a debate about Ukraine? Because we know, and we can see as we look at different conflicts around the world, that a government that is a menace to its own people is necessarily going to be a menace to international peace and security. When a government is aggressive and hostile toward its neighbours, we know that will also likely lead to or be associated with the repression of human rights domestically.

It is in the midst of the Russian attempt to distract attention from domestic challenges, economic challenges, and human rights issues inside Russia that it is undertaking this aggressive activity in other countries. Therefore, we need to be very clear about the fact that human rights in Russia must not be sacrificed. There is a very concrete way that we can do it. We can support and pass Magnitsky sanctions, which specifically target human rights abusers associated with the Russian regime. This is a piece of innovative political technology that targets, with sanctions, individuals involved in human rights abuses. Unlike in times passed, the autocrats of the world and those around them often enjoyed having investments in and travelling to countries in the west. By working with our allies to impose these individual targeted Magnitsky sanctions, we can make a real concrete difference for human rights in Russia.

This is something I know individual members of the government support, but so far we have seen in statements made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a reluctance to move forward with this. I think we know why. Because the government is pursuing a policy of closer relations with the Russian government. It justifies it on the basis that if we engage, we could talk about human rights issues. I would be more sympathetic to that if we actually saw the government using engagement as a means to advance human rights issues, if it was talking to the Russians but still insisting on Canadian values and still insisting, for instance, on the implementation of Magnitsky sanctions. However, that has not been the tone, and does not seem to be the direction, at least, that the current Minister of Foreign Affairs is setting.

I encourage all members of the House to understand the importance of Magnitsky sanctions. This is not a piece of political technology that is limited in its effectiveness to Russia. We should explore the use of Magnitsky sanctions in many different places to target human rights abusers, but let us take this vital step. It is a step that is important to Ukrainians and the Ukrainian community in Canada. They want to see their Russian neighbours enjoying the same freedoms that people in Ukraine and Canada enjoy. I think they understand that a Russia that is genuinely free and democratic can be a good neighbour to Ukraine, at some point in the future we hope. However, as long as there is internal repression of human rights in Russia, there is a greater threat that exists to Ukraine and other countries in the region.

Number one is to do more for human rights inside Russia.

Number two is that the government needs to strengthen military co-operation with Ukraine. We hear a lot from members of the government about the need to be engaged as a strategic partner with Ukraine. However, there is one simple thing they could do, which is to reverse a step they took back on May 6 of this year. At the time of the previous government, the Harper government, it was agreed that we would share information from Canadian satellites with the Ukrainian armed forces. This information was very helpful in their fight with Russian-backed entities in eastern Ukraine. This was a decision the previous government undertook, but then it was reversed by the Liberal government. We have stopped providing these satellite images.

I have asked this question of multiple members of the government today, and it is important that we continue to ask this question. No justification has been given for withdrawing the use of this imagery in terms of giving it to the Ukraine government. We can imagine what the reasoning might be. We can only assume that the Russians wanted Canada to stop providing this information to Ukrainian authorities and that the Liberal government decided to listen to the wishes and the interests of the Russians. The reality is that this satellite imaging was extremely helpful to the Ukrainian armed forces. It was right for us to be providing this strategic support. As of May 6 of this year, Canada stopped providing these images.

I have a quote from Ivan Katchanovski, a political science professor at the University of Ottawa. He said, “I think this was a sign of a possible change in the Canadian stance toward Ukraine”. He noted as well that budgetary considerations were unlikely to be the real reason for these decisions.

These images are being taken anyway. Canada has these satellites, so sharing these images with the Ukrainian government does not strike me as a difficult or challenging thing to do. If the Russians are against it and the Liberal government is being overly-influenced by Russian interests, then that obviously creates a problem for Ukraine. Ukraine is in a battle for its very existence and Canada needs to be there. We need to provide these satellite images.

For all of the government members who are giving flowery speeches about the need to support Ukraine and to work with Ukraine, I ask them to take this simple step and show goodwill, show that they actually want to co-operate. That would be proof positive of a real commitment to working with Ukraine. However, it looks like, on the one hand, there is this discussion of the need to work with Ukraine. On the other hand, there is this pulling back of support. There seems to be a dissidence between what is being said and the reality, at least as it pertains to military co-operation.

We need to strengthen military co-operation with Ukraine. This would mean the continuation of the training mission that began under the previous government, which is up for renewal in March 2017. We have yet to hear a formal commitment with respect to continuing that support. It would be really unfortunate if the government did not continue to provide Ukraine with what it needed in addition to the satellite imagery we pulled back in other areas.

The final point I want to make with respect to Canada's co-operation with Ukraine is on the areas in which we can do more. We can reinstate initiatives that were aimed at promoting communal harmony in Ukraine. When I was in Ukraine in August, it was interesting to have discussions with people about the issues of some of the religious tension that existed. There have been significant concerns about faith-based persecution taking place in Crimea and in other Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine, the persecution especially of Catholics and Protestants, as well as some persecution targeted at the Muslim community.

As we think about that, it is important to recognize that under the previous government, we had the Office of Religious Freedom. It provided funding for on-the-ground projects aimed at building harmony between different communities. That office had projects inside of Ukraine aimed at bringing together some of the different religious elements and promoting communal harmony, this being important for the ongoing unity of the Ukrainian state.

During a debate we had in the spring about the Office of Religious Freedom, one member from the NDP suggested that the fact we were putting money into projects on religious freedom in Ukraine suggested that this office was somehow political, as if to suggest that there were no real issues with communal harmony in Ukraine but especially as we saw the persecution of certain faith groups in Russian-occupied parts of eastern Ukraine. There is a need for Canada to be involved in that conversation, and we can provide meaningful support.

I am pleased to support this free trade deal, but I am also eager to urge the government to do more when it comes to helping Ukraine, to do more for human rights inside Russia, to strengthen our military co-operation with Ukraine, reverse the decision with regard to satellite imaging, and reinstate international initiatives aimed at promoting communal harmony, especially which have benefits for Ukraine. We could do these things. We could actually put our money where our mouths are when it comes to helping that country in addition to this important step today, which is the free trade deal.

Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement Implementation ActGovernment Orders

December 13th, 2016 / 12:20 p.m.
See context

Mississauga Centre Ontario

Liberal

Omar Alghabra LiberalParliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Consular Affairs)

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member knows that the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development is conducting a study for the sanctions framework, and it is looking at, among other things, the Magnitsky proposal. However, I have a question for the member. If the Magnitsky Act was so clear cut, when his party was in government, why did it not implement it?

Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement Implementation ActGovernment Orders

December 13th, 2016 / 12:20 p.m.
See context

Conservative

Garnett Genuis Conservative Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB

Mr. Speaker, under the previous government, important steps were taken with regard to supporting Ukraine and addressing human rights issues in Russia, and there was a commitment to move forward with the Magnitsky Act. In fact, the parliamentary secretary's own party committed with respect to supporting a Magnitsky Act before the last election. I do not know the precise timelines when this was proposed. The idea of a Magnitsky Act is something that has been developed relatively recently. It is not a form of sanctions that has been around for decades. This is a new piece of political technology that was developed to deal with human rights abuses. It is innovative, it has been passed in the United States and it works very well.

Obviously the commitment was there. Had the Conservatives been re-elected, we would have seen the implementation of the Magnitsky Act. The parliamentary secretary's own party made this commitment. If this is so ambiguous and it needs more study, the Liberals should have done the study before they made this commitment. Let us get this done, let us pass this common sense initiative and let us make it non-partisan.