Bill C-59 (Historical)

National Security Act, 2017

An Act respecting national security matters

Part 1 enacts the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, which establishes the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and sets out its composition, mandate and powers. It repeals the provisions of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act establishing the Security Intelligence Review Committee and amends that Act and other Acts in order to transfer certain powers, duties and functions to the new Agency. It also makes related and consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 1.‍1 enacts the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act to authorize the issuance of directions respecting the disclosure of and request for information that would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity and the use of information that is likely to have been obtained as the result of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity.
Part 2 enacts the Intelligence Commissioner Act, which provides that the duties and functions of the Intelligence Commissioner are to review the conclusions on the basis of which certain authorizations are issued or amended, and determinations are made, under the Communications Security Establishment Act and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and to approve those authorizations, amendments and determinations if those conclusions are reasonable. This Part also abolishes the position of the Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment, provides for that Commissioner to become the Intelligence Commissioner, transfers the employees of the former Commissioner to the office of the new Commissioner and makes related and consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 enacts the Communications Security Establishment Act, which establishes the Communications Security Establishment and, among other things, sets out the Establishment’s mandate as well as the regime for authorizing its activities. It also amends the National Defence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 4 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to
(a) add a preamble to that Act and provide a mechanism to enhance the accountability of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(b) add new limits on the exercise of the Service’s power to reduce threats to the security of Canada including, in particular, by setting out a list of measures that may be authorized by the Federal Court;
(c) provide a justification, subject to certain limitations, for the commission of acts or omissions that would otherwise constitute offences;
(d) exempt employees of the Service and persons acting under their direction from liability for offences related to acts committed for the sole purpose of establishing or maintaining a covert identity;
(e) create a regime for the Service to collect, retain, query and exploit datasets in the course of performing its duties and functions;
(f) make amendments to the warrant regime that are related to datasets; and
(g) implement measures for the management of datasets.
Part 5 amends the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act to, among other things,
(a) emphasize that the Act addresses only the disclosure of information and not its collection or use;
(b) clarify the definition of “activity that undermines the security of Canada”;
(c) clarify that advocacy, protest, dissent and artistic expression are not activities that undermine the security of Canada unless they are carried on in conjunction with an activity that undermines the security of Canada;
(d) provide that a disclosure of information is authorized only if the disclosure will contribute to the carrying out by the recipient institution of its national security responsibilities and will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary;
(e) require that information disclosed be accompanied by information about the accuracy of the disclosed information and the reliability of the manner in which it was obtained; and
(f) require that records be prepared and kept in respect of every disclosure of information and that every year a copy of every record prepared in the preceding year be provided to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.
Part 6 amends the Secure Air Travel Act to authorize the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to collect from air carriers and operators of aviation reservation systems, for the purpose of identifying listed persons, information about any individuals who are on board or expected to be on board an aircraft for any flight prescribed by regulation, and to exempt an air carrier from providing that information, or from the application of any provision of the regulations, in certain circumstances. It amends the Act to authorize that Minister to collect personal information from individuals for the purpose of issuing a unique identifier to them to assist with pre-flight verification of their identity. It also reverses the rule in relation to a deemed decision on an application for administrative recourse. Finally, it amends the Act to provide for certain other measures related to the collection, disclosure and destruction of information.
Part 7 amends the Criminal Code to, among other things,
(a) make certain procedural modifications to the terrorist listing regime under section 83.‍05, such as providing for a staggered ministerial review of listed entities and granting the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness the authority to amend the names, including aliases, of listed entities;
(b) change the offence of advocating or promoting terrorism offences in general, in section 83.‍21, to one of counselling the commission of a terrorism offence, and make corresponding changes to the definition of terrorist propaganda;
(c) raise one of the thresholds for imposing a recognizance with conditions under section 83.‍3, and amend when that section is to be reviewed and, unless extended by Parliament, to cease to have effect;
(d) repeal sections 83.‍28 and 83.‍29 relating to an investigative hearing into a terrorism offence and repeal subsections 83.‍31(1) and (1.‍1), which require annual reports on such hearings;
(e) require the Attorney General of Canada to publish a report each year setting out the number of terrorism recognizances entered into under section 810.‍011 in the previous year; and
(f) authorize a court, in proceedings for recognizances under any of sections 83 and 810 to 810.‍2, to make orders for the protection of witnesses.
Part 8 amends the Youth Criminal Justice Act to, among other things, ensure that the protections that are afforded to young persons apply in respect of proceedings in relation to recognizance orders, including those related to terrorism, and give employees of a department or agency of the Government of Canada access to youth records, for the purpose of administering the Canadian Passport Order.
Part 9 requires that a comprehensive review of the provisions and operation of this enactment take place during the fourth year after section 168 of this enactment comes into force. If that section 168 and section 34 of Bill C-22, introduced in the 1st session of the 42nd Parliament and entitled the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, come into force within one year of each other, the reviews required by those sections are to take place at the same time and are to be undertaken by the same committee or committees.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

After this meeting, I am going to go to a meeting of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security where we will discuss Bill C-59. We'll be meeting with the CSE Commissioner, as it happens.

That bill involves transferring CSE national defence-related powers to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. The bill also contains provisions that will require the authorization of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to conduct an operation.

How do you see that?

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to take the conversation in a bit of a different direction here. I think we're running into a phenomenon here of cyberwarfare not really fitting under the normal protocols of war and the rules of warfare. It operates at the edges of those. International protocols prohibit targeting civilian targets, and those kinds of principles we're used to. I know that neither of you represents CSE, but the legislation that's before Parliament in Bill C-59 proposes to allow active use of cyber-attacks in sabotage. It's a concern for me that we, as Canadians, are stepping into an area of international conflict that's not well regulated internationally.

My question, I guess, would be directed largely to Mr. Feltham. What's your relationship with CSE in terms of their, I would say, requests for moving into active cyber-attacks?

The second part of the question is this: do you feel that you are already authorized in DND to use active cyber-attacks against both foreign states and individuals for CSE? Are you already authorized to do those things? What's your relationship with CSE on those aspects?

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

NATO's article 5 is summed up as an attack on one being an attack on all. It was only used once, on 9/11, and of course it was civilian infrastructure that was attacked. With Bill C-59, there's going to be a cyber-offensive posture provided to the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Communications Security Establishment. What would be classified as an article 5 in the cyberworld?

Public Safety

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Mr. Speaker, the research reports today are highly speculative, but the point is simply this. We are dealing with a flawed system that was implemented about 10 years ago by the previous government, and we are trying very hard to fix that system. It requires new legislation, new regulations, and a new computer system built from the ground up. The first step, the legal authority, is contained in Bill C-59, and I am sure that all members of Parliament will want to vote for this legislation.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Actually, I'll take the half minute to ask one other....

If you were to change one thing in Bill C-59, Mr. Fogel, that you think is absolutely critical for public safety and balancing the need for rights and privacy, what would it be?

[Shimon Fogel]

Mindful of the time, I'll be very brief.

It is, I think, the reverse. “Counselling” is the new language that's introduced in Bill C-59.

For me, it's less about the language that's used as it is about establishing who it's directed toward. Bill C-59 requires a direct link between someone who is promoting or counselling terrorist activity and the one who's going to act upon it, without recognizing that an individual promoting it may have the intention of creating a certain environment that will be attractive to as yet unknown or unidentified individuals, so you can't establish that direct chain.

If we were to tweak it in a way that makes it more consistent with other legislation but doesn't require that direct link on specific acts, I think it would strengthen the legislation.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I feel so privileged.

I thank both witnesses for being here and for your testimony.

I'm intrigued by your testimony, specifically about the language. I want both of you to weigh in on this if you could, please.

Changing “counselling” of terrorism to the “promotion” of terrorism, how does that change the context of Bill C-59 and what CSIS and other agencies need to do? Are we still going to be as effective with that term change?

Mr. Fogel, could you go first, please?

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you very much.

As you know—this is a bit beyond Bill C-59 but does fit into the discussion because we are talking about security—in late September, Minister Goodale issued a ministerial directive on information obtained by torture. For the purposes of the record, the new rules ban the use of information that was probably obtained through torture, except when it's necessary to save lives or to prevent against major personal injuries.

For example, last week I asked Professor Forcese if it would be more effective to enact that directive and the principles on which it is based in legislation—

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Roach, the first question is going to you.

We're talking about security matters here, and when you look at Bill C-59 and see the repeal of investigative hearings, which you're very much in favour of, I think some Canadians might sit back and read about that in an article, or hear political parties that are not in favour of it, and feel less safe.

Can you speak about investigative hearings in general terms? You called them an “unwieldy concept” in a piece with Craig Forcese, for Policy Options. An ineffective approach is basically what it comes down to, but can you expand on that?

[Shimon Fogel]

I'm not entirely familiar with that particular aspect of the case. It is good practice, and I believe, frankly, that Canada already undertakes consultation with all its like-minded allies on a routine and regular basis looking for best practices, those that we can share with others, and those where we can benefit from the experience of other nation-states.

I'm encouraged when I look at the process of Bills C-51 and C-59 and the commitment to periodically review, both to refine on the basis of experience but also to be able to be responsive to changing circumstances on the ground. That's exactly the right approach that we should be taking. I'm encouraged that we do consult with our allies in order to benefit from their experience in areas where we have less.

[Professor Kent Roach, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, As an Individual]

Thank you very much for inviting me to appear before the committee.

My colleague Craig Forcese has already addressed you and has focused on parts 2, 3, and 4 of the bill. I will focus on the other parts of Bill C-59.

Part 1 providing for a government-wide super-SIRC has been widely praised. In my view, it implements the important principle, if not the precise details, that animated the Arar commission's report; namely, that review should expand with the state's national security activities and that review strengthens rather than weakens security.

Improvements can still be made. I recommend that the new and very much welcome super-SIRC be somewhat supersized. In my view, it should contain a minimum of five members and up to eight members. Amnesty International has endorsed this recommendation, and you've heard some very interesting proposals about strengthening the new super-SIRC both from Professor Wark and Mr. Fogel.

We should think about having more diversity in appointments and not simply focusing on the consultation with leaders of political parties, which is very much a holdover from the original 1984 Cold War era CSIS Act. We could also include people with expertise in privacy, as you heard from the Privacy Commissioner. I think it is also important that there be representation where possible from communities that may be disproportionately affected by national security activities.

The mandate of the new review agency needs to be better defined. On my reading, the reference to “department” or “corporation”, which is incorporated in the new act, does not include the RCMP. This should be very clearly spelled out. It should be clear that the new committee can review the national security activities of the RCMP, hear complaints about the national security activities of the RCMP, and have full access to classified information that the RCMP has on the same basis that it will have access to classified information that CSIS, CSE, and other agencies involved in national security have.

Moving to part 5, I remain of the view that the SCISA part of Bill C-59 remains the weakest part of the bill. I would advocate that the definition of threats to national security in section 2 of the CSIS Act be the default trigger for information sharing, subject to carefully tailored and justified additions in cases where that may be inadequate. The novel Bill C-51 definition of activities that undermine the security of Canada was grossly overbroad. Even after the amendments in this bill, it would remain overbroad.

When I talk about overbreadth, and I know that some members of this committee have read the Air India commission report, I refer to overbreadth not only from a civil liberties perspective but frankly from a security perspective. If everything is a security threat, effectively nothing is a security threat. I think we really should tighten the definition with respect to information sharing.

On the subject of Air India—and here I'm going just a touch beyond Bill C-59—I must again reiterate my objections to the CSIS human source privilege that was enacted in the Protection of Canada from Terrorists Act. If it is not repealed, at least I would recommend that, as an urgent matter, there be a study of whether CSIS's practice of granting anonymity to witnesses is hindering terrorism prosecutions.

The Privacy Commissioner has made a strong case to you that the standard for receiving agencies under SCISA should be raised to “necessity”. I agree. I would also not be troubled by having that same standard with respect to sending agencies. The Privacy Commissioner raised the issue that sending agencies may not have experience with security, but they also maybe don't have the same incentive that receiving agencies may have to keep, perhaps unnecessarily, the information that they receive.

In this regard, a critical feature of the new review agency is that it will be able to examine the legally privileged material that is the basis on which receiving agencies will make decisions, perhaps wrongly, to retain any information.

Moving to part 6, the committee is well aware of the problems of a no-fly list. The reforms in C-59 strike me as minimal. Four months is a long time to be a wrongfully listed person, even if the default has been changed. Special advocates should have a role in appeals, and Bill C-51's restriction on the information that these security-cleared advocates can see in security certificate cases should also be repealed. More fundamentally, however, perhaps the new committee that has access to classified information should review whether the costs of the no-fly list, both financial and human—in terms of false positives—are actually worth its benefits.

Moving to part 7 of the bill, I note that the CCLA submitted to you that the reference to terrorism offences in the counselling offence is not defined. That's not my reading. I would read the reference to terrorism offences as referring to the definition of terrorism offences contained in section 2 of the Criminal Code, but this is a matter that needs to be clarified.

The changes to the preventive arrest provisions are difficult to evaluate, but I would favour further amendments to clarify limits on questioning of people who may be detained for up to seven days. I would also advocate that there be some response to the Driver case in Manitoba, which held that at least one part of the peace bond provisions relating to treatment programs violated the charter. I would also recommend that we look at something like section 10 of the U.K. Terrorism Act, 2000, which would allow people to challenge listing as terrorist groups without that very act of challenge being the basis for a terrorism offence.

I applaud the government for repealing investigative hearings, a technique that has never been successfully used and, if used, could hinder terrorism prosecutions.

Finally, this is important and complex legislation that was made necessary by Bill C-51. I would propose that given the comprehensive, if not radical, nature of C-51 and the important proactives of this bill, that the review of this bill be commenced within the fourth year of its enactment, not the sixth year as contemplated in part 9. I would also propose that the review be undertaken by a special joint committee of the Commons and the Senate, which could include one to two members of the new National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.

In addition to my previously submitted brief, which I hope you have and has been translated, those are my submissions.

Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.

[Shimon Fogel, Chief Executive Officer, Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs]

Thank you, Chair, for the opportunity to present to the members of this committee on behalf of the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs, the advocacy agent for the Jewish Federations of Canada.

We are a national, non-partisan, non-profit organization representing more than 150,000 Jewish Canadians affiliated through local federations across the country. We believe in Canada's foundational values of freedom, democracy, and equality, and are committed to working with government, Parliament, and all like-minded groups to ensure that Canada remains a country where we all enjoy equal protections and opportunities.

In March 2015, I appeared as a witness before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security as it studied Bill C-51. Our testimony began with a statement of fact, “Jews are consistently targeted by hate and bias-related crimes in Canada at a rate higher than any other identifiable group.” Those words are, unfortunately, as true today as they were then.

Statistics Canada recently released its report on 2016 hate crimes, and once again Jews were targeted more than any other religious minority, with 221 incidents. We must, however, keep this in perspective. Canada is a very safe place for identifiable groups and one of the greatest places in the world in which to live as a minority. However, we must also remain vigilant. A single hate crime is one too many.

Whether considering the attack on a synagogue in Jerusalem, a gay nightclub in Orlando, an African American church in Charleston, or a mosque in Quebec City, extreme hate continues to precipitate extreme violence. Jews are often primary targets for terrorist attacks throughout the world: Belgium, Argentina, France, India, Bulgaria, Israel, Denmark, the United States. Understandably, Jewish Canadians are not just concerned about what threats might meet them abroad, but what could happen here at home.

Public Safety Canada's “2016 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada” notes that Hezbollah, the listed terrorist entity widely believed to have carried out the bombing of a Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires, has networks operating here in Canada. The notorious 2004 firebombing of a Jewish school in Montreal still looms large in our collective memory.

Our community, therefore, takes a keen interest in the government's approach to counterterrorism. We appreciate the opportunity we were afforded to engage in the consultations on Canada's national security framework, both before this committee and with the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. I hope that our recommendations will prove helpful and constructive for the committee.

We'll speak on the expanded oversight for CSIS, but before going there let me just address a couple of considerations with respect to advocacy or promotion of terrorism offences in general.

In the context of the former Bill C-51, CIJA was supportive of measures to empower security officials to criminalize the advocacy and promotion of terrorism and seize terrorist propaganda. CIJA supported these measures as a means of denying those intent on inspiring, radicalizing, or recruiting Canadians to commit acts of terror the legal leeway to be clever but dangerous with their words.

Bill C-59 seeks to change the law's articulation of this offence from “advocating or promoting” to “counselling” a terrorism offence. This doesn't necessarily undermine the intended function of the provision. Justice Canada's background information on the advocacy and promotion offence states, “The offence is modelled on existing offences of counselling and the relevant jurisprudence. It extended the concept of counselling to cases where no specific terrorism offence is being counselled, but it is evident nonetheless that terrorism offences are being counselled.”

The same intended outcome seems to be achieved in Bill C-59, which adds the caveat that the counselling offence “may be committed...whether or not...the person counsels the commission of a specific terrorism offence.” If, as Minister Goodale indicated in his recent testimony before this committee, this change empowers authorities to enforce the law with greater impact, it would seem a reasonable shift. However, we believe there is an oversight in the proposed new language that could narrow the scope of the provision, weakening it substantially.

The existing offence applies to “Every person who, by communicating statements, knowingly advocates or promotes the commission of terrorism offences in general”. Swapping out the advocacy and promotion language, this should become something like “Every person who counsels the commission of a terrorism offence”, but it doesn't. Instead, Bill C-59 reads, “Every person who counsels another person to commit a terrorism offence”. With this wording, it appears that the offence could apply only to a specific individual counselling another specific individual.

When it comes to the offence of instructing a terrorist activity, the Criminal Code is explicit. The offence is committed whether or not the accused instructs a particular person to carry out the activity or even knows the identity of the person instructed to carry out the activity. The same standard should apply to the counselling offence. The change of “advocacy and promotion” to “counselling” also impacts on the definition of terrorism propaganda.

Bill C-59 would remove “advocacy and promotion of terrorism offences in general” from the definition, consistent with the change proposed for the counselling offence I've just discussed. However, the all-important caveat that a specific terrorism offence need not be counselled, which is included in the new counselling offence, is lacking here. This should be adjusted for the sake of consistency.

I'll turn to expanded oversight for CSIS.

In our testimony on Bill C-51, CIJA supported the expansion of CSIS's role and responsibilities to include disruption of potential terrorist attacks. While we believed the new mandate was justified, we maintained that enhanced oversight was required to prevent abuse. Just as Canadians stand to benefit from a more robust approach to counterterrorism that emphasizes prevention, we argued that a concurrent increase in the review of CSIS's activities would be beneficial.

Measures to enhance SIRC's ability to provide adequate review are long overdue and are all the more imperative with CSIS's expanded mandate. We supported the refinements to CSIS's expanded mandate that Bill C-59 would put in place and the establishment of a national security and intelligence review agency. Both should help to ensure greater balance in protecting the security and civil rights of Canadians.

In the context of Bill C-51, we proposed several concrete reforms to enhance oversight and accountability for CSIS. The new oversight agency will fulfill our first and perhaps most important recommendation's objective of enabling a review of security and intelligence activities across all government agencies and departments. However, we believe the following three recommendations regarding the structure and composition of the new agency would help ensure it is set up to be as impactful as possible.

First, the chair of the new agency should be someone with experience in intelligence and national security, and should occupy the position on a full-time basis to ensure consistent, professional leadership.

Unfortunately, Bill C-59 states, “The Chair and Vice-chair may be designated to hold office on a full-time or part-time basis”. The bill also states, “Every member of the Review Agency who is not designated as the Chair or Vice-chair holds office on a part-time basis”.

We suggest this be changed to provide the option of other members being brought on full time without requiring a legislative amendment. Given that the workload of the new agency is likely to be significantly greater than that of SIRC, this could conceivably require full-time engagement from all members.

Second, we recommend that the chair of the new agency be designated an officer of Parliament required to provide regular reports directly to Parliament. This mirrors the recommendation we made in the context of Bill C-51 with regard to the chair of SIRC.

The requirement enshrined in Bill C-59 that public reports from the new agency be tabled in Parliament is beneficial, but this reporting is still mediated through the Prime Minister and other ministers. Designating the chair of SIRC an officer of Parliament with a mandate for regular reporting directly to Parliament would send a clear signal that the work of the new agency is independent from the government of the day.

Third, we believe Parliament should have a greater voice in the appointment of members of the new agency.

We welcome the consultation provisions included in Bill C-59 but believe the appointments should also be subject to approval by resolution of the Senate and the House of Commons. This small addition, which is already standard practice in the appointment of officers of Parliament, would further enhance the credibility of the appointments process.

Although this may be more appropriate for your colleagues at the finance committee, it's also important to stress that the national security and intelligence review agency will require the allocation of significant resources, both professional and financial, if it is to be given a chance to succeed in fulfilling its important mandate.

CIJA's testimony in 2015 concluded with a plea for committee members to support a private member's bill that sought to extend hate crime penalties beyond houses of worship to schools and community centres. That initiative failed but was revived in this Parliament in Bill C-305, which passed third reading in the Senate in October.

I am pleased to conclude my remarks today, Mr. Chair, with sincere thanks to each of you for coming together in unanimous support for Bill C-305, a clear example of how elected officials can work together and make a practical difference to protect Canadians.

I hope committee members will consider my remarks today in that same constructive spirit, and I'm grateful for the opportunity to join with you.

Thank you.

[Khalid Elgazzar]

I think it would be any provisions that actually establish the redress system. For example, who is going to administer the system? What might it be called? What are the procedures? What are the parameters? Is there an appeal process involved? This is similar to what is currently at section 16 of the Secure Air Travel Act in terms of appeals, which I understand is being beefed up under Bill C-59.

Essentially, I would just like to see the establishment of a redress system, whatever is required to establish it. You may give it a name. I know in the United States they've given it a name: the traveller redress inquiry program. I would have thought at the very least that under section 32 of SATA, the regulations section of the act, the government might have included something that states that the government can make regulations with regard to a redress system. Even that would be just a small indication that this is something that's going to happen.

Frankly, our position is that the government should take this opportunity to catch up to our allies, including the United States, and bring about the entire system. This, again, isn't something where we're asking the government to reinvent the wheel.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Now, in an ideal world, if you had a chance—and I'm sure you've been asked by my colleague across the way to provide to the committee any recommendations you have—what changes would you like to see that aren't already included in this Bill C-59 on the whole issue of the no-fly list?

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to the witnesses for being here today.

I appreciate the comments that were made earlier, with respect to the concern that you have about all forms of violent extremism. Given the attack that happened in New York, I'm sure your organization has already or will be condemning the actions that occurred in that circumstance.

You indicate that there has been an historical lack of accountability within CSIS. It goes back many years. In 2015, Bill C-51 was brought in to address this and now Bill C-59 takes that review and accountability even further. However, from your testimony today, I'm hearing that there remains a lack of confidence in addressing the concerns within CSIS.

What do you propose is the solution?