Afghanistan Committee on May 9th, 2022

[Gen Wayne D. Eyre]

None who came to my attention.

[Jasraj Singh Hallan, Conservative, Calgary Forest Lawn, AB]

Was anyone at your department ever deemed as rejected because of any other concerns at all, who were identified as interpreters?

[Gen Wayne D. Eyre]

Mr. Chair, not to my knowledge.

[Jasraj Singh Hallan, Conservative, Calgary Forest Lawn, AB]

Thank you.

We know that our counterparts, the Brits, evacuated around 11,000 people from Afghanistan. We know, through the testimony here, that we had roughly 3,700—I think it was—who came out. Can you explain what the difference was between us and our counterparts? Why the difference in numbers?

[Gen Wayne D. Eyre]

Mr. Chair, I think it's important to note that when we withdrew in 2014, other allies stayed on the ground. The British and the Americans had a long, enduring presence. They also had a sizable presence at the Kabul International Airport after the fall of Kabul, where we didn't.

There were costs to pulling out in 2014, and that was one of them.

I do have to say, per capita—compared with some of our other allies, such as the French and the Germans—our numbers were significantly higher. I'll ask Admiral Auchterlonie to jump in, because we were talking about this earlier today.

[VAdm J.R. Auchterlonie]

Thank you, Chief.

I think that's key. The fact is, we were working with our allies throughout, but I can go back to the point about the size of our footprint on the ground. We weren't there since 2014, but we reinserted our folks to assist in the evacuation. Then, when Kabul fell, we actually evacuated the embassy as scheduled.

I can expand on that point, in fact.

[Jasraj Singh Hallan, Conservative, Calgary Forest Lawn, AB]

I think that's....

I have limited amount of time.

[VAdm J.R. Auchterlonie]

Okay.

[Jasraj Singh Hallan, Conservative, Calgary Forest Lawn, AB]

I appreciate the answer.

The Toronto Sun had an article last year, following the end of Operation Aegis, titled “PMO, Global Affairs holding off deploying [Canadian Armed Forces] Kabul”. The article outlined that there was a 17-member non-combatant evacuation operations team that was waiting in Kuwait but that never received orders to go into Afghanistan. The CAF members said, “We want to go and do the right thing, but the government won't let us”.

Is it accurate that a NEO was deployed to Kuwait but never went into Afghanistan? If they didn't, what was the reason for that?

[The Chair, Liberal, Sukh Dhaliwal]

General, we need a brief answer. There are 30 seconds left.

[Gen Wayne D. Eyre]

Mr. Chair, I'm not familiar with that article.

In essence, we did conduct a non-combatant evacuation operation with our troops on the ground in Kabul. Perhaps, and I'm speculating here—

[Jasraj Singh Hallan, Conservative, Calgary Forest Lawn, AB]

Are you aware of the team that was waiting in Kuwait?

[The Chair, Liberal, Sukh Dhaliwal]

Admiral Auchterlonie, do you have something to add?

[VAdm J.R. Auchterlonie]

Thank you very much.

In fact, in conducting the operation, we had various capabilities in place. We conducted a contested non-combatant evacuation operation in Kabul consisting of one team, Task Force Arrowhead, which worked for me. There was another one that was working for the commander of special operation forces.

[Jasraj Singh Hallan, Conservative, Calgary Forest Lawn, AB]

Were they deployed into Afghanistan?

[The Chair, Liberal, Sukh Dhaliwal]

Mr. Hallan, your time is up.

We will go to Mr. Sidhu for five minutes.

Please go ahead, Mr. Sidhu.

[Maninder Sidhu, Liberal, Brampton East, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair and Chief of the Defence Staff General Eyre.

You mentioned earlier the cost of Canadian Armed Forces being pulled out in 2014 and the impacts it had on the evacuation. When we compare that with our allies—it's easy to compare numbers—you mentioned that with all things considered, we worked with our allies very efficiently, considering that we didn't have the same number of assets on the ground, as we didn't have the same type of presence as our allies.

Vice-Admiral Auchterlonie, you mentioned some of the details of the operation, and we were cut short of time in a previous round.

I'd really like to hear more about the operation and the threats to our personnel, our assets on the ground, how you were able to move efficiently, with all things considered. I think it's important for this committee to know that.

[VAdm J.R. Auchterlonie]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for the question.

The conditions on the ground, as I said before, were tenuous, chaotic and desperate. I think you're well aware of that. Our forces were working on the ground in that chaotic environment.

Going back to separating in two phases, prior to the fall of Kabul, we were working in support to ensure we could evacuate. Once Kabul fell, we then had to conduct a contested non-combatant evacuation.

Let's come back to the fall of Kabul. We talked about the strategic intelligence that we led. I think it's quite consistent—with all the allies it was the same thing. In April, we were looking at six months, and then as it got closer, we knew it was going to fall. But I think everyone, including the Taliban, were surprised at how rapidly Kabul fell.

That being said, I want to talk about the tactical intelligence on the ground with our folks. We were able to execute the evacuation of our embassy, and were the only ally to do that because we had the tactical intelligence capabilities on the ground, we had the forces with the capabilities and we had air power to do that. The only reason we weren't there after Kabul fell was because we were the only embassy able to evacuate because of the intelligence we had, the capabilities we had on the ground and the air power we had available. Our allies weren't able to do that. They had significant forces left on the ground because they couldn't get them out early enough. They would have, if they could have.

Moving on to the second part, the contested non-combatant evacuation, working with our allies, again, we reinserted capabilities on August 19 and started flying that day. Our first flight out that day was full. It had allies on board. It had Canadian entitled personnel. It had Afghans from other nations, as well as cargo, because we were part of the allied airlift. As we ramped up the operation, as our folks and the capabilities were inserted, we had more and more Canadian entitled personnel inside the airport at that point. At that time, we started to fill the planes up, which you saw over that period of time. Between August 19 and 26, you saw us evacuate almost 3,000 personnel, by effectively allowing our folks on the ground to command and make the hard decisions that they were facing.

The last point I'd reiterate is that the folks on the ground were working tirelessly, 24-7, for over a week, to make sure we got as many folks out as we could after the fall of Kabul. They should really be commended for the effort they did on the ground, not only the special capabilities, but my task force on the ground, as well as our air crews, who worked tirelessly to save as many Afghans as we could.

[Maninder Sidhu, Liberal, Brampton East, ON]

Thank you for that.

I'm not sure if anybody else on the leadership team wants to add to that....

I understand that there were a lot of complexities. To hold that 14-kilometre radius took a tremendous amount of strength, hard work and grit.

If there's anything else that can be added, that would be very nice.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sukh Dhaliwal]

General Eyre.

[Gen Wayne D. Eyre]

I think it's also important to note that we paid very close attention to the intelligence that was coming in, the tactical intelligence on the ground.

You'll remember the suicide attack on Abbey Gate that killed a number of Americans—13, I believe. We had Canadian Forces members in that exact location 24 hours before. The strike happened after we started our retrograde, after we started downsizing our evacuation. That just speaks to the importance of tactical level intelligence and just how dangerous the situation was. As it was, we had a number of our armed forces members in the vicinity who were able to provide rapid combat first aid to those who were wounded by that attack.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sukh Dhaliwal]

You have 20 seconds, Mr. Sidhu.

[Maninder Sidhu, Liberal, Brampton East, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd just like to take this opportunity to reiterate my appreciation to the armed forces. It was definitely a difficult time, but I want to express my appreciation for all of the hard work that was done during that very tense situation.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sukh Dhaliwal]

Thank you, Mr. Sidhu.

Mr. Brunelle-Duceppe, you have two and a half minutes. Go ahead.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

General Eyre, this will be my last opportunity to speak with you today, so I want to thank you for being here this evening.

My questions revolve around facts. I'm not going to steer you into political territory. That is not at all my intention.

Are you aware that a group by the name of the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan exists?