National Security Act, 2017

An Act respecting national security matters

This bill was last introduced in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session, which ended in September 2019.

Sponsor

Ralph Goodale  Liberal

Status

This bill has received Royal Assent and is now law.

Summary

This is from the published bill.

Part 1 enacts the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, which establishes the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and sets out its composition, mandate and powers. It repeals the provisions of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act establishing the Security Intelligence Review Committee and amends that Act and other Acts in order to transfer certain powers, duties and functions to the new Agency. It also makes related and consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 1.‍1 enacts the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act to authorize the issuance of directions respecting the disclosure of and request for information that would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity and the use of information that is likely to have been obtained as the result of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity.
Part 2 enacts the Intelligence Commissioner Act, which provides that the duties and functions of the Intelligence Commissioner are to review the conclusions on the basis of which certain authorizations are issued or amended, and determinations are made, under the Communications Security Establishment Act and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and to approve those authorizations, amendments and determinations if those conclusions are reasonable. This Part also abolishes the position of the Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment, provides for that Commissioner to become the Intelligence Commissioner, transfers the employees of the former Commissioner to the office of the new Commissioner and makes related and consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 enacts the Communications Security Establishment Act, which establishes the Communications Security Establishment and, among other things, sets out the Establishment’s mandate as well as the regime for authorizing its activities. It also amends the National Defence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 4 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to
(a) add a preamble to that Act and provide a mechanism to enhance the accountability of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(b) add new limits on the exercise of the Service’s power to reduce threats to the security of Canada including, in particular, by setting out a list of measures that may be authorized by the Federal Court;
(c) provide a justification, subject to certain limitations, for the commission of acts or omissions that would otherwise constitute offences;
(d) exempt employees of the Service and persons acting under their direction from liability for offences related to acts committed for the sole purpose of establishing or maintaining a covert identity;
(e) create a regime for the Service to collect, retain, query and exploit datasets in the course of performing its duties and functions;
(f) make amendments to the warrant regime that are related to datasets; and
(g) implement measures for the management of datasets.
Part 5 amends the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act to, among other things,
(a) emphasize that the Act addresses only the disclosure of information and not its collection or use;
(b) clarify the definition of “activity that undermines the security of Canada”;
(c) clarify that advocacy, protest, dissent and artistic expression are not activities that undermine the security of Canada unless they are carried on in conjunction with an activity that undermines the security of Canada;
(d) provide that a disclosure of information is authorized only if the disclosure will contribute to the carrying out by the recipient institution of its national security responsibilities and will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary;
(e) require that information disclosed be accompanied by information about the accuracy of the disclosed information and the reliability of the manner in which it was obtained; and
(f) require that records be prepared and kept in respect of every disclosure of information and that every year a copy of every record prepared in the preceding year be provided to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.
Part 6 amends the Secure Air Travel Act to authorize the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to collect from air carriers and operators of aviation reservation systems, for the purpose of identifying listed persons, information about any individuals who are on board or expected to be on board an aircraft for any flight prescribed by regulation, and to exempt an air carrier from providing that information, or from the application of any provision of the regulations, in certain circumstances. It amends the Act to authorize that Minister to collect personal information from individuals for the purpose of issuing a unique identifier to them to assist with pre-flight verification of their identity. It also reverses the rule in relation to a deemed decision on an application for administrative recourse. Finally, it amends the Act to provide for certain other measures related to the collection, disclosure and destruction of information.
Part 7 amends the Criminal Code to, among other things,
(a) make certain procedural modifications to the terrorist listing regime under section 83.‍05, such as providing for a staggered ministerial review of listed entities and granting the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness the authority to amend the names, including aliases, of listed entities;
(b) change the offence of advocating or promoting terrorism offences in general, in section 83.‍21, to one of counselling the commission of a terrorism offence, and make corresponding changes to the definition of terrorist propaganda;
(c) raise one of the thresholds for imposing a recognizance with conditions under section 83.‍3, and amend when that section is to be reviewed and, unless extended by Parliament, to cease to have effect;
(d) repeal sections 83.‍28 and 83.‍29 relating to an investigative hearing into a terrorism offence and repeal subsections 83.‍31(1) and (1.‍1), which require annual reports on such hearings;
(e) require the Attorney General of Canada to publish a report each year setting out the number of terrorism recognizances entered into under section 810.‍011 in the previous year; and
(f) authorize a court, in proceedings for recognizances under any of sections 83 and 810 to 810.‍2, to make orders for the protection of witnesses.
Part 8 amends the Youth Criminal Justice Act to, among other things, ensure that the protections that are afforded to young persons apply in respect of proceedings in relation to recognizance orders, including those related to terrorism, and give employees of a department or agency of the Government of Canada access to youth records, for the purpose of administering the Canadian Passport Order.
Part 9 requires that a comprehensive review of the provisions and operation of this enactment take place during the fourth year after section 168 of this enactment comes into force. If that section 168 and section 34 of Bill C-22, introduced in the 1st session of the 42nd Parliament and entitled the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, come into force within one year of each other, the reviews required by those sections are to take place at the same time and are to be undertaken by the same committee or committees.

Elsewhere

All sorts of information on this bill is available at LEGISinfo, an excellent resource from the Library of Parliament. You can also read the full text of the bill.

Votes

June 11, 2019 Passed Motion respecting Senate amendments to Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters
June 11, 2019 Failed Motion respecting Senate amendments to Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters (amendment)
June 11, 2019 Passed Motion for closure
June 19, 2018 Passed 3rd reading and adoption of Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters
June 19, 2018 Passed 3rd reading and adoption of Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters
June 19, 2018 Passed 3rd reading and adoption of Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters
June 11, 2018 Passed Concurrence at report stage and second reading of Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters
June 11, 2018 Failed Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters (report stage amendment)
June 6, 2018 Passed Time allocation for Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters
Nov. 27, 2017 Passed Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters (referral to a committee before second reading)

Ihsaan Gardee Executive Director, National Council of Canadian Muslims

Good morning, members.

Thank you very much for your attention and time today.

My name is Ihsaan Gardee, as mentioned, and I serve as executive director of the National Council of Canadian Muslims. I am joined today by my colleague, Professor Faisal Bhabha, NCCM's legal counsel and the chair of our national security policy committee.

The NCCM was founded in 2000 as an independent, non-partisan, and non-profit grassroots organization that for over 17 years has been a leading voice for Muslim civic engagement and the promotion of human rights. The NCCM's mandate is to protect the human rights and civil liberties of Canadian Muslims, advocate for their public interests, build mutual understanding, and challenge discrimination and Islamophobia.

We work to achieve this mission through our work in four primary areas: community education and outreach, media engagement, anti-discrimination action, and public advocacy. The NCCM has a long-standing and robust public record of participating in major public inquiries, intervening in landmark cases before the Supreme Court of Canada, and providing advice to security agencies on engaging communities and promoting public safety.

In terms of our position, the NCCM has always supported the government's responsibility to ensure national security. We commend the current government for fulfilling its election promise to review Bill C-51 as its condition for supporting the bill in the first place, and to consult with Canadians. While we welcome, for instance, that Bill C-59 proposes to create a national security review agency with more oversight and review than we currently have, our general objection remains constant. This law goes too far. It virtually guarantees constitutional breach, and it offers inadequate justification. It strengthens the security establishment when the evidence available gives every indication that the institutions carrying out national security intelligence gathering and enforcement mandates are in disarray, rife with bias and bullying from the top down. Oversight of those agencies is not sufficient. Real reform is necessary.

While we share the concerns of others you have heard from, including Amnesty International and others, for the purposes of our opening statement today I'll be focusing our testimony on two major substantive concerns we have with Bill C-59. Number one is the powers given to CSIS, and number two, the failure to address systemic problems with the no-fly list.

In terms of our reasons, Canadian Muslims are just as concerned about security as other Canadians. We face the same risk of untimely death or injury at the hands of terrorists as any Canadian. In fact, globally the overwhelming majority of victims of political violence, including ideological extremist violence, have been Muslims. Being a population with global connections, Canadian Muslims are threatened and impacted by global terrorism as much, if not more, than other Canadians. We thus have a high interest in Canada developing a strong and sound national security policy with robust oversight, accountability, and redress mechanisms to guard against abuses and mistakes.

At the same time, members of Canadian Muslim communities have been victims of Canadian national security policy. Over the last 15 years we have seen three separate judicial inquiries, numerous court rulings, out-of-court settlements, and apologies that acknowledged the constitutional violations committed against innocent Muslims by national security intelligence and enforcement. Canadian Muslims are not only disproportionately affected by these errors and abuses, but we also bear the brunt of social impact when xenophobic and anti-Muslim sentiment surges.

NCCM agrees with the plurality of experts who state that more power to security agencies does not necessarily mean more security for Canadians. National security mistakes not only put innocent people at risk of suspicion and stigma, but also divert attention away from actual threats and obstruct effective action to promote safety and security. At the same time that Alexandre Bissonnette was dreaming up his murderous plot to attack a Quebec City mosque, the RCMP were “manufacturing crime”, according to the B.C. Superior Court judge in the case against John Nuttall and Amanda Korody. They were Muslim converts and recovering heroin addicts living on social assistance, whose terrorism charges were stayed last year after a court found they had been entrapped by police.

Bill C-59 strengthens the security establishment but does not address the security needs of Canadian Muslims. While the idea of prevention is laudable, any potential benefit from this approach will be negated by the incursions on charter rights that disproportionately affect members of our community, and which will continue to happen under the guise of threat reduction, information sharing, and no-fly listing.

If the government wishes to collaborate with communities on prevention, it needs to build trust and confidence first. For many young Canadian Muslims, the documented and admitted involvement of intelligence and enforcement agencies in rendition and other human rights abuses, and the complete lack of accountability and perceived impunity that have been created as a result, have bred a lack of confidence in the Canadian security establishment.

This past summer, a group of CSIS employees filed a civil claim against the service, alleging discrimination, harassment, bullying, and abuse of authority. They described a workplace environment within the service that is racist, Islamophobic, sexist, and homophobic, where the culture is like an old boys' club and where minority representation in management is abysmally low. The day after the claim was filed, two senior former CSIS employees were quoted in the media saying they were not surprised by the allegations.

In October 2017, CSIS released the report of an independent, third-party investigation into allegations of harassment in the Toronto region office. The findings noted an “old boys' culture”, demeaning treatment, swearing and discriminatory statements, distrust among employees towards management, and a lack of diversity among the staff.

If these kinds of reports are indicative of the overall culture that exists within these organizations toward their own employees, it does little to assuage concerns within Canadian Muslim communities about unfair profiling and error.

The Canadian Human Rights Commission conducted employment equity audits of CSIS in 2011 and 2014, and the findings are shocking for a powerful public institution operating in a 21st-century, multicultural, democratic society.

There were zero per cent visible minorities in senior management positions at a time when visible minorities were about 20% of the Canadian population. We have to infer from that not just a glass ceiling but an actual bar. The CHRC also noted an institutional culture that undervalued minorities and reproduced attitudinal barriers, which resulted in fewer hiring and advancement opportunities for minorities.

The security agency's loss of trust within Canadian Muslim communities has been exacerbated by the lack of accountability for past wrongs committed against innocent Muslims. While the government has concluded significant settlements and made apologies, no one from within those agencies has been held to account.

To the best of our knowledge, there has been no disciplinary action and no public acknowledgements. Instead of accountability, some of those involved in the well-known torture case of Maher Arar have even been promoted within the agencies.

At best, there was individual and institutional incompetence in the security agencies. At worst, it was gross negligence or bad faith. Neither is acceptable and the taxpaying Canadians who fund these agencies deserve better.

The lack of accountability projects a culture of impunity within the Canadian security agencies that reinforces the insecurity Canadian Muslims experience. The problems with CSIS will not be mitigated by Bill C-59. No amount of administrative oversight can cure the systemic ills. These agencies need reform.

We do not see any attention given in this proposed legislation to the real impact that bias in national security has in producing insecurity and harm within our communities. Without a clear statutory mandate and direction from our government, we do not believe that civil society alone can change the culture within CSIS and other security agencies.

We are willing to help, but that burden cannot fall only upon us.

I'll now pass it over to my colleague, Professor Bhabha, to conclude with our recommendations.

Agriculture and Agri-foodOral Questions

December 8th, 2017 / 11:45 a.m.


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Conservative

Luc Berthold Conservative Mégantic—L'Érable, QC

Mr. Speaker, whether in Saint-André, New Brunswick, or in Calgary, where I met with grain producers, everyone is wondering who in this government is standing up for agriculture.

Farmers were called tax cheats, family transfers were compromised, deferred cash tickets were almost taken away, and the government refused to split Bill C-59 on grain transportation. The list is long.

Worst of all, the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food has not been involved in any of the free trade negotiations. Agriculture is the basis of our economy.

Why are the Liberals abandoning farmers?

Public SafetyOral Questions

December 8th, 2017 / 11:25 a.m.


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Ajax Ontario

Liberal

Mark Holland LiberalParliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness

Mr. Speaker, Bill C-59 was preceded by the most exhaustive public consultation across Canada ever on national security. There was an opportunity by the public safety and national security committee to ensure there was a review of the security framework. That led to the legislation before us today, which would see finally the oversight that was talked about for so many years, including when I was the critic in opposition and pushing for it.

We have waited for over a decade. It is time to move forward with appropriate oversight.

Public SafetyOral Questions

December 8th, 2017 / 11:25 a.m.


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NDP

Scott Duvall NDP Hamilton Mountain, ON

Mr. Speaker, the Liberals are claiming it is not possible to repeal the Conservative Bill C-51. My colleague from Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke is proposing just that with his Bill C-303 to fully protect Canadians' rights.

Under the 138-page Liberal Bill C-59, CSIS still has extensive and invasive powers. The privacy of Canadians is still under threat and oversight of government agencies is insufficient.

Will the government divide Bill C-59 into separate bills so they can be properly studied? Canadians' rights are at stake.

Public SafetyOral Questions

December 8th, 2017 / 11:25 a.m.


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Ajax Ontario

Liberal

Mark Holland LiberalParliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness

Mr. Speaker, yesterday, the Privacy Commissioner said that Canada was moving from the back of the pack and catching up with the rest of the international community. In fact, he said that Canada was moving to the lead as a result of the legislation, Bill C-59.

The fact is that the legislation is putting us at the vanguard, that we are ensuring two things equally: one, the protection of Canadians; and two, making sure that their rights are protected.

Public SafetyOral Questions

December 8th, 2017 / 11:25 a.m.


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NDP

Marjolaine Boutin-Sweet NDP Hochelaga, QC

Mr. Speaker, the Liberals promised to fix the problems in the Conservatives' anti-terrorism bill, which was an unprecedented attack on Canadians' civil rights.

The Privacy Commissioner sounded the alarm on the Liberals' Bill C-59 yesterday in committee. The thresholds for sharing information about Canadians among departments are still too low and must be more limited.

Will the government finally agree to amend its bill to protect Canadians' civil rights?

Kellie Leitch Conservative Simcoe—Grey, ON

I've been meaning to ask all of you another question.

In your reading of Bill C-59, each of you have made some comments on the number of layers and whether or not new reviews would be placed on CSIS and their capacity to be able to do things. Do you think it's helpful in allowing CSIS to meet its mandate by having these additional layers? Mr. Leuprecht, you had commented with regard to the issues around methodology and how that would be implemented. Could you comment and then we'll come back to the others?

Kellie Leitch Conservative Simcoe—Grey, ON

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, all, for taking the time to come today.

Mr. Leuprecht, I'd like to ask you one particular question. I guess it's in follow-up to your comment about how Canada no longer lives in an isolated part of the world with respect to these issues around security.

Bill C-59, we've heard from the Department of Justice, will make it more difficult for law enforcement to secure preventative arrests because the threshold is being raised to secure such an order. I was wondering if you could make some comments with respect to that and your perspective on it.

Pam Damoff Liberal Oakville North—Burlington, ON

Thank you very much.

My next question has to do with the minister's testimony when he was before this committee on Bill C-59. He was talking about the changes from Bill C-51, amending, advocating, and promoting the commission of terrorism offences in general, and replacing the offence to apply only when a person specifically counsels another person to commit a terrorism offence. It provides a clear and more appropriate legal structure surrounding them. When he was questioned, he was asked if this would actually provide law enforcement with better tools to be able to enforce.... Now, you had mentioned that you thought the definition was still too broad. I don't know if you had an opportunity to see what the minister was saying in terms of it actually narrowing the definition to allow law enforcement to enforce....

I'd also welcome comments from both of you on that.

Glen Motz Conservative Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB

I have 30 seconds. I have one more question I want a response to. Sorry.

Bill C-59, as we've heard from the Department of Justice, will make it more difficult for law enforcement to secure preventative arrests. Now, because the threshold to secure such an order is being raised, do you, Mr. Leuprecht, consider this to be problematic?

December 7th, 2017 / 10:20 a.m.


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Acting General Counsel, Canadian Civil Liberties Association

Cara Zwibel

We feel that the scheme laid out in Bill C-59, as we said, is an improvement in terms of clarifying what the contours of threat disruption look like and making clearer to both the public and to the service itself what the acceptable and prohibited bounds are. In particular, the addition of prohibited activities, including detention, was in our view quite an important one.

I want to reference that when we expressed concerns about disruption and why this is not being done by law enforcement, some of that has to do with making sure we can effectively prosecute people once we determine they've done something contrary to the law. The other thing is that we've never been particularly concerned about the kind of disruption you mentioned, such as talking to a parent and saying, “Your child's been getting into some trouble.” We're more concerned with some of the items that are now specifically enumerated in the legislation—things like fabricating or disseminating any information, record, or document; altering or removing websites and communications, and things like that. It's helpful, in our view, to have those in the legislation.

We have suggestions for how the warrant scheme might be improved, and we can elaborate on those in our written submissions.

Glen Motz Conservative Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB

Thank you.

Dr. Leuprecht, the powers in Bill C-51 are not uncommon. You had said in your testimony, again on Bill C-51, “Canadians have a profound misconception of what disruption constitutes. CSIS being able to talk to parents to tell them that their child is up to no good is a disruption power.” I can go on with that, but with the changes proposed in Bill C-59, particularly in securing a warrant to conduct certain disruption activities, do you believe we are heading in the right direction with this legislation on that particular front?

Glen Motz Conservative Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to both groups for being here today.

Mr. Leuprecht, you had said in previous testimony on Bill C-51, “CSIS is the most reviewed intelligence security service in the western world and therefore, I think we can safely say in the world as it is.” In your reading of Bill C-59, are there any new layers of review placed upon CSIS, and do you think those are helpful in helping CSIS fulfill it's mandate?

December 7th, 2017 / 10:15 a.m.


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Research Assistant, Department of Political Science, Royal Military College of Canada, As an Individual

Hayley McNorton

Considering the broad mandates of both NSIRA and NSICOP, there is a potential for overlap, especially in what they review for. They both could technically review issues related to efficacy, compliance, innovation of agencies.

They're geared toward different things. For example, the parliamentarians have a diversity of expertise, so they would be very useful in reviewing legislation. According to Bill C-59, NSIRA is made up of former SIRC members. They have the experience and intelligence accountability to look at things that are more geared to compliance. However, there probably will need to be some kind of delineating of responsibilities to prevent overlap and the minimization of duplication of work.

December 7th, 2017 / 10:10 a.m.


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Advocate, National Security Program, Canadian Civil Liberties Association

Lex Gill

Absolutely.

The government has failed to demonstrate why this publicly available information exception as worded is necessary or proportionate, or what risks it's meant to mitigate in the first place. The CSE has identified a need to access reports on the global infrastructure as a justification for this provision, yet a more narrowly defined list of information types would easily respond to such a need.

While section 7 specifies that privacy must be considered, the nature of the protection is vague; the regulations setting out the scope of protection are likely to be secret, and the potential for invasive information collection and abuse is high.

The parallel term “publicly available dataset” in the CSIS Act remains undefined but appears to replicate the same types of problems.

Finally, we welcome the new accountability mechanisms in Bill C-59 and strongly support the creation of the new, integrated review body, and the introduction of an intelligence commissioner with the ability to exercise quasi-judicial oversight. However, we are concerned that significant gaps remain. The commissioner only issues reasons when rejecting an authorization. The reasons are kept secret from the public. There is no adversarial input. The authorizations will continue to be issued on a class basis, and there is no framework for appeal or review of decisions except by the minister and the intelligence agencies themselves.

Without amendments that strengthen the role of the commissioner, his or her ability to exercise meaningful oversight and control will be limited in practice.

We welcome questions from the committee about these issues and other aspects of Bill C-59.