Afghanistan Committee on May 9th, 2022

[The Chair, Liberal, Sukh Dhaliwal]

Thank you, Mr. Brunelle-Duceppe.

We will now go to the NDP.

Honourable member Kwan, go ahead, please, for six minutes.

[Jenny Kwan, NDP, Vancouver East, BC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the minister and to the officials for coming before the committee, with a special thank you, of course, to our military for the work you do each and every day to keep Canada safe and the incredible work you're doing abroad as well, with so many crises around the globe.

Through you, Mr. Chair, I'd like to ask the minister this first question. She indicated that 3,700 Afghans were evacuated during this critical period. Could the minister advise on whether all the flights were full in the evacuation effort?

[Anita Anand, Liberal, Oakville, ON]

Of course, I was not the minister at the time, but I'd like to say something very important on this topic. The limiting factor at the airport was not the fact that there were our planes there. The limiting factor was the fact that we had only one slot per day to evacuate Afghan nationals. To me, that has to be recognized every single time we talk about the evacuation.

Chief, do you want to add anything?

[Gen Wayne D. Eyre]

Mr. Chair, thanks for the opportunity to add some more detail to the minister's statement.

I think we need to look at this in two periods—pre-August 15, before Kabul fell to the Taliban, and then post-August 15. Before August 15, yes, there were some flights that were not at full capacity. The reason was quite simple. Late in the game, the Government of Afghanistan imposed a requirement for all those leaving Afghanistan to have valid Afghan passports. Those Afghans could not get through Afghan government security at the airport to board those flights. That was the reason that a number of flights before August 15 were not at capacity.

After August 15, shortly after we re-established the air bridge, a number of the initial flights were not at full capacity, because we were just getting ourselves established with our troops on the ground. Finding sufficient numbers of Canadian entitled personnel, in the very, very small window that we had, was a challenge.

I will say, however, that in the latter part we certainly made up for those flights that weren't filled to complete capacity by putting many more on the flights than the planes were designed for. There were 534 Afghans in the back of a C-17 that was designed for 200. That's the type of measure our members on the ground took to get out as many Afghans as possible.

[Anita Anand, Liberal, Oakville, ON]

I'll add to that, if I may.

You have to remember that there were a number of factors that the Canadian Armed Forces had to take into account in loading those planes. These included weather, fuel, cargo and weight considerations, which all fluctuated with the different types of aircraft that we had on the ground. We had the CC-130J Hercules, the CC-150 Polaris and the CC-177 Globemaster.

It is, again, a testament to our Canadian Armed Forces personnel that they were able to do an exceptional job. The fact is that they're highly skilled professionals who were operating under extreme pressure in a fluid and unpredictable environment, and I'm very proud of their work.

[Jenny Kwan, NDP, Vancouver East, BC]

Thank you.

The empty seats were a result of people not being able to get the passports that were required, because of the changed rules. Subsequently, the flights were over-subscribed to make up for those numbers. That is the gist of what I understand.

At the time of the evacuation, did Canada evacuate any Afghans who made it through the airport gates, but were not on the GAC-referred lists or on the IRCC lists?

[Gen Wayne D. Eyre]

Mr. Chair, the answer is yes. The situation on the ground was fluid. One of the lessons we've taken away from this is the delegation of authority to the lowest levels.

Our commanders and our young leaders on the ground made decisions at times to take Afghans who weren't on the list because they were part of a vulnerable community or there was sufficient evidence to believe that, yes, there was some link with Canada. Those are the types of decisions that our people on the ground were making very successfully.

[Jenny Kwan, NDP, Vancouver East, BC]

Do we know how many of the folks fall into that category?

[Gen Wayne D. Eyre]

Mr. Chair, the simple answer is no. I will ask Vice-Admiral Auchterlonie if he has those stats.

[Vice-Admiral J.R. Auchterlonie, Commander of the Canadian Joint Operations Command, Department of National Defence]

Thank you, chief.

I don't know them off the top of my head.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for allowing me to join.

I'll echo the Chief's comment there and to reinforce the Minister's point, just to get back to that, there were two different phases. The fact is—

[Jenny Kwan, NDP, Vancouver East, BC]

I'm sorry. Can I suggest that maybe we could get those numbers submitted to the committee? I would appreciate that.

[Gen Wayne D. Eyre]

I'm not sure that we have those numbers with any degree of accuracy.

[Jenny Kwan, NDP, Vancouver East, BC]

I see.

[VAdm J.R. Auchterlonie]

To clarify, we were part of a coalition air bridge at the time. So, not only were we bringing Canadian-entitled personnel, we were also bringing cargo and allied-entitled personnel. Therefore, in terms of those numbers, we were not only bringing Canadian-entitled persons, but also the coalition air bridge.

In those early flights after Kabul fell, we had Canadian-entitled personnel and allied personnel on the plane, as well as Afghans if they were proceeding to our nation. It wasn't only our personnel.

[Jenny Kwan, NDP, Vancouver East, BC]

Yes. We have heard that from witnesses who were particularly concerned from the perspective that many of the folks Canada had identified did not make it on the flight, so I was trying to get clarity on that.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sukh Dhaliwal]

Thank you very much, Madam Kwan. Your time is up, unless the vice-admiral wants to respond to Madam Kwan's question briefly. Probably not.

Okay. Thank you.

We'll now come back to you, Ms. Findlay, for five minutes. Go ahead, please.

[Kerry-Lynne Findlay, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Minister, I want to give you a chance to clarify something. My first question to you this evening was if you have met with the representatives from the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan, and your answer was no. However, in response to my colleague Mr. Brunelle-Duceppe, you said that you had met with them, although informally.

Would you like to clarify that?

[Anita Anand, Liberal, Oakville, ON]

I have not met with them. I was in the same room at a conference where there were some members of the Afghan resistance movement. We didn't speak. I heard one of them present some information about the situation in Afghanistan, but I did not have a one-on-one conversation with anyone.

[Kerry-Lynne Findlay, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock, BC]

Thank you for that clarification.

After the United States and NATO announced their withdrawal in April 2021, what was the Canadian assessment at that time? How long did Canada think the Afghan security forces could maintain key territories, including Kabul?

[Anita Anand, Liberal, Oakville, ON]

I'll start with some high-level comments and ask the chief, who was in place at the time, to elaborate.

As you may know, starting on August 4, 2021, the Canadian Armed Forces started providing strategic airlift, which I've described. These efforts ensured the successful evacuation of 3,700 Afghan nationals. The situation on the ground was volatile, very difficult and very intense. The fall of Kabul happened much more quickly than was expected.

Chief, did you want to...?

[The Chair, Liberal, Sukh Dhaliwal]

General Eyre, please go ahead.

[Gen Wayne D. Eyre]

Mr. Chair, I'll go back to my previous statement. Our assessment on April 1 was that should western forces withdraw, the Taliban would likely decisively defeat the ANDSF, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, capture most major urban areas and re-establish Taliban control over most of Afghanistan. Now, that timeline shrank as we got closer to August 15.

On July 8, our assessment was that we had six months maximum. As events would indicate, it was much less than that.

[Kerry-Lynne Findlay, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock, BC]

Thank you.

Am I correct in saying that as of April 2021, the assessment was that they weren't going to be able to hold out, but by July 8, you're saying, it was very evident. Is that fair?

[Gen Wayne D. Eyre]

It was increasingly more evident. Of course, with intelligence assessment, nothing is ever 100%. No one can predict with absolute certainty the future. We deal in probabilities with intelligence assessments.

[Kerry-Lynne Findlay, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock, BC]

We were told, and have been told before, that CAF was not on the ground in Afghanistan in those months leading up. But we've also heard testimony that there was an intelligence recognizance team deployed there for several months before. The testimony was that they were giving regular briefings to the embassy. However, we heard from the ex-ambassador, and he said he had no briefings and didn't know anything, basically, until the day of.

I'm seeking clarity on that point.