Bill C-13

An Act to implement the Protocol on the Accession of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership

This enactment implements the Protocol on the Accession of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, done at Auckland and Bandar Seri Begawan on July 16, 2023, by updating how that Agreement is defined or referred to in certain Acts and by amending other Acts to bring them into conformity with Canada’s obligations under that Agreement and Protocol.

An Act to Implement the Protocol on the Accession of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership

[Brad Vis, Conservative, Mission—Matsqui—Abbotsford, BC]

Madam Speaker, the member from the Bloc asked an excellent question about Taiwan. Indeed, Canada has a long history and a growing economic relationship with Taiwan. I think that is where we need a strategic partnership by recognizing its sovereignty in standing up to Chinese ambition, which may lead to a global conflict in the next 20 years. We need to be on the side of Taiwan, not on the side of Communist China as it relates to that sovereign country.

[Dan Muys, Conservative, Flamborough—Glanbrook—Brant North, ON]

Madam Speaker, I think my colleague from British Columbia has really hit the nail on the head. We all stood in this place in support of Bill C-5, the major projects bill. That was more than eight months ago. We know that Germany was able to build an LNG facility in less than seven months; the Netherlands in six months; and Finland in four months. We have had MOUs. We have had photo ops. We have had press releases. However, we have had no shovels in the ground and no results. My colleague has outlined a number of practical actions that we can take to make sure our economy is ready to take advantage of the fact that Canada does have everything the world wants.

Maybe the member can elaborate a bit more on that.

[Brad Vis, Conservative, Mission—Matsqui—Abbotsford, BC]

Madam Speaker, one of the great honours I have in being a member of Parliament is that I get to meet with incredible entrepreneurs across Canada. They have heard the words of the Prime Minister and have been hopeful, but that hope is running thin. It is time to act. It is time to see shovels in the ground. It is time to use the advantages that we have been gifted in this country to our economic success.

For example, if we built a pipeline in northern British Columbia, that one project would exceed the total worth of all our trade with China today. How could we not take that opportunity right now? How are we not moving on that like those other countries in Europe have when action was required?

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to rise today to speak to Bill C‑13. I always get these numbers mixed up. We always end up losing track because there are so many bills. However, as the Bloc Québécois critic for international trade, I want to reassure my colleagues that I know what this bill is about.

This is an agreement that the committee I serve on was able to study. Although this agreement does not change much in the sense that it involves the United Kingdom's entry into an existing agreement, it is still a good thing. However, we are going to take a few detours and talk about several aspects of this matter that are different. Members will recall that this concerns the United Kingdom's accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, an existing agreement that goes back several years. However, since the United Kingdom regained its customs sovereignty, most of the agreements had to be redone.

Allow me to take a brief detour and draw a comparison with the situation in Quebec. For a long time now, Quebec has been having a great debate, which is still ongoing and will soon come to an end in the next few years. I am talking about Quebec's independence, of course. An important referendum was held in 1995. In fact, we just commemorated the 30th anniversary of this referendum last fall. At the time, we were told that Quebec would not automatically be included in the trade agreements that were negotiated by Canada.

Jean Charest could pass for either a Liberal or a Conservative these days, but he was a Progressive Conservative at the time. He used to speak on behalf of the “no” side while waving a Canadian passport that was not his own, because it was the wrong colour. As a federal member of Parliament, his passport should have been green. He was waving a blue passport, which was not his, to express his pride. His pride was based on being someone he was not. Now, let me get back to the matter at hand.

At the time, Jean Charest said there would be a transition period. He said that an independent Quebec could perhaps take part in NAFTA, but that there would nevertheless be a transition period during which Quebec would not take part in trade agreements. During that time, companies would not have the guaranteed market access that is provided for in the agreements negotiated and signed by Canada. Certain precedents did exist at the time, but they referred to multilateral agreements. There was no real precedent for what happens when a country wins or regains its trade sovereignty or what happens with agreements negotiated by customs unions like Canada or the European Union.

We got an answer to what happens in that situation in the form of Brexit, which happened a few years ago. What happened? Brexit proved exactly what one might expect, and that is, common sense prevailed. The trading partners of a country that regains its trade sovereignty will usually all want to continue doing business with that country. It makes sense. It is crystal clear. It is that simple.

Brexit came into effect on January 1, 2021. In 2020, the United Kingdom quickly copied and pasted all the agreements previously negotiated by the European Union. They were known as temporary agreements. They included the continuity agreement between the United Kingdom and Canada, which Canada debated right here at the time. This proves that, in record time, the United Kingdom was able to simply renew the agreements that the EU had negotiated and signed and remain in those agreements. As a result, there was no period of uncertainty, no period during which British businesses were disconnected from the partners with which the EU had signed agreements. That same year, the U.K. was even able to sign an agreement with Japan, which did not have an agreement with the EU.

A nation that regains its trade sovereignty rekindles the interest of outgoing partners and can even create new partnerships, as with the U.K.'s entry into the Trans‑Pacific Partnership. The U.K. is a relatively small country in terms of population; it is an island. This supports Jacques Parizeau's point that, regardless of a country's size, it is completely viable when it is in a large market.

We are pleased to see this, and I thank Canadian parliamentarians, because by supporting the U.K.'s entry, probably unanimously, they are defusing the very argument they might have raised a few years from now against Quebec's independence. I thank my good friends in advance.

Thanks to the lottery, my colleague from Jonquière tabled a bill on behalf of the Bloc Québécois, for which I was the critic, that sought to enhance Parliament's role in trade negotiations and in the process of ratifying the results of the negotiations. These agreements are like vampires, in that they turn to dust in the light of day, so the goal was to change that and find a way for us to know a little more about what was happening.

Speaking of the United Kingdom, I was once in a committee meeting in which we were asked to review the agreement with the U.K. without having the text in front of us. That is the Canadian monarchy at work. That is what happens when a Parliament only cares about the executive branch and a handful of strong ministers. It claims to be part of British tradition, where Parliament is king and master of everything, but in reality, opacity is the order of the day and nobody knows anything.

It is well known that, in the Canadian system, parliamentarians have to study an implementation bill in which hardly anything can be amended. In committee, every time I try to amend bills implementing agreements, the first thing that happens is that the chair tells me that my amendment is out of order because it goes against the intent of the bill or because it would require new funding, a new budget. When we suggest creating new committees, oversight committees or other types of committees, we are immediately told that that would be out of order because we cannot change the intent. Only a few pages of the implementation bill can be amended, but trade agreements sometimes contain thousands of pages of regulations.

Of course, the agreement has already been signed by the time it is even tabled in Parliament. In the end, we just rubber-stamp it, but then later, whenever we want to change or object to something in an agreement, we are accused of being against the very principle of trade. The logical fallacy could not be clearer.

Another problem is the waiting period. On paper, there is no law requiring a minimum waiting period between the time an agreement—which, I would remind members, can sometimes be thousands of pages long—is announced and the time it is presented to Parliament. Theoretically, it could be announced one day and be tabled in Parliament the next morning. Nothing in the law prevents that. This is one of the elements of the bill that the Bloc Québécois highlighted a few weeks ago.

I find it astounding that a majority of parliamentarians are saying that they do not want to do their job, that they are not interested in doing their job and that they are going to trust the government. Even the official opposition says that it will blindly follow the government into the abyss, if necessary. Studying trade agreements would be too much work. That should not happen. Talk about an official opposition.

Our bill would have enshrined into law the principle of a minimum waiting period of 21 days from the time an agreement is made public to the time it is brought before the House. However, I remember that representatives of the Liberal Party rose and said that that bill was not necessary because there was already an official policy that referred to this 21-day period. Well, a policy is not legislation, as today's debate proves, because only 15 days went by between the time the protocol on the accession of the United Kingdom to the Trans-Pacific Partnership was made public and the time it was tabled in the House. That is proof that we need legislation and that it is not enough to just have a policy that mentions a minimum waiting period.

Shame on the government for doing this, thinking no one would notice. I am sorry, but I noticed. This shows why we need legislation setting out the minimum waiting period from the time an agreement is made public to the time it is presented and tabled here in the House. I think that is the bare minimum.

Furthermore, there is absolutely nothing in the Canadian Constitution that would allow a province that is opposed to an agreement to veto it. This stands in sharp contrast to Belgian federalism. In Belgium, if one region opposes an international agreement, the whole country cannot move forward, even if the Belgian parliament supports it. That is what open federalism really means. That is federalism that is respectful of its regions. Canada does not have that kind of federalism, and we have the proof right here.

There is also nothing that would allow Quebec or any other province to say that it would like its own negotiators, that it would like to nominate someone to sit at the table to negotiate agreements and defend its interests and values. There is nothing like that in there.

Now let us talk about the substance of the agreement. We do not have any major issues on that front. It is a free trade agreement. The U.K. is not generally associated with modern-day slavery. It will not violate human rights, nor is it responsible for major environmental disasters. It is a developed society. On the surface, there is no reason to believe it will engage in unfair competition.

The U.K. is also a country with a robust aerospace sector. It is Quebec's second-largest partner behind the United States. It is very far behind the U.S., but it is still the second-largest export partner. There is a lot of collaboration and exchange in the aerospace sector. The agreement is therefore welcome on that front. Members will recall that Montreal is the third-largest aerospace cluster in the world, after Seattle and Toulouse, and it is one of only three places where all the parts needed to assemble an entire aircraft are available. We do not assemble entire aircraft, but if we wanted to do that in the greater Montreal area, we could. We have enough SMEs and large businesses and sufficient wherewithal to say that we can provide the parts to assemble an entire aircraft. The aerospace sector is extremely important. I am also troubled by the fact that Canada does not have an aerospace policy. It is the only country with such a large cluster that does not have an aerospace policy. The government has repeatedly promised a policy, most recently at the end of its last term. However, no such policy materialized, and that is simply disgraceful, given the importance of our industry and our sector. Nevertheless, as I was saying, we are okay with that part.

There are no further concessions on supply management, either. Unfortunately, some concessions were made under the CPTPP, but the damage is done. With regard to the quotas that have already been lost, there was an agreement that with the United Kingdom's accession, they would be distributed across what had already been given up. However, the problem is that each time new concessions are made on supply management, we are told not to worry because we are supposedly gaining something else somewhere. With the agreement with the EU and with the CPTPP, we were told that the Canadian meat industry was going to get access to the European market. We know that with the United Kingdom specifically, as well as the EU, there are non-tariff barriers. It is true that on paper, tariffs on pork and beef have been lowered for farmers, but there are all kinds of sanitary and phytosanitary measures in place that have no scientific basis. What we need is reciprocity of standards. We should negotiate with these countries to reach an agreement to make sure that when a product is imported, the scientific rules are actually based on science.

I moved an amendment during the consideration of the bill we are discussing today. The amendment called for the agreement to take effect after a sanitary and phytosanitary protocol with the U.K. had been negotiated and signed. Unfortunately, the two parties did not want to support my amendment, even though that is how negotiations work in real life. In a way, allowing the United Kingdom's accession to the CPTPP would be doing that country a favour, even though we will also benefit from an economic standpoint.

Canada has shown us time and again that it is an amateur when it comes to negotiations. I would think that a good negotiator takes time to sit down for preliminary discussions. If we say we are ready to allow the U.K.'s accession and that we know that we are doing the country a big favour, should we not at least sit and talk? Even more so considering that technically, the U.K. allows Canadian meat imports, but no Canadian meat actually gets into the country. It would therefore be appropriate to sit down and talk before allowing its accession to the CPTPP in order to reach an agreement to ensure that our meat actually gets into the U.K. Cheese from the U.K. has already been allowed into Canada. We have given them a few concessions here and there. In exchange, the U.K. has not allowed our meat into their country, so we should sit down and reach an agreement.

It is unfortunate that my amendment, which sought to prohibit the coming into force of this agreement before an agreement could be reached, was rejected. A case like this could have been dealt with very quickly. It is unfortunate that I saw the Liberals and the Conservatives carry on like the best of friends and reject an amendment that could have served our farmers and their interests.

I will now turn to my final point. I am still trying to understand why Canada signs agreements and why its official position is one of support for investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms. I also spoke to that yesterday in my speech on Indonesia. I speak to that whenever trade agreements come up in the House. It always sounds very abstract, very legal and very complex. It seems very far removed from the concerns of average Canadians, but in fact, it is a huge deal. In practice, it is about giving multinational corporations sovereign powers and allowing them to sue states when governments or legislative bodies adopt measures in favour of better environmental protection, more social justice and stronger workers' rights.

For example, when Mexico imposed a tax on sugary drinks to combat the Mexican obesity epidemic, it was sued by a multinational corporation. When Egypt raised the minimum wage, it was sued by a multinational corporation. Canada is signing trade agreements that allow for clauses like this. When Australia moved to introduce plain packaging to limit cigarette promotion, it was sued by Philip Morris.

In my colleague's constituency, Lac‑Saint‑Jean, there is a lawsuit going on right now that was filed by an American company over the cancellation of Énergie Saguenay's Quebec LNG project. How much is it costing the government?

From a democratic standpoint, what does it mean when Canada proudly says it supports investor-state dispute settlement and supports self-censorship of its own policies? Why is it supporting the idea that, when Parliament stands up and overwhelmingly passes a law that aligns with the public interest, a profit-motivated multinational corporation can sue it before a tribunal established under trade agreements? Does that make sense? I really want to know. I do not think it makes sense, because peoples do have rights, after all. Democracies do have rights.

There may be other ways to resolve disputes. Before NAFTA made this mechanism so common, disputes were simply settled at the country level. If a company felt it had been wronged by a government policy in another country where it was investing, it would call upon its own country, its own government. Obviously, governments could misuse these mechanisms. Not everything is fair. However, it was more diplomatic, and if the dispute had to be resolved through a lawsuit, it happened between governments. I think that is much more sensible than elevating multinationals to the status of fully sovereign powers, which is very costly.

The two parties in the House that are friends of multinational corporations believe very strongly in the benefits of investor-state dispute settlement, or ISDS, so I proposed an amendment to this agreement, like the one I proposed to the agreement with Indonesia, which we debated yesterday. Since ISDS is so great, I proposed that the minister table an annual report on its costs and effects. The two parties that are friends of multinationals rejected that amendment. They believe so strongly in the benefits that they do not want to tell us what they are. That is just great. Good job, guys.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development reported that ISDS resulted in a win for the multinational or an out-of-court settlement in 60% of cases. That means that the multinational was able to completely or partially override the democratic will of the political system in 60% of cases. However, there is something that cannot be quantified, something that the figures do not show, and that is how this works upstream as well. Behind closed doors, political decision-makers must be deciding not to implement certain measures because they are worried about being sued. There is also an upstream self-censorship effect.

Once again, I do not understand why Canada is signing up for this.

I see that my time is up. We will continue this conversation with our our esteemed colleagues in just a moment during questions and comments.

[Jean-Yves Duclos, Liberal, Québec Centre, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I feel good about two things that my colleague mentioned in his remarks. The first is that we are once again debating a free trade agreement that is excellent for jobs across Canada, including in Quebec. The second is that the Canadian government and the Prime Minister are successfully working on economic security and national security. He rightly mentioned the aerospace industry.

Is he also aware that this work is having a significant impact on the shipbuilding industry in the greater Quebec City area? The Davie shipyard and its thousand suppliers are creating a major shipbuilding hub in the greater Quebec City area because of this combination of national security and economic security.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

Mr. Speaker, the link between national security and economic security is obvious, especially at a time of grave geopolitical and economic peril like today. I would not call the Davie shipyard a success; it was a long time coming. There were many setbacks. There was a bipartisan consensus to create a lot of problems.

Having said that, I do not have a problem with the agreement itself. However, I would not call it a great success for Canadian diplomacy in this area, particularly for the reasons that I mentioned. When one knows how to negotiate and there is a major irritant with a country that is largely being given a favour and that will come out the big winner by being allowed to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the major irritant should be resolved. In this case we are talking about sanitary and phytosanitary barriers. That is what happens when one knows how to negotiate. Unfortunately, Canada does not know how to negotiate.

[Marilyn Gladu, Conservative, Sarnia—Lambton—Bkejwanong, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I agree with the member.

There really are a lot of agreements, but no effort has been made to harmonize the specifications. Right now, we cannot send our meat to the United Kingdom, but the United Kingdom can send its meat here. That is not good.

Would my colleague care to comment on that?

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

Mr. Speaker, a good part of my speech was about that, and I talked about it in my previous answer, but I have no problem repeating it.

Expanded meat access was one of the promises in the agreement with the European Union. Cheesemakers in Quebec were told to accept the breach, the slight setback, because in exchange, our meat could be exported to the large European market.

However, the European Union, or rather the United Kingdom, which has regained its trade sovereignty, is applying sanitary and phytosanitary barriers that are not based on actual scientific standards. Tariffs are indeed going down, but in reality, non-tariff barriers are preventing more of our meats from being exported.

If Ottawa knew how to negotiate, it would have ensured that there was an agreement or a real resolution to the issue of non-tariff barriers on Canadian meat before allowing the United Kingdom to enter into the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my colleague, who has once again shown how well he knows his file.

In his remarks, he briefly alluded to Bill C‑228, which is sponsored by the member for Jonquière and which deals with international trade treaties. I would like the member to explain to our colleagues here today how that bill would change the way Canada drafts international trade agreements.

How would it actually change the way things are done right now?

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

Mr. Speaker, on the one hand, it would ensure that parliamentarians are not being played for fools, that they are not just here to rubber-stamp agreements. It is my understanding that we were elected by the people to represent interests and values, so doing actual work on agreements should be a big part of our responsibility.

What the bill would have done, for example, is set a minimum time frame to ensure that we have time to study an agreement before it is tabled and debated here in the House. There would be an actual study in committee. The idea is never to repeat what we went through in late 2020, when we studied an agreement without having the actual text of that agreement. It was beyond ridiculous. The bill would also guarantee Parliament's support for an agreement before it is signed, not just its rubber stamp after the fact. At the end of the day, this bill would ensure that parliamentarians do actual work on agreements.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to truly thank my colleague for his speech on investor-state dispute settlement. I actually think that things are worse than how he described them in his speech. My colleague said that large transnational corporations currently have the right to take part in agreements, but it is worse than that. They currently have more rights than Canada does in such agreements.

Could my colleague comment on the fact that trade agreements do not always have to include an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism?

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

Mr. Speaker, as I said earlier, when we examine a trade agreement implementation bill in committee, there is not much that we can amend, but this is one of the few things that we can change. Since the implementation bill has to change the legal system to recognize the ISDS, it is a legal clause. However, I am always just about the only committee member to vote against that clause. I vote in favour of most of the clauses in these agreements, and I generally vote in favour of the trade agreements themselves, but I always vote against this particular clause. In the past two Parliaments, when the NDP was a recognized party, its members usually voted with me against these agreements. I was not the only one to vote against them, but now I am. I do not understand how we can abdicate our sovereignty in this way.

As my colleague said, this likely puts these companies above states, but it also creates pressure upstream on public decision-makers. It creates a climate of self-censorship. It is also important to point out that the potential victims of the actions of multinationals do not have the same rights under trade agreements. There is no protection mechanism. The government often boasts about the chapters on the environment and workers' rights, but they are often purely symbolic. There is no legal mechanism for that, whereas the multinationals have a mechanism to protect their right to profit.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, this is interesting because the Bloc has consistently indicated that trade agreements should be debated well before they are actually signed off on. I think Canada is actually in a very unique situation. We are the only country of the G7 that has trade agreements with all G7 countries. Canada has been very successful in terms of world trade, and today is yet another example of how we continue to expand export opportunities. There are literally hundreds of trade treaties between Canada and other nations.

With all the consultation with stakeholders, provinces, industries and parliamentarians, I am not convinced that changing the process is in Canada's best interests. Can the member explain why he believes that is the case?

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I do not know whether there is enough time, but I would like to put a question back to him. What is the point of having an official policy if it is not followed?

My colleague tells us that there is no need for a change in procedure, and yet Canada's official policy made up a substantial part of the legislation that we introduced and that was unfortunately defeated. That policy can be found on the Global Affairs Canada website. I can no longer recall the exact title, but it was something like the “treaty ratification policy”. Canada's official policy involves a minimum period of 21 days between the time an agreement is announced and the time it comes before Parliament. In the case of the United Kingdom, it took 15 days. What is the point of having a policy?

It was the Liberals who adopted that policy, not me. That is the policy that they are normally proud of. It is supposed to be in force. In committee, we heard from senior officials who said that as far as they were concerned, the policy was in force, but that they had received a political directive. What is the point of having a policy if it is not followed? That is why we think that this policy ought to be made into law. Then, perhaps the government would follow it.

[Linda Lapointe, Liberal, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I will be sharing my time with the member from Mississauga East—Cooksville.

I am very pleased to rise today as a proud member of the Standing Committee on International Trade. This is my fourth year serving on that committee and it is always very interesting. We have studied a number of free trade agreements. Today, I am rising to discuss Bill C‑13, which seeks to implement the United Kingdom's accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or CPTPP.

First of all, it is important to remember that this bill does not create a new trade agreement. The CPTPP already exists. Canada has been a member of it since 2018, along with 10 other major economies in the Indo-Pacific region. What we are doing today is welcoming a new partner into the agreement, a major addition. With the United Kingdom's accession, the CPTPP will go from 11 to 12 economies and will represent close to 600 million consumers, or around 15% of global GDP.

International trade is central to Canada's prosperity. Our nation is a trading nation. About one in five jobs depends on exports, and more than 60% of our gross domestic product is tied to international trade. Every year, Canadian companies export more than $780-billion worth of goods and services around the world. These exports support millions of jobs in every region of the country.

In an ever-changing world, it is essential for Canada to diversify its trading partners. Just look at what is happening south of the border. That is one of the main reasons we need to diversify our markets. It is therefore strategic for our country to open up more markets elsewhere in the world.

The United Kingdom's accession to the CPTPP is a step in that direction. The United Kingdom is the world's sixth-largest economy, with a GDP of over $3 trillion and a population of nearly 70 million. Bilateral trade between Canada and the United Kingdom already exceeds $40 billion annually. It is our third-largest trading partner. The United Kingdom is also one of the largest investors in Canada, with more than $90 billion in direct investment in our economy. The United Kingdom's accession to the CPTPP will therefore strengthen these economic ties and open up new opportunities for our businesses.

This bill is also strategic for another reason. It positions Canada as an economic hub between Europe and the Indo-Pacific region. Canada is in a unique position given that it is a member of the CPTPP and has a trade agreement with the European Union. We are one of the few countries in the world that has preferential access to markets representing more than 1.5 billion consumers. This creates extraordinary opportunities for Canadian businesses. In my riding in the Lower Laurentians, which includes Rosemère, Boisbriand, Saint-Eustache and Deux-Montagnes, many businesses depend directly on international trade.

There is a very large aerospace industry in the Lower Laurentians, as well as a sizable agri-food and food processing industry. We have innovative small and medium-sized businesses, thriving manufacturers and entrepreneurs who export their products all over the world. Trade agreements are not abstract concepts for these businesses. They represent real opportunities for growth. They mean new markets, new partners and new jobs here in Quebec and Canada. Several key sectors of our economy will benefit from this expansion of the CPTPP.

As I mentioned earlier, the aerospace, agri-food, clean technologies, service and innovative industries come to mind. These sectors play a vital role in the Canadian economy. For example, the agri-food industry accounts for $140 billion in economic activity in Canada and employs more than two million Canadians. Aerospace, for its part, accounts for nearly 215,000 highly skilled jobs and contributes more than $28 billion to the Canadian economy. Access to new markets can therefore have a direct and positive impact on these industries.

I want to raise another point. As chair of the Liberal women's caucus, I want to highlight an important dimension of modern trade. International trade needs to be more inclusive. Today, a growing number of women are running businesses in Canada. Women-owned businesses account for 18% of Canadian SMEs and that number continues to grow. However, many entrepreneurs still face barriers when it comes to accessing international markets. Modern trade agreements, like the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or the CPTPP, can help create more opportunities for women entrepreneurs by making it easier to access markets and by supporting the growth of SMEs. When women succeed in business, the entire economy benefits.

It is also essential that international trade reflect the values we stand for. The CPTPP includes important provisions on labour rights and environmental protection. These provisions help ensure that economic growth respects high standards and is in line with sustainable development. Trade can be a powerful driver of prosperity, but it must also be fair, responsible and sustainable.

In a global context marked by economic uncertainty, geopolitical tensions and rapid changes in supply chains, it is more important than ever for Canada to strengthen its partnerships with countries that share our values. The United Kingdom's accession to the CPTPP sends a clear message. It demonstrates that Canada believes in open international trade based on rules founded on co-operation between reliable partners.

This bill will open new doors for our businesses, support job creation, and strengthen Canada's position in the global economy. Trade agreements are not just legal documents. They are tools for prosperity. When they are well negotiated, as is the case with the CPTPP, they allow Canada to export not only its products, but also its values: high standards for workers, for the environment, and for fair competition.

That is exactly what this bill does today.