Bill C-59 (Historical)

National Security Act, 2017

An Act respecting national security matters

Part 1 enacts the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, which establishes the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and sets out its composition, mandate and powers. It repeals the provisions of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act establishing the Security Intelligence Review Committee and amends that Act and other Acts in order to transfer certain powers, duties and functions to the new Agency. It also makes related and consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 1.‍1 enacts the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act to authorize the issuance of directions respecting the disclosure of and request for information that would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity and the use of information that is likely to have been obtained as the result of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity.
Part 2 enacts the Intelligence Commissioner Act, which provides that the duties and functions of the Intelligence Commissioner are to review the conclusions on the basis of which certain authorizations are issued or amended, and determinations are made, under the Communications Security Establishment Act and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and to approve those authorizations, amendments and determinations if those conclusions are reasonable. This Part also abolishes the position of the Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment, provides for that Commissioner to become the Intelligence Commissioner, transfers the employees of the former Commissioner to the office of the new Commissioner and makes related and consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 enacts the Communications Security Establishment Act, which establishes the Communications Security Establishment and, among other things, sets out the Establishment’s mandate as well as the regime for authorizing its activities. It also amends the National Defence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 4 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to
(a) add a preamble to that Act and provide a mechanism to enhance the accountability of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(b) add new limits on the exercise of the Service’s power to reduce threats to the security of Canada including, in particular, by setting out a list of measures that may be authorized by the Federal Court;
(c) provide a justification, subject to certain limitations, for the commission of acts or omissions that would otherwise constitute offences;
(d) exempt employees of the Service and persons acting under their direction from liability for offences related to acts committed for the sole purpose of establishing or maintaining a covert identity;
(e) create a regime for the Service to collect, retain, query and exploit datasets in the course of performing its duties and functions;
(f) make amendments to the warrant regime that are related to datasets; and
(g) implement measures for the management of datasets.
Part 5 amends the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act to, among other things,
(a) emphasize that the Act addresses only the disclosure of information and not its collection or use;
(b) clarify the definition of “activity that undermines the security of Canada”;
(c) clarify that advocacy, protest, dissent and artistic expression are not activities that undermine the security of Canada unless they are carried on in conjunction with an activity that undermines the security of Canada;
(d) provide that a disclosure of information is authorized only if the disclosure will contribute to the carrying out by the recipient institution of its national security responsibilities and will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary;
(e) require that information disclosed be accompanied by information about the accuracy of the disclosed information and the reliability of the manner in which it was obtained; and
(f) require that records be prepared and kept in respect of every disclosure of information and that every year a copy of every record prepared in the preceding year be provided to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.
Part 6 amends the Secure Air Travel Act to authorize the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to collect from air carriers and operators of aviation reservation systems, for the purpose of identifying listed persons, information about any individuals who are on board or expected to be on board an aircraft for any flight prescribed by regulation, and to exempt an air carrier from providing that information, or from the application of any provision of the regulations, in certain circumstances. It amends the Act to authorize that Minister to collect personal information from individuals for the purpose of issuing a unique identifier to them to assist with pre-flight verification of their identity. It also reverses the rule in relation to a deemed decision on an application for administrative recourse. Finally, it amends the Act to provide for certain other measures related to the collection, disclosure and destruction of information.
Part 7 amends the Criminal Code to, among other things,
(a) make certain procedural modifications to the terrorist listing regime under section 83.‍05, such as providing for a staggered ministerial review of listed entities and granting the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness the authority to amend the names, including aliases, of listed entities;
(b) change the offence of advocating or promoting terrorism offences in general, in section 83.‍21, to one of counselling the commission of a terrorism offence, and make corresponding changes to the definition of terrorist propaganda;
(c) raise one of the thresholds for imposing a recognizance with conditions under section 83.‍3, and amend when that section is to be reviewed and, unless extended by Parliament, to cease to have effect;
(d) repeal sections 83.‍28 and 83.‍29 relating to an investigative hearing into a terrorism offence and repeal subsections 83.‍31(1) and (1.‍1), which require annual reports on such hearings;
(e) require the Attorney General of Canada to publish a report each year setting out the number of terrorism recognizances entered into under section 810.‍011 in the previous year; and
(f) authorize a court, in proceedings for recognizances under any of sections 83 and 810 to 810.‍2, to make orders for the protection of witnesses.
Part 8 amends the Youth Criminal Justice Act to, among other things, ensure that the protections that are afforded to young persons apply in respect of proceedings in relation to recognizance orders, including those related to terrorism, and give employees of a department or agency of the Government of Canada access to youth records, for the purpose of administering the Canadian Passport Order.
Part 9 requires that a comprehensive review of the provisions and operation of this enactment take place during the fourth year after section 168 of this enactment comes into force. If that section 168 and section 34 of Bill C-22, introduced in the 1st session of the 42nd Parliament and entitled the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, come into force within one year of each other, the reviews required by those sections are to take place at the same time and are to be undertaken by the same committee or committees.

Opposition Motion—Terrorism

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Madam Speaker, today we mark the fourth anniversary of the horrific attack here, on Parliament Hill. We lost corporal Nathan Cirillo. Two days ago was the anniversary of the attack in which Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent lost his life in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, not too far from my riding. I think this is fitting, in light of today's debate on terrorism—a difficult, complex issue that too often leads to loss of life—and on Canada's response to terrorism in order to maintain public safety. We remember these two men who served their country and who lost their lives in horrible circumstances not too long ago.

I would also like to take this opportunity to remind the House that the NDP was proud to support the motion moved by the Conservatives just over a year ago to recognize that these horrific, heinous crimes committed by ISIS constitute genocide. There is no doubt about the real nature of this horrific violence perpetrated against minorities, women, the LGBT community and all other victims. We support the Conservatives' motion.

We know that all parties want the to achieve the same end. Regardless of what we say, regardless of our differences of opinion as to the means to that end, our objective is to put criminals, to put terrorists, behind bars.

The question before us today is how a democratic, law-based society should go about achieving that end. We are facing a number of challenges, which I will address during my speech. Obviously, the fact that we acknowledge those challenges and that we have no easy ways to overcome them does not mean we are being soft on the issue or that we want these individuals, who may be living in Canadian communities, to threaten public safety.

I think it is worth looking at the two key pieces here in this motion. However, before I go any further, I would be remiss to not congratulate Nadia Murad for receiving the Nobel Peace Prize for the extraordinary work that she has done to bring this issue to the forefront.

The one thing I can agree on with my colleague for Calgary Nose Hill, although we do not agree on everything, is that the deafening silence that sometimes follows this kind of advocacy, that someone like Nadia Murad engages in, is troubling. We always want to do better as parliamentarians and as a country.

In that vein, I think it is also important to recognize that we cannot even begin to imagine the strength and courage required to go through the type of ordeal and horror that she has witnessed. However, it takes even more courage to relive that horror, to be an advocate and be part of the political process in seeking justice and change in the way that different countries engage in these difficult issues.

With that being said, I do want to address the two parts of this motion. I want to start with part (a) that specifically goes into this issue relating to rehabilitation.

I think the issue here is that we have to look at the fight to combat radicalization. It has been made clear by many national security experts and many experts who have worked in connected fields that one of the key challenges that is facing this era of social media, for example, where it is easy for an individual and in many cases individuals with mental health issues who are easily being manipulated through social media and other means by different individuals related to ISIS and others, is that a proper, comprehensive anti-radicalization strategy is required to tackle this issue. It is not an issue that is exclusive to ISIS. It is also when we see white supremacists or when we see other extremism that leads to violence.

I think that is the key is to counter radicalization that leads to violence. That is the key piece of how we ensure public safety with regard to these matters.

It is something the New Democrats brought up in the previous Parliament when we were debating then Bill C-51. We said to the government of the day that although there was an issue of addressing public safety, rather than adopting new, draconian legislation that does not actually address the issue and keep communities safe, why not give additional resources to the policing community, for example?

In 2012, the police recruitment fund was cut. It allowed provinces and municipalities to have additional resources to hire police and, in some cases, put together special units that could tackle, for example, organized crime and street gangs. It provided the kinds of resources that could allow police to do their work and complement the efforts being deployed by the RCMP to tackle the issue of terrorism and other forms of extremism that we unfortunately see in Canada and other countries today. We raised that issue.

We also raised the issue of radicalization and being preventative. I know sometimes “preventative” has a certain meaning, and rhetoric can be construed around it to make it mean something that it does not. The reality is that prevention is not about trying to use kid gloves with individuals who may commit heinous crimes. It is about making sure Canadians are safe and that these crimes and terrorist attacks are not being committed in the first place. After all, we can deploy all of the resources and legislative tools we can after the fact, but there is already a failure when we talk about things after the fact. How do we avoid getting to that point whenever possible? Countering radicalization is one way to do so.

Of course there are challenges. For instance, Montreal's Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence lacks funding. I will not get into detail because there is also an internal management issue related to Government of Quebec programs. However, Montreal's mayor, Valérie Plante, raised an important point in this debate. She said that Montreal's government is reluctant to provide ongoing funding to the centre because the population it serves extends well beyond the greater Montreal area. It is, after all, the only organization in North America whose mission is to prevent radicalization leading to violence.

As part of a study by the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, we met with representatives of the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence. They told us they are getting calls from all across Canada and even the American east coast. For example, parents and members of a vulnerable community in New York have been calling the centre for assistance. This shows that there is a desperate need, not only in Canada but also in the U.S. and around the world. Strategies have been deployed in Europe to solve the problem, but here in Canada and North America, there is an appalling lack of initiatives.

Of course I welcome the funding allocated by the federal government to try to address the issue, but obviously, it is not enough. If that were the case, there would be more than just one centre. If I am not mistaken, the government will fund only individual projects. What we need are broad, generalized efforts.

Let us also not forget the importance of providing additional training to our police forces and especially the RCMP to support their work with communities that are vulnerable to all kinds of extremism, whether from ISIS or the far right. Right-wing extremism is a growing threat, according to an article published by the Toronto Star a few weeks ago. I encourage all my colleagues to read it.

All of this shows that we must not only do more, but also think about the types of strategies being used. This is essential to ensuring public safety. When we talk about crime and terrorism, some people and some political parties might think that the word “prevention” means being gentle with those who are about to commit the most horrendous crimes in the history of humanity. Let us be clear: prevention means ensuring public safety and avoiding the loss of more lives like that of Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent and Corporal Nathan Cirillo, whom we lost four years ago.

The other element of course concerns the intelligence-to-evidence gap, more specifically dealing with part (b) of this motion, which is the issue of how we prosecute these individuals, particularly those who are returning to Canada. It is a huge challenge that we face, and we are not alone in facing it.

There are different reasons why this intelligence-to-evidence gap exists. One of the reason is the additional powers given to CSIS. When we look at the threat-reduction powers given to CSIS under Bill C-51, they continue to exist despite the amendments I presented at the public safety committee during debate on Bill C-59, which essentially represents the Liberals' attempt at correcting and failing to correct many of the outstanding issues. The big issue is that those threat-reduction powers are, in a word, and I am sure some lawyers will cringe hearing me say this because it is probably not the correct terminology, essentially extra-constitutional powers. CSIS is going to judges and asking them for judicial authorization to use its threat-reduction powers in a way that can contravene the charter.

What we saw in Bill C-59 is that while those powers still exist, they have become, as I like to put it, less unconstitutional than they were under Bill C-51. However, the big problem in the debate today is the issue relating to information that is gleaned through the powers CSIS is using, because at the end of the day, the RCMP, in its responsibilities as a law enforcement entity in working with Crown prosecutors to bring these returning foreign fighters to justice and making sure they find themselves behind bars, cannot use the information CSIS has. Therefore, it is deploying its own own efforts. It cannot simply cherry-pick what CSIS has obtained through a whole different regime of judicial authorization than using its own powers as the RCMP under the Canada Evidence Act and, of course, nationally under the Constitution, first and foremost.

The other challenge relating to that is not just the powers being exercised by CSIS and the RCMP in their own individual silos but also how we use information obtained through international conflict, the consequences of that conflict, and how we use that in a constitutional way in fair trials. It is interesting when we say “fair trials”, because I am sure many Canadians listening to us and some members of other parties might say, “Who cares about fairness? These people have perpetrated some of the most horrible crimes known to humanity. They have committed genocide.” However, fairness is important in ensuring public safety, because it ensures the sanctity of the proceedings. Therefore, if we want successful proceedings that properly prosecute and convict these individuals, and hopefully in the cases where obviously it is appropriate and the findings are such, we need fairness, or else the proceedings will get thrown out and we will be right back to square one.

There are a few elements to that. One was brought up. Here I will refer my colleagues to the fantastic podcasts by Craig Forcese and Stephanie Carvin called “Intrepid”, where there was an interview with Solomon Friedman, a criminal defence attorney. As he put it in the interview, these people are not always the most popular individuals when it comes to considering the victims of horrible crimes. However, he brought up an important point. When we look at the fantastic reporting by Stewart Bell, for example, on what is going on with these fighters who have been detained in Kurdish facilities, we will see that those facilities have abhorrent conditions and that the RCMP cannot just walk into facilities that are potentially engaging in less-than-savoury practices, whether it is torture or other things, or where the conditions are far below the standards that Canadians would expect for incarcerated offenders in our corrections facilities. The big issue there is that it would be easy for a judge, as a result of the arguments of a defence attorney, to look at that Kurdish facility and say that there clearly is an argument to be made as to whether the information before the court is true or not, because it is a result of confessions obtained under duress. Certainly that is not for me to say, but I want to make sure, as a legislator, that we are ensuring the maximum fairness in a process to maximize the success rate so that we find ourselves in safer communities and achieve the public safety and the justice objectives of our system based on the rule of law.

I admit, that is not always what the public wants to hear.

Ultimately, we have to acknowledge that we all want the same thing. The big question is how to go about fixing this problem. It is a challenge.

A reporter asked me a question following an excellent Global News report by journalist Stuart Bell. The reporter asked me whether the government should be taking steps to bring these people back to Canada.

It is a question for which I have no answer. Obviously, as the minister mentioned, I do not want diplomats to put themselves in danger to bring back these individuals. Nor do I want individuals to come back to Canada and be a threat to public safety.

That said, we also have a responsibility towards those people who hold Canadian citizenship. If they have committed horrible crimes, we must ensure that they are prosecuted in Canada and put behind bars in Canada. Not only do we have a responsibility to protect law-abiding citizens, but we also must prosecute those who are not. It is not always a very popular concept, but it is one of the underlying principles of Canadian citizenship.

We are not just talking about the cartoonish characters the Conservatives have made up, usually frightening men in their twenties who return home and threaten our safety. There are also extremely complex cases, such as the women who went abroad. In some cases, because of their movements and activities with ISIS, they could be prosecuted.

Those kinds of cases are much more complicated, because they may involve women who have gone through rape, spousal violence, and all sorts of other, more nebulous situations abroad, which we may not have information about. These are highly complex cases. Women are, of course, one of the groups that has been victimized by ISIS. Why would we want to abdicate our responsibility towards Canadian women who have been victimized by ISIS?

I can understand how, in some cases, some women may be found guilty of certain offences under the Criminal Code provisions regarding travelling and supporting a terrorist group. However, we must not neglect the women who are victims.

The government has a job to do. It needs to use the information at its disposal to make sure everything possible is being done to protect victims who are Canadian citizens.

That goes for children as well. I think all Canadians, everyone tuning in at home and everyone here in the House, would agree that it is unacceptable for Canadian children, some under the age of five, to end up in camps in a conflict zone abroad. By failing to bring these women back to Canada, we are also leaving their children stranded in a foreign country under execrable conditions.

I will come back to the quote from Nadia Murad included in this motion. She mentions brainwashing. Children as young as five years old, sometimes younger, can be turned into child soldiers abroad, as we often see in war zones where genocide is committed. Radicalization can turn them into future threats to public safety in their own right, and we do not want that to happen.

Protecting a child and also protecting public safety are extremely commendable goals that anyone can get behind, even though this is happening in war zones where situations can become extremely tricky and difficult to handle.

In conclusion, while I certainly recognize Canadians' concerns in wanting to ensure public safety, let me be clear that while we might differ on the methods to be deployed and how we hone the tools that we have to prosecute returning foreign fighters and to counter radicalization, all in the House agree that more can be done to close the intelligence-to-evidence gap to ensure public safety. However, we do ourselves a disservice when we do so in a way that sometimes brushes aside the fact that not all of these individuals are coming from the same situation. There is a huge challenge when it comes to women and children, in particular, which cannot be ignored. For that reason, more needs to be done. We look forward to collaborating with the government as it tries to seek solutions to this issue.

It would be naive to say that this is not the most complicated public safety issue we are currently dealing with. We therefore have to tackle it head on. I am pleased to work with my colleagues from all parties to try to resolve this issue and keep the public safe.

[Lloyd Longfield, Liberal, Guelph, ON]

Madam Speaker, the parliamentary secretary mentioned that in the final term of the Harper government from 2011 to 2015, it cut $1 billion from Canada's security services.

When we take the tools away from security services and yet criticize them for not doing their job, I want to ask the parliamentary secretary the role of government providing the framework, legislation such as Bill C-59 and the funding to do their jobs, the separation of politics from law enforcement and the judiciary and how important it is for us to give the tools that law enforcement and the judiciary need in order to do their jobs.

[Karen McCrimmon]

Madam Speaker, with Bill C-59, we needed both. We needed ways to protect the safety and security of all Canadians as well as ways to protect people's rights and freedoms, and that is what we have done. This bill would do both. It would give CSIS the power to commit acts of disruption, but under judicial oversight. People will understand that those powers would be limited in scope and in time and would only be used on the rarest of occasions, when the judiciary was convinced that they were appropriate.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Madam Speaker, I want to ask my colleague a question about threat disruption powers. She rightly highlighted the flaws in Bill C-51, which was tabled in the last Parliament by the Conservatives. Despite my efforts to make amendments to Bill C-59 in committee, CSIS will keep its threat disruption powers. One of the major issues, besides the fact that a judge is essentially being asked to green-light unconstitutional disruption activities, is the comparison of information and evidence that would be admissible in court.

One of the problems pointed out by experts is that, with the threat disruption powers used by CSIS, which are obtained through a very specific system, with approval from a judge, the RCMP must then take its own measures to gather the same information in order for it to be admissible as evidence.

Would my colleague agree that giving this kind of power to CSIS exacerbates an existing problem with streamlining the work of intelligence agencies and the work of police forces?

[Karen McCrimmon, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Lib.]

Madam Speaker, before I begin, I would like to recognize that today is the fourth anniversary of the attack on Parliament Hill and the loss of Corporal Nathan Cirillo. Today, we pay tribute to both Corporal Cirillo and Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent, who served their country with dedication and honour. Our thoughts and prayers are with their families and friends today.

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in the debate on the motion by the hon. member for Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles. We can all support the sentiments expressed by Nadia Murad, the Yazidi human rights activist and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize.

Nadia Murad's powerful words remind us of the horrors unleashed by Daesh on the population it held captive. They remind us of the cruelty and brutality meted out by the group's violent depraved adherence. They remind us of the terrible suffering endured in particular by the Yazidi minority, and especially Yazidi women and girls. They remind us how important it is to do everything in our power to bring those responsible to justice and to prevent groups like Daesh from coming into existence in the first place.

At the height of its self-professed caliphate, tens of thousands of people from all over the world joined Daesh. They came from neighbouring Middle Eastern countries. However, they also came from places around the world, including Europe, Australia, the United States and Canada. All of these countries, Canada included, are dealing with the reality that some of these people eventually may come back.

At the time we took office, about 60 Canadian terrorist travellers had returned to our country. Over the last three years, that number, which includes people who joined Daesh as well as other terrorist groups elsewhere, has remained relatively stable. However, since the global coalition against Daesh, of which Canada is a proud member, helped bring about the group's decisive defeat late last year, we and our allies have been aware that some of these people may be on the move.

According to the 2017 public report on the terrorist threat to Canada, about 190 Canadians have travelled overseas to join terrorist groups and remain abroad. Roughly half of them are in Syria, Iraq and Turkey. Some, perhaps many of them, are dead. Among those who survived, some are detained or are in hiding. They may be unable or unwilling to leave. A few may be attempting to move to Africa, Asia or Europe, and perhaps back to Canada. We are fortunate that we are only dealing with relatively small numbers compared to many of our allies. However, we have no illusions. These individuals were part of an organization that did horrific things. Many of them may have a good deal of blood on their hands and serious security risks are involved.

The good news is that Canada's security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies are well trained and well prepared to address the threat and keep us safe. Canadians can be assured that our national security and intelligence agencies are carefully monitoring these individuals and actively assessing the threat that each one poses. When our agencies learn that an individual is planning a return, a coordinated whole-of-government approach is initiated. This ensures that measures to mitigate any potential threat can be taken even before that individual sets foot in Canada.

If at all possible, arrest and prosecute are the favoured courses of action. It is a criminal offence to leave or attempt to leave Canada to commit terrorism offences. Canadian law enforcement actively pursues investigations and lays criminal charges when the evidence is there. In the last couple of years, the RCMP has been able to charge four people with terrorism-related offences after their return to Canada. Two have been convicted and two remain before the courts.

There were no such charges under the previous government. In fact, until last year, all terrorism charges in Canada had either been laid in absentia or against people whose terrorist activity took place on Canadian soil. Of course, binding evidence related to actions taken in a war zone on the other side of the world is very difficult work.

Therefore, while the RCMP and its law enforcement partners pursue that evidence, other counterterrorism tools are brought to bear. These tools include investigations, surveillance and monitoring, intelligence-gathering and lawful information-sharing, the no-fly list, revocation of passports, legally-authorized threat-reduction measures and terrorism peace bondings. Taken together, these measures help keep Canadians safe and they happen while police and prosecutors do everything they can to collect evidence and bring terrorists to justice in courts of law.

At the same time, it is important to note that terrorist travellers are only one of the serious threats that Canada faces. In general, our country is peaceful and safe, but we cannot meet the threat of domestic terrorism with complacency.

Unfortunately, there have been attempts on Canadian soil by people who were radicalized here. Some were inspired by the ideologies of groups like Daesh and al-Qaeda, while others by white supremacists. I am referring to the shooting at the mosque in Sainte-Foy, and attacks in Edmonton, Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu and even here, in our Parliament.

CSIS, the RCMP, the Canada Border Services Agency and all other security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies work tirelessly to know as much as we possibly can about every threat to our security. On a regular basis, they expertly assess and reassess all available data to make sure that we stay up to date as threats evolve. Our security and intelligence agencies also work in close co-operation with our allies. Those allies include NATO, our Five Eyes and G7 partners, the European Union, Interpol and others. That co-operation is crucial, given the global nature of terrorist threats today.

The Government of Canada is constantly working to strengthen its ability to manage terrorist threats. The federal terrorism response plan, for example, facilitates a coordinated and integrated response to a terrorism incident or threat.

The government is also modernizing and enhancing Canada's security and intelligence laws through Bill C-59. Among many other measures, this proposed new legislation would ensure that CSIS had the proper tools and authorities to investigate threats, including extremist travellers. For example, within well-defined legal parameters, and subject to strengthened oversight, Bill C-59 would give CSIS the ability to analyze travel-related data sets to investigate the movements and behaviours of extremist travellers. This is an important tool that our security professionals would be able to use within the clear constitutional and legal framework created by Bill C-59 to protect Canadians and Canadian interests around the world.

Just as Canada's federal terrorism response plan recognizes that responding to threats and events requires close collaboration with many players, so too do our prevention efforts. It is in that spirit that we launched the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence last year. The centre coordinates, bolsters and helps fund innovative programs and research in countering all kinds of radicalization to violence and supports local organizations on the front lines of early prevention efforts. This approach is guided by the fact that early intervention to prevent radicalization to violence can and does work.

A key part of our support for prevention efforts is the community resilience fund. This fund provides financial assistance to organizations undertaking programming and research to address radicalization to violence in Canada. It also mobilizes what we know about successful programming in Canada and around the world and shares these lessons among front-line practitioners across the country.

To date, over $16 million has been invested in community resilience funding for research and intervention projects. For the next fiscal year and beyond, the fund will have $7 million available each year for existing and new projects.

All of this represents concrete, thoughtful and responsible action to combat and prevent terrorism. Our government is being vigilant without being alarmist. We are confident, but we are not complacent. Unfortunately, part of the opposition motion we are debating today could be interpreted as an attempt to use this sober topic to score political points rather than as a serious effort to grapple with the genuine issues we are facing.

We should be able to disagree without resorting to rhetoric and hyperbole. I disagreed vehemently, for example, with the deep cuts the Harper government made, in its final term, to our national security agencies: $530 million cut from the RCMP; $390 million cut from Canada Border Services Agency; $69 million cut from CSIS; $49 million cut from the Communications Security Establishment; and $171 million cut from the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority. It was over $1 billion in all.

I also disagreed with the Harper government's indifference towards prevention and counter-radicalization. According to former CSIS analyst Phil Gurski, “the previous...government had an abysmal record when it came to countering violent extremism and early detection.”

I disagree with the Conservatives' repeated refusal to strengthen accountability mechanisms for our national security agents, as we have done now with the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, created last year, and as we are doing with legislation currently before the other place. Accountability is about protecting our rights and freedoms, but it is also about making sure that our agencies operate effectively to keep us safe.

I disagreed with the way the Harper Conservatives drafted a national security bill with provisions so vague and so open-ended as to make them virtually unusable by our security agencies. That is a mistake we are correcting with Bill C-59, which will give our agencies the legal clarity they need to do their jobs.

I disagreed passionately with the Conservatives' elimination of health care for refugee claimants. It is under this very program, which we have now reinstated, that Yazidi women and girls in Canada are receiving counselling and mental health care, and health care in general, to help them deal with the unimaginable trauma they experienced at the hands of Daesh. I will remind hon. members that under our government, 1,400 women and families, 85% of them Yazidi, have come to Canada after surviving Daesh. Three Yazidi refugees were accepted by the Harper government.

In spite of all of this, I would never accuse the Conservatives of being soft on terrorism. That should be beneath us in this place. In the fight against terrorism, while we may disagree about methodology, every one in this chamber is on the same side.

In that spirit, we intend to join the opposition in support of today's motion. We do not agree with every word of it, mainly the parts the Conservatives wrote, but we wholeheartedly endorse every syllable of the quote from Nadia Murad. We are all heartbroken by what happened to Nadia and many others like her. We all want the perpetrators to face justice and for girls and boys in Canada, Syria and everywhere else to live in a world shaped by love and peace.

[Michelle Rempel, Conservative, Calgary Nose Hill, AB]

Madam Speaker, much of the processes that were put in place to bring actors of genocide and atrocity crimes to justice were put in place in the wake of World War II, when state actors were at the head of violence. That is no longer the case. ISIS is not a state actor. It is a network of terrorists who not only committed genocide against the Yazidi people in Iraq, but have carried out threats to the western world. Our processes need to reflect this reality.

This is why I am deeply concerned that the government has made it harder and put roadblocks in place, for example, for the judiciary to use tools such as peace bonds to stop people who are highly suspected of terrorism. It has actually made that more difficult. Bill C-59, which is currently being considered in the other place, would reduce the powers of Canadian security agencies in many ways to information share, to act quickly to stop threats of these people when they arise. This flies in the face of testimony of experts on how we deal with this.

To me, the government is going in the opposite direction. Rather than looking at a new global context, the reality of what conflicts looks like today, it is saying that there is nothing to see here and is reducing the powers of our law enforcement agencies to keep Canadians safe and bring the perpetrators of atrocity crimes to justice.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague from the NDP for the question.

I believe that is the challenge. We both sit on the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security and we got through Bill C-59, which amended Bill C-51. Bill C-59 will make it even harder for law enforcement to lay charges.

It is certainly a challenge abroad. There are international agreements and opportunities to work on this. I believe there is nothing stopping us from sending intelligence teams and the RCMP there to find evidence and work in collaboration with the forces on the ground.

We should have the means to do this, but if we do not, then that is why we are calling on the government to take action and find legal avenues to make this happen.

It is the government's responsibility to solve this problem, but that is not what we are seeing right now. It seems like the Liberals do not feel like solving this problem.

Public Safety

[Karen McCrimmon, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Lib.]

Mr. Speaker, I want to reinforce what I said earlier. We have introduced national security legislation that will clarify once and for all that advocacy, protest, dissent and artistic expression are not activities that undermine the security of Canada.

Bill C-59 was developed with the most extensive consultation we have ever done. It will reflect the needs and desires of the Canadian people.

[Karen McCrimmon, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Lib.]

Mr. Speaker, we are undoing Harper's Bill C-51. We have a proposed piece of legislation that will be before this House, Bill C-59, which will make improvements that people have been demanding. We have had the most widespread consultation on this proposed piece of legislation, and we are confident that it will reflect the needs and desires of the people of Canada.

[Brian Herman]

Thank you for the question, Mr. Rankin.

We have reflected on that. I must say that in all of this we do have a dialogue with Department of Justice officials where we sometimes discuss with them our concerns and some of the rationale for why they have drafted what they have.

This is where I go to the point that I made about the consistency of what we've been saying when it came to discussing amendments to Bill C-51 and to Bill C-59, and that is the signals that are sent and how in an effort to increase expediency in the system to deal with the charter concerns about efficiency and speed, sometimes there are certain provisions that get caught up in a broad basket of issues and that should not be there. We feel that these particular provisions are so serious as to warrant being kept strictly indicted.

[Jim Eglinski, Yellowhead, CPC]

I have two questions, and they're kind of related.

Under Bill C-59, you've been given the authority to lead the cyber centre, and you talk about the other government agencies: Public Safety, Shared Services, the RCMP, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the military.

Being a former policeman and having been involved in major crimes in larger communities, I know there are always conflicts, perhaps the bullheadness of one department over another department.

You've had some time since Bill C-59 came out, and we have been discussing it in the House and around. Are your agencies getting together already and working together? Do you see that this will be a fairly easy transition and a joint effort, or do you feel that there may be some stumbling blocks and pressure back and forth maybe because you've been given the lead?

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

The other piece I want to ask about is the vulnerabilities equities process that exists within the NSA in the U.S. On the same topic of transparency, I'm wondering about this. More and more, especially with the existence of the centre, I'm assuming that there's going to be more work done to identify these vulnerabilities.

In Bill C-59, a lot of the pieces involve working with the private sector to identify the vulnerabilities and to, in some cases, even study them to a certain extent. I don't want to rehash the debate that we've had quite extensively at this committee, but is there a specific protocol that exists here, in the same way that the NSA has developed one, in order to disclose to the public and parliamentarians, etc., the existence of vulnerabilities in software and such?

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

We heard from the Bill C-59 conversations that it's like a hockey analogy, in that it depends on the coach. They say that a good defence is a strong offence. I'm intrigued by how we always defer or default to a defensive posture when actually that defensive posture may be an offensive posture.

[Scott Jones]

I think the key thing is that defensive cyber-operations are proposed in Bill C-59. It's a tool we can use to respond against any malicious cyber-activity.

There are a number of elements. The first one is the permission to undertake that activity. It's up to the Minister of National Defence, with consultation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to ensure that if there are any foreign relations aspects, they are taken into account.

But this wouldn't be the first measure, if you were taking a defensive action. You would want to increase your network defences. You would want to try to increase your resiliency against the activity. This type of activity is something that, if there were no other option, you would turn to as things escalated.

There are a number of other things we would look to do. If the activity were originating from a foreign actor, we would engage our international CCIRC community. The Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre has relationships around the world with national computer emergency response teams to respond. We could ask them for help. We would certainly look for law enforcement, if that were a better option.

[Scott Jones, Deputy Chief, Information Technology Security, Communications Security Establishment]

Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.

My name is Scott Jones. It's a pleasure to be back again. I'm the deputy chief of IT security at the Communications Security Establishment and the head-designate of the soon-to-be established Canadian centre for cybersecurity.

I am joined today by Rajiv Gupta, the director of standards architecture and risk mitigation. Thank you for inviting us to discuss this very important topic.

The Communications Security Establishment is the lead technical and operational agency for cyber security in the Government of Canada. We are mandated to protect information and information infrastructures of importance to the Government of Canada.

This expertise in protecting and providing information is over 70 years in the making. The protection of government communications has been a part of CSE's mission since it was first established in 1946 as the Communications Branch of the National Research Council.

It goes without saying that the world of 1946 was much different from the world of today. What has not changed, however, is the need for innovative and skilled leadership to meet the challenges of an evolving world.

Canada's new national cybersecurity strategy, announced in June of 2018, recognizes this and sets out Canada's vision for security and prosperity in the digital age. Among the new measures in this strategy is the creation of the Canadian centre for cybersecurity, to be housed at the Communications Security Establishment.

Combined with the investments made in budget 2018, these efforts will enable us to remain resilient against cyber-threats and to continue to protect the safety and security of Canadians—and there's a great deal worth protecting.

Recent innovations in technology have created incredible opportunities for economic growth in Canada. The benefits of an increasingly digital society are many and should not be understated.

The Internet has brought enormous benefits to the lives of Canadians. Many federal government services are online. Budget 2018's investments in strengthening digital services demonstrate that the government is embracing new and innovative technology.

But of course, Canadians can only reap the benefits of online commerce when they can conduct their online activities with confidence and trust. These risks should not dissuade us from adopting new technologies, but they should be acknowledged and mitigated.

Unfortunately, we have all seen how cyber-compromises can result in significant financial loss, the loss of intellectual property and reputational damage to a company, an individual, or a government. For example, recent cases involving ransomware demonstrate the increasing threat of cybercrime and the effects of a cyber-compromise.

Today's cyber-threat actors have a variety of motivations and capabilities. They include state actors, hacktivists, criminals and terrorists capable of a broad range of disruption, from denial of service attacks to the exposure of personal information.

CSE plays an important role in stopping threat actors from achieving their goals. Our expertise helps identify, prepare for, and defend against the most severe and persistent threats to Canada's systems and networks.

There are three keys to success: partnerships, appropriate authorities and talent.

Let's begin with partnerships.

Cyber security is everyone's business. Our relationships with industry are critical to defending Canada and Canadians from cyber threats.

Equally important are our relationships with other government departments, including Public Safety Canada, Shared Services Canada, the RCMP and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

Beyond the government and the private sector, CSE's partnerships also extend to academia and leading-edge research groups.

The Canadian centre for cybersecurity will greatly improve our ability to work with industry, other government departments, other government partners and academia. The cyber centre will consolidate the key cybersecurity operational units of the Government of Canada under a single roof. In doing so, the cyber centre will establish a unified source of expert advice, guidance, services and support on cybersecurity operational matters, providing Canadians with a clear and trusted place to turn for cybersecurity advice.

An important part of this is ensuring continuity in the functions of the Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre—also known as CCIRC—at Public Safety, once it becomes part of the cyber centre. Specifically, a crucial element of CCIRC's work is the notification of victims in the event of a cyber-compromise. This is an important role and one that will need to continue under the cyber centre.

Second, I would like to talk about CSE's authorities.

As you all know from debates on Bill C-59, under the proposed legislation, CSE would retain its current cyber security and information assurance mandate and would be given a new authority to defend important networks outside the Government of Canada.

The proposed Communications Security Establishment Act would also explicitly allow CSE to share cyber threat information with owners of systems outside the Government of Canada, so they can better protect their networks and information. For example, CSE could more extensively share information about specific cyber threats with the owners of critical infrastructure such as communications companies or the banking sector.

Finally, the CSE act would give CSE the ability to take action online to defend important Canadian networks and proactively deter cyber-threats before they reach important Canadian systems. These new authorities will better protect Canadians' most sensitive information and important cyber-networks from compromise and strengthen Canada's cyber-defences.

Third, and most key for me, is people. Among the new measures introduced as part of the national cybersecurity strategy is funding to develop Canadian cyber-talent. We are fortunate at CSE to have incredibly bright and talented Canadians working to address these tough cyber-challenges. However, to continue the success, we need to build on this talent and harness the tremendous brain power in the cyber field that exists here in Canada.

With strong partnerships, appropriate authorities and skilled people, CSE is working to address cyber threats facing Canada. However, cyber security is everyone's responsibility, and it will take all of our expertise and innovation to remain resilient.

Thank you for your invitation. We look forward to answering your questions.