Bill C-59 (Historical)

National Security Act, 2017

An Act respecting national security matters

Part 1 enacts the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, which establishes the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and sets out its composition, mandate and powers. It repeals the provisions of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act establishing the Security Intelligence Review Committee and amends that Act and other Acts in order to transfer certain powers, duties and functions to the new Agency. It also makes related and consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 1.‍1 enacts the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act to authorize the issuance of directions respecting the disclosure of and request for information that would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity and the use of information that is likely to have been obtained as the result of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity.
Part 2 enacts the Intelligence Commissioner Act, which provides that the duties and functions of the Intelligence Commissioner are to review the conclusions on the basis of which certain authorizations are issued or amended, and determinations are made, under the Communications Security Establishment Act and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and to approve those authorizations, amendments and determinations if those conclusions are reasonable. This Part also abolishes the position of the Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment, provides for that Commissioner to become the Intelligence Commissioner, transfers the employees of the former Commissioner to the office of the new Commissioner and makes related and consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 enacts the Communications Security Establishment Act, which establishes the Communications Security Establishment and, among other things, sets out the Establishment’s mandate as well as the regime for authorizing its activities. It also amends the National Defence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 4 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to
(a) add a preamble to that Act and provide a mechanism to enhance the accountability of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(b) add new limits on the exercise of the Service’s power to reduce threats to the security of Canada including, in particular, by setting out a list of measures that may be authorized by the Federal Court;
(c) provide a justification, subject to certain limitations, for the commission of acts or omissions that would otherwise constitute offences;
(d) exempt employees of the Service and persons acting under their direction from liability for offences related to acts committed for the sole purpose of establishing or maintaining a covert identity;
(e) create a regime for the Service to collect, retain, query and exploit datasets in the course of performing its duties and functions;
(f) make amendments to the warrant regime that are related to datasets; and
(g) implement measures for the management of datasets.
Part 5 amends the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act to, among other things,
(a) emphasize that the Act addresses only the disclosure of information and not its collection or use;
(b) clarify the definition of “activity that undermines the security of Canada”;
(c) clarify that advocacy, protest, dissent and artistic expression are not activities that undermine the security of Canada unless they are carried on in conjunction with an activity that undermines the security of Canada;
(d) provide that a disclosure of information is authorized only if the disclosure will contribute to the carrying out by the recipient institution of its national security responsibilities and will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary;
(e) require that information disclosed be accompanied by information about the accuracy of the disclosed information and the reliability of the manner in which it was obtained; and
(f) require that records be prepared and kept in respect of every disclosure of information and that every year a copy of every record prepared in the preceding year be provided to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.
Part 6 amends the Secure Air Travel Act to authorize the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to collect from air carriers and operators of aviation reservation systems, for the purpose of identifying listed persons, information about any individuals who are on board or expected to be on board an aircraft for any flight prescribed by regulation, and to exempt an air carrier from providing that information, or from the application of any provision of the regulations, in certain circumstances. It amends the Act to authorize that Minister to collect personal information from individuals for the purpose of issuing a unique identifier to them to assist with pre-flight verification of their identity. It also reverses the rule in relation to a deemed decision on an application for administrative recourse. Finally, it amends the Act to provide for certain other measures related to the collection, disclosure and destruction of information.
Part 7 amends the Criminal Code to, among other things,
(a) make certain procedural modifications to the terrorist listing regime under section 83.‍05, such as providing for a staggered ministerial review of listed entities and granting the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness the authority to amend the names, including aliases, of listed entities;
(b) change the offence of advocating or promoting terrorism offences in general, in section 83.‍21, to one of counselling the commission of a terrorism offence, and make corresponding changes to the definition of terrorist propaganda;
(c) raise one of the thresholds for imposing a recognizance with conditions under section 83.‍3, and amend when that section is to be reviewed and, unless extended by Parliament, to cease to have effect;
(d) repeal sections 83.‍28 and 83.‍29 relating to an investigative hearing into a terrorism offence and repeal subsections 83.‍31(1) and (1.‍1), which require annual reports on such hearings;
(e) require the Attorney General of Canada to publish a report each year setting out the number of terrorism recognizances entered into under section 810.‍011 in the previous year; and
(f) authorize a court, in proceedings for recognizances under any of sections 83 and 810 to 810.‍2, to make orders for the protection of witnesses.
Part 8 amends the Youth Criminal Justice Act to, among other things, ensure that the protections that are afforded to young persons apply in respect of proceedings in relation to recognizance orders, including those related to terrorism, and give employees of a department or agency of the Government of Canada access to youth records, for the purpose of administering the Canadian Passport Order.
Part 9 requires that a comprehensive review of the provisions and operation of this enactment take place during the fourth year after section 168 of this enactment comes into force. If that section 168 and section 34 of Bill C-22, introduced in the 1st session of the 42nd Parliament and entitled the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, come into force within one year of each other, the reviews required by those sections are to take place at the same time and are to be undertaken by the same committee or committees.

[Shimon Fogel, Chief Executive Officer, Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs]

Thank you, Chair, for the opportunity to present to the members of this committee on behalf of the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs, the advocacy agent for the Jewish Federations of Canada.

We are a national, non-partisan, non-profit organization representing more than 150,000 Jewish Canadians affiliated through local federations across the country. We believe in Canada's foundational values of freedom, democracy, and equality, and are committed to working with government, Parliament, and all like-minded groups to ensure that Canada remains a country where we all enjoy equal protections and opportunities.

In March 2015, I appeared as a witness before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security as it studied Bill C-51. Our testimony began with a statement of fact, “Jews are consistently targeted by hate and bias-related crimes in Canada at a rate higher than any other identifiable group.” Those words are, unfortunately, as true today as they were then.

Statistics Canada recently released its report on 2016 hate crimes, and once again Jews were targeted more than any other religious minority, with 221 incidents. We must, however, keep this in perspective. Canada is a very safe place for identifiable groups and one of the greatest places in the world in which to live as a minority. However, we must also remain vigilant. A single hate crime is one too many.

Whether considering the attack on a synagogue in Jerusalem, a gay nightclub in Orlando, an African American church in Charleston, or a mosque in Quebec City, extreme hate continues to precipitate extreme violence. Jews are often primary targets for terrorist attacks throughout the world: Belgium, Argentina, France, India, Bulgaria, Israel, Denmark, the United States. Understandably, Jewish Canadians are not just concerned about what threats might meet them abroad, but what could happen here at home.

Public Safety Canada's “2016 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada” notes that Hezbollah, the listed terrorist entity widely believed to have carried out the bombing of a Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires, has networks operating here in Canada. The notorious 2004 firebombing of a Jewish school in Montreal still looms large in our collective memory.

Our community, therefore, takes a keen interest in the government's approach to counterterrorism. We appreciate the opportunity we were afforded to engage in the consultations on Canada's national security framework, both before this committee and with the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. I hope that our recommendations will prove helpful and constructive for the committee.

We'll speak on the expanded oversight for CSIS, but before going there let me just address a couple of considerations with respect to advocacy or promotion of terrorism offences in general.

In the context of the former Bill C-51, CIJA was supportive of measures to empower security officials to criminalize the advocacy and promotion of terrorism and seize terrorist propaganda. CIJA supported these measures as a means of denying those intent on inspiring, radicalizing, or recruiting Canadians to commit acts of terror the legal leeway to be clever but dangerous with their words.

Bill C-59 seeks to change the law's articulation of this offence from “advocating or promoting” to “counselling” a terrorism offence. This doesn't necessarily undermine the intended function of the provision. Justice Canada's background information on the advocacy and promotion offence states, “The offence is modelled on existing offences of counselling and the relevant jurisprudence. It extended the concept of counselling to cases where no specific terrorism offence is being counselled, but it is evident nonetheless that terrorism offences are being counselled.”

The same intended outcome seems to be achieved in Bill C-59, which adds the caveat that the counselling offence “may be committed...whether or not...the person counsels the commission of a specific terrorism offence.” If, as Minister Goodale indicated in his recent testimony before this committee, this change empowers authorities to enforce the law with greater impact, it would seem a reasonable shift. However, we believe there is an oversight in the proposed new language that could narrow the scope of the provision, weakening it substantially.

The existing offence applies to “Every person who, by communicating statements, knowingly advocates or promotes the commission of terrorism offences in general”. Swapping out the advocacy and promotion language, this should become something like “Every person who counsels the commission of a terrorism offence”, but it doesn't. Instead, Bill C-59 reads, “Every person who counsels another person to commit a terrorism offence”. With this wording, it appears that the offence could apply only to a specific individual counselling another specific individual.

When it comes to the offence of instructing a terrorist activity, the Criminal Code is explicit. The offence is committed whether or not the accused instructs a particular person to carry out the activity or even knows the identity of the person instructed to carry out the activity. The same standard should apply to the counselling offence. The change of “advocacy and promotion” to “counselling” also impacts on the definition of terrorism propaganda.

Bill C-59 would remove “advocacy and promotion of terrorism offences in general” from the definition, consistent with the change proposed for the counselling offence I've just discussed. However, the all-important caveat that a specific terrorism offence need not be counselled, which is included in the new counselling offence, is lacking here. This should be adjusted for the sake of consistency.

I'll turn to expanded oversight for CSIS.

In our testimony on Bill C-51, CIJA supported the expansion of CSIS's role and responsibilities to include disruption of potential terrorist attacks. While we believed the new mandate was justified, we maintained that enhanced oversight was required to prevent abuse. Just as Canadians stand to benefit from a more robust approach to counterterrorism that emphasizes prevention, we argued that a concurrent increase in the review of CSIS's activities would be beneficial.

Measures to enhance SIRC's ability to provide adequate review are long overdue and are all the more imperative with CSIS's expanded mandate. We supported the refinements to CSIS's expanded mandate that Bill C-59 would put in place and the establishment of a national security and intelligence review agency. Both should help to ensure greater balance in protecting the security and civil rights of Canadians.

In the context of Bill C-51, we proposed several concrete reforms to enhance oversight and accountability for CSIS. The new oversight agency will fulfill our first and perhaps most important recommendation's objective of enabling a review of security and intelligence activities across all government agencies and departments. However, we believe the following three recommendations regarding the structure and composition of the new agency would help ensure it is set up to be as impactful as possible.

First, the chair of the new agency should be someone with experience in intelligence and national security, and should occupy the position on a full-time basis to ensure consistent, professional leadership.

Unfortunately, Bill C-59 states, “The Chair and Vice-chair may be designated to hold office on a full-time or part-time basis”. The bill also states, “Every member of the Review Agency who is not designated as the Chair or Vice-chair holds office on a part-time basis”.

We suggest this be changed to provide the option of other members being brought on full time without requiring a legislative amendment. Given that the workload of the new agency is likely to be significantly greater than that of SIRC, this could conceivably require full-time engagement from all members.

Second, we recommend that the chair of the new agency be designated an officer of Parliament required to provide regular reports directly to Parliament. This mirrors the recommendation we made in the context of Bill C-51 with regard to the chair of SIRC.

The requirement enshrined in Bill C-59 that public reports from the new agency be tabled in Parliament is beneficial, but this reporting is still mediated through the Prime Minister and other ministers. Designating the chair of SIRC an officer of Parliament with a mandate for regular reporting directly to Parliament would send a clear signal that the work of the new agency is independent from the government of the day.

Third, we believe Parliament should have a greater voice in the appointment of members of the new agency.

We welcome the consultation provisions included in Bill C-59 but believe the appointments should also be subject to approval by resolution of the Senate and the House of Commons. This small addition, which is already standard practice in the appointment of officers of Parliament, would further enhance the credibility of the appointments process.

Although this may be more appropriate for your colleagues at the finance committee, it's also important to stress that the national security and intelligence review agency will require the allocation of significant resources, both professional and financial, if it is to be given a chance to succeed in fulfilling its important mandate.

CIJA's testimony in 2015 concluded with a plea for committee members to support a private member's bill that sought to extend hate crime penalties beyond houses of worship to schools and community centres. That initiative failed but was revived in this Parliament in Bill C-305, which passed third reading in the Senate in October.

I am pleased to conclude my remarks today, Mr. Chair, with sincere thanks to each of you for coming together in unanimous support for Bill C-305, a clear example of how elected officials can work together and make a practical difference to protect Canadians.

I hope committee members will consider my remarks today in that same constructive spirit, and I'm grateful for the opportunity to join with you.

Thank you.

[Khalid Elgazzar]

I think it would be any provisions that actually establish the redress system. For example, who is going to administer the system? What might it be called? What are the procedures? What are the parameters? Is there an appeal process involved? This is similar to what is currently at section 16 of the Secure Air Travel Act in terms of appeals, which I understand is being beefed up under Bill C-59.

Essentially, I would just like to see the establishment of a redress system, whatever is required to establish it. You may give it a name. I know in the United States they've given it a name: the traveller redress inquiry program. I would have thought at the very least that under section 32 of SATA, the regulations section of the act, the government might have included something that states that the government can make regulations with regard to a redress system. Even that would be just a small indication that this is something that's going to happen.

Frankly, our position is that the government should take this opportunity to catch up to our allies, including the United States, and bring about the entire system. This, again, isn't something where we're asking the government to reinvent the wheel.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Now, in an ideal world, if you had a chance—and I'm sure you've been asked by my colleague across the way to provide to the committee any recommendations you have—what changes would you like to see that aren't already included in this Bill C-59 on the whole issue of the no-fly list?

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to the witnesses for being here today.

I appreciate the comments that were made earlier, with respect to the concern that you have about all forms of violent extremism. Given the attack that happened in New York, I'm sure your organization has already or will be condemning the actions that occurred in that circumstance.

You indicate that there has been an historical lack of accountability within CSIS. It goes back many years. In 2015, Bill C-51 was brought in to address this and now Bill C-59 takes that review and accountability even further. However, from your testimony today, I'm hearing that there remains a lack of confidence in addressing the concerns within CSIS.

What do you propose is the solution?

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

I think the committee would appreciate it—and I think you've alluded to it—if you would get us precise recommendations on the no-fly list in the form of actual language that you would want to see inserted into the bill, and that you provide it to us. I personally am confident that this government is committed and that the parameters are there. Through your advocacy efforts, I think you have the cross-party commitment that the budgetary component of that will be put into place to construct that system.

In the remaining couple minutes, I'd like to delegate some of my time to my colleague, Ms. Young. I would like to ask you about Canadian youth and the vulnerability of Canadian youth.

My colleague Mr. Paul-Hus referred to terrorist financing. The other source of energy for a terrorist organization is recruitment. Canadian youth are vulnerable—and not just Muslim youth but Canadian youth generally—to organizations like al Shabaab, Abu Sayyaf, and ISIS through recruitment.

Bill C-59 brings the Youth Criminal Justice Act into play through section 159, which basically says that, in the context of detention, as a preventative mechanism, young offender considerations have to be taken into account in counterterrorism work. Are there any other components to this bill that you want to raise or highlight with respect to the protection of Canadian youth, and could you comment very briefly on the importance of working with our Canadian youth to prevent radicalization?

You have about a minute or so.

[Zamir Khan]

I would agree that it will take time to build the redress system, that it is complex. I will agree with that. What I don't see is that the framework in Bill C-59 ensures that a redress system will ever be built. I would like to see in the legislation, just as the administrative process is outlined, that a watch-list cannot continue without redress. I don't see that currently.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

When I alluded to the issues of culture change, I think it's important that you hear that you're making us feel at some level, within the limits of our time together here this morning, the stigma that you're exposed to day after day, and I thank you for that.

Bill C-59 is one building block, as departmental officials and the minister have testified recently, in a three-step series to getting us where we would want to be with respect to an equivalent of the U.S. system. It provides the legal basis. There's a budgetary basis, as well, and ultimately, there's the construction of an IT-based system that would operate the redress system. The committee received testimony from the department that this is a complex exercise.

I appreciate your point, Mr. Khan, that there is software available that may well serve in some way in terms of solutions being integrated into the Canadian system ultimately, but there are complexities and there's not just one department involved. This is an exercise that cannot be undertaken and completed tomorrow.

It's also important, because there are youth involved and privacy issues, that data needs to be protected and that this is done in the right way. Would you agree that, if those are the right parameters to getting us to where we want to be, there isn't really, from a government side, an intermediate quick fix that would satisfactorily answer the concerns you bring us today?

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Gardee and Professor Bhabha, I think this is what my colleague was getting at concerning what was said with regard to Bill C-51, and we heard this during the national security framework review that this committee undertook.

One of the concerns that were raised with the changes to the Criminal Code, the offences related to the promotion of terrorism.... Some families, for example, in terms of reporting to the proper authorities certain actions in hopes of rehabilitating a member of their family or their community, because those offences were so wide and general and vague, remained silent in order to not implicate a member of their family or their community.

Are the changes proposed to the Criminal Code in Bill C-59 related to that specific issue sufficient as far as you and your organization are concerned?

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Okay.

I would like to go back to the no-fly list.

I am one of the MPs who signed a letter that has been sent to the Minister asking him for action.

Bill C-59 provides for the possibility of issuing a unique identifier to people, but do you feel that using biometric data could be something to add in order to make it easier to identify people?

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

That answers my question, thank you. As I do not have a lot of time, I would like to continue with my questions to you.

When you testified about Bill C-51, you mentioned that members of the community want to help with deradicalization, but they are afraid of being accused of being extremists.

Do you think that Bill C-59 solves that problem?

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

What the minister has said, though, is that Bill C-59 gives us the legislative framework to build the regulations, and then the funding is required. This is the first step in making sure that this happens.

I have only five seconds left, so thank you.

[Zamir Khan]

—one interesting thing is that if you are a listed person, one of those 2,000 people or more on the list, you have a recourse path that is legislated. It's mandated in the Secure Air Travel Act. That's what we're saying here. For the many thousands more who are false positives, who have nothing to do with this list, that process is not legislated. Even with the amendments of Bill C-59, it's not guaranteed that a redress system would be implemented.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

As you mentioned, the list was put in place in 2007. One of the challenges was the way the previous government set it up. Instead of going the course that the Americans did, ours was done differently. As a result, officials, when they were here last week, said that it's going to be difficult and likely more costly to try to switch over now. Having said that, I think that in Bill C-59 we have the framework in place to start putting all of this in place.

I'm going to switch over to our other witnesses, though, because you think we should just get rid of it altogether. Is that what you were testifying? You don't think a redress system is something that we should pursue.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

As you know, I have a constituent whose son's name matches a name on the no-fly list. Just to clarify, it's not just Muslims who are on the no-fly list. They're not. They may be predominantly, I don't know, but certainly it affects many Canadians, regardless of religion.

Some of the concerns that I know are addressed in Bill C-59, and I think you probably share them.... Maybe you can clarify. One was that she had no capacity to find out if, in fact, her son was on the no-fly list. Bill C-59 will give a parent or guardian the ability to find out if that name is on the list. That didn't exist before. I'm not sure if you were aware of that or not.

[Zamir Khan]

Thank you.

Before I start, I want to apologize to the committee that my colleague, Khalid, can't be here. I'm going to be wearing two hats today, one as a parent and one as a makeshift legal adviser.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on Bill C-59. My name is Zamir Khan and I am one of the parent founders of No Fly List Kids. We represent the hundreds of families and thousands of citizens adversely affected by Canada's passenger protect program. The scope of our knowledge, and accordingly our testimony, is limited to the passenger protect program, such as amendments the Secure Air Travel Act.

I am not a legislative expert or a security expert. I am simply a Canadian citizen and a father, here to testify to the harmful impact that can be enabled by gaps in legislation and when intelligence gathered by our own security agencies is applied in a haphazard manner. As you are likely aware, the passenger protect program, also known as Canada's no-fly list, was implemented in 2007 with a design that included, in the words of our current Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, “a fundamental mistake.”

That flaw, which persists today, is that verifying whether passengers are potentially listed persons is delegated to airlines and done solely based on their name, and this is despite both booking information and the Secure Air Travel Act watch-list containing additional identifiers such as date of birth. Any innocent traveller caught in this web is subjected, at a minimum, to extra delays and additional security scrutiny to prove their identity. They are then stuck in a perpetually revolving door to repeat the process every time they fly.

We are often asked how many Canadians are affected by this problem. Statistics about the program and its effectiveness have not been shared since its inception in 2007 when the transport minister disclosed that there were up to 2,000 names on the list. Our group has been contacted by over 100 affected families, representing the tip of the iceberg. The vast majority of encumbered travellers are unaware of the source of their difficulties by virtue of the Secure Air Travel Act explicitly prohibiting the disclosing of any information related to a listed person. However, based on the names of the falsely flagged individuals we know of, and the number of Canadians who share those names, we conservatively estimate that over 100,000 Canadians are potential false positives when they fly. The methodology and rationale behind this estimate will be detailed in our upcoming written submission.

I am personally involved in this issue. My three-year-old son, Sebastian, has been treated as a potentially listed person since his birth. That means, for the first two years of his life, Sebastian was young enough, in the eyes of travel regulations, to be considered a “lap-held infant” who didn't require a seat on the flight, but old enough to be flagged as a possible security threat.

For families with flagged infants, the associated delays further complicate an already challenging travel schedule. As these children grow older, they become aware that they are the reason for the ever-present waiting and security scrutiny. That stigmatization has been described by the minister as a traumatizing experience for them and their families. When the children grow into teenagers and young adults, particularly young men, their innocence becomes less obvious. As our group has heard, their delays become longer and the scrutiny more intense. This has meant that some families have missed flights and the kids shy away from air travel for fear of stigmatization. This is not a future I want for my son.

The Secure Air Travel Act permits the minister to enter into agreements with foreign nations to disclose our watch-list to them. For example, a working group was established in 2016 to share our no-fly list with the United States. The prospect of this data being shared internationally is troubling to our families, who have experienced frightening ordeals of being detained and questioned or having passports confiscated while travelling abroad. Indeed, my wife and I are concerned about the treatment that awaits our family should we travel outside of Canada, given what already happens domestically. A watch-list that places undue suspicion on us is being shared internationally by our government, yet the burden to prove our innocence is being placed entirely on our shoulders.

All of this is to illustrate that the impact here runs much deeper than mere inconvenience. It is stigmatizing, inescapable, arguably a violation of charter rights, and as this committee has previously recommended, it is eminently solvable.

No Fly List Kids has been advocating for a fix to this flawed system for two years, and thus far the government has responded in two ways. In January 2016, the minister emphasized to airlines that children under the age of 18 did not require additional screening. However, as was reported by CBC, the result was Air Canada reiterating to their employees that all matches to the list must have their identities verified in person regardless of age.

In June 2016, the government announced the passenger protect inquiries office, or PPIO, designed to assist travellers who have experienced difficulties related to aviation security lists. Our group is not aware of a single family for whom the PPIO has been able to resolve their case. To the average Canadian, a resolution would mean permanently clearing someone who is falsely flagged. The PPIO considers recommending signing up your child for an airline rewards program or applying to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's redress system as a resolution.

For those flagged by the Canadian list like my son, a U.S. redress number does not help. Airline rewards programs are an inconsistent and flawed band-aid that the minister has called a stopgap measure. It's not good enough.

Earlier this year, the committee authored the report entitled “Protecting Canadians and their Rights: A New Road Map for Canada's National Security”. No Fly List Kids agrees with your recommendation 35 that the only solution for Canadians is an expeditious redress system to assist travellers erroneously identified as a person on the specified persons list.

In lieu of our legal adviser Khalid, I will now articulate our views on Bill C-59 and how, while it provides some initial framing, it falls short of ensuring a timely implementation of a redress system.

I will briefly touch on the following points: one, that the pressing need for a redress system has been established; two, that Bill C-59 does not go far enough in the establishment of a redress system; and three, time permitting, that the technology required for a redress system already exists and is being employed by our allies.

Let's start with the good news. Over the past few years, law-abiding Canadians from coast to coast have recounted their personal stories of delay, frustration, humiliation, and frankly, consternation in their encounters with the no-fly list regime. Those stories took on a new urgency when the No Fly List Kids group came together a little less than two years ago to bring to light how the list was affecting their children, including infants.

It appears that the message has gotten through. The group has secured letters from 202 members of Parliament, constituting two-thirds of the House of Commons, all calling for the swift establishment of a redress system. There appears to be all-party support for getting this done, but that brings me to the bad news.

On reading the proposed amendments to the Secure Air Travel Act contained in Bill C-59 it is apparent that, although the bill takes a small step toward the establishment of a redress system, it falls short of actually establishing the system. Bill C-59 includes a section that permits the minister to collect personal information for the purpose of issuing a unique identifier to travellers. It's a small step forward, but it's not where we need to go.

To illustrate by way of example, section 16 of the act currently provides an appeal mechanism for individuals who are denied boarding. There's also a section for administrative recourse.

Contrast that with Bill C-59, which does not come close to setting out the details of a redress system for people who are falsely flagged by the list.

My final point is that we are not asking the government to reinvent the wheel. We need to look no further than our closest neighbour, the United States. We have attached screenshots of booking information for the same passenger travelling from Canada to Halifax and New York, with a Canadian airline, Air Canada. As you can see, the technology is already there for the passenger to input their redress number when travelling to the United States and be cleared at the time of booking.

Thank you to the committee.