This bill was last introduced in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session, which ended in September 2019.
Ralph Goodale Liberal
This bill has received Royal Assent and is now law.
This is from the published bill.
Part 1 enacts the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, which establishes the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and sets out its composition, mandate and powers. It repeals the provisions of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act establishing the Security Intelligence Review Committee and amends that Act and other Acts in order to transfer certain powers, duties and functions to the new Agency. It also makes related and consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 1.1 enacts the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act to authorize the issuance of directions respecting the disclosure of and request for information that would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity and the use of information that is likely to have been obtained as the result of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity.
Part 2 enacts the Intelligence Commissioner Act, which provides that the duties and functions of the Intelligence Commissioner are to review the conclusions on the basis of which certain authorizations are issued or amended, and determinations are made, under the Communications Security Establishment Act and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and to approve those authorizations, amendments and determinations if those conclusions are reasonable. This Part also abolishes the position of the Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment, provides for that Commissioner to become the Intelligence Commissioner, transfers the employees of the former Commissioner to the office of the new Commissioner and makes related and consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 enacts the Communications Security Establishment Act, which establishes the Communications Security Establishment and, among other things, sets out the Establishment’s mandate as well as the regime for authorizing its activities. It also amends the National Defence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 4 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to
(a) add a preamble to that Act and provide a mechanism to enhance the accountability of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(b) add new limits on the exercise of the Service’s power to reduce threats to the security of Canada including, in particular, by setting out a list of measures that may be authorized by the Federal Court;
(c) provide a justification, subject to certain limitations, for the commission of acts or omissions that would otherwise constitute offences;
(d) exempt employees of the Service and persons acting under their direction from liability for offences related to acts committed for the sole purpose of establishing or maintaining a covert identity;
(e) create a regime for the Service to collect, retain, query and exploit datasets in the course of performing its duties and functions;
(f) make amendments to the warrant regime that are related to datasets; and
(g) implement measures for the management of datasets.
Part 5 amends the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act to, among other things,
(a) emphasize that the Act addresses only the disclosure of information and not its collection or use;
(b) clarify the definition of “activity that undermines the security of Canada”;
(c) clarify that advocacy, protest, dissent and artistic expression are not activities that undermine the security of Canada unless they are carried on in conjunction with an activity that undermines the security of Canada;
(d) provide that a disclosure of information is authorized only if the disclosure will contribute to the carrying out by the recipient institution of its national security responsibilities and will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary;
(e) require that information disclosed be accompanied by information about the accuracy of the disclosed information and the reliability of the manner in which it was obtained; and
(f) require that records be prepared and kept in respect of every disclosure of information and that every year a copy of every record prepared in the preceding year be provided to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.
Part 6 amends the Secure Air Travel Act to authorize the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to collect from air carriers and operators of aviation reservation systems, for the purpose of identifying listed persons, information about any individuals who are on board or expected to be on board an aircraft for any flight prescribed by regulation, and to exempt an air carrier from providing that information, or from the application of any provision of the regulations, in certain circumstances. It amends the Act to authorize that Minister to collect personal information from individuals for the purpose of issuing a unique identifier to them to assist with pre-flight verification of their identity. It also reverses the rule in relation to a deemed decision on an application for administrative recourse. Finally, it amends the Act to provide for certain other measures related to the collection, disclosure and destruction of information.
Part 7 amends the Criminal Code to, among other things,
(a) make certain procedural modifications to the terrorist listing regime under section 83.05, such as providing for a staggered ministerial review of listed entities and granting the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness the authority to amend the names, including aliases, of listed entities;
(b) change the offence of advocating or promoting terrorism offences in general, in section 83.21, to one of counselling the commission of a terrorism offence, and make corresponding changes to the definition of terrorist propaganda;
(c) raise one of the thresholds for imposing a recognizance with conditions under section 83.3, and amend when that section is to be reviewed and, unless extended by Parliament, to cease to have effect;
(d) repeal sections 83.28 and 83.29 relating to an investigative hearing into a terrorism offence and repeal subsections 83.31(1) and (1.1), which require annual reports on such hearings;
(e) require the Attorney General of Canada to publish a report each year setting out the number of terrorism recognizances entered into under section 810.011 in the previous year; and
(f) authorize a court, in proceedings for recognizances under any of sections 83 and 810 to 810.2, to make orders for the protection of witnesses.
Part 8 amends the Youth Criminal Justice Act to, among other things, ensure that the protections that are afforded to young persons apply in respect of proceedings in relation to recognizance orders, including those related to terrorism, and give employees of a department or agency of the Government of Canada access to youth records, for the purpose of administering the Canadian Passport Order.
Part 9 requires that a comprehensive review of the provisions and operation of this enactment take place during the fourth year after section 168 of this enactment comes into force. If that section 168 and section 34 of Bill C-22, introduced in the 1st session of the 42nd Parliament and entitled the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, come into force within one year of each other, the reviews required by those sections are to take place at the same time and are to be undertaken by the same committee or committees.
All sorts of information on this bill is available at LEGISinfo, an excellent resource from the Library of Parliament. You can also read the full text of the bill.
Marco Mendicino Liberal Eglinton—Lawrence, ON
Marco Mendicino Liberal Eglinton—Lawrence, ON
Madam Chair, through you to Ms. Sahota, first, I appreciate the question. It allows me to expand on how we are combatting foreign interference.
I talked about how we have created new authorities and powers for our national security intelligence agencies, through Bill C-59, that bestow upon them the ability to address and to mitigate any potential threats to our national security.
We've also put into place a protocol that applies specifically during elections. It is called the critical election incident public protocol. It is applied by our most senior non-partisan, professional public servants, who have been charged with the responsibility of receiving information and intelligence as it relates to any foreign interference that could pose a threat to an election. It is applied when they inform and educate Canadians about that work.
This is a protocol that has served Canadians well. However, I would also point out to Ms. Sahota that we are not resting on our laurels. We are building on the recommendations put forward by two distinguished Canadians, Mr. Judd and Morris Rosenberg. I know that my colleague, Minister LeBlanc, has reported recently to the Prime Minister on how we are advancing recommendations to strengthen the mechanisms we have in place to protect all of our institutions, and most especially our elections.
Ryan Turnbull Liberal Whitby, ON
Thanks, Madam Chair.
Mr. Jean, thank you for being here. I appreciate your testimony.
You mentioned several times, in response to various questions about the CSIS Act, the fact that CSIS was introduced in 1984. I know that our government added some threat reduction measures in Bill C-59, which was first tabled in the House in 2017. I know those are subject to legal authorization, so there was some enhancement of powers of CSIS and CSE, if I am not mistaken, with regard to threat reduction measures.
I am wondering, in terms of your deep knowledge in this space, and a review of the CSIS Act—which you seem to think is necessary and on which I agree with you—what specific changes should be made to the CSIS Act, in your view?
The context is always different. I was deputy clerk and helped the Harper government pass Bill C-51 late in its mandate. A little bit later, I helped the Trudeau government amend it through Bill C-59.
At the time, in 2015-16, there was still a great deal of focus on anti-terrorism. This is the time when Daesh had overrun most of northern Iraq. There were all kinds of issues in the Middle East at the time.
As Mr. Jean and others can explain to you, there are a range of threats that the Government of Canada worries about, from terrorism to domestic terrorism to cybersecurity to foreign interference and so on. That's why we have a national security adviser. That's why we have a cabinet committee on security and intelligence, and that's why the government wanted NSICOP created.
I'll try my best to reconstruct a chronology using Google. I may get some of the order wrong or whatever.
Yes, I was deputy clerk in 2015. I was appointed deputy clerk by Prime Minister Harper and stayed for the transition and the early days of Mr. Trudeau's mandate. He appointed me clerk in January of 2016, and I took on that role for the next three years.
There were quite a few things in play at the time.
A very early priority of the government, you may recall, was to create the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians to give a group of parliamentarians with appropriate security clearances a window into national security and intelligence issues. Bill C-22 was an early initiative by the government.
Also, then, there were a number of initiatives under way, so by the time we got to 2017, which I know is the period of interest here, there were quite a few things in play. Bill C-59, which was the comprehensive overhaul of national security legislation, would have been in play in late 2016 and early 2017. We were very concerned about disinformation issues. It's a matter of public record that Putin's Russia tried to disrupt the French election in May of 2017 and that they tried to disrupt the German election in September of 2017.
At the time, cybersecurity was a huge issue. Members who have been here long enough will remember Chinese cyber-attacks on the National Research Council that were called out by the Harper government—by Minister Baird—in early 2014. A personal focus for me very much was on cybersecurity: secure communications for the Prime Minister and secure communications for the cabinet, and investments in cybersecurity, which came to fruition in the 2018 budget.
I could go on, but that gives you some sense of what was going on at that time.
I'll just quickly say no. Several of the problems I raised were actually enshrined in Bill C-59, the creation of the CSE act. One of the things we think needs to be done is to bolster the powers of both NSIRA and the intelligence commissioner to be able to review these kinds of activities and be able to discuss their findings publicly.
Lindsay Mathyssen NDP London—Fanshawe, ON
Thank you for that.
Yes, it was mentioned within that same lawsuit, in the documents that the BC Civil Liberties Association came out with, the glossary of terms of unselected data and publicly available data and how they are used. Do laws like Bill C-59...? That lawsuit was before Bill C-59. It addressed more the old Bill C-51 problems. Specifically as we look at Bill C-26, do those laws adequately address the threats that civil libertarians are worried about in terms of taking advantage of publicly available data?
Opposition Motion—Instruction to the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and EthicsBusiness of SupplyGovernment Orders
Liberal
Marco Mendicino Liberal Eglinton—Lawrence, ON
Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for his question.
The government takes the issue of foreign interference very seriously. All of our legislation demonstrates our commitment to this issue. Consider for example Bill C‑59, which granted the Canadian Security Intelligence Service new powers to reduce threats caused by foreign interference. Another example is Bill C‑76, which targeted foreign funds that could pose a threat to our democratic institutions.
My colleague is quite right to ask questions. That is the purpose of this House. The point of this place is to shed light on how we carry out these duties. At the same time, it is fair to point out that, for the government and for everyone else, partisanship is not good for debate.
I hope we can set partisanship aside as we move forward.
Opposition Motion—Instruction to the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and EthicsBusiness of SupplyGovernment Orders
Eglinton—Lawrence Ontario
Liberal
Marco Mendicino LiberalMinister of Public Safety
Madam Speaker, I want to thank the opposition for this opportunity to speak to this motion. Protecting Canadians means protecting the country's institutions. It is an important responsibility for all governments, but some are trying to exploit the freedoms we enjoy as Canadians to sow division and compromise our democratic values.
It is for that reason that this motion is so important. I assure all members in the chamber that this government takes foreign interference with the utmost seriousness. The threats that it poses to our economy, to our academic and research institutions, to our critical infrastructure and, indeed, to our democratic institutions, including most especially our elections, is of paramount importance and work in which I hope all members will be united.
Although I have identified these priorities, they are indeed the pillars of our democracy. The people who who work within these institutions, Canadians who contribute, is sacred.
I understand that there has been a substantial amount of heat and passion in this subject matter. At times I think it has been regrettable to see that the discourse has strayed far too much into partisanship. I do not believe any of us benefit from that. It is my sincere hope that we would be able to have a debate on this motion, on the merits, on the principles, on civility and respect, because only together united can we fight against foreign interference and protect our institutions and our democracy.
There are two primacies to this motion. One is that we need more transparency. I am going to speak to that and about the ways in which this government is raising the bar and shining a light on the way in which we protect our national security. The second is the questions around what this government is doing to fight against foreign interference.
Let me start with the latter. Since taking the reins of government, we have been very proactive in putting in place the people, the resources, the technology, the powers and the authorities to equip all of the agencies that work within our national security and public safety apparatuses to protect our institutions.
By way of example, that includes legislation like Bill C-59, which gave CSIS new threat reduction measure powers to address and mitigate; in other words, reduce threats that may be caused by foreign interference or other hostile activities that could be used to undermine our democratic institutions. We put that legislation into place.
This government also introduced Bill C-76 to crackdown on foreign funding that could be used to interfere with our elections. It has become a useful tool to deter and disrupt those efforts as a way of safeguarding our democratic institutions.
Very recently, I launched a public consultation that will see the creation of a foreign-influenced transparency registry, so we can promote legitimate diplomacy and foreign activities on Canadian soil, while at the same time deterring and stopping any efforts that go beyond legitimate diplomatic activities here at home.
Even as we have done that, this government has raised the bar on transparency. We have done that through the creation of a number of new committees and agencies.
The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians is there to study matters related to security and intelligence. This new committee was created by our government to increase collaboration between all recognized parties in the House of Commons and with the Senate.
Under the leadership of one of my colleagues on the government side, many recommendations were made in a unified, cohesive manner to fight foreign interference. The government is in the process of implementing some of those recommendations.
What is more, we created the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, or NSIRA. The purpose of this agency is to review all the work that is done by our national security agencies. It has access to top secret information so that it can review our agencies' national security and public safety activities, in order to assure everyone that the work is being done properly or, if not, to provide meaningful recommendations that will benefit everyone.
By creating these bodies, we have raised the bar of transparency. We are benefiting from their work. We are doing so in a way that is bipartisan. In other words, we are finding ways to collaborate across the aisle in this chamber.
In addition to that, vis-à-vis our democratic institutions and specifically our elections, our government created the critical election incident public protocol, as well as the CEIPP panel, which is made up of our top, non-partisan, independent, professional public servants. They are there to ensure that during the course of an election that all the checks, balances and protections are doing their job to preserve the integrity of our federal elections. That is precisely what not one but two independent panels confirmed after they examined the circumstances of the federal elections in 2019 and 2021.
In short, they certified that those elections were free and fair, libres et justes, and my hope is that Canadians will take assurances in those conclusions, not to give rise to some sense of complacency but rather so we can be sure we are on the right track when it comes to putting in place the mechanisms necessary to shield our democratic institutions from foreign interference.
We need to do more. That is why, in addition to all of those mechanisms, just last week we announced the appointment of David Johnston, a former governor general appointed by Stephen Harper, a Conservative prime minister, and an individual with unimpeachable qualities and characteristics, to fulfill the role and to give us concrete advice on what the next best practical steps ought to be, given some of the questions around the 2019 and 2021 elections.
This builds on the two reports that were filed by James Judd and Morris Rosenberg, two former public servants with distinguished records, in a non-partisan, independent way, contributing to the dialogue in this important area with tangible, concrete recommendations on which the government has committed to act.
Indeed, in the case of Mr. Judd, we have acted on all but one of the recommendations. With regard to Mr. Rosenberg's report, we have heard my colleague, the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, who has committed to implementing those recommendations as well.
In the event that there are any questions about Mr. Johnston's qualifications, which I again believe are unimpeachable, let me quote from a number of Conservatives who have said the following.
I believe it was Fred Delorey, the former national chair of the Conservative Party campaign in 2021, who said that there was nobody better qualified. I believe it was Stephen Harper who said that David Johnston was the best of Canadians.
We can place trust and confidence that he will, without any pride or prejudice toward political parties or partisanship, put forward the best possible recommendations when it comes to the important subject matter of fighting against foreign interference.
I will say a few concluding words about the work that is being done by PROC, another forum in which the government is putting forward witnesses to again shed light on the way in which we are doing the work around foreign interference and national security.
Most recently PROC heard from the Prime Minister's national security intelligence advisor, the deputy ministers from Global Affairs and the former deputy minister from Public Safety, as well as from my colleagues, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs. All of them were able to certify that the federal elections in 2019 and 2021 were free and fair, but acknowledged that foreign interference was a significant challenge that required a proactive posture, one that continues to study, very thoughtfully and carefully, the types of tools and mechanisms we need to put in place to combat against those hostile actors who would try to undermine our democracy.
Our government will continue to co-operate with that committee. It is important that we demonstrate a willingness to work with all parliamentarians so we can offer evidence and advice and put our collective minds together to navigate this challenge.
Beyond Parliament, it is important that we engage Canadians.
I want to take a moment to underline that in the conversations I have had with a number of communities around how we create new tools, including the foreign agent registry, expressions of concern have been articulated to me, concerns that we do this work in the right way, that we do it transparently, and that the ways that we draft and craft our laws are done consistent with the principles that are espoused in the law and in the charter. That has to be the bedrock of the way in which we put pen to paper when we draft our legislation. It is technical work. It is complex work.
It is challenging to define and get the parameters right for how these authorities are triggered, used and then accountable in the use of those authorities, to be sure they are exercised reasonably and then accountable thereafter in the public reporting of it all.
With respect to Bill C-59, that is precisely why, when we created the new threat reduction powers for CSIS, we did so concurrently with the creation of NSIRA, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, so we could be accountable and transparent, so if any questions were raised legitimately about how these powers were being used, we could make the necessary course corrections to maintain trust and confidence in all Canadians when it came to the way in which we did the work around national security.
The Conservatives have gone to some length at times to be political and to be partisan, and that is regrettable. I do not believe that any of us profit from trying to score political points. We are a democracy. This is a chamber that sees some vigorous debate every single day, and it is a privilege to be part of those debates. Through those debates, my hope is that we are able to refine our ideas and advance them for the national interest.
However, when it comes to foreign interference, whether from the People's Republic of China, Russia or any other hostile actor that would attempt to undermine our institutions, it is important we take a team Canada approach.
We all have a vested interest in protecting the rules, principles and values that underpin our democracy. My sincere hope is that we will be able to continue to do this work in a way where, yes, there is fierce debate but it does not stray into partisanship and into the unnecessary politicization of an issue that should transcend it, so that we can do whatever is necessary to protect our democracy from all the threats that lie on the horizon.
It's not about strengthening the bill. It's about making sure that we use effectively the capabilities we have. The U.S. has vast capabilities that it uses on a regular basis, in part to prevent a change in the international balance of power. That is not primarily Canada's objective, although Canada's objective is inherently to uphold the status quo.
Canada's outline in the last paragraph of my statement [Technical difficulty—Editor] three clear focal points of red lines that Canada will not tolerate and where adversaries will know that Canada will deploy, either alone or with its allies, these active or offensive measures as provided for in Bill C‑59. The problem is that Canada has not been willing, by and large, to engage in these measures, with some exceptions of hunt forward teams when it comes, for instance, to issues such as those of Ukraine.
Canada needs to be a bit bolder in how it uses the powers that the agencies have been granted to defend Canadian interests.
Emmanuella Lambropoulos Liberal Saint-Laurent, QC
Thanks.
I appreciate your response. I'm wondering, because I'm not super familiar with Bill C‑59, if you can let us know if there are any gaps that currently exist in that bill that create a difference, let's say, between our capabilities and those of the U.S. If it were to become strengthened in times of need in the future, in what ways can it be strengthened?
It's a great question. We've tried for 20 years to build norms and consensus around this, and we've made very little progress within the UN and within other bodies.
What you need to understand is that there are people who believe in the liberal rules-based international order—that's about 57 countries—there are countries that are agnostic, and then there's a subset of countries that simply do not believe in that order, so we will never get an international cyber-governance regime, at least not in the foreseeable future, but we can force hostile actors [Technical difficulty—Editor]. We can deter them from bad behaviour if they know that the United States and its allies lay out big, clear red lines, such that there will be serious repercussions for that actor—whether in cyberspace or kinetic, through sanctions or otherwise—for crossing those lines. My opening statement lays out precisely that sort of mechanism.
However, the Government of Canada has been extremely reticent in using the powers that were given to CSE in Bill C-59 once the act received royal assent. The challenge is, then, what is the point of providing those powers if we're not actually going to use them to advance our interests? Canada has always prided itself on being a country that builds and then enforces international norms and rules, but when it comes to cyberspace, by not using those powers we are effectively doing exactly the opposite.
Now that we have those powers, we also need to use them to defend our interests and our allies' interests. The reason we need to use them is that this is a very particular role for the state to play, because private sector actors and other public sector actors do not have active and offensive capabilities that they can employ. Only the state can deploy those capabilities, so only the state can be proactive in either interdicting or, if need be, in cyberspace, also perhaps sabotaging the capabilities of state-based or state-tolerated malicious actors.
Emmanuella Lambropoulos Liberal Saint-Laurent, QC
Thanks, Chair.
I'd like to thank you, Professor, for being with us today to answer some of our questions.
First, what does the international cyber-governance regime currently look like in terms of international laws and norms governing state behaviour? You mentioned in your opening remarks that no other country comes anywhere near the U.S. in terms of ability when it comes to offensive cyber-measures, and you also said that Canada does have the capacity because of Bill C-59, but that we don't necessarily have the political will.
I'm wondering if you can tell us, from your perspective, what Canada can do, along with its allies, in order to strengthen this rules-based international order in the cyber-domain.
Dr. Christian Leuprecht Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, As an Individual
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I will make my statement in English. However, I will be happy to answer your questions in English or French.
The statement was distributed to you beforehand, so I will skip some parts of it.
Harvard University’s Belfer Center's cyber-power index ranks Canada in eighth place as a comprehensive global cyber-power. The CPI characterizes Canada as a high-intent, low-capacity cyber-power with notable strengths in cyber-defence, cyber-norms development initiatives and surveillance. By contrast, Canada’s intent and capability to conduct cyber-enhanced foreign intelligence and offensive cyber-operations place it in the middle of the CPI pack, lagging behind Russia and China and its Five Eyes partners—in particular, the U.S. and the U.K.—as well as the Netherlands and Israel. On the one hand, CPI’s evaluation of Canada reflects two decades of Canadian cybersecurity initiatives. On the other hand, the ranking shows that Canada has a strategic cyber-deficit.
For 20 years, cyber-diplomacy has largely failed to generate broad agreement on international norms to constrain malicious behaviour by state-based and state-tolerated actors in cyberspace. To deter and constrain bad behaviour, western states need to engage using active and offensive cyber-measures. This is what the U.S. doctrine of persistent engagement has been enabling since 2018. However, no U.S. ally comes close to matching U.S. resources and capabilities.
The 2019 passage of Bill C-59 expanded the role and impact Canada could have in cyberspace by authorizing CSE to conduct offensive cyber-operations. The addition of these capabilities to CSE’s mandate was hailed as a major step. In theory, the combination of foreign intelligence, active cyber-operations and defensive cyber-operation mandates enables the full spectrum of cyber-espionage, sabotage and subversion operations. Canada now has the capacity but lacks the political will to demonstrate independent international leadership to reduce instability and uncertainty in cyberspace.
I propose a cyber-doctrine of functional engagement to bolster tacitly accepted cyber-norms. Regularly employing cyber-capabilities is the most effective way for Canada to reduce uncertainty in cyberspace and limit threats to its national interests.
Due to Canada’s resource constraints and limited foreign policy ambitions, functional engagement prescribes that Canada employ the full range of its cyber-capabilities to establish and reinforce a limited set of clearly defined and communicated focal points to deter and constrain unacceptable behaviour.
Instead of continuously and globally employing cyber-capabilities to change the overall balance of power in the international system, functional engagement calls for Canada to employ its cyber-capabilities more narrowly, in specific instances when a malicious cyber-actor conducts activity that is antithetical to Canada’s focal points, such as by directly degrading Canadian sovereignty and the security of its people; degrading or subverting international law and the integrity of international, electoral or democratic institutions; and undermining Canada’s economic security, competitiveness and prosperity.
The proposed cyber-doctrine of functional engagement seeks to shape adversarial behaviour cumulatively by strengthening tacitly accepted cyber-norms within the limited resources and unique character of Canada’s historical leadership on foreign policy niches as a traditional middle power.
Thank you for your attention.
Ryan Turnbull Liberal Whitby, ON
Thank you, Madam Chair.
I'm sorry that I had to be away from the committee for a few minutes, but I'm glad to be back. I'm glad to still get my turn to speak to the amendment I put forward.
Again, it is quite reasonable to ask the campaign directors to come before the committee as additional witnesses. We've had a whole host of credible witnesses. In terms of our study, we've heard from the majority of witnesses, some of them more than once, and they've given us some very compelling testimony. I don't think it gives the Conservatives what they're looking for and I think that's why they continue to push us to have to debate this topic.
This is really clear-cut. Our government has been acting on foreign election interference since 2015. We know that the past government, prior to that, did absolutely nothing on foreign election interference. That's a fact. I've never heard a Conservative say otherwise. In fact, in the House, we heard an exchange between Minister LeBlanc and the leader of the official opposition. Minister LeBlanc said:
When my friend, the opposition leader, was the minister responsible for democratic institutions, he did nothing when intelligence agencies raised the issue over 10 years ago.
Mr. Poilievre's response was:
Mr. Speaker, we did not have to, because the Communist dictatorship in Beijing was not helping the Conservative Party to get elected.
I don't know how anyone can hear remarks like that and not fully understand that the Conservative motivations here are clearly partisan.
When we heard Minister LeBlanc at the committee today, he made reference to this statement, calling it a “perverse” sense of how a minister would take their responsibility. For the leader of the official opposition, who was formerly responsible for democratic institutions, to say such a thing really speaks to the true motivations of what the Conservatives are trying to do. They are well known for this as a party, because they have done this over and over again.
We've seen this. It's not that surprising. Many Canadians know that this is the new Conservative Party of Canada, a party that is constantly becoming more extreme, trying to stoke more division and trying to question our democratic institutions, and they won't let any of the facts get in the way of their partisan games.
We also know what Mr. Poilievre said this week in English, and this will be a direct quote, contrary to what Mr. Cooper said in our previous meeting today. Pierre Poilievre said, “They are so concerned about how the Prime Minister is acting against Canada's interest and in favour of a foreign dictatorship's interests”. He then said in French—I'm quoting the English—“we've never had an intelligence service so worried about a Prime Minister and his collaboration with a foreign power”.
For me, this is morally reprehensible. It's disgusting. It reeks of partisanship. It is really calling into question the motivations of our Prime Minister, who, like all of us, stood for office and is doing this for the benefit of the country and is giving so much to this country.
It is utterly disgusting. I don't even have words to describe how I feel about it. It actually makes me sad to think that this is the kind of politics we have in this country today.
When you add in the comments that Mr. Cooper made earlier to Minister Joly, which I found very offensive.... I really wish Mr. Cooper would realize just how gender-biased his remarks were and how disempowering that would feel. I can't put myself in the minister's shoes, but I can say we totally expect tough questions, of course, to ministers when they come before this committee. Holding the government to account is the responsibility of all of us, and it's something we all take very seriously, but when you are a complete and total jerk about it, and are offensive and are basically putting on display for everybody that you're gender-biased and discriminatory in your perspectives, you're just embarrassing yourself. It would be nice for him to actually “man up” and apologize for those comments.
Anyway, I'm sure we'll keep waiting for that to happen. I'm hopeful that he will find in his better judgment, at some point in the near future, a way to come back to us and hopefully apologize for those remarks.
Look, I've spent a lot of time talking about how much our government has done on foreign election interference and I've been very careful to also say that we should never allow ourselves to think that we've done enough. We need to evolve and do more. With respect to the threats from our adversaries, we've heard the same thing from multiple witnesses. I think every member of the government who's come before this committee, whether public servants or ministers or deputy ministers, has said the same thing: Canada needs to take these threats seriously. We are doing that, but we also need to constantly reflect and consider how we can strengthen the many different strategies we have currently.
I think it's important to give an overview, a more condensed summary. It would be really nice to hear some acknowledgement of that. It would really go a long way in our debates and conversations on a study that's so important, if parties....
I don't have a lot of hope, obviously, for the Conservative Party, because I've just given you quotes about how hyperpartisan they're being about an issue, on the one hand claiming they want to get to the truth and then, when they hear from the security experts and intelligence experts who are the most prominent figures in their fields—who are coming and telling us the things that we should be doing—not being willing to listen to that. They're not taking those things into consideration, and then they're even ignoring what they're being told and what the reports are saying. They're ignoring the facts.
I think my job is to continue to confront their partisanship with facts and information, which we have plenty of. I don't think that's being unreasonable. I think that just extends our debate, of course, and I think we need an acknowledgement that our government has been doing a lot on foreign election interference. Just because the Conservative Party woke up to this recently doesn't mean that our government has been inactive.
Going right back to 2017, we passed the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act and then formed NSICOP, with members from all parties. We all know this. We all have members of our parties who sit on that committee of parliamentarians. That's just one thing. I realize if that were all we had done, fine, you could perhaps criticize, but....
I'm not saying that we can't be critical. We should be critical, and that's fine, but when you're ignoring the facts, that's not being informed based on the information we've been given.
I think to respect the process, we really need to review those facts until, in my view, people acknowledge that those things are all real, positive, sizable steps forward in protecting our democracy.
I mentioned the 2018 ethics committee report on threats to democracy and the substantive government response to that, which came shortly afterward. We established the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security with a budget of $155 million and we announced the rapid response mechanism at the 2018 G7 summit. Those are three sizable things. The ethics committee wrote a report of more than 100 pages, and the government responded. Then the government did some things that relate to foreign election interference, one of them being setting up the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, giving it a budget to do its job and setting up the rapid response mechanism with other G7 partners. I think those things have to be acknowledged. They are significant.
Then in 2019, there were many more steps taken. There was a major report that a committee did in 2018, and then some things were immediately done that year. Then in 2019, a whole host of other things were done. Before the 2019 election, there were six or seven major steps taken. One was the announcement of the plan to protect Canadian democracy. I mentioned this before, but I am referring back to it to say that four-pillar plan really represents an all-of-government approach.
If we look at the details of that plan, we could actually check off the things that have been done as a result of that plan. Conservatives always seem to say that the Liberals just talk about things and they don't do anything. No, these things got done. You can't deny that. I can give you very specific examples, and I'd be happy to do that. Mrs. Block, I see you shaking your head, but these things got done. Again, I'm not saying that they're perfect, but I'm saying none of these things were in place before our government came to power.
This isn't a rose-coloured glasses moment for me. These are real, tangible steps that have been taken. We set up the SITE task force, which includes CSIS, the RCMP, the rapid response mechanism and the Communications Security Establishment, CSE. We passed Bill C-76, the Elections Modernization Act, which added protections for third parties to funnel funds into partisan advertising, in addition to a bunch of other things.
It's important to keep in mind, of course, that Bill C-76 was tabled in the House in 2018, and it took until almost the end of 2019, I believe, to actually get passed through the House. That Elections Modernization Act added a whole bunch of things that I think are really significant. I went through some of those in my previous comments, but just to summarize, a whole bunch of things were added to strengthen our process.
We also passed Bill C-59, which was tabled in the House in 2017. That's an act respecting national security matters. That act gave CSIS and the CSE new threat reduction measures. Again, when we had CSIS come before us, the director said they do intervene and use threat reduction measures. Obviously those powers were given to them through an act that our government tabled in the House of Commons. It took two years to get through the House and came into force in 2019, but it shows significant progress. Between 2017 and 2019, there were multiple legislative things that took place. There were numerous bodies that were set up, including the SITE task force. Again, the critical election incident public protocol and the panel were also established before the election.
We also have examples like the Canada Declaration on Electoral Integrity Online, which was a commitment that all of the major social media platforms and online platforms made. That's another sizable undertaking. It's not as though we just threw that up and people just agreed to it. A lot of work went into it. Again, for the opposition parties to keep claiming that we've done nothing just shows ignorance of the facts.
The other thing I was really happy to read about earlier this morning, which I just happened to dive deeper into, was the digital citizen initiative through Canadian Heritage. Again I would like to take time tonight to demonstrate to you this all-of-government approach that involves multiple departments all working together on foreign election interference—both primary prevention and early intervention, which involves educating the public. It involves people being more aware through things like the digital citizen initiative, which really is trying to educate people on digital literacy. That was composed of 23 projects over nine months, and it reached 12 million Canadians. That's 12 million Canadians who learned about digital literacy—in other words, how to question the content that they consume online, which we know is the most common way in which people consume information today. Those 23 projects over nine months reached 12 million Canadians. That's a significant undertaking. It didn't just happen overnight. Lots of work went into that. Canadian Heritage led that work, and it had an impact.
We can ask ourselves how much of an impact it had and we could ask what else we need to do on that front. I would suggest that we need to do more. What's interesting is that if I look at budget 2022, I see more resources for initiatives like that as well. Again, I'm being critical of my own government and reflecting and asking what we haven't done yet, but when you're not operating in the realm of reality or fact, then how are you making a judgment? I'm looking at the information we've been given and informing myself based on that. It seems that at least the Conservative members don't seem willing to do that, which I think again reeks of partisanship, because it's just wilful ignorance of the facts. We have to look at the information we've been given and the testimony of the security experts and intelligence experts whom we've heard from.
Another initiative was the Get Cyber Safe program, which is a national public awareness campaign to inform Canadians about cybersecurity. Not only did we do digital literacy training; we also did a major public awareness campaign. That was led by the Communications Security Establishment, and it's an important part of an overall strategy that links it to another major strategy of the government called the national cyber security strategy. This, I feel, demonstrates very clearly how there's kind of a whole-of-government approach.
I've described so far how we've launched a four-pillar plan called a plan to protect Canadian democracy. We set up the SITE task force, which includes CSIS, the RCMP, the rapid response mechanism and the CSE. We passed two bills. We set up the public protocol and panel for the writ period, within the election period, and we did a declaration on election integrity online, the digital citizen initiative and the cyber-safe initiative. That was all in 2019, before the election.
Again, for anyone to claim that we didn't do anything or that we weren't taking foreign interference into account or taking it seriously, that just shows ignorance of the facts. In 2020 there was an independent assessment done. We all know that was done. An independent person named James Judd was appointed and produced a report. I have it here. There are some really good analyses and suggestions, most of which have been followed through on. The vast majority of them seem to have been implemented, and obviously the government has to assess what the best way forward is.
There's evidence that the report was taken seriously, that the independent advice of Mr. Judd was taken into consideration and that there were measures, mechanisms and initiatives implemented based on those recommendations. Again it shows responsible leadership from a government that took the independent advice into consideration. It demonstrates how the government is taking this threat seriously, so I just don't understand how anyone can claim....
Maybe we could find consensus in some way if the Conservative Party of Canada would just live in reality and come to terms with some of the facts about the things that our government has done. Maybe a member of that party could pipe up today on a point of order and say they recognize that the government has done a lot on foreign election interference and they all now want to reflect on how we move forward and what else we can do. Then we could have a constructive, non-partisan, committed conversation, because I really believe that when it comes down to it, we all really do care about our democracy. We want to protect the health of our democracy. I know I do. I really care about our democracy, so for anyone to claim that our party, our leader, I or anybody else does not take this seriously is just deeply offensive. It is deeply offensive, and I won't stand for it, because it's not true, so cut it out. Let's work together. Let's work together on the things that we know we need to do.
We have 16 recommendations from the newest independent report from Morris Rosenberg. Morris Rosenberg wrote a really substantive report. I would say it's even better than the first report after 2019, the Judd report. I feel as though the Rosenberg report has even more substance in it, more things we can do or consider doing. I know the Prime Minister has already made an announcement asking Minister LeBlanc and the Privy Council to, within 30 days, look at all of the reports that have been done, say they are going to implement them and come up with an implementation plan. To me, that shows a responsiveness. It shows that there was an independent assessment done. It shows that we care and that we're considering that independent advice.
I don't know how parties like the Bloc Québécois can criticize, because they didn't even show up for the briefings during the last election. I mentioned this earlier, because I'm dumbfounded by this little fact that was in a footnote. I came across this and thought, first of all, that it's difficult to understand how the Conservatives, the NDP and others can claim that they didn't know about things and almost claim ignorance when they were part of these briefings, but then, on the other hand, the Bloc never came to the briefings. It just seems very rich for them to then accuse the government of not being transparent enough. They didn't even come to the briefings on foreign election interference in the 2021 election. It's clearly said in the report that Rosenberg wrote.
Again I feel frustrated by the fact that our opposition parties don't really want to work on this issue, in my view, but just seem to want to push some political agenda they have. I hope we can get through that logjam and come to terms with the fact that there are facts in the matter and that we should be taking those into consideration.
I mentioned 2020 and 2021. I am establishing a timeline and a pattern of responsible leadership. I know nobody wants to listen to that, it seems, but that's the truth. Responsible leadership involves having all of these different initiatives to tackle foreign election interference, and as the threats to Canadian democracy are evolving, our government is responding to each step along the way. You can see it, year over year.
That's not to say it's perfect. I'm not claiming that, and we have to seriously look at it, but that's exactly what we've been doing. With every step, every year, there is a track record of progress. If you're denying that there has been progress, I don't know how we come to terms with moving forward on a study when you won't look at the information and facts we have been given.
That is our job, as a committee. Our job is to come to these studies and do this work in good faith for the benefit of Canadians. We're not benefiting Canadians when we deny the facts and the information that we've been given. To me, we're avoiding our responsibilities, in a sense. We're not taking this work seriously if we're not willing to look at the facts. It's unfortunate, but that's what we're seeing today.
In 2021, our government worked on updating the Canada declaration on election integrity online, and that got updated. It was done again for the commitment for the online platforms. I think Rosenberg quite rightly says it's great to have that declaration, but social media companies.... I could quote the quote if you would like, but I remember it off the top of my head. I will paraphrase it, so I apologize to the folks in the committee if they remember verbatim what Rosenberg wrote. He basically said that online platforms, even though they have signed this declaration, are still the major source of misinformation and disinformation, and those platforms are where Canadians are consuming a lot of that information.
Could we criticize and say that maybe the declaration doesn't go far enough? Maybe we need to do deeper work with online platforms around foreign election interference and the dissemination of disinformation on their platforms. We've talked a lot in different committees about this issue of disinformation being so widespread and how much of an impact it has on Canadians.
Yes, we can see that there were instances of disinformation in the last election, both foreign and domestic. There was quite a lot of it, I'm sure. If we were to have our experts in this area come before us, they would showcase many examples of online campaigns that featured information that was not quite accurate or that put a spin on things that could potentially influence voter behaviour and voter intentions.
It is very difficult for us to establish a direct link. We've heard that. One of the challenges that we all have to come to terms with is that we don't know the extent that disinformation out there is impacting Canadians' sense of disenfranchisement and perhaps their level of anger and frustration with Canadian democracy and their feelings toward different parties and their policies. We don't know the direct causal links, because people consume so much information and get so many different impressions upon which they then base their decisions.
A lot of that is not even conscious for many Canadians. You see something, you react to it, you relate to it in a certain way, you associate it with something else and you internalize it. Some people are able to block it out. Other people are not. How does that resonate with you over time? Everybody is slightly different. Ms. Block may not react to things the same way that Ms. Gray does or Mr. Barrett does, or anybody else on this side does. We're all quite different in how we internalize the information that we're consuming, whether it's online or not.
The point I'm trying to make here is that even though a declaration on election integrity online has been a positive step and has been updated and social media platforms at least have expressed a commitment to protecting our elections, perhaps we can go a lot further and a lot deeper on that work. I'd be happy to get into a constructive debate on how we move forward in relation to foreign election interference by tackling the challenges that come naturally with online platforms having so much power in our democracy today.
This goes right back to the 2018 report, which was done by the ethics committee. I note that Mr. Fergus served for quite some time on the ethics committee, and I know it's done great work. I notice that Mr. Fergus participated in some way in that report, even though I don't think he was on the ethics committee at the time.
I've looked at the report. I haven't had the time to read all 100-and-whatever pages, but I look forward to reading it. I read the government response. The government response is very substantive. The recommendations coming out of that report really dig into online disinformation. Even the title of the report is all about looking at how our whole democracy is shifting, with online platforms disseminating so much information that people consume and having more power over the Canadian public because of where people are getting their information.
To me, it highlights the importance of this area. We could be digging into that, and I would invite that. Out of this study, we could have some very serious conversations about how to move forward, and I would be really happy to deliberate on that with my opposition colleagues and talk that through with the very substantive reports that we have. We can use them as background information to make some determinations as to what we can do.
In budget 2022 in particular, our government made additional commitments. Again, this showcases a track record of progress. Our government, after 2021, didn't just rest on its laurels and say it couldn't do more or become passive in this regard in any way. We made additional commitments and rolled out new supports and measures to tackle foreign election interference. I have mentioned some of these before, but I'll quickly condense them into a very short summary here.
We committed to expanding the rapid response mechanism and offering more resources to it. When I think about G7 countries all tackling the very same issues in terms of threats to their democracy, I really think that they're going through the same things. The more we share information and collaborate and the more we strengthen our early warning systems for foreign election interference by working with our G7 partners, the better. I am sure everyone here agrees that this is a positive step. First of all, our government setting up the rapid response mechanism in 2018 was a good thing. I am sure everyone agrees that collaborating with G7 partners on identifying foreign actors and their strategies to intervene in or interrupt our elections in any way is a good thing. I'm sure everyone agrees that adding more resources and expanding that initiative is also positive. I'm sure everyone would agree with that.
I would also note that we enhanced cybersecurity activities to protect against disinformation. That's also a positive step moving forward.
We funded more research to support public institutions to continue to look at foreign election interference and understand how they can protect themselves.
We also added resources to the Privy Council Office to coordinate, develop and implement government-wide measures. That, to me, is really positive. The Privy Council plays a key role in all of this. We heard today from Minister LeBlanc, and we've noted it before in terms of the public protocol and how important the Privy Council Office is in coordinating, developing and implementing government-wide measures.
I also mentioned the 2023 independent assessment. Again, the Rosenberg report has 16 recommendations. I'm sure all the members of this committee have read those recommendations and are considering them. When I asked Minister LeBlanc today when he was here, he was very clear about saying yes, we will be implementing what is recommended in the Rosenberg report. Obviously there's a process there to look at what's been recommended. Perhaps the government will say, “Well, on one or two we may take a slightly different path”, but the point is that many...and it is the same with the Judd report. Many of the recommendations were implemented.
Again, it shows a very clearly laid out track record of concern for Canadian democracy, for progress, for taking tangible, important steps forward in ensuring that we're protecting and doing our utmost to protect Canadian democracy.
Lastly, for this timeline overview that I'm giving, we have the Prime Minister's announcement, which we've all heard about by now. I'm sure many of the members took note of the more important and sizable next steps that the Prime Minister outlined.
He had a conversation with NSICOP's chair, our good colleague, David McGuinty, who I think is a fantastic chair and a really great parliamentarian. I've benefited from many conversations with him since I got here in 2019, and I really think he's doing a great job. I know he takes his role on that committee very seriously. I trust that he's doing his utmost to recommend and implement strategies and measures that will help protect Canadian democracy from foreign interference.
I note that the Prime Minister, in his remarks, asked the chair of NSICOP and the head of NSIRA to start work on foreign election interference, and I think that's a really good thing. I think that work is starting very soon.
We also note that there's an appointment that will come soon, in the coming weeks. I think it was pretty clear in the remarks that the Prime Minister made that an independent special rapporteur will be appointed to assess the situation and make recommendations on protecting and enhancing Canadians' faith in our democracy. That special rapporteur will independently look at what we need to do, assess all of the allegations that have been made and the information that's out there that Canadians are concerned about right now, and identify gaps in our systems and our mechanisms that have been set up by our government. I trust that will be a non-partisan, impartial process that will give us that outside perspective that's not coloured by any partisan politics and will offer really good, thoughtful, fact-based suggestions on how to move forward. Whether a public inquiry is a recommendation or not, we'll have to see. I think, again, based on the testimony that we heard, that there are a lot of people who don't agree that a public inquiry is the best way forward, and I take them very seriously.
I know that my colleague Mr. Gerretsen, when he was here earlier today, spoke to the fact that the previous campaign director for the Conservative Party in the last election, Mr. DeLorey, said that he didn't think that a public inquiry was the best way forward, and I have his remarks here.
He said, “A public inquiry is not the best way to address the issue of election interference. No meaningful solutions will come from it.”
I feel like I should read that again. I'm not sure anyone's listening. He said, “A public inquiry is not the best way to address the issue of election interference. No meaningful solutions will come from it.” He then said, “A multi-partisan committee, working with security officials, is a better way to identify and address the problems and find lasting solutions to protect our elections for the future.”
For me, this corroborates what we heard from security and intelligence professionals like Jody Thomas and David Morrison, who pointed to the fact that these highly sensitive documents and information that would need to be reviewed need expertise to be interpreted, because they come with so many caveats, are only part of a picture and are sometimes misleading. We require trained professionals.
Also, there are some significant risks to Canada's national security and the individuals who make up that community. Let's not forget that the national security community is made up of real people who are doing work on behalf of Canadians as well. We can't hang them out to dry because the Conservatives think we should be exposing all of the intelligence that the national security community has.
If Fred DeLorey agrees with security and intelligence professionals, perhaps the Conservatives could consider that even one of their own—not just anybody, but their previous national campaign manager—is agreeing with the national security and intelligence professionals, all of whom seem to be saying the same thing, which is that you're not going to get what you want out of a public inquiry.
We all agree, and I think everyone agrees, that this issue is important to the public. They need to be aware that it's an issue. They need to be aware of what the government is doing. They need to be more aware on an everyday basis to know what to watch out for. That's why there is that initiative around raising online awareness—the public campaign that I talked about—for Canadians who are reading and consuming information online. How many of us are consuming information online every day?
My daughter did something the other week. She said, “Daddy, you spend a lot of time on social media.” I said, ”No, I don't”. I was in denial about it. She's a smart kid. She's 11 years old. She pulled out my phone and went into the screen time portion of it. I had spent 11 hours of screen time in one day on my phone. It wasn't all on social media, but can you imagine?
How much information are we consuming online on a daily basis? I've seen evidence to suggest that Canadians, on average, are spending over an hour on social media alone. It really is important to consider how online information consumption is impacting the public and how important it is to make people aware of what they're looking at, to improve digital literacy and raise awareness around what foreign election interference looks like for the Canadian public when it's done online.
What the Rosenberg report shows is that the main examples of things that qualified as attempts at interference coming from foreign state actors were disinformation campaigns online. It highlights the importance of how this is shifting Canada's democracy and shifting that overall threat environment that we need to take seriously, and we are. Nobody can doubt that we are. You can, if you want to ignore all the facts, but I would suggest that if you do some reading and look at the lived reality, you would be able to have a good, thorough debate and discussion based on the information that we have at our fingertips.
The Prime Minister's remarks also included a number of other tangible next steps. One was that the Minister of Public Safety will launch the consultation on a new foreign influence transparency registry in Canada. This is something that every party has said might be a really good thing to do. Australia and some other countries have done it, and the United States has too, if I'm not mistaken.
If our government is starting to move forward on a consultation process, this is another substantive step that shows we are taking this seriously and that we really want to keep up with the threats to our democracy and ensure that we are protecting Canadians and our democratic institutions as well as we can.
Also, the Minister of Public Safety was tasked with immediately establishing a national coordinator position for countering foreign interference. This is another important step. I already mentioned the importance of the Privy Council Office in terms of coordination across government, but having a foreign interference coordinator in Public Safety is also an extremely positive next step, because we know that every government institution, every ministry, every part of government needs to be protected from foreign interference. It's not just our elections. What we've heard from the Rosenberg report is that a lot of the public protocol focuses just on the writ period and that we should be extending our focus outside of the writ period into the pre-writ period. In a minority Parliament, what is pre-writ? It's all the time. It's the whole time. An election looms at every moment.
Taking the report and the independent assessment that Rosenberg has done seriously, in my opinion, the Prime Minister has quite rightly tasked the Minister of Public Safety with establishing a coordinator position on foreign interference as another positive next step forward.
Last, in terms of this timeline, the other really big tangible step forward that the Prime Minister made was to task Minister LeBlanc and the Clerk of the Privy Council with reviewing all of the reports that have been done on this topic. NSICOP is one. The Rosenberg report is another, but any other reports that have been done should be reviewed. The way it was phrased in the Prime Minister's remarks was that there should really be a comprehensive review of recommendations and within 30 days an implementation plan should be in place.
That is responsible. It's a very compressed timeline for the number of recommendations that are in those reports. It starts to move from basic recommendations to how we are going to actually implement these things. That is important.
I did strategic planning for a living for quite a number of years, and that's how I would approach it. I would identify recommendations and a strategic plan and then quickly develop implementation plans and then divide those up into implementation plans or action plans for each of the ministries and then have ministers who are accountable for those take them on, with timelines attached to them.
To me, that's how you get things done. You don't just wave a wand and say, “Oh, we're going to make this happen.” You actually have to do a comprehensive review of all of the recommendations that are in those reports, pull them all together, and then decide and deliberate on which ones make sense and which ones may not, because there's always an opportunity to decide what the best way forward is.
A good role for our committee to play that would be really constructive would be to look at all of the reports and recommendations ourselves and then be recommend things out of our study and our work that Minister LeBlanc and the Clerk of the Privy Council could consider. That would be a great contribution to the next steps that Minister LeBlanc has been tasked with developing in the next 30 days. That would be a really positive next step.
I would wrap up here by saying that I've established a timeline of progress and tangible steps that have been taken on foreign election interference. It's clearly laid out in the Rosenberg report, so no one can say they don't have this information. We all have the information that I've gathered. I've taken the time to do that. I would invite other members to look at the facts, the timelines and the information.
If members would like, I'd be happy to send them an overview of what I've worked on here, to make sure that they feel they have the information at their fingertips. We can make sure that in the future, we all start our conversation from the point of view of facts, evidence, living in reality and looking at the information and the progress that's been made, which has been substantive. I don't think there's any questioning of that.
That's it for me, Madam Chair. I really appreciate the time and the attention of my colleagues.