Bill C-59 (Historical)

National Security Act, 2017

An Act respecting national security matters

Part 1 enacts the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, which establishes the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and sets out its composition, mandate and powers. It repeals the provisions of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act establishing the Security Intelligence Review Committee and amends that Act and other Acts in order to transfer certain powers, duties and functions to the new Agency. It also makes related and consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 1.‍1 enacts the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act to authorize the issuance of directions respecting the disclosure of and request for information that would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity and the use of information that is likely to have been obtained as the result of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity.
Part 2 enacts the Intelligence Commissioner Act, which provides that the duties and functions of the Intelligence Commissioner are to review the conclusions on the basis of which certain authorizations are issued or amended, and determinations are made, under the Communications Security Establishment Act and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and to approve those authorizations, amendments and determinations if those conclusions are reasonable. This Part also abolishes the position of the Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment, provides for that Commissioner to become the Intelligence Commissioner, transfers the employees of the former Commissioner to the office of the new Commissioner and makes related and consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 enacts the Communications Security Establishment Act, which establishes the Communications Security Establishment and, among other things, sets out the Establishment’s mandate as well as the regime for authorizing its activities. It also amends the National Defence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 4 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to
(a) add a preamble to that Act and provide a mechanism to enhance the accountability of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(b) add new limits on the exercise of the Service’s power to reduce threats to the security of Canada including, in particular, by setting out a list of measures that may be authorized by the Federal Court;
(c) provide a justification, subject to certain limitations, for the commission of acts or omissions that would otherwise constitute offences;
(d) exempt employees of the Service and persons acting under their direction from liability for offences related to acts committed for the sole purpose of establishing or maintaining a covert identity;
(e) create a regime for the Service to collect, retain, query and exploit datasets in the course of performing its duties and functions;
(f) make amendments to the warrant regime that are related to datasets; and
(g) implement measures for the management of datasets.
Part 5 amends the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act to, among other things,
(a) emphasize that the Act addresses only the disclosure of information and not its collection or use;
(b) clarify the definition of “activity that undermines the security of Canada”;
(c) clarify that advocacy, protest, dissent and artistic expression are not activities that undermine the security of Canada unless they are carried on in conjunction with an activity that undermines the security of Canada;
(d) provide that a disclosure of information is authorized only if the disclosure will contribute to the carrying out by the recipient institution of its national security responsibilities and will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary;
(e) require that information disclosed be accompanied by information about the accuracy of the disclosed information and the reliability of the manner in which it was obtained; and
(f) require that records be prepared and kept in respect of every disclosure of information and that every year a copy of every record prepared in the preceding year be provided to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.
Part 6 amends the Secure Air Travel Act to authorize the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to collect from air carriers and operators of aviation reservation systems, for the purpose of identifying listed persons, information about any individuals who are on board or expected to be on board an aircraft for any flight prescribed by regulation, and to exempt an air carrier from providing that information, or from the application of any provision of the regulations, in certain circumstances. It amends the Act to authorize that Minister to collect personal information from individuals for the purpose of issuing a unique identifier to them to assist with pre-flight verification of their identity. It also reverses the rule in relation to a deemed decision on an application for administrative recourse. Finally, it amends the Act to provide for certain other measures related to the collection, disclosure and destruction of information.
Part 7 amends the Criminal Code to, among other things,
(a) make certain procedural modifications to the terrorist listing regime under section 83.‍05, such as providing for a staggered ministerial review of listed entities and granting the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness the authority to amend the names, including aliases, of listed entities;
(b) change the offence of advocating or promoting terrorism offences in general, in section 83.‍21, to one of counselling the commission of a terrorism offence, and make corresponding changes to the definition of terrorist propaganda;
(c) raise one of the thresholds for imposing a recognizance with conditions under section 83.‍3, and amend when that section is to be reviewed and, unless extended by Parliament, to cease to have effect;
(d) repeal sections 83.‍28 and 83.‍29 relating to an investigative hearing into a terrorism offence and repeal subsections 83.‍31(1) and (1.‍1), which require annual reports on such hearings;
(e) require the Attorney General of Canada to publish a report each year setting out the number of terrorism recognizances entered into under section 810.‍011 in the previous year; and
(f) authorize a court, in proceedings for recognizances under any of sections 83 and 810 to 810.‍2, to make orders for the protection of witnesses.
Part 8 amends the Youth Criminal Justice Act to, among other things, ensure that the protections that are afforded to young persons apply in respect of proceedings in relation to recognizance orders, including those related to terrorism, and give employees of a department or agency of the Government of Canada access to youth records, for the purpose of administering the Canadian Passport Order.
Part 9 requires that a comprehensive review of the provisions and operation of this enactment take place during the fourth year after section 168 of this enactment comes into force. If that section 168 and section 34 of Bill C-22, introduced in the 1st session of the 42nd Parliament and entitled the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, come into force within one year of each other, the reviews required by those sections are to take place at the same time and are to be undertaken by the same committee or committees.

[Shelly Bruce]

The bill does not refer specifically to critical infrastructure, but I think it makes reference to non-governmental systems, which are tantamount to critical infrastructure, because as you say, our global information infrastructure is made up of public and private enterprises.

In that space, CSE, which is currently focused on defending and blocking activities on the government infrastructure, is limited right now to providing advice and guidance only to critical infrastructure owners in a way such that the information is available to the general public.

In this regard, Bill C-59 opens up CSE to take the expertise that has been developed—the tools, the capabilities.... In fact, some of that capability has been exposed to critical infrastructure owners in the form of a tool called “Assembly Line”. We've put it out there. It's a tool that was developed in-house, but we've made it available to others who can use it to help triage and understand malware that might be affecting their systems.

CSE would be able to go even further with this legislation to helping critical infrastructure owners who request our assistance and whom the minister has designated as eligible to receive assistance from CSE.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Mr. Dubé is well past his time.

I do have a question, if you don't mind. I want to pick up on the exchange between Ms. Bruce and Mr. Fragiskatos concerning the private infrastructure, if you will.

This conversation has largely been devoted to public infrastructure. It reminded me of a conversation I had last week with a representative of the banking industry. His comment was that when we feed information into the security services, it just disappears and we never hear from them again. It seems to me that this cyber infrastructure is actually shared between the private and public sectors, and that Bill C-59 doesn't speak to—it's not obvious, at least—that private infrastructure piece. This issue has consumed the British. The British government has intervened quite actively in protecting private infrastructure.

First, on Bill C-59 as is, what contribution in terms of a framework does it make? Second, what is the next piece, if you will, in addressing that issue?

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I just have one question, following up the questions that my colleague was asking.

In terms of changes that have been made in Bill C-59 to the CRCC, the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission, and the RCMP specifically, how will these impact the RCMP, and do you anticipate that the latter will work better under Bill C-59? Can you give us a little more information?

Mr. Brown, I'm not sure whether it would be you or the RCMP who would respond to that.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Does Bill C-59 offer any strength to your role in that process?

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

I won't pursue that line. I would be so brave as to suggest, then, that just maybe Bill C-59 should include some provision to work with other departments in order to make that happen—and stronger, if I'm hearing what you're providing for us.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Brown.

If I can be so bold as to interpret what you've just told me, it's that maybe Bill C-59 should be strengthened in that area?

[Malcolm Brown]

Working with our friends in the Department of Justice, there are conversations and discussions going on, because it is a Justice and Public Safety dialogue with our colleagues in the provinces and the territories. There is, I would say, a general consensus that we need to do better, but Bill C-59 doesn't propose changes. We are actively engaging with our colleagues in the Department of Justice, as I say, on ways to improve the status quo, and that also involves engagement with provincial jurisdictions.

[Michel Picard, Liberal, Montarville, QC]

Thank you.

Mr. Brown, Bill C-59 changes the powers to oversee the various agencies mentioned in it.

What impact will that have on the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP?

[Michel Picard, Liberal, Montarville, QC]

My question is for CSIS and the RCMP. Throughout the bill, we note the absence of FINTRAC. That is not an oversight. There is no denying that terrorist financing is a reality. That said, the current trend is to keep reducing the cost of terrorist attacks. For example, a truck may be stolen and crashed into a crowd. The financial aspect has changed.

In the current modern circumstances, would it be a good idea to reconsider the link with FINTRAC? Are our legal methods for working with the organization enough to keep us from having to establish a link with FINTRAC in Bill C-59?

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Basically, I want to know whether you think the provisions of Bill C-59 will change things, or if your role will remain the same without changing significantly.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Thank you.

I want to talk about CSE's role. Currently, unless I am mistaken, the relationship between CSE and the Department of National Defence is one of funding and operations. Under Bill C-59, there will be a transfer, or a severing of CSE from the Department of National Defence. As a result, Public Safety Canada will have more responsibilities.

Is that indeed the case?

[Malcolm Brown]

There are no uniquely specific provisions in Bill C-59 to deal with the question of violent extremist travellers. There are elements of Bill C-59 that provide the tools and assets for the agencies that will improve our ability to safeguard Canada from any threats that may present. I will also say, though, that there is a variety of tools that are available to the government, to all of us here and others, to manage and assess and take action as necessary to protect Canadians and ensure, where there is the evidence, that prosecutions can be launched against these individuals.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I will talk about ISIS fighters. We know that 180 Canadians decided to wage Jihad around the world, especially in Irak and Syria, but also in other places, including Africa. Some 60 of them are known and have returned to Canada. Ten of them are followed more closely by our police services and CSIS, but there is a legal problem. Will Bill C-59 help Canada take measures to enable it to prosecute those people, even if it means deporting dual citizens?

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Thank you.

I have a little bit of time left, I'm sure.

I have one yes or no question. A previous witness at this committee expressed concern and suggested that if Bill C-59 passes as written—and this applies I suppose to you, Ms. Bruce—then CSE may interfere in the democratic electoral process in another country.

Can you please confirm that CSE has no intention of using its new powers to interfere in any democratic electoral process in any foreign country?

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

In light of the recent domestic terrorist attacks in the U.K., in Europe, and obviously here in Canada, which involved acquisition and the use of objects available to citizens—chemicals, vehicles, whatever—has the government reviewed the revisions in Bill C-59 to ensure that it permits appropriate emergency disruptive activities, specifically to CSIS, including without warrants where required? Are you satisfied with disruptive powers under this bill?