National Security Act, 2017

An Act respecting national security matters

This bill was last introduced in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session, which ended in September 2019.

Sponsor

Ralph Goodale  Liberal

Status

This bill has received Royal Assent and is now law.

Summary

This is from the published bill. The Library of Parliament often publishes better independent summaries.

Part 1 enacts the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, which establishes the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and sets out its composition, mandate and powers. It repeals the provisions of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act establishing the Security Intelligence Review Committee and amends that Act and other Acts in order to transfer certain powers, duties and functions to the new Agency. It also makes related and consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 1.‍1 enacts the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act to authorize the issuance of directions respecting the disclosure of and request for information that would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity and the use of information that is likely to have been obtained as the result of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity.
Part 2 enacts the Intelligence Commissioner Act, which provides that the duties and functions of the Intelligence Commissioner are to review the conclusions on the basis of which certain authorizations are issued or amended, and determinations are made, under the Communications Security Establishment Act and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and to approve those authorizations, amendments and determinations if those conclusions are reasonable. This Part also abolishes the position of the Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment, provides for that Commissioner to become the Intelligence Commissioner, transfers the employees of the former Commissioner to the office of the new Commissioner and makes related and consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 enacts the Communications Security Establishment Act, which establishes the Communications Security Establishment and, among other things, sets out the Establishment’s mandate as well as the regime for authorizing its activities. It also amends the National Defence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 4 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to
(a) add a preamble to that Act and provide a mechanism to enhance the accountability of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(b) add new limits on the exercise of the Service’s power to reduce threats to the security of Canada including, in particular, by setting out a list of measures that may be authorized by the Federal Court;
(c) provide a justification, subject to certain limitations, for the commission of acts or omissions that would otherwise constitute offences;
(d) exempt employees of the Service and persons acting under their direction from liability for offences related to acts committed for the sole purpose of establishing or maintaining a covert identity;
(e) create a regime for the Service to collect, retain, query and exploit datasets in the course of performing its duties and functions;
(f) make amendments to the warrant regime that are related to datasets; and
(g) implement measures for the management of datasets.
Part 5 amends the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act to, among other things,
(a) emphasize that the Act addresses only the disclosure of information and not its collection or use;
(b) clarify the definition of “activity that undermines the security of Canada”;
(c) clarify that advocacy, protest, dissent and artistic expression are not activities that undermine the security of Canada unless they are carried on in conjunction with an activity that undermines the security of Canada;
(d) provide that a disclosure of information is authorized only if the disclosure will contribute to the carrying out by the recipient institution of its national security responsibilities and will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary;
(e) require that information disclosed be accompanied by information about the accuracy of the disclosed information and the reliability of the manner in which it was obtained; and
(f) require that records be prepared and kept in respect of every disclosure of information and that every year a copy of every record prepared in the preceding year be provided to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.
Part 6 amends the Secure Air Travel Act to authorize the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to collect from air carriers and operators of aviation reservation systems, for the purpose of identifying listed persons, information about any individuals who are on board or expected to be on board an aircraft for any flight prescribed by regulation, and to exempt an air carrier from providing that information, or from the application of any provision of the regulations, in certain circumstances. It amends the Act to authorize that Minister to collect personal information from individuals for the purpose of issuing a unique identifier to them to assist with pre-flight verification of their identity. It also reverses the rule in relation to a deemed decision on an application for administrative recourse. Finally, it amends the Act to provide for certain other measures related to the collection, disclosure and destruction of information.
Part 7 amends the Criminal Code to, among other things,
(a) make certain procedural modifications to the terrorist listing regime under section 83.‍05, such as providing for a staggered ministerial review of listed entities and granting the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness the authority to amend the names, including aliases, of listed entities;
(b) change the offence of advocating or promoting terrorism offences in general, in section 83.‍21, to one of counselling the commission of a terrorism offence, and make corresponding changes to the definition of terrorist propaganda;
(c) raise one of the thresholds for imposing a recognizance with conditions under section 83.‍3, and amend when that section is to be reviewed and, unless extended by Parliament, to cease to have effect;
(d) repeal sections 83.‍28 and 83.‍29 relating to an investigative hearing into a terrorism offence and repeal subsections 83.‍31(1) and (1.‍1), which require annual reports on such hearings;
(e) require the Attorney General of Canada to publish a report each year setting out the number of terrorism recognizances entered into under section 810.‍011 in the previous year; and
(f) authorize a court, in proceedings for recognizances under any of sections 83 and 810 to 810.‍2, to make orders for the protection of witnesses.
Part 8 amends the Youth Criminal Justice Act to, among other things, ensure that the protections that are afforded to young persons apply in respect of proceedings in relation to recognizance orders, including those related to terrorism, and give employees of a department or agency of the Government of Canada access to youth records, for the purpose of administering the Canadian Passport Order.
Part 9 requires that a comprehensive review of the provisions and operation of this enactment take place during the fourth year after section 168 of this enactment comes into force. If that section 168 and section 34 of Bill C-22, introduced in the 1st session of the 42nd Parliament and entitled the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, come into force within one year of each other, the reviews required by those sections are to take place at the same time and are to be undertaken by the same committee or committees.

Elsewhere

All sorts of information on this bill is available at LEGISinfo, an excellent resource from the Library of Parliament. You can also read the full text of the bill.

Votes

June 11, 2019 Passed Motion respecting Senate amendments to Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters
June 11, 2019 Failed Motion respecting Senate amendments to Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters (amendment)
June 11, 2019 Passed Motion for closure
June 19, 2018 Passed 3rd reading and adoption of Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters
June 19, 2018 Passed 3rd reading and adoption of Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters
June 19, 2018 Passed 3rd reading and adoption of Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters
June 11, 2018 Passed Concurrence at report stage and second reading of Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters
June 11, 2018 Failed Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters (report stage amendment)
June 6, 2018 Passed Time allocation for Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters
Nov. 27, 2017 Passed Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters (referral to a committee before second reading)

December 12th, 2017 / 9:35 a.m.
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Liberal

Sven Spengemann Liberal Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON

I think the committee would appreciate it—and I think you've alluded to it—if you would get us precise recommendations on the no-fly list in the form of actual language that you would want to see inserted into the bill, and that you provide it to us. I personally am confident that this government is committed and that the parameters are there. Through your advocacy efforts, I think you have the cross-party commitment that the budgetary component of that will be put into place to construct that system.

In the remaining couple minutes, I'd like to delegate some of my time to my colleague, Ms. Young. I would like to ask you about Canadian youth and the vulnerability of Canadian youth.

My colleague Mr. Paul-Hus referred to terrorist financing. The other source of energy for a terrorist organization is recruitment. Canadian youth are vulnerable—and not just Muslim youth but Canadian youth generally—to organizations like al Shabaab, Abu Sayyaf, and ISIS through recruitment.

Bill C-59 brings the Youth Criminal Justice Act into play through section 159, which basically says that, in the context of detention, as a preventative mechanism, young offender considerations have to be taken into account in counterterrorism work. Are there any other components to this bill that you want to raise or highlight with respect to the protection of Canadian youth, and could you comment very briefly on the importance of working with our Canadian youth to prevent radicalization?

You have about a minute or so.

December 12th, 2017 / 9:35 a.m.
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Parent, No Fly List Kids

Zamir Khan

I would agree that it will take time to build the redress system, that it is complex. I will agree with that. What I don't see is that the framework in Bill C-59 ensures that a redress system will ever be built. I would like to see in the legislation, just as the administrative process is outlined, that a watch-list cannot continue without redress. I don't see that currently.

December 12th, 2017 / 9:30 a.m.
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Liberal

Sven Spengemann Liberal Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON

When I alluded to the issues of culture change, I think it's important that you hear that you're making us feel at some level, within the limits of our time together here this morning, the stigma that you're exposed to day after day, and I thank you for that.

Bill C-59 is one building block, as departmental officials and the minister have testified recently, in a three-step series to getting us where we would want to be with respect to an equivalent of the U.S. system. It provides the legal basis. There's a budgetary basis, as well, and ultimately, there's the construction of an IT-based system that would operate the redress system. The committee received testimony from the department that this is a complex exercise.

I appreciate your point, Mr. Khan, that there is software available that may well serve in some way in terms of solutions being integrated into the Canadian system ultimately, but there are complexities and there's not just one department involved. This is an exercise that cannot be undertaken and completed tomorrow.

It's also important, because there are youth involved and privacy issues, that data needs to be protected and that this is done in the right way. Would you agree that, if those are the right parameters to getting us to where we want to be, there isn't really, from a government side, an intermediate quick fix that would satisfactorily answer the concerns you bring us today?

December 12th, 2017 / 9:20 a.m.
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NDP

Matthew Dubé NDP Beloeil—Chambly, QC

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Gardee and Professor Bhabha, I think this is what my colleague was getting at concerning what was said with regard to Bill C-51, and we heard this during the national security framework review that this committee undertook.

One of the concerns that were raised with the changes to the Criminal Code, the offences related to the promotion of terrorism.... Some families, for example, in terms of reporting to the proper authorities certain actions in hopes of rehabilitating a member of their family or their community, because those offences were so wide and general and vague, remained silent in order to not implicate a member of their family or their community.

Are the changes proposed to the Criminal Code in Bill C-59 related to that specific issue sufficient as far as you and your organization are concerned?

December 12th, 2017 / 9:20 a.m.
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Conservative

Pierre Paul-Hus Conservative Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC

Okay.

I would like to go back to the no-fly list.

I am one of the MPs who signed a letter that has been sent to the Minister asking him for action.

Bill C-59 provides for the possibility of issuing a unique identifier to people, but do you feel that using biometric data could be something to add in order to make it easier to identify people?

December 12th, 2017 / 9:20 a.m.
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Conservative

Pierre Paul-Hus Conservative Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC

That answers my question, thank you. As I do not have a lot of time, I would like to continue with my questions to you.

When you testified about Bill C-51, you mentioned that members of the community want to help with deradicalization, but they are afraid of being accused of being extremists.

Do you think that Bill C-59 solves that problem?

December 12th, 2017 / 9:15 a.m.
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Liberal

Pam Damoff Liberal Oakville North—Burlington, ON

What the minister has said, though, is that Bill C-59 gives us the legislative framework to build the regulations, and then the funding is required. This is the first step in making sure that this happens.

I have only five seconds left, so thank you.

December 12th, 2017 / 9:15 a.m.
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Parent, No Fly List Kids

Zamir Khan

—one interesting thing is that if you are a listed person, one of those 2,000 people or more on the list, you have a recourse path that is legislated. It's mandated in the Secure Air Travel Act. That's what we're saying here. For the many thousands more who are false positives, who have nothing to do with this list, that process is not legislated. Even with the amendments of Bill C-59, it's not guaranteed that a redress system would be implemented.

December 12th, 2017 / 9:10 a.m.
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Liberal

Pam Damoff Liberal Oakville North—Burlington, ON

As you mentioned, the list was put in place in 2007. One of the challenges was the way the previous government set it up. Instead of going the course that the Americans did, ours was done differently. As a result, officials, when they were here last week, said that it's going to be difficult and likely more costly to try to switch over now. Having said that, I think that in Bill C-59 we have the framework in place to start putting all of this in place.

I'm going to switch over to our other witnesses, though, because you think we should just get rid of it altogether. Is that what you were testifying? You don't think a redress system is something that we should pursue.

December 12th, 2017 / 9:05 a.m.
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Liberal

Pam Damoff Liberal Oakville North—Burlington, ON

As you know, I have a constituent whose son's name matches a name on the no-fly list. Just to clarify, it's not just Muslims who are on the no-fly list. They're not. They may be predominantly, I don't know, but certainly it affects many Canadians, regardless of religion.

Some of the concerns that I know are addressed in Bill C-59, and I think you probably share them.... Maybe you can clarify. One was that she had no capacity to find out if, in fact, her son was on the no-fly list. Bill C-59 will give a parent or guardian the ability to find out if that name is on the list. That didn't exist before. I'm not sure if you were aware of that or not.

December 12th, 2017 / 8:55 a.m.
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Parent, No Fly List Kids

Zamir Khan

Thank you.

Before I start, I want to apologize to the committee that my colleague, Khalid, can't be here. I'm going to be wearing two hats today, one as a parent and one as a makeshift legal adviser.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on Bill C-59. My name is Zamir Khan and I am one of the parent founders of No Fly List Kids. We represent the hundreds of families and thousands of citizens adversely affected by Canada's passenger protect program. The scope of our knowledge, and accordingly our testimony, is limited to the passenger protect program, such as amendments the Secure Air Travel Act.

I am not a legislative expert or a security expert. I am simply a Canadian citizen and a father, here to testify to the harmful impact that can be enabled by gaps in legislation and when intelligence gathered by our own security agencies is applied in a haphazard manner. As you are likely aware, the passenger protect program, also known as Canada's no-fly list, was implemented in 2007 with a design that included, in the words of our current Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, “a fundamental mistake.”

That flaw, which persists today, is that verifying whether passengers are potentially listed persons is delegated to airlines and done solely based on their name, and this is despite both booking information and the Secure Air Travel Act watch-list containing additional identifiers such as date of birth. Any innocent traveller caught in this web is subjected, at a minimum, to extra delays and additional security scrutiny to prove their identity. They are then stuck in a perpetually revolving door to repeat the process every time they fly.

We are often asked how many Canadians are affected by this problem. Statistics about the program and its effectiveness have not been shared since its inception in 2007 when the transport minister disclosed that there were up to 2,000 names on the list. Our group has been contacted by over 100 affected families, representing the tip of the iceberg. The vast majority of encumbered travellers are unaware of the source of their difficulties by virtue of the Secure Air Travel Act explicitly prohibiting the disclosing of any information related to a listed person. However, based on the names of the falsely flagged individuals we know of, and the number of Canadians who share those names, we conservatively estimate that over 100,000 Canadians are potential false positives when they fly. The methodology and rationale behind this estimate will be detailed in our upcoming written submission.

I am personally involved in this issue. My three-year-old son, Sebastian, has been treated as a potentially listed person since his birth. That means, for the first two years of his life, Sebastian was young enough, in the eyes of travel regulations, to be considered a “lap-held infant” who didn't require a seat on the flight, but old enough to be flagged as a possible security threat.

For families with flagged infants, the associated delays further complicate an already challenging travel schedule. As these children grow older, they become aware that they are the reason for the ever-present waiting and security scrutiny. That stigmatization has been described by the minister as a traumatizing experience for them and their families. When the children grow into teenagers and young adults, particularly young men, their innocence becomes less obvious. As our group has heard, their delays become longer and the scrutiny more intense. This has meant that some families have missed flights and the kids shy away from air travel for fear of stigmatization. This is not a future I want for my son.

The Secure Air Travel Act permits the minister to enter into agreements with foreign nations to disclose our watch-list to them. For example, a working group was established in 2016 to share our no-fly list with the United States. The prospect of this data being shared internationally is troubling to our families, who have experienced frightening ordeals of being detained and questioned or having passports confiscated while travelling abroad. Indeed, my wife and I are concerned about the treatment that awaits our family should we travel outside of Canada, given what already happens domestically. A watch-list that places undue suspicion on us is being shared internationally by our government, yet the burden to prove our innocence is being placed entirely on our shoulders.

All of this is to illustrate that the impact here runs much deeper than mere inconvenience. It is stigmatizing, inescapable, arguably a violation of charter rights, and as this committee has previously recommended, it is eminently solvable.

No Fly List Kids has been advocating for a fix to this flawed system for two years, and thus far the government has responded in two ways. In January 2016, the minister emphasized to airlines that children under the age of 18 did not require additional screening. However, as was reported by CBC, the result was Air Canada reiterating to their employees that all matches to the list must have their identities verified in person regardless of age.

In June 2016, the government announced the passenger protect inquiries office, or PPIO, designed to assist travellers who have experienced difficulties related to aviation security lists. Our group is not aware of a single family for whom the PPIO has been able to resolve their case. To the average Canadian, a resolution would mean permanently clearing someone who is falsely flagged. The PPIO considers recommending signing up your child for an airline rewards program or applying to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's redress system as a resolution.

For those flagged by the Canadian list like my son, a U.S. redress number does not help. Airline rewards programs are an inconsistent and flawed band-aid that the minister has called a stopgap measure. It's not good enough.

Earlier this year, the committee authored the report entitled “Protecting Canadians and their Rights: A New Road Map for Canada's National Security”. No Fly List Kids agrees with your recommendation 35 that the only solution for Canadians is an expeditious redress system to assist travellers erroneously identified as a person on the specified persons list.

In lieu of our legal adviser Khalid, I will now articulate our views on Bill C-59 and how, while it provides some initial framing, it falls short of ensuring a timely implementation of a redress system.

I will briefly touch on the following points: one, that the pressing need for a redress system has been established; two, that Bill C-59 does not go far enough in the establishment of a redress system; and three, time permitting, that the technology required for a redress system already exists and is being employed by our allies.

Let's start with the good news. Over the past few years, law-abiding Canadians from coast to coast have recounted their personal stories of delay, frustration, humiliation, and frankly, consternation in their encounters with the no-fly list regime. Those stories took on a new urgency when the No Fly List Kids group came together a little less than two years ago to bring to light how the list was affecting their children, including infants.

It appears that the message has gotten through. The group has secured letters from 202 members of Parliament, constituting two-thirds of the House of Commons, all calling for the swift establishment of a redress system. There appears to be all-party support for getting this done, but that brings me to the bad news.

On reading the proposed amendments to the Secure Air Travel Act contained in Bill C-59 it is apparent that, although the bill takes a small step toward the establishment of a redress system, it falls short of actually establishing the system. Bill C-59 includes a section that permits the minister to collect personal information for the purpose of issuing a unique identifier to travellers. It's a small step forward, but it's not where we need to go.

To illustrate by way of example, section 16 of the act currently provides an appeal mechanism for individuals who are denied boarding. There's also a section for administrative recourse.

Contrast that with Bill C-59, which does not come close to setting out the details of a redress system for people who are falsely flagged by the list.

My final point is that we are not asking the government to reinvent the wheel. We need to look no further than our closest neighbour, the United States. We have attached screenshots of booking information for the same passenger travelling from Canada to Halifax and New York, with a Canadian airline, Air Canada. As you can see, the technology is already there for the passenger to input their redress number when travelling to the United States and be cleared at the time of booking.

Thank you to the committee.

December 12th, 2017 / 8:45 a.m.
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Ihsaan Gardee Executive Director, National Council of Canadian Muslims

Good morning, members.

Thank you very much for your attention and time today.

My name is Ihsaan Gardee, as mentioned, and I serve as executive director of the National Council of Canadian Muslims. I am joined today by my colleague, Professor Faisal Bhabha, NCCM's legal counsel and the chair of our national security policy committee.

The NCCM was founded in 2000 as an independent, non-partisan, and non-profit grassroots organization that for over 17 years has been a leading voice for Muslim civic engagement and the promotion of human rights. The NCCM's mandate is to protect the human rights and civil liberties of Canadian Muslims, advocate for their public interests, build mutual understanding, and challenge discrimination and Islamophobia.

We work to achieve this mission through our work in four primary areas: community education and outreach, media engagement, anti-discrimination action, and public advocacy. The NCCM has a long-standing and robust public record of participating in major public inquiries, intervening in landmark cases before the Supreme Court of Canada, and providing advice to security agencies on engaging communities and promoting public safety.

In terms of our position, the NCCM has always supported the government's responsibility to ensure national security. We commend the current government for fulfilling its election promise to review Bill C-51 as its condition for supporting the bill in the first place, and to consult with Canadians. While we welcome, for instance, that Bill C-59 proposes to create a national security review agency with more oversight and review than we currently have, our general objection remains constant. This law goes too far. It virtually guarantees constitutional breach, and it offers inadequate justification. It strengthens the security establishment when the evidence available gives every indication that the institutions carrying out national security intelligence gathering and enforcement mandates are in disarray, rife with bias and bullying from the top down. Oversight of those agencies is not sufficient. Real reform is necessary.

While we share the concerns of others you have heard from, including Amnesty International and others, for the purposes of our opening statement today I'll be focusing our testimony on two major substantive concerns we have with Bill C-59. Number one is the powers given to CSIS, and number two, the failure to address systemic problems with the no-fly list.

In terms of our reasons, Canadian Muslims are just as concerned about security as other Canadians. We face the same risk of untimely death or injury at the hands of terrorists as any Canadian. In fact, globally the overwhelming majority of victims of political violence, including ideological extremist violence, have been Muslims. Being a population with global connections, Canadian Muslims are threatened and impacted by global terrorism as much, if not more, than other Canadians. We thus have a high interest in Canada developing a strong and sound national security policy with robust oversight, accountability, and redress mechanisms to guard against abuses and mistakes.

At the same time, members of Canadian Muslim communities have been victims of Canadian national security policy. Over the last 15 years we have seen three separate judicial inquiries, numerous court rulings, out-of-court settlements, and apologies that acknowledged the constitutional violations committed against innocent Muslims by national security intelligence and enforcement. Canadian Muslims are not only disproportionately affected by these errors and abuses, but we also bear the brunt of social impact when xenophobic and anti-Muslim sentiment surges.

NCCM agrees with the plurality of experts who state that more power to security agencies does not necessarily mean more security for Canadians. National security mistakes not only put innocent people at risk of suspicion and stigma, but also divert attention away from actual threats and obstruct effective action to promote safety and security. At the same time that Alexandre Bissonnette was dreaming up his murderous plot to attack a Quebec City mosque, the RCMP were “manufacturing crime”, according to the B.C. Superior Court judge in the case against John Nuttall and Amanda Korody. They were Muslim converts and recovering heroin addicts living on social assistance, whose terrorism charges were stayed last year after a court found they had been entrapped by police.

Bill C-59 strengthens the security establishment but does not address the security needs of Canadian Muslims. While the idea of prevention is laudable, any potential benefit from this approach will be negated by the incursions on charter rights that disproportionately affect members of our community, and which will continue to happen under the guise of threat reduction, information sharing, and no-fly listing.

If the government wishes to collaborate with communities on prevention, it needs to build trust and confidence first. For many young Canadian Muslims, the documented and admitted involvement of intelligence and enforcement agencies in rendition and other human rights abuses, and the complete lack of accountability and perceived impunity that have been created as a result, have bred a lack of confidence in the Canadian security establishment.

This past summer, a group of CSIS employees filed a civil claim against the service, alleging discrimination, harassment, bullying, and abuse of authority. They described a workplace environment within the service that is racist, Islamophobic, sexist, and homophobic, where the culture is like an old boys' club and where minority representation in management is abysmally low. The day after the claim was filed, two senior former CSIS employees were quoted in the media saying they were not surprised by the allegations.

In October 2017, CSIS released the report of an independent, third-party investigation into allegations of harassment in the Toronto region office. The findings noted an “old boys' culture”, demeaning treatment, swearing and discriminatory statements, distrust among employees towards management, and a lack of diversity among the staff.

If these kinds of reports are indicative of the overall culture that exists within these organizations toward their own employees, it does little to assuage concerns within Canadian Muslim communities about unfair profiling and error.

The Canadian Human Rights Commission conducted employment equity audits of CSIS in 2011 and 2014, and the findings are shocking for a powerful public institution operating in a 21st-century, multicultural, democratic society.

There were zero per cent visible minorities in senior management positions at a time when visible minorities were about 20% of the Canadian population. We have to infer from that not just a glass ceiling but an actual bar. The CHRC also noted an institutional culture that undervalued minorities and reproduced attitudinal barriers, which resulted in fewer hiring and advancement opportunities for minorities.

The security agency's loss of trust within Canadian Muslim communities has been exacerbated by the lack of accountability for past wrongs committed against innocent Muslims. While the government has concluded significant settlements and made apologies, no one from within those agencies has been held to account.

To the best of our knowledge, there has been no disciplinary action and no public acknowledgements. Instead of accountability, some of those involved in the well-known torture case of Maher Arar have even been promoted within the agencies.

At best, there was individual and institutional incompetence in the security agencies. At worst, it was gross negligence or bad faith. Neither is acceptable and the taxpaying Canadians who fund these agencies deserve better.

The lack of accountability projects a culture of impunity within the Canadian security agencies that reinforces the insecurity Canadian Muslims experience. The problems with CSIS will not be mitigated by Bill C-59. No amount of administrative oversight can cure the systemic ills. These agencies need reform.

We do not see any attention given in this proposed legislation to the real impact that bias in national security has in producing insecurity and harm within our communities. Without a clear statutory mandate and direction from our government, we do not believe that civil society alone can change the culture within CSIS and other security agencies.

We are willing to help, but that burden cannot fall only upon us.

I'll now pass it over to my colleague, Professor Bhabha, to conclude with our recommendations.

Agriculture and AgrifoodOral Questions

December 8th, 2017 / 11:45 a.m.
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Conservative

Luc Berthold Conservative Mégantic—L'Érable, QC

Mr. Speaker, whether in Saint-André, New Brunswick, or in Calgary, where I met with grain producers, everyone is wondering who in this government is standing up for agriculture.

Farmers were called tax cheats, family transfers were compromised, deferred cash tickets were almost taken away, and the government refused to split Bill C-59 on grain transportation. The list is long.

Worst of all, the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food has not been involved in any of the free trade negotiations. Agriculture is the basis of our economy.

Why are the Liberals abandoning farmers?

Public SafetyOral Questions

December 8th, 2017 / 11:25 a.m.
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Ajax Ontario

Liberal

Mark Holland LiberalParliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness

Mr. Speaker, Bill C-59 was preceded by the most exhaustive public consultation across Canada ever on national security. There was an opportunity by the public safety and national security committee to ensure there was a review of the security framework. That led to the legislation before us today, which would see finally the oversight that was talked about for so many years, including when I was the critic in opposition and pushing for it.

We have waited for over a decade. It is time to move forward with appropriate oversight.

Public SafetyOral Questions

December 8th, 2017 / 11:25 a.m.
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NDP

Scott Duvall NDP Hamilton Mountain, ON

Mr. Speaker, the Liberals are claiming it is not possible to repeal the Conservative Bill C-51. My colleague from Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke is proposing just that with his Bill C-303 to fully protect Canadians' rights.

Under the 138-page Liberal Bill C-59, CSIS still has extensive and invasive powers. The privacy of Canadians is still under threat and oversight of government agencies is insufficient.

Will the government divide Bill C-59 into separate bills so they can be properly studied? Canadians' rights are at stake.