Good evening, everyone.
Thank you for inviting me to testify.
This evening I will be discussing advance requests for medical assistance in dying.
Advance requests for medical assistance in dying make it possible for capable persons to consent in advance to the provision of medical assistance in dying where they are in a state of life or health incompatible with their values, such as a state of advanced dementia preventing them from recognizing family members or from performing their activities of everyday life. Such requests are now made as part of a relaxing of the rules governing access to medical assistance in dying, as may be seen in the way Canadian legislation has evolved on the matter.
I would like to draw your attention to a few historical facts.
Bill C‑14 made it possible for persons to agree to have a physician or nurse practitioner inflict death on them with their consent, provided they gave their consent at the time the medical assistance in dying was administered. This constituted an exception to, or a derogation from, the rule stated in section 14 of the Criminal Code that prohibits a third party from inflicting death on a person even where that person has given consent. This development was accompanied by the legislator's introduction of safeguards that restricted or limited the circumstances in which medical assistance in dying may be provided based on the eligibility criteria developed at that time.
Bill C‑7 added an exception to that rule by permitting persons to receive medical assistance in dying even if, at the time it is administered, those persons are unable to consent to it, provided they have signed a prior written agreement with a physician waiving the requirement to consent to medical assistance in dying at the time it is provided. Here again, the legislator established safeguards to protect the person who is to receive medical assistance in dying.
It is now being proposed that persons who do not yet have a grievous and irremediable medical condition, but who anticipate having such a condition, should, if in a given situation such as a state of advanced dementia preventing them from recognizing family members or performing their activities of everyday life, be allowed to receive medical assistance in dying in circumstances in which — and I want to emphasize this — they, although conscious, are unable to consent to the provision of medical assistance in dying.
By legislating on this matter, Canada would be joining a very small number of countries that have accepted that a person may receive medical assistance in dying by means of an advance request. I am referring to the Netherlands and Belgium, which have very different statutes on this issue.
In the Netherlands, advance requests for medical assistance in dying are authorized, but, between 2017 and 2019, there were only two or three cases per year of persons suffering from advanced dementia who received euthanasia in accordance with their advance medical directives.
In Belgium, an advance euthanasia directive takes effect only if a person is irreversibly unconscious at the time of euthanasia. In other words, that person must be in an irreversible coma. From 2016 to 2020, between 22 and 33 persons per year received euthanasia in accordance with their advance medical directives.
Unlike Belgium, Canada is currently considering the possibility of providing medical assistance in dying to a person who has made an advance request, not where that individual is in an irreversible coma, which presupposes a total loss of consciousness, but where a person with a grievous and irremediable medical condition such as advanced dementia is still conscious, even if only minimally so, but incapable of giving free and informed consent to the provision of medical assistance in dying.
In such circumstances, Parliament would be asked to validate or sanction under criminal law the possibility for a person who makes an advance request for medical assistance in dying to receive such assistance if the conditions that individual has established as activation triggers of his declaration are met.
While the drafting of an advance request for medical assistance in dying entails its own difficulties, particularly with regard to the identification of factors that may determine when it should take effect, activation of the declaration presents challenges in many areas: the medical condition required for consideration to be given to providing such assistance; the provision of medical assistance in dying to an incapable or more or less unconscious person; the severity of the person's cognitive losses; the family members who would be called upon to commence the assessment process leading to the provision of medical assistance in dying; and the medical and other assessments required to determine whether the person has reached a point where his or her previously expressed wishes must be considered.
Here the challenge for legislators is to design robust safeguards that will protect persons who have made advance requests for medical assistance in dying — such requests are generally made many years before the condition that may potentially give rise to their activation appears — from abuses such as medical assistance in dying that is provided too early or in haste under pressure from family members or medical staff who sympathize with the state of mental deterioration of the person, who will thus be put in a highly vulnerable position.
In addition to Parliament's intervention in criminal law, there can be no doubt that provincial statutes, as in Quebec's case, will be required to determine the circumstances in which an advance request for medical assistance in dying may be activated when a person is considered incapable of giving consent yet is still conscious, even if minimally so.