Madam Speaker, welcome back to the House. I welcome all of my friends on the other side, as well as my colleagues, and I wish every member of the House a very happy new year. I hope to have a really productive winter and spring session in the 45th Parliament.
I start by reflecting on what Bill C-16 would and would not do. At the outset, I can state that the bill is largely supported by the Conservative Party of Canada, but there are some red lines, which I will elaborate on, that need to be discussed. We can start that debate as early as today.
When Parliament legislates on criminal law, it does not engage in abstraction, but exercises the most serious power entrusted to a democratic legislature: the power to define wrongdoing, protect the public, including victims, and impose meaningful consequences on those who harm others. Bill C-16 fails in that responsibility, not because it is too firm but because it is too careless. It continues a troubling pattern we have seen time and time again of laws that sound tough in press releases, but are drafted so loosely, so vaguely and so defensively that they hand the control of criminal sentencing to the courts by default.
Bill C-16 claims to modernize sentencing. In reality, it would open the door to a constitutional crisis, chaos, further litigation and a steady erosion of Parliament's role in defining the moral boundaries of criminal law.
I want to remind the House that what we are debating today is simply not new. More than four years ago, during debate on Liberal Bill C-5, I stood in the chamber and warned of exactly where this approach would lead. Bill C-5 stripped away 14 mandatory minimums for very serious criminal offences, including drug charges, that Parliament had deliberately put in place to ensure the denunciation of and deterrence for serious crimes. At that time, I said that removing mandatory minimum penalties under the banner of compassion would not make our justice system fairer; it would make it weaker, less predictable and less capable of protecting the public. Four years later, that warning has not only aged well but sadly been proven correct.
Mandatory minimum penalties were never about denying judicial discretion. They were about ensuring that Parliament spoke loudly and clearly about the gravity of that danger. As I said then, and as I say today, this is not a partisan issue. Mandatory minimum penalties have been around since the very first Criminal Code in 1892 and were brought in by consecutive Liberal and Conservative governments.
Bill C-5 deliberately silenced the message reflecting the gravity of the danger that certain offences cause. Bill C-16 would do nothing to restore it. Sadly, it would continue down the same path. This is not evidence-based reform; it is policy-making driven by ideology, insulated from the real-world harm it causes.
For victims of crime, the justice system is not an academic exercise and it is not a theoretical debate about hypotheticals; it is about whether the law means what it says and whether consequences are real. That is where the bill gets it wrong. Bill C-16 tells victims one thing, yet it would deliver another. It claims to modernize sentencing, while it would reopen every door the House has tried to close.
The Liberal government wants credit for being tough on crime, but it refuses to do the hard work of writing laws that actually withstand constitutional scrutiny, protect communities and respect Parliament's role in setting punishment. The Supreme Court of Canada, in the mid-nineties and in 2016, released two landmark decisions that provided a road map to the Liberal government, under then prime minister Justin Trudeau, to do exactly these things, and nothing was done.
My views on this issue are not theoretical. They are shaped by decades of working inside the criminal justice system and my nearly 30 years as a lawyer, including many as a Crown prosecutor. I have stood in courtrooms with victims. I have seen their anguish and their fears. I have seen the aftermath of serious violent crimes, including gun violence.
I have watched judges struggle to impose meaningful consequences within the frameworks the Liberals chose to weaken. When legislators strip away sentencing certainty, they do not empower justice; they inject inconsistency and unpredictability into a system that depends on public confidence to function.
The charter does not prohibit mandatory minimum penalties. The Supreme Court of Canada has said that repeatedly in a number of decisions. Section 12 prohibits “cruel and unusual...punishment”. The test is not whether a sentence is harsh but whether it is grossly disproportionate. That is an exacting standard, and intentionally so.
Supreme Court jurisprudence has emphasized that gross disproportionality is reserved for punishment that is “so excessive as to outrage standards of decency”, not merely sentences that some judges might view as excessive or unnecessary. That distinction matters, because Parliament is constitutionally entitled to impose punishment that reflects denunciation, deterrence and moral condemnation, even when courts might prefer a lighter sentence.
The Liberal narrative pretends that any mandatory minimum risks unconstitutionality. That is simply false. It is the narrative we heard in the 44th Parliament. What creates constitutional vulnerability is careless breadth, missing guardrails and deliberate legislative ambiguity, all of which are present in Bill C-16.
Bill C-16 continues a now familiar Liberal strategy, which is drafting legislation not to withstand constitutional scrutiny but to invite it. The government legislates, knowing and, in some cases, hoping that courts will be asked to fix what Parliament refuses to resolve.
Academic literature has warned for years that overly broad criminal provisions, combined with a rigid sentencing framework, create fertile ground for section 12 litigation, particularly when Parliament fails to include clear guardrails or safety valves. The Supreme Court's section 12 jurisprudence allows courts to assess mandatory minimum penalties using reasonable hypothetical scenarios. They are not absurd and fanciful scenarios, but ones that could realistically arise under the law.
This is where Bill C-16 becomes dangerous, because once Parliament enacts a mandatory minimum penalty without explicit statutory guardrails, it invites defence counsel to construct hypotheticals designed to stretch the law to its constitutional breaking point. This will lead to courts invalidating mandatory minimums incrementally, case by case. The Macdonald-Laurier Institute has warned that this cycle has systematically hollowed out Parliament's authority over sentencing, not because mandatory minimums are inherently unconstitutional, but because the Liberals refused to draft them responsibly. Bill C-16 repeats this mistake.
The Liberals claim that removing mandatory minimum sentences, expanding judicial discretion and hollowing out sentencing floors are required by the charter and demanded by the Supreme Court. That is false. The Supreme Court has never said that mandatory minimum penalties are illegal. It has never said that Parliament lacks the authority to impose them. What it has said repeatedly is that Parliament must legislate carefully. Bill C-16 would not do that. Instead, it would use a single, deeply divided decision as justification for dismantling sentencing law far beyond what the court required.
Nowhere is that misrepresentation made clearer than in the Attorney General of Quebec v. Senneville. In that case, the majority of the court struck down mandatory minimum penalties for child pornography offences, relying not on the actual facts before it but on a constructed hypothetical scenario, a scenario that Parliament never intended to capture when it enacted those sentencing provisions. The hypothetical imagined an 18-year-old who briefly received or possessed an image without evidence of predatory behaviour, coercion or exploitation. That scenario was then used to invalidate sentencing floors that were designed to address the most serious and harmful forms of child sexual exploitation, offences that involve deliberate conduct, repeat behaviour and profound harm to victims.
This is not a reasonable hypothetical in any meaningful legislative sense. Parliament does not draft criminal law to address fleeting, technical-edged cases. It legislates for the heartland of an offence, the conduct that motivated Parliament to act in the first place. Stretching a law aimed at combatting child sexual exploitation to hypothetical outliers fundamentally distorts legislative intent. That is precisely why the dissent in Senneville matters so much and why the Liberals would rather the House not talk about it.
The dissenting justices issued a clear and forceful warning not only to the courts but to Parliament. They rejected the idea that section 12 of the charter requires lawmakers to sentence for the least serious imaginable application of an offence. They emphasized that mandatory minimums are constitutionally permissible where they reflect Parliament's judgment about the gravity of core criminal conduct. The dissent cautioned that using hypotheticals to strike down laws would transform section 12 of the charter into a weapon against democratic decision-making, allowing courts to invalidate Parliament's choices based on speculative scenarios rather than real-world harm.
Instead of responding to Senneville without discipline, by clarifying offence definitions, narrowing the application or adopting a narrowly tailored safety valve, the government chose a very different path. Bill C-16 does not correct a problem identified by the court. It uses Senneville as political cover to advance a long-standing ideological goal: the systematic dismantling of mandatory minimum penalties altogether. In other words, a contested, deeply divided Supreme Court decision, a five-four split, has now become the excuse for a sweeping legislative retreat.
Bill C-16 is not in careful compliance with the charter. It is a capitulation, a surrender of Parliament's authority based on the most expansive reading of judicial power, even while the court warned against it. This is not what responsible law-making looks like and not what Canadians expect from the House.
As Chief Justice Wagner warned, alongside Côté, Rowe and O'Bonsawin, using far-removed hypotheticals to dismantle Parliament's sentencing choices risks undermining democratic accountability itself. The dissent stated plainly that Parliament is not constitutionally required to sentence for the least serious imaginable case. That sentence alone dismantles the Liberal theory of criminal law.
The dissent went further, warning that the majority's approach risks converting section 12 into a rolling licence to invalidate democratically enacted penalties untethered from real-world harm. The dissent emphasized that minimums serve expressive and denunciatory functions. They communicate society's moral judgment, not merely actuarial risk assessments. Crucially, the dissent recognized that judicial discretion already exists in the criminal process in charging decisions, prosecutorial elections, plea negotiations and sentencing ranges above the minimum. In other words, these judges acknowledged what the government refuses to admit: The system already has safety valves and Parliament is allowed to rely on them. This is where Bill C-16 collapses under its own weight.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that carefully drafted safety valves can preserve mandatory minimums while protecting against gross disproportionality. The dissent in the Supreme Court decision of Nur, from 2015, made this explicit, pointing to hybrid offences and prosecutorial discretion as legitimate mechanisms to prevent unjust outcomes.
Bill C-16 involves no clear statutory safety valve, no proportionality override, no exceptional circumstance clause and no direction to courts on how Parliament expects minimums to operate. It is unserious to claim that a Liberal crime bill protects victims when it systematically weakens sentencing. Victims do not experience crime as a hypothetical. They do not experience it as a charter seminar. They experience it as fear, loss, trauma and lasting harm. Mandatory minimums are about certainty, denunciation and public trust, which is sadly lacking after 10 years of failed Liberal policies. When the government undermines Parliament's ability to set clear consequences, it sends a message to communities that criminal accountability is negotiable.
The House has a choice. We can continue down the Liberal path, drafting criminal law that collapses under constitutional pressure, inviting litigation and leaving victims behind, or we can reaffirm a basic democratic truth: Parliament sets law, courts apply it and the charter guards against true excess, not political discomfort. Bill C-16, as written, fails that test.
We must also consider the context in which Bill C-16 is being debated. Canadians are not imagining things. They are not misinformed. They are responding to reality. After nearly a decade of catch-and-release bail policies, the repeal of mandatory minimums and a long line of Liberal criminal justice reforms, Canadians are scared. They have every reason to be. Since 2015, trafficking has increased by over 80%. Sex assaults are up nearly 76%. Violent crime overall has increased by more than 50%. These are not talking points. These are StatsCan figures.
Mandatory sentencing is not optional and never should be. Parliament did not impose these penalties casually or accidentally. They were put in place precisely because certain crimes are so grave, so dangerous and so destructive that Parliament determined that incarceration must be the baseline, not the exception. That is why it is so troubling that even where Bill C-16 contains measures we can acknowledge as constructive, the government insists on embedding them inside a broader, soft-on-crime framework that undermines their effectiveness.
There are elements of the bill that move in the right direction. Banning the creation and distribution of deepfake images is necessary and long overdue. We are pleased that the government finally adopted the substance of my colleague from Calgary Nose Hill's private member's bill, Bill C-216, to protect Canadians from this new and insidious form of exploitation. Likewise, the inclusion of mandatory reporting requirements for child sex abuse material, also drawn from that private member's bill, is a necessary step.
I am also pleased to see the government finally adopting an approach that Conservatives have been calling for all along, recognizing the murder of an intimate partner as first degree, a reform championed by my colleague from Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola in his private member's bill.
These positive measures do not excuse what comes next. Despite these additions, Bill C-16 continues the Liberal pattern of weakening accountability. The bill would empower judges to disregard virtually every mandatory prison sentence in the code, with the exception of two: murder and treason. That includes mandatory penalties for aggravated sexual assault with a firearm, human trafficking, extortion with a firearm, drive-by shootings and multiple firearm offences. If judges are permitted to simply opt out of these penalties, then nothing about these sentences is mandatory, full stop. This is not reform. This is an abdication of our responsibility. If the government were serious about public safety, it would split the poison pill from the bill and allow Parliament to work constructively on the provisions that genuinely protect Canadians.
Conservatives believe that Parliament must stand with victims, not with legal loopholes. We believe accountability must be real, not optional. We believe that the role of the House is to protect Canadians, not to explain away its own inaction. The bill can be made better, but only if the Liberals are prepared to abandon their soft-on-crime reflex and take public safety seriously for a change.