Afghanistan Committee on May 9th, 2022

[Gen Wayne D. Eyre]

It is a classified report. I'm not sure of the rules that surround that. We'll have to take that one away and find out what the rules are.

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Please get back to us on that.

Was there an interdepartmental between the different departments—maybe this is more for the deputy minister—of lessons learned or the after action process?

[The Chair, Liberal, Sukh Dhaliwal]

Deputy Minister Matthews, please go ahead.

[Bill Matthews]

I'm aware that there are conversations about lessons learned. I will have to get back and check to see if they're formal lessons learned. There's certainly been dialogue. I don't know if it's as formal as what the chief mentioned, but the chief may be aware.

[Gen Wayne D. Eyre]

We provided input to a PCO-led post-operation review. I have not seen the output of that.

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

All right. You were invited to provide input, but you obviously weren't at the PCO table.

[Gen Wayne D. Eyre]

Yes.

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

We'll see what we can do about getting back on that.

Again, this may be for the deputy, but actually it may be for those in uniform. What was the impact when the election was called in the midst of this evacuation? What changed?

[Bill Matthews]

I was not in the department at that time, so I will have to ask the chief if he noticed any change in posture.

[Gen Wayne D. Eyre]

Mr. Chair, as you know, during the election period the minister retained his authorities as minister, so where we sought authorities from and the daily briefings did not change.

Probably the most challenging aspect was the ability to communicate and the tighter control on the ability to discuss publicly what was happening. That being said, there were a number of technical briefings, not for attribution. Admiral Auchterlonie was our speaker at those for the most part. We did one for attribution shortly after the evacuation effort ceased. I was the one who briefed and that one was for attribution.

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

I'll get into what's going on right now. This may be for you, General Eyre or maybe General Boivin, based on your time on the ground there more than the other members.

Are you surprised at all by the horrendous or heinous behaviour of the Taliban, especially with respect to what's ongoing right now in that country to women, children and visible minorities?

[Gen Wayne D. Eyre]

Mr. Chair, from our time that we served there together in Kandahar, I am not surprised. They have not changed their approach from when they ruled the country in the 1990s.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sukh Dhaliwal]

Major General Boivin, do you want to respond?

[MGen Steve Boivin]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My answer is very much in line with the answer from the chief of the defence staff. I am absolutely not surprised by their behaviour. They are loyal to their history.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sukh Dhaliwal]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Ruff.

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

My final question goes back to you, General Eyre.

Where did we fail? You were the OMLT commander and one of the first on the ground in Afghanistan.

I've publicly stated that we obviously failed to prep the Afghan security forces. During our duration, we did our best. What's your personal take? Where did we fail in making sure Afghanistan didn't fall again to the Taliban?

[The Chair, Liberal, Sukh Dhaliwal]

General Eyre and honourable members, the time is up, but briefly respond, please.

[Gen Wayne D. Eyre]

Mr. Chair, I've been thinking about this question for the last 15 years, since serving there in 2007. It could be a number of different areas, but I'm not sure the premise of “where did we fail” is accurate because we provided some excellent training and some excellent equipment.

I'll recommend an interesting book. It's called A Question of Command by Mark Moyar. It discusses the importance of leadership in counterinsurgency and insurgency operations and how the elites of a country have to take ownership of the fight. It talks about how the elites have to lead and set the example for all to follow. With the endemic corruption in the country at the time, it was hard for the elites to have that credibility with the average person.

Again, it's just my own personal opinion, but one I've reflected on a lot.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sukh Dhaliwal]

Thank you very much, Mr. Ruff. Your time is up.

We will go to the honourable member Salma Zahid for six minutes. Please, go ahead.

[Salma Zahid, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

Thank you, Chair, and thanks to all of you for appearing before the committee.

Thanks to all the Canadians serving in the armed forces for the work you do here for the Canadians, as well as across the world.

I think we all wish that Canada could have evacuated more people. As mentioned, Canada evacuated 3,700 people and I want to take the opportunity to thank you for making sure that we could get those 3,700 members out. Thank you to all the National Defence people who supported the evacuation air bridge effort.

I think it's worthwhile for the committee members to understand the reality on the ground and the barriers that existed when we talk about staying longer or doing more earlier, in terms of evacuation flights.

Can you walk us through some of the challenges and the barriers that you were facing there?

[The Chair, Liberal, Sukh Dhaliwal]

General Eyre.

[Gen Wayne D. Eyre]

Mr. Chair, if I understand the question correctly, it is whether we could have stayed longer to conduct more evacuation flights.

[Salma Zahid, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

Could it have started earlier? What challenges did you face?

[Gen Wayne D. Eyre]

In terms of starting earlier, we started very shortly after the request came in. Given what's called “ramp space” and “slots”, the number of slots that we could have for Canada limited the number of flights that we could put in.

In terms of staying longer, the deteriorating security situation on the ground, the fact that our allies, namely the U.S., were withdrawing on August 30 meant that we had to cease evacuation operations on August 26 because after that date the focus was on reducing the security perimeter around Kabul International Airport.

You have to realize that the perimeter around that airfield was 14 or 15 kilometres and took a sizable force to be able to secure. It was a very dangerous operation to collapse a security perimeter while surrounded and ensure the safety and security of our own forces and get them out. Let me just say, you don't want to be the last flight out of there when there's no security perimeter in place.

The 26th was the last day that we could, in conjunction with our allies, conduct evacuation operations. In fact, we did get some Afghans out on the 27th, but that was due to some low-level coordination. That was the reality on the ground.

[Salma Zahid, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

As of August 23, Canada secured a guaranteed landing time each day. How many landing times were given to each of the other allied nations participating in the air bridge?