Afghanistan Committee on June 18th, 2008

[Gen Rick Hillier]

I think there are two separate components here, Mr. Dewar.

First of all, of course, as you are aware, before the NATO mission assumed responsibility for region command in south Kandahar province in August 2006, it was Operation Enduring Freedom, which was the American-run mission. So on the ground you had the U.S. State Department, USAID, the U.S. embedded training teams with the Afghan battalion, and if I recall correctly, some police trainers who are there. Many of those folks then moved out as battalions changed and as NATO took over and more Canadians arrived on the ground. But as Afghan army units and police move in, for example, we have actually seen embedded training teams and trainers and mentors from many nations on the ground. So we work with units that have British training teams, we work with units with French training teams, and equally, we work with units that have U.S. embedded training teams in them.

The massive investment into the police that I spoke about is coming in a huge way from the United States of America, so we are seeing more in the way of police training teams trying to build them--even though we're seeing them from other countries also.

That complex international team has been on the ground for quite a while. The Team Canada part, which really works well together, in my view, actually then functions within that and sometimes gets great support from USAID dollars that actually fund the road or the training teams that are building the police that we need to be able to help the security in Kandahar province.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

One of the things I found interesting and surprising was that in Kandahar, in the PRT that we visited most recently, the team did consist of the component parts I mentioned. I think most people weren't aware of that. I certainly wasn't, as a member of Parliament. The team, as was illustrated to me, was the State Department, USAID, and police mentoring teams.

The other part I found interesting, and you've touched on it, is that the funding for a lot of the police training is actually from the Operation Enduring Freedom, to the tune of $8 billion that the Americans are providing for training.

My point in illustrating this is just to lay it out for people, that this is how things are working on the ground. I understood OEF as a separate parallel mission, but I see integration in terms of the training, at least with police.

Do you have any concerns about that? Because some of us do, simply because we believed that the ISAF was doing its job, and that OEF--I have problems with it, but we'll agree to disagree on that--was separate. What I'm seeing, certainly in the organizational charts and the funding, is that there actually is integration of those two.

Does that concern you at all?

[Gen Rick Hillier]

In fact, no, it doesn't, Mr. Dewar. I think we have the most positive of both sides of the fence with the least risk. ISAF-NATO has taken on the mission for the security in Afghanistan itself. OEF continues to keep the mission for building the police of Afghanistan under their mandate. NATO has refused to take it. And the United States of America, of course, ends up then funding to the tune, as you mentioned, of billions of dollars, and equally importantly, of hundreds moving to thousands of police mentors that no other country has been able to provide at this point in time.

So we, working in NATO in the ISAF mission, have exactly the right set-up, where we work for the institution that we belong to, and then we actually get to take advantage of that OEF investment into the police building, because without it we wouldn't see any positive implications for years.

That's essentially the extent of OEF operations there.

[The Chair, Conservative, Pierre Lemieux]

Thanks very much, General.

We'll go over to Mr. Hawn.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, General, for coming, and thank you again for your many years of dedicated service—I didn't say decades this time.

General, just to follow up on a question from before, is the reason for the American losses in the month of May in Afghanistan being more than in Iraq because their losses increased dramatically in Afghanistan or because they decreased dramatically in Iraq?

[Gen Rick Hillier]

In fact, it's largely the latter. I don't follow Iraq in great detail. That's not my part of ship. I have sufficient to occupy my every waking hour, all the time.

What I have been able to assess myself is that they've had some progress in Iraq that is actually fairly significant, from their view, and as a result the level of violence has in many cases diminished. As a result of that--obviously very important for them--they have had significantly fewer losses. It has actually fallen below what is a consistent level of losses in Afghanistan.

Now, I wouldn't underestimate, though. At this point in time we have been expecting, and we are seeing, up in the Arghandab area--and perhaps it's part of the Sarposa thing--that in that normal campaign season in southern Afghanistan there has been an increase from January, February, and March in fighting and operations and attacks by the Taliban. This started early in May, just as the poppy harvest season was ending and all those young men were deciding to pick up a gun for $10 a day or so.

So we get an increase right at this point in time that carries on through the summer, which is exactly what we've been expecting, and we've been conducting operations to make sure we can mitigate as much as possible and then take advantage to further accelerate the progress.

So there might have been a tiny bit of that. But they've had success in Iraq. They've reduced their losses there because they've reduced the violence there. That is the basis of that difference and change.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

So it is not a condemnation of the lack of progress in Afghanistan.

[Gen Rick Hillier]

No, not at all.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Many Canadians think the mission has changed post-Manley, that now all of a sudden we're concentrating on development, governance, and reconstruction—as if we weren't doing it before. Can you comment on that, or is this just a continuation of what's been the mission all along?

[Gen Rick Hillier]

I think there's been a great realization that we've been doing this all along and that now we're doing it much, much better. The Canadian Forces have been doing much of the reconstruction outside Kandahar City. In many cases, we're using money provided and generally overseen by CIDA. We think this has worked well in risky areas, where civilians do not yet fit. But as a result of the Manley report, an immense amount of work has gone on amongst all the departments, with Foreign Affairs in the lead. They are focusing better and getting a greater effect.

I'll tell you from the heart that we're very excited about some of our recent commitments. There is one for 50 schools. There is the Dahla Dam, which is massive in its potential positive implications. This dam could end up changing the lives of tens of thousands of people in the Arghandab district right down to Kandahar City, to Pashmul. There is also the program to inoculate some seven million children against polio.

We are talking about a country with one of the highest child mortality rates in the world, and I think these programs are absolutely exciting. They will provide jobs for the boys, which is key right now. But there will also be things that show every Afghan in the south that there is hope—a different life from what the Taliban is planning. We in the Canadian Forces are absolutely delighted with this commitment, and we're going to bend our backs to make sure we can enable it to be as effective as possible.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Some commentators have suggested that what happened recently and what we are facing now is another Operation Medusa. How would you characterize those comments?

[Gen Rick Hillier]

I would say it's anything but. First, I'd look at it from the friendly forces side. When we were in Operation Medusa, we had no Afghan forces with us whatsoever. They simply weren't available, and those that were available around the north or near Kabul were not capable of coming in and conducting operations of the nature that we faced in Operation Medusa. Their leadership was not capable of planning and then commanding and conducting those operations, and they weren't equipped, trained, or ready. Now we have six Afghan National Army kandaks, or battalions, moved in. So we have two full brigades with a core commander exercising command and control, with the senior commander of the Afghan National Army on the ground in Kandahar. They are doing the planning for operations to restabilize the Arghandab district. They've already started these operations. What we see there is night and day compared with 18 or 20 months ago.

From the enemy perspective, in Medusa they put a lot of fighters in the field and managed to keep them there. They dug into one area and determined that they would own it. They were ready for a conventional, almost World War I kind of fight, and they paid a tremendous price. They will not do that in Arghandab. They don't have the number of warriors that their spokesmen like to claim they have. They don't have the number of villages. When they get into a firefight, they'll try to disappear as quickly as possible. Our aim is to make sure they can't just melt away and come back to fight another day.

We'll support the Afghans. The Taliban cannot conduct the kind of operations they did during Medusa. Conversely, the Afghan army can conduct the kind of operations they had no possibility of conducting just 18 to 20 months ago. So I think the difference is phenomenally greater right now.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

The ANA and ANP have been called our exit plan. With what you've seen of their training and what you've learned in the last few days, where do you think they might be by the end of 2011?

[Gen Rick Hillier]

As for their tactical capabilities, I'm focused on building an Afghan National Army brigade in Kandahar province, with all the supporting pieces. If we accomplish this, we will have made significant progress. Three years from now, we will have a robust brigade that will be well trained, well led—we have to work with the leaders that the Afghan army puts in—and well equipped. Of course, the continuity of the program to equip the Afghan army, funded mainly by the United States of America, continues at the pace we see. They'll be a well-prepared brigade.

There will be setbacks. It's two steps forward, one step back. Occasionally it's two steps back, but mostly we're going forward. We will have a solid brigade there. They will have an immense capability to conduct security operations and help stabilize Kandahar province, so we'll have done our piece. In line with our commitment, if they station more Afghan battalions in Kandahar province, we will free up the training teams to work with them. We're doing this now with the commando battalion that just showed up in Kandahar province.

So we'll have a robust Afghan National Army brigade. There will be less progress, though, with the police.

[The Chair, Conservative, Pierre Lemieux]

Thank you very much, General.

Colleagues, we're now moving into a five-minute round, and we go to Ms. Minna.

[Maria Minna, Liberal, Beaches—East York, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I would like to share my time with Mr. Dosanjh. And I'll try to be quick.

General, welcome. There are a number of things that interest me, but two areas in particular.

One is the ability to sustain peace, given what is going on with Pakistan and the constant border situation. It seems, from what I read and what a lot of people are saying, that with the most recent agreements of the current government with the Taliban in Pakistan and with the soft touch, we're going to constantly be seeing insurgents coming across.

To what extent do you think this is going to cause instability? It seems to me we have an unending situation with that kind of problem across the border. I would like your thoughts on that.

The other area is the issue of development. I know we have beefed it up; you have just mentioned a number of projects and very major construction. But I'm wondering about the extent to which the whole area of development in Afghanistan, not just by us but others, is leading now. It seems to me that if we don't win the hearts and minds of people in terms of their income and addressing poverty, we probably won't succeed.

And there is the issue of poppies. Are we able to eradicate the poppies? Is there a major program to diversify, to move the people away from that? Do we buy them?

[Some hon. members]

Oh, oh!

[Maria Minna, Liberal, Beaches—East York, ON]

I don't mean to use; they need money. Can we get the farmers to switch? They have to sell their product, so instead of their selling it on the illegal market, maybe we take the poppies away from them.

I'm just asking whether there are any really innovative ideas out there to try to deal with some of these problems.

[Gen Rick Hillier]

Thank you for the question.

I'll just start at the third point and work backwards. I'm a Newfoundlander, so my mind works in mysterious ways, even to me at times.

On the poppies and the drug issue, this is a massive problem. Nobody minimizes it and I certainly would not. I've seen it first-hand. You see fields, acres, and valleys covered in poppies, and you know what's coming from that: 95% of the world's production of opium, 5% to 10% of which is flowing into North America itself. That's a direct threat to us.

Let me offer you General Hillier's assessment, based on what I know about this mission and what I've seen in the country.

There is no short-term solution. You almost have to a build the country around the problem and eradicate it that way. The United Nations drug prevention programs say that any country that has a per capita income of more than $1,000 per year will not be a drug-exporting country. Afghanistan right now stands somewhere in the $450 range of per capita income. You have to help build an economy, a rule of law, and a government structure that can maintain both those things to finally, fully, and effectively get rid of the drug problem—certainly reduce it significantly, but get rid of it completely.

In the shorter term, various programs inside the country, Afghan-led and funded by many different nations, have had varying degrees of success. But that success has not yet been able change the fundamental scope of the amount produced, although there's been lots of determination for it. It's a long-term solution, I believe.

Secondly, on the development side and whether we are winning the hearts and minds, what I suggest to you is what I alluded to in my opening remarks. If you draw a line around Helmand, Kandahar, and perhaps a couple of other provinces in the south, in the rest of Afghanistan in that great arc--including Kabul and Badakhshan province, Mazar, Balkh, and Herat--the development has been absolutely phenomenal. There are basic medical services, roads, transportation networks, and those kinds of things. Those are very basic but are still going in. People have been able to go back to farming, move back to their homes, and have some security. Even though we continue to question and be concerned about the capacity of the police, we actually think that around the rest of Afghanistan the development is phenomenal.

If you go to Kabul after you've been to the provinces, you kind of say, “Why are we wasting our time here? We should be putting the effort out there because the development is so far ahead.” But that development, particularly on the transportation side, relates to problem three. You can offer farmers an opportunity to plant something else. They're world famous for watermelons and fruits and vegetables, which they used to provide to Pakistan. They used to supply all of India's demand for figs, but all that disappeared when their basic transportation systems were destroyed. As an opium farmer, you can take a $10 million crop out on a mule train, but if you want a $10 million crop of watermelons, etc., you need to have a road network with a transportation system to move it to market.

So the development part is fundamental to it. We see it right around the country. It's more difficult in the south because of the greater risk and lack of security, or the instability.

Leading to the issue of sustaining the peace, there's no question there are two pieces to helping Afghanistan become a stable country.

First is helping them build their own structures, including the security structures to look after their own businesses.

Second is helping Pakistan resolve the issues on the federally administered tribal area provinces and being able to improve the lives of people there. We have great concerns about some of the things that have happened on the frontier and the easy flow of people back and forth with weapons at places. We think Pakistan has done a lot—and I'm speaking from the military perspective—in the past several years, and in the past months particularly. It needs to do much more and will need some help, there's no question about it. The solution is equally in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the challenges are immense.

[The Chair, Conservative, Pierre Lemieux]

Thanks very much, General.

We'll go to Mr. Khan for five minutes.

[Wajid Khan, Conservative, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, General Hillier. It's always a pleasure to have you as a witness. It's too bad we won't be having you for a long time.

Thank you again for your service to the country.

Whenever something happens that is not good--a little surprise, or a security situation such as the break-in at the prison, the focus is immediately on whether we are failing. I understand there should be concern, but at the same time, I would like you to tell us in your own words what has happened since the break-in. How have the NATO forces combated the Taliban, and what are the latest results?

There's always a silver lining in every cloud, and I'm trying to find a silver lining in this one.

[Gen Rick Hillier]

Sir, I could come back and just mention that I always believe that in a dark cloud there's a silver lining, and if you work hard enough, in a silver cloud you can find a dark lining. There are obviously lots of folks who always want to do that.

From our perspective militarily, we've been watching the Afghan National Army security forces. We've been working now for these last two or two and a half years, specifically from the Canadian perspective, to produce and develop their units and develop their leaders and get them to take responsibility for security operations, and then actually not only take responsibility but be able to deliver. The silver lining, the positive thing here, is that all of a sudden we've seen that--yes, with massive challenges and problems, but still able to deliver. We've seen that.

When we conducted operations with one of their battalions last November and October up in roughly that same area, they had difficulty running a battalion, a small battalion, and we had actually a significant Canadian Forces unit with them to make sure we could backstop them and support them. Now they've got a full-up brigade operating up near the Arghandab. They've done all the planning for it themselves and putting it in place, and they appear to be relatively successful in being able to implement those operations.

We've turned from a joint partnership in working through those operations to taking very much a supporting role, even though our platoons are with their companies helping them conduct the operations themselves. What we have seen here is a very positive thing, and what we want to be able to do is build up on it.

They've also taken responsibility to bring a sense of calm and stability and psychological security, if you will, to Kandahar City itself, after the Sarposa prison break and after all the discussion from the Taliban spokesmen about what they were going to try to do in the Arghandab. They've had extra police come in, some of the ANCOP battalion, and they have actually been very visible and, we believe, very effective in helping restabilize Kandahar City itself in a certain sense, so that people are comfortable that the Taliban aren't going to end up there. We think that's a very positive thing. They simply weren't capable of it even six months ago, let alone 12 months ago.

[Wajid Khan, Conservative, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

Has there been any combat right after the break-in?

[Gen Rick Hillier]

I'm sorry, sir?

[Wajid Khan, Conservative, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

Has there been any combat today, or right after these people escaped? Has there been any combat with NATO forces?