Thanks very much.
Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and honourable members of the committee.
My name is Kate McNeece, and as the honourable chair just said, I am a partner at the law firm of McCarthy Tétrault, practising in competition, antitrust and foreign investment.
Thank you very much for inviting me to appear before you today.
Before I begin my statement, I want to note that I am appearing today in my capacity as an individual, and the views expressed today are my own, not those of my law firm or any client of McCarthy Tétrault. However, my submissions today are informed by my experience advising clients on the application of the Competition Act to their commercial agreements, conduct and mergers.
In my view, a comprehensive, clear and effective Competition Act is in the best interests of all stakeholders, including consumers and the business community. Bill C-59, along with the amendments enacted in 2022 and 2023, presents a comprehensive vision for the future of the act. I commend the government and this committee for their thoughtful approach to implementing meaningful competition law reform in Canada. In my remarks, I will highlight a few areas that I believe bear additional consideration.
First, I believe there is more work to be done to rightsize the merger control thresholds set out in sections 109 and 110 of the act. Over the past five years, the significant majority of transactions notified to the Competition Bureau have been designated non-complex, meaning they are identifiable by the clear absence of competition issues. Calibrating these thresholds to capture more potentially problematic mergers, while reducing the administrative burden on both merging parties and the bureau by excluding more mergers that clearly do not raise issues, should be a goal of any meaningful reform.
Bill C-59 changes the size of transaction thresholds to capture entities with significant sales in Canada. This is a step in the right direction. However, I suggest additional study to consider further calibration of these thresholds, including in particular an amendment to exclude from the “party-size” calculation assets and revenues of a vendor that is divesting its entire interest in a business. These are plainly irrelevant to the merged party's financial position.
Second, Bill C-59 introduces a disgorgement remedy for civil conduct that has been the subject of a tribunal order under section 75, 77, 79, or 90.1 of the act. I believe private actions under the act will be an important complement to bureau enforcement, and I understand these provisions are likely intended to incentivize use of these provisions.
However, the creation of a new collective redress mechanism from whole cloth risks confusion and uncertainty, when there is a simpler alternative. Section 36 of the act currently allows for collective redress for damages where there has been a violation of one of the criminal provisions of the act. I recommend that this committee consider revising Bill C-59 to remove the proposed disgorgement provisions, and instead allow private litigants to seek collective redress under section 36 of the act for conduct that has been the subject of a tribunal order concerning civil matters.
Third, Bill C-59 introduces private actions, administrative monetary penalties and financial remedies for conduct found to be contrary to section 90.1 of the act. I am particularly concerned that as drafted, these penalties could apply to agreements that would constitute mergers under section 92 of the act. It would cause significant uncertainty in transaction planning if mergers could be subject not only to bureau review and remedies under section 92 but also to AMPs, private actions and, potentially, disgorgement or damages under section 90.1. I urge the committee to explicitly exclude agreements and arrangements that constitute mergers for the purposes of section 92 from the scope of section 90.1 of the act.
Finally, I am concerned by the bureau's recent submission to this committee advocating for the inclusion of structural presumptions based on bright-line concentration and market share tests in the text of section 92. I caution the committee not to incorporate such a significant change into this bill without a careful study of the evidence supporting the magnitude of notified transactions that would be captured by the proposed thresholds and therefore be subject to a reversed burden, without consultation with a wide variety of stakeholders to understand the impact of such a change on merger activity and without consideration as to whether the proposed tests, which are taken verbatim from the new December 2023 U.S. horizontal merger guidelines, are appropriate in the context of Canada's economy.
While bright-line structural presumptions can be useful in providing direction to merging parties on the likely treatment of a prospective transaction and in potentially dissuading problematic transactions, in my view, they are most appropriately placed in enforcement guidelines, as they are in the U.S. The assessment of competitive effects is necessarily a contextual one, and the more balanced approach taken in Bill C-59, which permits but does not require the tribunal to assign greater weight to evidence of concentration and market share, is the more appropriate course.
Thank you very much for your time this afternoon. I would be happy to answer any questions.