Bill C-7 (Historical)

An Act to amend the Criminal Code (medical assistance in dying)

This enactment amends the Criminal Code to, among other things,
(a) repeal the provision that requires a person’s natural death be reasonably foreseeable in order for them to be eligible for medical assistance in dying;
(b) specify that persons whose sole underlying medical condition is a mental illness are not eligible for medical assistance in dying;
(c) create two sets of safeguards that must be respected before medical assistance in dying may be provided to a person, the application of which depends on whether the person’s natural death is reasonably foreseeable;
(d) permit medical assistance in dying to be provided to a person who has been found eligible to receive it, whose natural death is reasonably foreseeable and who has lost the capacity to consent before medical assistance in dying is provided, on the basis of a prior agreement they entered into with the medical practitioner or nurse practitioner; and
(e) permit medical assistance in dying to be provided to a person who has lost the capacity to consent to it as a result of the self-administration of a substance that was provided to them under the provisions governing medical assistance in dying in order to cause their own death.

Criminal Code

[David Lametti, Liberal, Minister of Justice]

moved that Bill C-7, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (medical assistance in dying), be read the second time and referred to a committee.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to speak today about Bill C-7, an act to amend the Criminal Code regarding medical assistance in dying, MAID. The bill before the House today is identical to former Bill C-7, which I was proud to have introduced in February following significant consultation among Canadians and experts. I believe this bill reflects a consensus among Canadians and I call on all of my colleagues in this place to support its timely passage.

As members will recall, this bill proposes a legislative response to the Quebec Superior Court's ruling in Truchon and Gladu, in which the court ruled that it is unconstitutional to limit MAID to persons whose death is reasonably foreseeable. That declaration of invalidity, which applies only in Quebec, was initially suspended for six months and subsequently extended by four months, such that it would have come into effect on July 12.

We were all working toward that deadline when this bill was initially introduced. As with many other aspects of our lives, the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted our usual parliamentary activities and it became impossible to meet the July deadline. As Attorney General, I asked for a further extension, which the court granted, until December 18, 2020.

Even though the ruling in Truchon and Gladu was suspended, Quebeckers who are experiencing intolerable suffering and who meet all the eligibility criteria except that of reasonably foreseeable death can apply to the court for an exemption that would allow a practitioner to provide medical assistance in dying despite Parliament not yet having amended the legislation.

Six exemptions have been granted since Justice Baudouin handed down her ruling in September 2019, and others are under review. The availability of exemptions limits the impact of the suspension of the ruling in Quebec.

I would like to take a moment to note the passing of Mr. Truchon, one of the plaintiffs in the case that led to these important changes to our medical assistance in dying regime. Like many Canadians, Mr. Truchon was concerned about the impact of the pandemic on his quality of life in addition to the suffering caused by his medical condition. He want the option to obtain medical assistance in dying, which he did in April. I would like to express my deepest condolences to his loved ones.

The bill before members today, four years after the enactment of Canada's first medical assistance in dying provisions in 2016, proposes a significant change to Canada's MAID regime in broadening eligibility to persons whose natural death is not reasonably foreseeable.

The 2016 amendments were, themselves, a historic change in our criminal law. They created exemptions to some of the most serious criminal offences, which aim to protect one of our most fundamental values, that of human life. These exemptions sought to protect and promote another of our most cherished values, individual freedom, and more specifically, the freedom to decide when enough medical suffering is enough and to choose when and how one's life should end.

Health Canada's first annual report on medical assistance in dying in Canada released this past July indicates that since then nearly 14,000 Canadians have received MAID. In 2019, MAID accounted for 2% of deaths in Canada.

The requirement for reasonably foreseeable natural death was part of a MAID regime that was adopted in 2016. However, we decided not to appeal the Truchon and Gladu decision because we agreed that medical assistance in dying should be available as a means to address intolerable suffering outside of the end-of-life context. To ensure the consistency of criminal law across the country, we committed to amending the Criminal Code.

Before amending the Criminal Code, we conducted an extensive consultation with Canadians. We gathered responses from 300,000 people through an online questionnaire. My colleagues, the Minister of Health and the Minister of Employment, Workforce Development and Disability Inclusion, our parliamentary secretaries and I also held round tables across Canada with over 125 experts and stakeholders. The summary of these activities can be viewed on the website of the Department of Justice.

Based on these consultations and other sources of information, the bill proposes adjusting both the eligibility criteria and the procedural safeguards to respond to the decision rendered in Truchon and Gladu. The bill also proposes allowing patients to waive the requirement to give final consent in specific circumstances so that they do not lose their access to medical assistance in dying.

We know that Canadians are also concerned about other issues that are not addressed in this bill. I am thinking, in particular, of access to medical assistance in dying on the basis of mental illness. I am also thinking about advance requests for medical assistance in dying for people who are not yet suffering but fear they will be after they have lost their ability to request this assistance and who want to make their wishes known before that happens.

The upcoming parliamentary review of the medical assistance in dying regime and of the state of palliative care in Canada will provide an opportunity to give these complex issues the time and attention they deserve. It is up to Parliament to determine the scope of this review and when to conduct it.

COVID-19 has delayed this important review, but I am confident that Parliament will undertake it as soon as possible. That being said, our government's top priority is to meet the deadline set by the Quebec Superior Court in the Truchon and Gladu case.

Before I discuss the contents of the bill in more detail, I would like to note the important concerns of many individuals in the disability community about changing Canada's MAID policy from a way to avoid a painful death to a means of relieving intolerable suffering. It is crucial that these concerns not be forgotten as we resume our debate. In the view of many disability groups, a MAID regime that does not limit eligibility to those whose death is already reasonably foreseeable enshrines in law the erroneous view that disability itself is a valid reason for ending life. We have also heard from individuals living with disabilities, like Mr. Truchon and Ms. Gladu, that autonomy in how they choose to live and die is paramount. These are complex and nuanced points of view.

Let me be absolutely clear. Our government supports the equality of all Canadians without exception and categorically rejects the notion that a life with a disability is one that is not worth living or worse than death itself. I believe the fundamental principle that all lives have equal and intrinsic value can be balanced with other important interests and societal values, in particular, the importance of individual choice for Canadians. This balance is at the heart of the bill's objectives, which are to recognize the autonomy of individuals to choose MAID as a means for relieving intolerable suffering, regardless of the foreseeability of their natural death, while at the same time protecting vulnerable persons, recognizing that suicide is an important public health issue and affirming the inherent and equal value of every person's life.

I will now go into the specifics of various elements of the bill.

The bill proposes to expand eligibility for medical assistance in dying by repealing the criteria for a reasonably foreseeable natural death. Medical assistance in dying would therefore be available to people suffering unbearable pain, who have a serious and incurable disease, infection or disability, and whose medical condition is characterized by an advanced and irreversible decline in their capacity.

This removal of “reasonable foreseeability of natural death” from the eligibility criteria would mean that some persons whose only condition is a mental illness could be eligible for MAID. However, the bill proposes to exclude mental illness on its own as a ground for MAID eligibility.

Our consultations and the report of the Council of Canadian Academies that studied this issue indicated that the trajectory of mental illness is more difficult to predict than that of most physical illnesses, that spontaneous improvement is possible, and that a desire to die and an impaired perception of one's circumstances are symptoms, themselves, of some mental illnesses.

This means that it would be very difficult to determine when, if ever, it is appropriate to grant someone's request that their life be ended solely on the basis of mental illness. In no way does this suggest that persons with a mental illness necessarily lack the decision-making capacity to consent to MAID, or that the suffering associated with a mental illness is of a lesser degree than the suffering associated with physical illness.

During second reading debate of former Bill C-7, some members noted their support for this exclusion while others raised concerns. This issue requires much more thought and debate. We feel the parliamentary review of the MAID legislation would be an appropriate forum for this.

The bill also proposes changes to the safeguards, since the existing safeguards were designed to protect persons whose death is reasonably foreseeable.

Expanding eligibility requires changes to the safeguards, since many experts believe there are greater risks in assessing applications for medical assistance in dying from individuals whose death is not reasonably foreseeable.

The bill therefore proposes two sets of safeguards. Each applies whether natural death is reasonably foreseeable or not. This is the only role that the concept of reasonably foreseeable death would play in the new regime. It would no longer constitute grounds for refusing a request for medical assistance in dying.

Reasonable foreseeability of natural death, or RFND, refers to a temporal but flexible connection between the person's overall medical circumstances and their anticipated death. It allows for clinical judgment, as it requires a comprehensive individual assessment that does not have a result in a specific prognosis and clearly does not require death to be imminent.

Individuals may decline towards death along trajectories of greater or lesser predictability. As such, RFND is not defined by a maximum or minimum prognosis, but it does require a temporal link to death in the sense that the person is approaching the end of their life in the near term.

We kept the RFND standard because it provides flexibility in relation to the difficult and imprecise exercise of anticipating when natural death might occur. A natural death that is expected within six to 12 months certainly meets the RFND standard. That was made clear when Parliament adopted Bill C-14 as an end-of-life regime. It did not impose a six- to 12-month prognosis requirement to preserve flexibility, but it still considered such timelines to be within the meaning of RFND.

A person's death may also be foreseeable in the temporal sense over longer periods, depending on the particular circumstances under consideration. However, having an illness that will cause death several years in the future would not normally meet the condition of RFND.

Safeguards for those whose deaths are reasonably foreseeable are based on safeguards that currently exist with two changes. First, the 10-day reflection period would be eliminated. Second, the request for medical assistance in dying will no longer require the signature of two independent witnesses, just one.

A person paid to provide health care services or personal care who is not involved in the assessment of the person's eligibility for medical assistance in dying can now act as an independent witness.

During second reading of former Bill C-7, some hon. members expressed concern about removing some of the safeguards.

Allow me to assure hon. members that these changes are based on the comments we received during our consultations and follow through on them.

For those whose natural death is foreseeable, many of whom spend a long time seriously thinking about what they want to do, the 10-day reflection period might unduly prolong their suffering.

We also learned that people who live in long-term care facilities or in remote regions may have difficulty finding two independent witnesses. These difficulties are exacerbated by the pandemic. The independent witness confirms the identity of the person, but does not participate in assessing their eligibility for medical assistance in dying. Only one person is required for meeting that safety objective.

Newly eligible persons whose death is not reasonably foreseeable would benefit from additional safeguards, the purpose of which is to ensure that sufficient time and expertise is devoted to the assessment of their MAID request. Where death is not reasonably foreseeable, the suffering motivating a MAID request may be due to a broader range of sources that warrant greater attention before someone's life is prematurely ended, to reduce the risk of providing MAID when there is a possibility of alleviating the person's suffering.

Specifically, the bill proposes a minimum 90-day assessment period, which would require that at least one of the practitioners assessing eligibility has expertise in the condition that is causing the person's intolerable suffering. A formal specialization or certification by a medical college would not be required. The bill would also require that a person whose death is not reasonably foreseeable be informed of and offered available means to relieve suffering, such as mental health and disability supports. In addition, the practitioner would have to be satisfied that those other means of relieving suffering have been seriously considered.

These are clarifications to the existing requirement of informed consent. It is our hope that these steps are already taken in all cases, but the Criminal Code would explicitly require them for those whose death is not reasonably foreseeable.

In addition to changes in response to the decision in Truchon and Gladu, the bill would let a person whose natural death is reasonably foreseeable and who has been deemed eligible to receive MAID to waive final consent if there is a risk they will lose the capacity to consent before the date on which they chose to receive MAID.

At present, the Criminal Code requires that, immediately before providing MAID, the practitioner must ensure that the person has given express consent to MAID and that they have the opportunity to withdraw their request. This safeguard, which attests to the irreversible nature of death and the importance of obtaining consent at the point of ending life, simply cannot be met if the person has lost the capacity to consent. This seems unfair when a person has been deemed eligible and was awaiting the procedure. In such cases, the rule could push some individuals to obtain medical assistance in dying earlier than they wanted to.

Under the amendments proposed in the bill, a person whose death is foreseeable, who has already been assessed and approved for MAID and has decided they want to receive it, could make an advance consent arrangement with their practitioner, setting out the date for the provision of MAID and their consent to MAID if they no longer have the capacity to consent at that later point.

According to round table participants and experts who looked at this question for the Council of Canadian Academies' 2018 reports, providing for advance consent in this way presents relatively little complexity or risk, and some practitioners have indicated they would be relatively comfortable providing MAID under such circumstances.

The bill does not propose to permit advance requests in contrast to what I have just described as advance consent. Advance requests are documents that may be provided at some future unknown date, if and when a set of expected circumstances materializes and when the person is no longer able to give consent. This issue is significantly more complex and challenging, and it will be examined during the parliamentary review.

Finally, the bill would enhance the monitoring regime, which is crucial for accountability and transparency. I have examined the bill for charter compliance and I am confident that it responds to the Truchon ruling in a way that respects the charter. I will soon table a charter statement that sets out key considerations about the bill's potential impacts on charter rights and freedoms.

In conclusion, these important amendments seek to guarantee that medical assistance in dying—

[The Assistant Deputy Speaker (Mrs. Alexandra Mendès), Alexandra Mendes]

We must now proceed to questions and comments.

The hon. member for St. Albert—Edmonton.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Madam Speaker, needless to say, this is an incredibly complex area. While Bill C-7 purports to respond to the Truchon decision, it goes considerably beyond the scope of Truchon, and in so doing, removes a number of safeguards that Parliament, in its wisdom, passed four short years ago. In so doing, it would pre-empt a legislative review, where there would have been an opportunity to thoroughly examine all of the issues before experts and to take into account the comprehensive reports of the Council of Canadian Academies.

Why would the government choose to pre-empt a legislative review and instead proceed in a rushed way, in the face of the expiration of a stay on the declaration of constitutional invalidity effective December—

[The Assistant Deputy Speaker (Mrs. Alexandra Mendès), Alexandra Mendes]

The hon. minister.

[David Lametti, Liberal, LaSalle—Émard—Verdun, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank the hon. member for his participation and concern, over the last four years, with respect to this issue.

As the hon. member has pointed out, we are responding primarily to the Truchon decision, but we used the opportunity to make a certain number of other modifications where there was a clear consensus among Canadians. We consulted widely with MAID service providers and with families who had gone through the process. There was a universal conclusion that the 10-day waiting period was only a source of suffering, that people who decided to have MAID had made the decision and the 10 days only prolonged suffering. I continue to hear that. The witness requirement was actually becoming an impediment for people in regions and in long-term care facilities to access MAID, so we decided to change that now.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for his exhaustive overview of the bill before us today. We are pleased to be able to work together on this bill, which speaks to the very needs of Quebeckers and Canadians.

I would like to hear the minister's thoughts on how he expects all members in committee to work together so that we can meet the December 18 deadline for the final legislation. I hope that our work will be constructive and that we will thoroughly examine the issues. We must not forget that the objective is for fewer people to suffer while awaiting a final piece of legislation.

Could the minister tell us how he hopes this will work and how he plans to make it happen? I believe we have chosen not to include mental illness for the time being. There is not necessarily a consensus on this issue. I would like to hear what he hopes to see from parliamentarians.

[David Lametti, Liberal, LaSalle—Émard—Verdun, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank my hon. colleague for her question.

Issues relating to minors, mental health and advance requests are complex ones. We will give these issues the consideration they deserve in a parliamentary review, which was already set out in the 2016 legislation.

I hope that we will have the co-operation of our colleagues in this chamber and in the other place. There is clearly a strong consensus across the country, including in Quebec, for measures like the ones we are proposing. We will ensure that parliamentarians work together to meet the deadlines.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Madam Speaker, I want to start by thanking the minister for the co-operative and open dialogue that he and I have maintained on the bill and many other matters in the justice area. I also want to thank him for bringing the bill back promptly, because the concern of the New Democrats has always been that we not inadvertently prolong suffering for those who are at the end of life and for their families.

I do have a concern that the minister seems to have dropped the review off the edge of the agenda here. We are talking about the bill, but the work we need to do also includes the broader review. I placed an order on the motion paper today suggesting that we establish a special committee to deal with these broader issues. The minister made many references to the review without talking about a schedule or how we would accomplish this review.

[David Lametti, Liberal, LaSalle—Émard—Verdun, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank the hon. member for his work and his collaboration. I think there is a question in there, which I am going to try to answer.

I will look at the motion. I am open to discussing the parameters of the review with my parliamentary colleagues from all sides of the House and, indeed, the other house. I am certainly open to discussing the parameters of the review as we move forward.

[Arif Virani, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada]

Madam Speaker, I wanted to touch on the consultations that took place around the country, some of which I was privileged to take part in, along with some of the other parliamentary secretaries assisting the ministers working on this file. I want to ask the minister if he could comment on the influence of the Audrey Parker case, and what that means in the context of persons who would have been approved of a proceeding but not had the time to wait until they can give that final consent. What does that do in terms of this issue of people availing themselves of MAID prematurely?

As a second point, I would ask the minister to clarify whether this new bill would affect at all the conscience rights of medical practitioners, in terms of their being compelled to provide medical assistance in dying.

[David Lametti, Liberal, LaSalle—Émard—Verdun, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank my hon. colleague for his work on this and various other aspects of our file.

I will answer the second question first. Conscience rights were protected in the bill. They were protected in 2016 in the original bill. They were reinforced by parliamentary committee, and they are maintained in the current bill.

With respect to Audrey Parker's amendment, colleagues will remember that this is the case of a woman in Halifax who had been evaluated and approved for MAID, but was at the end of her life and afraid of losing her capacity, so instead of being able to spend another Christmas with her family, she opted to take MAID earlier. We have incorporated what is, in effect, Audrey Parker's amendment into the legislation. There was widespread support for it across Canada, and I described it in my earlier remarks.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Madam Speaker, the minister's comments about conscience protection are totally false.

He knows, or should know, that the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario policy, which pre-existed this, in combination with the law the government brought in, effectively requires physicians to either provide or refer for euthanasia in certain situations. He also should know that hospices, including one in B.C., are being forced to close, reducing the number of palliative care beds because of their lack of desire to provide euthanasia. So much for protecting patients' autonomy. If patients want to receive care in an environment that does not include euthanasia, they should have the freedom and autonomy to do so.

In addition to that, I want to ask the minister quickly about the 10-day reflection period. The member for Richmond Hill, from the minister's own caucus, said that the 10-day reflection period is necessary. The minister knows as well that this reflection period can be waived in certain extraordinary circumstances already.

Why not leave the reflection period in place, as members of his own caucus are calling on him to do, recognizing that it can already be waived in certain extreme situations?

[David Lametti, Liberal, LaSalle—Émard—Verdun, QC]

Madam Speaker, with respect to the 10-day period, once again, we heard in our consultations across Canada from families, from people who have experience with MAID and from MAID service providers that all the 10-day waiting period did was add to people's suffering. It was characterized as inhumane, and we are taking it out.

I would also properly characterize the issue, which I feel my hon. colleague has failed to do. This is a charter right. It was held in the Carter case that this was a charter right, and the 2016 legislation enforced the charter right. A medical service provider is never forced to participate in this himself or herself.

The member is correct. He underplayed the words “under certain circumstances”, but those are, in fact, crucial. Under certain circumstances, where the person's charter right to access the service would be endangered, a medical practitioner has to give a reference. However, that is the extent of it, and that is entirely in balance with our charter provision. I would humbly submit that the hon. member's mischaracterization is erroneous.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to rise to speak on Bill C-7, an act to amend the Criminal Code respecting medical assistance in dying.

At the outset, I will say that the subject of medical assistance in dying is perhaps one of the most complex issues that could come before Parliament. Profound moral, legal and ethical questions are raised. Medical assistance in dying raises questions of individual autonomy, the need to respect the sanctity of life and the need to protect vulnerable persons, among other considerations.

It is no wonder that Canadians have such profound, deeply held and diverse views on this subject matter. After all, when we are talking about physician-assisted dying, we are talking about issues that literally concern life and death. When we, as parliamentarians, give consideration to an appropriate framework that provides safeguards, we must do so with regard to the fact that we are talking about a procedure that, when carried out, is irreversible. The patient dies. It is indeed a weighty subject of profound importance.

I am certainly informed of the complexity of the issue through my experience of having, in the last Parliament, served as the vice-chair of the Special Joint Committee on Physician-Assisted Dying. This committee was tasked with reviewing the Carter decision of the Supreme Court, which struck down the blanket Criminal Code prohibition and tasked Parliament and the committee with putting forward recommendations for a legislative response. I then sat on the justice committee, which studied Bill C-14, the government's legislative response. In that regard, I am in the unique position of having been through the process from start to finish, from the study of the Carter decision of the special joint committee through to the passage of Bill C-14 in June 2016.

The bill before us purportedly responds to the Truchon decision of the Superior Court of Quebec, which struck down an important component of Bill C-14, namely, that in order to qualify for medical assistance in dying, one's death must be reasonably foreseeable. When the Truchon decision was issued in September 2019, we on this side of the House in the official opposition called on the Attorney General to do the right thing and appeal the decision. We did this for a number of reasons.

To begin with, it is the responsibility of the Attorney General to uphold laws passed by Parliament. The law passed by Parliament was Bill C-14. I would note that the law had been passed a mere three years prior to the issuance of the Truchon decision. It was passed after a comprehensive review of the Carter decision and a comprehensive review of possibilities for a legislative framework. Therefore, in the end, Bill C-14 was a carefully thought-out and debated piece of legislation. One would think that in the face of that, the minister would have appealed the decision.

In addition to that, when one, having respect for this place and the laws passed by Parliament, actually looks at the Truchon decision and the reasoning of Madam Justice Baudouin, it should be all the more apparent the need to appeal the decision. Madam Justice Baudouin, in concluding that the reasonable foreseeability criterion contravened section 7 and section 15 of the charter, was driven, arguably, by a restrictive interpretation of the purpose of the law. Indeed, Madam Justice Baudouin reached her conclusion by singularly focusing on one objective of the law, namely, to protect vulnerable persons from being induced in a moment of weakness to ending their life.

However, that was not the only objective of the legislation. When one looks at the preamble of Bill C-7, it expressly provides for other objectives, including the sanctity of life, the dignity of the elderly and disabled, and suicide prevention, yet the judge in Truchon focused exclusively on only one of those objectives.

What Parliament sought to do in providing for a reasonably foreseeable criterion was to respond to what the Supreme Court called upon Parliament to do, namely, to strike a balance between individual autonomy and the need to respect vulnerable persons.

The Attorney General, moments ago, stood in this place and said that the government chose not to appeal the decision because it agreed with the substance of the decision. That is quite interesting because only four years ago, three years before the minister decided not to appeal the decision, ministers on that side of the House emphasized how critical the reasonably foreseeable criterion is to provide and ensure effective safeguards to protect the most vulnerable.

To that end I would quote the former health minister, Jane Philpott, who, on June 16, 2016 stated:

We are concerned with the Senate's recommendation for the removal of the clause that recommends that this be considered only in the face of natural death being reasonably foreseeable because of the fact that people with mental illness, among others, would not be adequately protected.

Then there are the comments of the then attorney general, the hon. member for Vancouver Granville, who introduced Bill C-14 and stated:

There are other compelling reasons for there to be a requirement that the person's natural death be reasonably foreseeable. First, it provides a fair way to restrict eligibility without making assisted dying available to almost everyone. Second, restricting eligibility in this way is necessary to protect the vulnerable.

In the face of those objectives, it is quite a departure and quite convenient for the minister to say that he was going to effectively abdicate his responsibility as attorney general to uphold the laws passed by Parliament by allowing a single decision of a single lower court judge in one province of this country to stand. The Attorney General acknowledged, and we should make no mistake about it, that the effect of Truchon and its codification, by way of this piece of legislation, significantly transforms the medical assistance in dying framework in Canada.

At the time of the Carter decision and when this House, four short years ago, debated Bill C-14, medical assistance in dying was thought to be an exception to the rule, not the rule. It was thought to be appropriate in certain circumstances in an end-of-life context, where one who was suffering intolerably could, upon providing clear consent, hasten their death.

With this legislation, it would now be appropriate to terminate human life even in the absence of a terminal illness and even in circumstances where the suffering is medically manageable. That is a radical transformation, and it creates a number of complexities around issues of suffering that might be psychological or existential and outside of an end-of-life context. When one removes the reasonably foreseeable criterion, all that is left is that one must have a serious disease, illness or disability, be in state of decline, and be suffering physically or psychologically as a result.

When one removes an end-of-life, or reasonably foreseeable, component, that already arguably subjective test becomes a whole lot more subjective, and that has the potential to put vulnerable persons' lives at risk. One can see that with those broad parameters, persons with degenerative disabilities could have their lives terminated, notwithstanding that they may have years, if not decades, to live. That has caused enormous concern in the disability community across Canada.

One month after the Truchon decision was issued, some 72 organizations from across Canada, representing a cross-section of the disability community, wrote to the Attorney General and pleaded with him to appeal the Truchon decision. They did so out of concern that persons with disabilities could be put at risk and have their lives prematurely ended.

The writers of the letter noted that the legislation could arguably contravene article 10 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which provides that persons with disabilities should be treated equally under the law. They note that persons with disabilities could be treated unequally because one could have medical assistance in dying made available to them for no other reason than they happen to be disabled.

It should be noted that the UN rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities sounded the alarm when she said she was, “extremely concerned about the implementation of the legislation on medical assistance in dying from a disability perspective.” From a disability perspective, that plea fell on deaf ears on the part of the Attorney General in terms of his failure to appeal the Truchon decision.

In light of what a significant change this legislation means, it is unfortunate that it has come to this, because appealing the decision would have allowed for time. It would have allowed time for Parliament to take into consideration the significant complexities associated with this change, a mere four years after Parliament had legislated a comprehensive regime, and it would have provided clarity in terms of informing Parliament about the scope of the framework upon which Parliament can legislate.

However, instead of taking the appropriate time to ensure that any legislative change respects the charter, because respecting the charter, including life, means protecting vulnerable persons, we are here with a profoundly significant piece of legislation being rushed. It is being rushed in the face of the expiration of the stay on the declaration of constitutional invalidity, effective this December.

While the Attorney General and the government emphasized the Truchon decision, it must be noted that this legislation goes well beyond the scope of Truchon. It removes important safeguards, including the 10-day reflection period. It removes the requirement that there be two witnesses to confirm that a person made the request of their own free will and that the request reflected their true consent. It provides for a complex advanced consent regime, one of those complex areas when it comes to medical assistance in dying policy, and it does all of this pre-empting what Parliament had determined, called upon and legislated in Bill C-14; namely, a legislative review that was supposed to take place this spring, but is not going ahead.

Now we are in this rushed process, instead of having an opportunity for members of Parliament to come together to hear from expert witnesses, to review the state of the law, to give consideration to the comprehensive reports of the Council of Canadian Academies and to receive diverse feedback on all of these issues. It need not have been this way. It should not have been this way, and it is regrettable that the government has so recklessly put us in this position by rushing through legislation that, arguably, could put vulnerable Canadians at risk and remove critical safeguards.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the President of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada and to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Madam Speaker, I agree with the importance of the legislation and the issue at hand. The intent of the government back in February was to ensure there would be more debate and the opportunity for us to explore the matter at hand further. No one anticipated what was going to happen with the coronavirus, and that has changed all aspects of our society. The legislation is before us because a court is obligating us to move as quickly as we can on it.

Would the member not agree that in many ways, during the first debate we had years ago on the legislation, there was still opportunity for us to have critical input? Does he have amendments that he would like to bring forward on this legislation?