Bill C-25

Strong and Free Elections Act

An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and to enact An Act to change the names of certain electoral districts, 2026

This enactment amends the Canada Elections Act to, among other things,
(a) establish new prohibitions and modify existing prohibitions, including in relation to foreign influence in the electoral process, accepting or offering a bribe, unauthorized use of a computer, making or publishing false or misleading information respecting elections and the candidate nomination process;
(b) establish new prohibitions in relation to voting in a nomination contest or leadership contest;
(c) prohibit the acceptance or use of certain contributions by political entities and third parties, including from anonymous sources;
(d) provide for new requirements relating to political parties’ policies for the protection of personal information; and
(e) expand the scope of certain provisions relating to the administration and enforcement of that Act, including by increasing the maximum administrative monetary penalties that may be imposed for certain violations and by granting the Commissioner of Canada Elections certain powers in respect of any conspiracy or attempt to commit, or being an accessory after the fact or counselling in relation to, a contravention of that Act.
The enactment also enacts a statute to change the name of certain electoral districts as a result of proposals by the members of the House of Commons who represent those electoral districts.

Strong and Free Elections Act

[Steven MacKinnon, Liberal, Minister of Transport and Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

moved that Bill C-25, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and to enact An Act to change the names of certain electoral districts, 2026, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to address the House of Commons today to speak to Bill C-25, the strong and free elections act. Bill C-25 introduces amendments to the Canada Elections Act that would bolster the strength and resilience of Canada's electoral system. As we all know, one of the cornerstones of our democracy is our electoral system, and at the foundation of that system is the Canada Elections Act. Canada's democracy is one of the most stable and strongest in the world, but it would be unwise to take this for granted. We must always be on guard for threats that could call into question the validity of our elections.

As we all know, the world in 2026 is much different from just a few years ago. The world has changed, and we, as guardians of Canada's democratic system, must change with it. The Canada Elections Act is already recognized worldwide for its robust administrative procedures, strong political financing regime and strict spending limits, but we know that no democracy, including ours, is immune to growing threats to elections that attempt to undermine confidence and erode trust in our democratic electoral processes. Malicious actors can seek to disrupt our democratic processes and elections from anywhere in the world at any time.

Despite these challenges, the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions confirmed that our elections remain secure. However, we must continue to ensure that Canada's democracy remains one of the strongest in the world and that it continues to be protected from ongoing threats wherever they arise.

That is why, in accordance with the long-standing tradition of proposing ongoing improvements to the Canada Elections Act, our government has proposed priority amendments to deal with these threats.

I want to take a moment to salute other parties in this House. I think the process that has led to the introduction of this bill has been a model. I am grateful for the input and look forward to the participation in the debate of my colleagues from all parties in the House. In fact, that reflects our shared responsibility, all 343 of us in this chamber, to protect, safeguard and cherish our democracy. This is perhaps our most solemn and important role.

It is essential that we build upon the knowledge and experience of experts when proposing changes to our democratic electoral system. Through Bill C-25, our government is acting on recommendations from the public inquiry into foreign interference, the Chief Electoral Officer and the commissioner of Canada elections. Bill C-25 will further strengthen and secure Canada's federal elections through several new measures.

Allow me to give a few examples. First, the bill will protect electors from unlawful attempts to influence their vote, not only once an election is called, but at all times. Second, the amendments will protect nomination and leadership contests from threats, including undue foreign influence, bribery and intimidation. Third, we are closing potential channels for foreign funding in electoral processes. Fourth, the bill will ban sophisticated deepfakes of electoral actors and officials that intend to mislead Canadians. Fifth, the amendments will mitigate long ballots, which challenge the administration and accessibility of federal elections for voters, candidates and election workers. Sixth, we are adding new privacy policy requirements for all federal political parties, including new disclosure requirements in the event of a data breach. Seventh, Bill C-25 will strengthen the commissioner of Canada elections' enforcement mandate by providing new investigative tools and increasing administrative monetary penalties for violations of the act.

I hope my colleagues will allow me to explain these measures in greater detail. As I mentioned at the outset, election interference can occur at any time, not just during election periods. Bill C‑25 addresses this issue in several ways. First, the act will expand the prohibition on undue foreign influence, offering or accepting a bribe, misleading publications falsely purporting to be issued by a certain person, and broadcasting outside Canada with intent to unduly influence voters at any time, not just during the election period. This protection will now also apply to nomination contests in our ridings and to leadership contests.

In addition, Bill C-25 would extend the extraterritorial application of certain offences to ensure that malicious actors operating outside of Canada can also be investigated and held accountable for breaking the law. For example, someone outside of Canada impersonating a candidate, publishing misleading information purporting to be from a candidate, lying about the rules of our elections or hacking into an electoral computer system to disrupt our elections could be prosecuted even if they do not reside in Canada.

Bill C-25 also proposes important new financing rules to increase transparency and prevent anonymous, foreign and dark money from entering into our democratic system. These include banning the use of crypto asset contributions, money orders and prepaid instruments such as prepaid credit cards or store gift cards for all activities by political actors and for regulated activities by third parties.

Importantly, under Bill C-25, third parties would only be permitted to use contributions they have received from Canadian citizens and permanent residents to pay for regulated election expenses. This means third parties could not use funds received from other third parties, such as corporations or businesses, for regulated activities. However, we understand that not all third parties receive contributions, and some may want to use their own revenue for regulated expenses. In those instances, third parties whose contributions represent 10% or less of their annual revenue would be able to use their own revenues to pay for regulated activities. These amendments would enhance transparency into the source of funds and mitigate the risk of foreign or untraced money entering our elections.

The next element I would like to highlight is how Bill C-25 would tackle the challenge of disinformation. We have all seen it. We have all lived it. Disinformation is a key tactic that aims to fuel discord and erode public trust in our democratic processes. Disinformation seeks to manipulate voters through intentional falsehoods, often spread online. The Chief Electoral Officer, in recent years, called disinformation about the electoral process the “most important” threat to Elections Canada's mandate, and security agencies have noted that disinformation is a persistent threat to election integrity.

Moreover, the final report from the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions states that, “If we do not find ways of addressing it, misinformation and disinformation have the ability to distort our discourse, change our views, and shape our society...it is no exaggeration to say that at this juncture, information manipulation (whether foreign or not) poses the single biggest risk to our democracy.”

The amendments proposed in Bill C‑25 will strengthen our democratic institutions through new and expanded prohibitions designed to counter this threat. Specifically, the bill prohibits knowingly spreading false information about election activities or the voting process with the intent to disrupt the conduct of an election or affect its results, while respecting the principles of freedom of expression and open dialogue that are at the heart of our democracy.

This prohibition includes knowingly producing or publishing false or misleading information with the aim of disrupting the conduct of an election or its results. That includes information about who is eligible to vote in an election; the voter registration process; when, where and how to vote; who to vote for; the procedure for becoming a candidate; how votes are validated or counted; and the results of an election.

Another vector for disinformation is the potential misuse of technology, which Bill C-25 also addresses. As we all know, technology has helped revolutionize democracies around the world, but it also carries certain risks. For example, AI-generated content is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish from reality. When combined with disinformation, AI-generated content such as deepfakes can pose a significant threat. Today, with a computer and a few keystrokes, malicious actors can generate highly realistic, yet fake, video, audio and text content.

To address this emerging issue, Bill C-25 makes amendments to the prohibition on impersonation for the purpose of capturing video footage and creating manipulated audio and video content, such as deepfakes, and extends its application to nomination and leadership contestants, who are also vulnerable to such threats.

Bill C-25 also broadens the scope of the prohibition on interfering with a computer system or database in order to, for example, launch a denial-of-service attack to influence the results of an election. The prohibition now includes the act of disrupting the conduct of an election.

That is one of the many examples that show just how essential Bill C-25 is to ensuring that our electoral system can respond appropriately to contemporary threats.

Another example of this is the way the bill would address the challenges posed by unduly long ballots. When Canadians go to the polls, they expect to see the names of candidates on the ballot who have a legitimate desire to represent their constituents if elected. This is foundational to our system of government. However, in ridings targeted by those who seek to create unduly long ballots, this is not the case. Instead, Canadians are inundated with the names of individuals who have no desire or intention of ever representing the interests of constituents.

Not only do these long ballots create significant accessibility issues for electors and election workers, especially those with disabilities, but they can also delay the vote count. This is why we paid close attention to the study on unduly long ballots by my colleagues from all sides on the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs and took note of what the witnesses had to say. I wish to express my gratitude to the members of the committee for their excellent work in this regard.

I am happy to note that what has been proposed in Bill C-25 aligns with all of the legislative recommendations from the committee. This includes the following important measures. First, individuals who seek to become candidates would require 100 unique supporting signatures from electors in their riding. Second, a candidate's official agent could only represent one candidate per election in an electoral district. Third, false information in nomination papers would be prohibited.

At a time when security is increasingly a concern in our political system, Bill C-25 proposes new measures to protect people. For example, the home addresses of returning officers would no longer be made public, candidates would be granted greater reimbursement for personal security expenses, and the rules for regulated fundraising events would be changed. We are seeing people's addresses published online, and harassing behaviour is occurring that limits the rights of people to participate in the democratic process. This is a security concern that must be addressed. In the case of a regulated fundraising event, information about the event would be publicly released, as it must, after it has occurred, including the names of participants and the municipality and province in which the event took place.

The next aspect of Bill C-25 that I would like to discuss concerns the stringent new requirements it imposes on federal political parties regarding the protection of personal information. These requirements are based on part 4 of Bill C-4, which received royal assent on March 12 and which clarified the exclusive regime governing federal political parties' dealings with personal information under the Canada Elections Act. It also made non-compliance with the party's policies subject to the act's administrative monetary penalty system. That means that a federal political party, or any person acting on the party's behalf, could face a monetary penalty if they do not comply with their own policy, depending on the circumstances and the discretion of the commissioner of Canada elections. It is important to note that Bill C-25 proposes increasing the maximum amount of the administrative monetary penalties for both individuals and entities.

Now I would like to explain some of the new policy requirements imposed on federal political parties as a condition for registration.

First, to ensure greater transparency and accessibility, each party must publish its privacy policy, written in plain language in English and French. Furthermore, to make it easy for Canadians to understand, the policy must use examples to explain how the party collects and uses Canadians' personal information.

Second, federal political parties must also include additional measures to safeguard personal information. Personal information must be protected through physical, organizational and technological security safeguards, such as locked filing cabinets and secure areas, document encryption and password protection, and a strict need-to-know rule for sharing personal information, based on how sensitive the information is.

Third, each federal political party's policy must require appropriate steps to be taken in the event of a data breach, including the loss of, unauthorized access to or unauthorized disclosure of personal information. While we would hope that this never happens, an individual whose personal information has been lost, accessed or disclosed must be notified if the breach creates a real risk of significant harm.

Fourth, privacy policies will also require parties to ensure that any third party receiving personal information from a federal political party, such as a supplier or contractor, has equivalent safeguards in place.

To ensure accountability, since the passage of Bill C‑4, each party must have a designated privacy officer responsible for conducting an annual review of the party's compliance with its policy. The Chief Electoral Officer must hold an annual meeting on the protection of personal information by federal political parties, and the privacy officer or a representative must attend. A party's policy must also cover relevant training provided to the party and those acting on its behalf.

I am going to conclude, having a missed a couple of other important measures in the bill, by just summing up in this way.

This is an important moment. It is a moment when all members of the chamber get to express themselves about our democracy. We have heard from the foreign interference commission inquiry, the Chief Electoral Officer and the commissioner of Elections Canada , and now it is up to Parliament to decide whether these measures are meeting the moment in terms of protecting our democracy.

I would observe only that much different debates are going on in democratic institutions in other places, and I am particularly grateful that here in Canada we are working to have strong, free and open elections in this country, where everyone is welcome to participate and may participate in our democracy.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Sturgeon River, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I welcome many of the measures contained in the bill. One measure I welcome is the closing of certain loopholes with respect to foreign funding through registered third parties by requiring third parties to set up separate bank accounts so that only funds donated from individual Canadians and permanent residents could be used for regulated activity. That being said, there is an exception that would allow third parties to use their revenues, their existing funds, if contributions are 10% or less on an annual basis the year before the pre-writ period.

Under any circumstances, could foreign funds be treated as being melded with the general funds or general revenues of the third party entity, thus creating a new loophole while seeking to close other loopholes?

[Steven MacKinnon, Liberal, Gatineau, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the member first of all for his very constructive suggestions as we have prepared for the introduction and the debate on the bill, and I want to acknowledge the very real concern about foreign, or in any other way inappropriate, implication or involvement in our electoral processes.

The goal is, I think, exactly as the member expresses, such that we would eliminate any kind of side road or back road into advocacy from foreign or dark money or from any other source that does not comprise ordinary Canadians, individuals, giving money to an organization to engage in regulated activities under the act. The 10% threshold of which the member speaks is a very low threshold, so I suppose in extreme cases that 10% might see an extremely small, maybe even infinitesimal, portion of contributions that are undesirable. However, this proposal is a far better cry from the current status quo.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Speaker, there are indeed plenty of good things in Bill C‑25. There are also many things the committee will have to take a very close look at. The Bloc Québécois has a lot of concerns. One thing that is not in the bill is political party financing, and I am wondering why the government opted not to tackle that.

Members are talking about foreign interference and public confidence in politicians, which is not exactly at an all-time high. The government could have taken this opportunity to make changes to political party financing.

Can my colleague explain why the government opted not to go in that direction even though this bill provided the opportunity to do so?

[Steven MacKinnon, Liberal, Gatineau, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the Bloc Québécois and applaud its contributions. I am also looking forward to hearing its comments and suggestions over the course of the legislative process. Once again, I think that this has been a shining example of collaboration, and we shall see where these proposals lead.

Where political financing is concerned, Canada has reason to be proud. In other countries, there are no limits on anonymous or foreign contributions. Here in Canada, we have very strict political financing rules, with relatively low limits compared to almost any other democracy in the world. This is a point of pride for us.

It is true that this bill has little to do with political party financing. I do not know whether the member wanted to discuss political party financing specifically or something else. Perhaps he could clarify that during the debate. I would be pleased to discuss the issue with him.

[Kristina Tesser Derksen, Liberal, Milton East—Halton Hills South, ON]

Mr. Speaker, we have heard a lot in the media about terribly long ballots, and about deepfakes impersonating people in politics. I would like my hon. colleague to comment on the negative impact that has on voter confidence in our democracy, and also the dangers we face if those malicious and nefarious behaviours remain unchecked by legislation.

[Steven MacKinnon, Liberal, Gatineau, QC]

Mr. Speaker, this is an example of a loophole. I want to thank my colleague for her commitment to our democracy as well.

With respect to longest ballot initiatives, let us be frank about this. There was repeated targeting of the Leader of the Opposition in this regard, whether in Carleton or in Battle River—Crowfoot. There was also targeting of the by-election in Terrebonne. Voters have been, I think, resoundingly saying in all those cases and others that they do not like these ballots. For persons with disabilities, they are a barrier to voting. For the administration, volunteers and election officials, right up to and including the Chief Electoral Officer, they are a major hassle.

What we are saying is that if someone wants to run in an election, as all of us have and will, they need a single financial agent who can be the financial agent for only one candidate.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I ask the hon. minister a very direct question and thank him for improvements made in the amendments in Bill C-25 to the Elections Act.

I wonder if the minister could give the House a quick rundown on the sections of former Bill C-65, which had been through committee, was being studied and had elements that are not included in this act. I wonder if he could explain why the government chose not to include improvements to the Elections Act from slightly more than a year ago that are now not included, such as removing obstacles for the collection of signatures for candidates.

[Steven MacKinnon, Liberal, Gatineau, QC]

Mr. Speaker, we have certainly engaged in a process. I thank the member for Saanich—Gulf Islands and her party for their constructive participation, and I look forward to her suggestions as this debate unfolds.

In fact, with Bill C-65 in the last Parliament, proposals to amend the Elections Act, some of those proposals emanated from the processes I outlined, notably recommendations from the Chief Electoral Officer and from the commissioner, and some others did not emanate from them.

My purpose in developing Bill C-25, the strong and free elections act, was to have a unifying vote of the chamber and a unifying debate in the chamber, where all members could feel comfortable getting behind the initiatives and proposals, and working together, the 343 of us, to strengthen our democracy, contrary to what is perhaps going on in some other countries.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Sturgeon River, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to follow up on my previous question. As I understood the government House leader's answer, with the exception to third parties being able to use their revenues rather than setting up an individual bank account, there would be some possibility of melding or of foreign monies.

Would it not be better simply to eliminate the exception and require all third parties to set up a separate bank account and have contributions from individual Canadians?

[Steven MacKinnon, Liberal, Gatineau, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I want to express my openness to that suggestion.

I think my colleague, the government and I are united on the objective. From my perspective, I would be happy to engage with the member, his party and other colleagues on any proposal that would eliminate the possibility of foreign money, dark money and otherwise inappropriate financial involvement in our electoral processes.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Sturgeon River, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak on Bill C-25, an act to amend the Canada Elections Act. This bill would make a number of substantive amendments to the act. It is, in some respects, a technical bill with many moving pieces. Those pieces include welcome measures to counter the disruptive and anti-democratic activities of the so-called longest ballot committee. This bill also contains welcome measures to counter foreign interference in our elections, as well as nomination and leadership contests. The bill would largely close loopholes that exist with respect to foreign funding of third parties. Additionally, the bill would create a number of new offences and extend existing offences under the act to leadership and nomination contests, and the bill would give significant new powers to the commissioner of Canada elections to undertake investigations and to enforce the act, among other measures. As I said, it contains a number of moving parts.

Before getting into some of the particulars of the bill, let me say that, on the whole, the measures contained in the bill are welcome. That is not to say that amendments need not be considered. I think in some instances they do. Moreover, certain measures within the bill warrant careful scrutiny, particularly some of the new offences, as well as the additional powers being afforded to the commissioner of Canada elections. With that said, Conservatives support debating this bill vigorously at second reading and then getting it to the procedure and House affairs committee for further study, review and possible amendments.

Let us move on to the particulars of the bill. The bill does deal with the very unwelcome activities of the longest ballot committee. We have seen, in the last number of years, the spectacle of this rogue group flooding the ballot in targeted ridings with fake candidates who have no interest in campaigning, no interest in engaging in voters, do not put forward substantive policy positions and have no interest in getting elected. They are merely names on a ballot, all part of a coordinated scheme to weaponize the ballot and undermine the democratic process.

The longest ballot committee has been able to flood the ballot by taking advantage of certain provisions in the Canada Elections Act. The clearest example is the signature threshold with respect to nomination papers. Under the act, a candidate must obtain 100 signatures from electors in the riding to get on the ballot. The longest ballot committee has identified roughly the same pool of 100 voters and encouraged or invited those voters to then sign the nomination forms of all of the fake candidates that they seek to get onto the ballot. This is a clear abuse of the Canada Elections Act insofar as the purpose of that section is to require that a candidate have the support of at least 100 electors, not that the same 100 voters can flood the ballot with an endless list of candidates. It is a low threshold, but a threshold nonetheless.

Let me say, for those who would dismiss the activities of the longest ballot committee as some sort of joke or something to shrug off, that nothing could be further from the truth. The activities of the longest ballot committee have had very negative consequences for voters, for candidates and for Elections Canada. We saw in Carleton, for example, 91 fake candidates, resulting in a metre-long ballot. What impact do things like a metre-long ballot have on elections?

They certainly cause voter confusion. They create barriers for persons with certain disabilities. They make it more difficult to administer elections. They create barriers for legitimate candidates to break through with voters and they cause long delays in tabulating the vote, with the overall effect of undermining confidence in the democratic process. The activities of the longest ballot committee need to be put to a stop.

The bill contains measures that would, I believe, largely achieve that objective, including requiring that electors sign only one candidate's nomination form and making it an offence to sign multiple forms, as well as requiring that an official agent act for only one candidate per riding. The longest ballot committee, other than in the most recent Terrebonne by-election, had, effectively, the same agent acting for all of the candidates. It would normally be seen as a conflict of interest to be acting for multiple candidates who were supposedly competing against one another, which would be the case if these were legitimate candidates instead of what amounts to a total and complete sham of the electoral process by the longest ballot committee.

On another matter, with respect to the third party regime, the bill does, in large part, close identified loopholes with respect to foreign funding of third parties. Integral to our democratic process is that our elections should be decided by Canadians, free of foreign influence and foreign interference, yet there are very significant loopholes that have allowed foreign interests, foreign actors, to influence our elections with witting third parties.

One might ask how this is possible, given that, for example, section 349.02 of the Canada Elections Act states that no third party shall use funds for a regulated activity if the source of the funds is a foreign entity.

There are two loopholes, in practice. One is a melding-of-funds issue, whereby certain contributions can be treated as part of the general revenue of the registered third party. I asked the Chief Electoral Officer about this at the procedure and House affairs committee and he confirmed that this loophole exists. It is described as follows:

Third parties are required only to record contributions given to them for the purpose of engaging in regulated activities. Contributions received for no specific purpose, or no purpose directly linked to regulated electoral activities, are treated as general revenue. If they are used for regulated activities, they are reported as forming part of the third party's own funds or resources.

In other words, if the contribution is specifically sent for a regulated activity, for the purpose of engaging in a regulated activity, foreign funds would be prohibited, but if they are sent in a general way, they might be able to be used, which means that, hypothetically, third parties could have 100% of their funds being from a foreign source.

Another loophole that exists is with respect to the transferring of funds or the funnelling of funds through various intermediaries. For example, if foreign entity A transferred money to Canadian intermediary B, and Canadian intermediary B transferred the money to a third party entity, it would be treated as a contribution from Canadian intermediary B, even though the ultimate source of the funds was foreign. That is problematic. I should add that it is hardly hypothetical. These are loopholes that have been exploited.

I saw this first-hand. Back in 2017, I filed a complaint with the commissioner of Canada elections in which nearly $700,000 U.S. from the U.S.-based Tides Foundation was funnelled into eight registered third parties that campaigned against the Harper government in the 2015 election. That is just one example. Because of these loopholes and the total lack of transparency, we do not know how often this is occurring, but it is a problem having regard for the fact that only Canadians should determine the outcome of our elections, free from foreign influence and interference.

This bill would largely, but not entirely, close these very problematic loopholes by requiring third parties to set up separate bank accounts in which they can only use the funds or donations of individual Canadians or PRs for regulated activities. There is an exception to that, which is that if a third party has contributions of less than 10% of its overall revenue in the year prior to the pre-writ period, it can use its own funds and does not need to set up a separate bank account.

That does raise questions about whether there are circumstances in which foreign funds could be treated as being melded with the general funds of a third party. For example, if a foreign entity sent money to a third party the year prior to the pre-writ period, would those funds be treated as melded? That is just one example.

Given the fact that we have fixed election dates in which the timing of an election is often relatively foreseeable, it is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which foreign actors take advantage of such a loophole to the degree that it may exist with this exception. All of this is to say that this needs to be carefully examined at the procedure and House affairs committee.

It is my view that the best solution to getting rid of the possibility of foreign money being used to influence our elections through third parties is to simply require that all third parties set up a separate bank account in which they use the contributions of individual Canadians and PRs. That seems to me to be the most straightforward, the most transparent and the most democratic approach. It would put third parties closer to the same playing field as political parties insofar as political parties can only use the contributions of individual Canadians and PRs.

I am pleased that in the questions I posed to the minister, he expressed openness to considering such an amendment and more broadly that he supports closing loopholes that allow for the use of foreign funding. I would hope that, at the very least, whether the government supports that amendment or not, it would support amendments to close any loopholes to the extent that they exist as a result of this exception.

Speaking of foreign interference, this bill would extend certain existing offences under the Canada Elections Act to leadership and nomination contests. For example, one such offence is with respect to undue influence by foreigners, which would include a person or entity knowingly incurring expenses to directly promote or oppose a nomination contestant or leadership contestant.

We have seen that leadership and nomination contests have been exploited. There is a vulnerability there. Madam Justice Hogue noted that nomination contests, for example, are the primary “gateway” and vulnerability for foreign interference in the democratic process. We saw a very clear example of that in the Liberal nomination in 2019 in Don Valley North, where the Beijing Toronto consulate was involved in organizing and coordinating international students from outside of the riding to support a certain candidate, who ultimately won that nomination and was elected to this place. I have to say that it was a scandal, because we know that former prime minister Justin Trudeau was informed about Beijing's interference in the 2019 election and turned a blind eye to it. Madam Justice Hogue concluded that he did so out of direct concern for electoral consequences to the Liberal Party. Needless to say, what happened in Don Valley North demonstrates the need for extending certain provisions of the Canada Elections Act relating to offences around foreign interference to nomination contests, as well as leadership contests.

With respect to some of the measures within the bill that warrant further scrutiny, I would note that administrative monetary penalties are increasing significantly: from $1,500, the maximum penalties for individuals at present, to $25,000. For organizations, the maximum administrative penalties are going up from $5,000 to $100,000. These represent a very significant increase. If the commissioner of Elections Canada is imposing an administrative penalty of $100,000, which is a pretty punitive penalty, it begs the question, given the dual-track enforcement option available to the commissioner, whether in circumstances such as that the appropriate course of action would be to refer the matter to the director of public prosecutions and to proceed by way of criminal prosecution.

The need for scrutiny is underscored by the fact that under this bill, the commissioner would no longer, in all circumstances, need to get judicial authorization in order to compel evidence. We need to scrutinize these new powers for the commissioner to ensure that they are balanced and proportionate and do not unduly infringe upon due process rights.

With respect to some of the new offences, they also need to be scrutinized, particularly through the lens of ensuring that they are charter-compliant and do not infringe upon freedom of speech and freedom of expression, as well as ensuring that they do not have any unintended and harmful chilling effects with respect to free speech.

Let me say, in closing, that the amendments brought forward in this bill are a step forward. They are a positive step forward. They close existing loopholes that have been exploited by foreign interests and foreign actors. They provide new powers to better protect the integrity of our elections. I look forward to carefully reviewing the bill at committee.

[Steven MacKinnon, Liberal, Minister of Transport and Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, that was a well-considered speech and I, indeed, look forward to continuing the debate and consideration of this very important piece of legislation.

Among the other interesting elements of the member's speech, I note his comments on the longest ballot. Some of the commentary around this is almost adulating in terms of applauding what I would consider to be the harassment of electors that is engendered by the behaviour of the longest ballot committee. It is truly, as the member pointed out, a perversion of some of our rules.

I wonder if the member has additional thoughts on the measures that we have put in place and if he believes that they will be sufficient to recentre the local contests that characterize our elections and to make people be legitimate and considered candidates in these elections.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Sturgeon River, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I share with the government House leader the fact that this so-called committee has attacked the democratic process and caused great disruption to voters. To that end, the measures contained in this bill are consistent, with recommendations that Conservatives have called for and that were adopted by the procedure and House affairs committee. When it undertook a study on the activities of the longest ballot committee, we had a unanimous report and there was consensus. Not all of those recommendations were included in this bill, but many of the key ones were. For those that were not, I would suggest that perhaps consideration be given to them for the possibility of further amendment to the bill, to further strengthen the bill as it pertains to preventing groups like the longest ballot committee from disrupting future elections.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank my colleague for his expertise on this matter. His speeches are always impressive. That said, we do have some reservations about Bill C-25. Of course we support the principle, but the bill covers many different subjects. For example, people will be prohibited from signing more than one nomination paper. We in the Bloc Québécois view this with some skepticism, because it would mean that those doing so are publicly endorsing a candidate. Not only that, but the Chief Electoral Officer has said that it would be very complicated, even from an administrative standpoint, to manage this situation and verify whether people have endorsed a single candidate. It could take hours and hours of work, and Elections Canada would need a lot more employees just to verify the nominations.

Is my colleague open to other solutions to address the issue of longer ballots?