Thank you, Mr. Chair, for the opportunity to speak to this committee about Bill C‑228.
I will confine my remarks only to the insolvency law aspects of the bill. My colleagues from Finance Canada we speak to the provisions of the bill affecting federal pension legislation.
Let me start by describing what the bill would do.
Canada's insolvency laws provide two sets of options to financially distressed companies—liquidation, or bankruptcy; and restructuring. The superpriority in Bill C‑228 would affect both options. Liquidation occurs when the company can no longer continue as a going concern. It must be wound up and its assets sold to pay the company's creditors. In bankruptcy, pension claims would change from unsecured status to superpriority status, meaning that they would be paid ahead of most other creditors.
The second impact of the bill would be on restructurings. Our insolvency laws are designed to encourage companies that are financially distressed but fundamentally viable to try to avoid liquidation through court-supervised restructuring plans with creditors. Bill C‑228 would change the current balance by requiring that a restructuring plan provide for payment in full of unfunded pension liabilities to receive court approval.
This quick presentation completed, I should note a few general contextual elements for the committee. Given our years of practice in analyzing and working with the domestic and international insolvency and bankruptcy systems, it is worth stating at the outset that the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act are carefully considered and calibrated regimes. Our fundamental aim in the system is to avoid liquidations and allow restructurings where possible, to ensure an orderly and fair system that prevents gaming or a race to the courthouse, and to incentivize behaviours that maximize the value of the corporation and its returns for all workers and creditors.
Large corporations, such as those most likely to have defined benefit pension plans or to avail themselves of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, are complicated entities with a number of competing interests. Shifts in one aspect of the regime will have implications and considerations for other aspects.
I will seek to highlight some of these areas of consideration for the committee, given the shifts that this bill would introduce.
It is also worth noting that this is an area to which we have dedicated considerable time and effort. In particular, I would note for the committee the important work proposed and implemented in the retirement security project, which saw changes to insolvency, corporate governance and federal pension laws with an eye towards the protection of pensioners and workers.
With that, I would begin by bringing some potential drafting issues to the committee's attention.
First, the committee should be aware that the bill uses terminology from federal pension law that may or may not be relevant to the various provincial pensions laws. The bill also does not distinguish between different types of pension plans with different employer funding obligations. My Finance colleagues would be happy to answer questions on these issues.
Second, I wanted to note that the five-year transition period, as drafted, is tied to a calendar date, to five years after coming into force. Insolvency law transition clauses are typically drafted to only affect proceedings that start after they come into force, to ensure that the rules do not change in the middle of an ongoing insolvency proceeding. Under Bill C‑228, a restructuring proceeding could start four years after coming into force, but the new superpriority could come into force a year later, changing the rules midstream and potentially reducing the chances of a successful restructuring.
I will now turn to a number of more substantive considerations the committee may want to investigate during its study of Bill C‑228.
First, the committee may want to look at the differential impact the bill could have on pensioners under different scenarios.
When the bankrupt assets are sufficient to cover unfunded pension liabilities, for instance, the bill may increase the amount that pensions could receive in a liquidation because they would be placed ahead of other creditors. When the bankrupt employer's assets are insufficient to cover the liability, which can be very large, it may be that losses could be locked in for pensioners without any prospect for further recovery given the impacts that the bill may have on restructurings or other possible futures of the plan.
Second, the committee may want to look into how the bill would change restructuring dynamics when a defined benefit pension plan is involved. We are all familiar with examples of insolvencies that resulted in pensioners not receiving their full benefits. On the other hand, there are also many examples of restructurings under current law where the pension plan was successfully preserved, along with the employer and ongoing jobs, such as Air Canada, Stelco and AbitibiBowater.
New superpriorities could, for example, shift the behaviour of players in the insolvency systems. With a new possibility that a secured creditor may be at risk of not receiving full payment given a pension deficit, that creditor may have a strong incentive to choose to race to the bank to call their loan, or similarly take steps to maximize their return in advance of an insolvency. It is possible that a change in the incentives in restructuring could trigger more insolvencies and even minimize the outcomes for pensioners when insolvency is triggered. The committee may want to speak to the creditor community to assess their views about the impact of this bill.
Similarly, the committee may want to consider the impact the bill could have on the availability of interim financing—that is, the special insolvency loans that insolvent companies must acquire to cover the restructuring costs.