We never, ever transferred anyone if we thought there was a substantial risk of torture. We knew there were problems in the Afghan system, but we developed a robust monitoring system. We intervened with training. We had every means of addressing the system from the very top, the president--and we intervened with the president--through the ministers, the director of the NDS, and on down.
That we knew there were problems in Afghanistan is one thing. We were very confident we could intervene in the system and create conditions for Canadian transfer of detainees where we would meet our obligations and we could be confident that Afghans were meeting their commitments, and the facts show that over time, we did 175 visits. While there were some early reports of mistreatment, many of which probably predated our arrangement, we went month after month, a visit every five days, and we could speak with confidence in a way that we could not before as to the treatment of Canadian-transferred detainees.
If we had not done this, we would not be able to do that. So that's a really important assertion. We would never have done that.